The AIVD is responsible for national security by timely identifying threats and risks that are not immediately visible. For this purpose the AIVD conducts investigations both within and outside the Netherlands. The AIVD shares specific knowledge and information enabling partners and interested parties to take appropriate measures. The AIVD identifies threats and risks, advises and mobilises other parties and actively reduces risks itself. By doing so the AIVD fulfils its own role within the network of government organisations involved in the protection of national and international security.
Foreword

The AIVD annual report 2006 which lies before you shows the large variety of work areas and fields of special interest of the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). Investigations into terrorism and radicalisation were hereby one of the service’s main priorities in 2006. Of the different strategies for the fight against terror and radicalisation described by the AIVD, the repressive approach to terrorism has already proven to be the most successful. Terror networks were identified and terrorists were prosecuted and convicted. However, radicalisation processes can rapidly take place. Within a short period of time networks of radical, young Muslims can change into terror cells. Effectively combating terrorism and radicalisation therefore demands not only repressive, but also preventative action. The Dutch Lower House has recently received an action plan against radicalisation. It was indicated in the recent coalition agreement that security is one of the government’s core tasks and one of the basic conditions of living in a society in which people feel safe, free, and united. The AIVD has a crucial part in this.

One of the core tasks of the AIVD is performing investigations in order to make unknown threats and risks visible. Within this context, the service studies, for example, the deeper origins of radicalisation. The AIVD has the knowledge and powers to conduct in-depth investigations into this subject. Sharing the results of the investigations into unknown threats and risks makes the core task of the AIVD effective. For example, in 2006 the service was more available than ever to the local authorities in order to share its expertise on radicalisation and to give advice on which effective governmental measures could be taken. I value the importance very much of bringing the AIVD’s perceptions to the attention of administrators, - from fellow ministers to town mayors, and from security areas to community-based organisations.

This broad-based cooperation elaborates on initiatives started in the development programme Prospect 2007. With this programme, the service acts upon recommendations of the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD, adopted by the government. As a result, in 2006 the service has grown in quality as well as in numbers. I am confident that the AIVD’s ability to take effective action will grow even further in 2007.

Dr. G. ter Horst
Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Trends and developments in the field of national security</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Terrorism, radicalisation and salafism</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Other developments</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>The role of the AIVD in the security system</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Jihadist terrorism</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1</td>
<td>International developments</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2</td>
<td>National developments</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Other terrorist groups</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1</td>
<td>Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2</td>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3</td>
<td>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.4</td>
<td>Irish and Northern Irish terrorist organisations</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.5</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Attack weapons</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1</td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2</td>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Financing terrorism</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Travel patterns</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>The use of the Internet by terrorists</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Radicalisation</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Developments</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>The Iranian community in the Netherlands</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Salafist centres in the Netherlands</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>The Turkish community in the Netherlands</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>The Moroccan community in the Netherlands</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>The Moluccan community in the Netherlands</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>Other minorities in the Netherlands</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Left-wing and right-wing extremism

1. **Left-wing extremism**
   - **Anti Fascistische Actie (Anti Fascist Movement) (AFA)**
   - **Resistance against asylum policy**

2. **Animal rights activism**

3. **Right-wing extremism**
   - **Neo-Nazis**
   - **Ultra-nationalism**
   - **Extreme right terrorism?**

4. **Unwelcome interference of foreign powers**

#### Proliferation

1. **Introduction**
2. **Countries of concern**
   - **Nuclear**
   - **Means of delivery**
   - **Procurement**

#### Foreign Intelligence

1. **General**

#### Protective security

1. **Developments**
2. **Safety and Security System**
3. **Protection vital sectors**
   - **National Advice Centre Vital Infrastructures (NAVI)**
   - **National Information Centre Cyber Crime (NICC)**
   - **Interdepartmental working group chemistry**
4. **Counter-terrorism alert system**
5. **Special Information Security**
   - **Security of Information Regulation for the Government Service - Special Information (Vir-bi)**
   - **Working Group on Special Information Security**
   - **National Security Authority (NSA)**
6. **Other activities**
   - **Screening candidate ministers**
8.6.2 Risk information accessible to the public
8.6.3 Voting machines
8.6.4 Integrity Violations Reporting Centre

9 Positions involving confidentiality and security screening
  9.1 Developments
  9.2 Designating positions involving confidentiality
    9.2.1 Guidelines for the Designation of Positions involving Confidentiality
    9.2.2 Developments in the designation of positions involving confidentiality
  9.3 Conducting security investigations
    9.3.1 Process improvements
    9.3.2 Debt-related problems
    9.3.3 Overviews of handled security investigations
    9.3.4 International organisations
    9.3.5 Security screening under the AIVD’s mandate
    9.3.6 Objection and appeal cases regarding security screening
  9.4 Civil aviation
    9.4.1 Designation order positions involving confidentiality civil aviation
    9.4.2 Conducting security screening

10 Oversight
  10.1 Control
    10.1.1 The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK)
    10.1.2 The Council for National Security
    10.1.3 Joint Counter-Terrorism Committee
    10.1.4 Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee
  10.2 Parliamentary matters and legislation
    10.2.1 The Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services
    10.2.2 The Lower House
  10.3 Communication
  10.4 Applications under the Freedom of Information Act
  10.5 Complaints
  10.6 Supervisory Committee
## 11 Cooperation

### 11.1 Cooperation in the Netherlands

- **11.1.1 Local authorities**
- **11.1.2 Counter-terrorism Infobox**
- **11.1.3 Police and the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary**
- **11.1.4 Public Prosecution Office (OM)**
- **11.1.5 Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD)**
- **11.1.6 National Counter-terrorism Coordinator**
- **11.1.7 Financial Expertise Centre**

### 11.2 Cooperation with the overseas parts of the Kingdom

### 11.3 European Cooperation

- **11.3.1 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)**
- **11.3.2 Counter Terrorist Group**
- **11.3.3 Club of Bern**
- **11.3.4 Middle Europe Conference**
- **11.3.5 Joint Situation Centre**

### 11.4 International cooperation

- **11.4.1 NATO**
- **11.4.2 United Nations**
- **11.4.3 The AIVD’s network of liaison officers and bilateral contacts**

## 12 Organisational development and management

### 12.1 Organisational development

- **12.1.1 Investigative competence**
- **12.1.2 Interpretative competence**
- **12.1.3 Mobilising competence**
- **12.1.4 Acting competence**
- **12.1.5 Growing intelligently and safely**
- **12.1.6 organisation of information and support processes**

### 12.2 Management

- **12.2.1 Quality management and departmental audit service**
- **12.2.2 Finance**
- **12.2.3 Management statement**
- **12.2.4 Internal security**
List of Definitions

Agent
An agent is a natural person, who, under the responsibility and instruction of the AIVD, has been charged with gathering specific intelligence regarding persons and organisations which could be relevant to the performance of the AIVD’s tasks, and with promoting and taking measures to protect the interests of a service, whether or not under the cover of an assumed identity or position.

AQUA ( Appropriately Qualified Agency )
AQUA is a security organisation of a Member State which satisfies the demands of the EU so that they may carry out ‘second-party evaluations’ of crypto-equipment independent of the producing country. The Netherlands is one of the Member States which may act as an AQUA, besides France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Italy.

Broad approach
The approach of the phenomenon terrorism and radicalisation in the broad sense of the word, in which attention is not solely aimed at identifying terrorists, gaining insight into their actions, and preventing attacks, but also at anti-integration and radicalising powers; i.e. persons, organisations, and developments that cause radicalisation in the broad sense of the word. This concerns radicalisation towards (terrorist) violence as well as radicalisation with other disrupting effects on society and the democratic legal order (such as the development of parallel social structures, taking the law into one’s own hands, inter-ethnic tensions, serious social disruption and polarisation). The translation of this broad approach into a policy implies that radicalised organisations, people, and developments need to be tackled with a broad range of measures by a broad range of national bodies. This may involve seeking a dialogue by means of measures ranging from administrative and judicial coercion to repression.

CBRN- terrorism
The commission of violence or threat of violence aimed against persons or inflicting serious social-disruptive property damage by dispersing or releasing chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material to bring about social change or to influence political decisions.
Counter-Terrorism Infobox
The CT Infobox is a special partnership of the AIVD, IND, KLPD, MIVD, OM, FIOD-ECD, and FIU-NL (formerly the project organisation MOT-BLOM) which comes under the AIVD and therefore is subject to the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002). This does not alter the fact that in practice cooperation within the CT Infobox takes place on equal footing in recognition of each party’s competences and responsibilities.

The goal of the CT Infobox is to contribute to the fight against terrorism by comparing and compiling to a central point information regarding networks and individuals who are involved in terrorism in one way or another, specially Islamist terrorism, and radicalisation related to it.

Via consultation, comparison, and analysis of the information provided by participating services to the CT Infobox, a rapid, multidisciplinary analysis and assessment of the available information can be made.

Dirty bomb
A conventional explosive in combination with a chemical, biological, or radiological component which is spread by the explosion.

Dual use goods
Goods or materials which can be used for two purposes (civilian as well as military use).

Fundamentalism
Orthodox, anti-liberal, mostly religious trend with an anti-intellectual character (no freedom of debate, no room for doubt).

Home-grown jihadist network
A jihadist network of which the members have mostly been born or have been brought up in the West, and which the radicalisation process has practically on the whole taken place in a Western context. This type of network also places jihad often emphatically in their own local context.

Informant
A person who, because of their position or capacity, has or can have information at their disposal which may be of importance to a proper performance of the AIVD’s duties.
Islamic
Concerning the religion Islam.

Islamism, Islamist
Islamism refers to a radical movement within Islam which strives to make society a reflection of what is, according to them, mentioned in the original sources of Islam - the Koran and the Sunnah (the sayings and practices of the Prophet). Islamism has a clear political agenda, the realisation of which may involve the use of violent or non-violent and even democratic means. Concepts related to Islamism are Salafism and Wahhabism.

Jihad
Armed struggle in the defence of (the country of) Islam. In a religious sense, the - not necessarily violent - struggle between good and evil, both inwardly and externally.

Jihadist network
A fluid, dynamic, vaguely delineated structure consisting of a number of individuals (radical Muslims) who are interrelated, both on an individual and aggregated level (cells, groups). They are at least temporarily bound together by a common purpose. This purpose is the pursuit of a jihadism (including terrorism)-related goal.

Jihadist terrorism
Also: violent jihadism. The willingness to contribute to armed struggle against the West and other perceived ‘Enemies of Islam.’

Intolerant isolationism
Intolerant isolationism is a form of radicalisation based on very intolerant opinions about people with different views and religions, which is aimed at isolating (what is perceived as) one’s own community from surrounding society, by creating as many parallel institutions as possible to replace those used in the surrounding society. In some cases this even means that people deny government authority and endeavour to take the law into their own hands on the basis of their own (religious) laws.

Means of delivery
These are systems, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft, which are necessary to deploy CBRN weapons effectively.
Official report
An official report is a written notification to a person or institution regarding personal details, processed by the AIVD, which could be of importance to this person or institution so that they can fulfil their responsibility concerning interests looked after by them (stakeholders).

Politically-motivated violent activism
Committing, or threatening to commit violence or causing personal and/or property damage in order to bring about social change and to influence political decisions. Politically-motivated violent activism can be distinguished from terrorism by the fact that this type of violence is not aimed at killing people and by the fact that the scope and seriousness of the phenomenon does not have a socially disruptive character.

Position involving confidentiality
A position involving confidentiality is a position in which the person holding it has the possibility to damage national security. These are: positions in which those involved are working with state secrets; positions in which national security is at issue through integrity violations; and specific positions in vital sectors.

Proliferation
Proliferation is the (further) spreading of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) and their means of delivery.

Radicalisation
The growing willingness to pursue and/or support radical changes in society (if necessary in an undemocratic manner) which are in conflict with or could pose a threat to the democratic legal order.

Risk-indication
A concrete indication that a person (entering the country) can pose a risk to national security or other vital interests.

Risk maps
A risk map is a map on the Internet giving information regarding risks. The risk map gives civilians, policy makers, and emergency services more insight into the present risks in their environment so that they can prepare themselves better for possible disasters. It is compulsory for the government, on the grounds of the Treaty of Aarhus implemented by the Freedom of Information Act (WOB) and Environmental
Management Act among other matters, to inform the population regarding possible disasters and serious accidents (risks).

**Safety and Security System**
The Safety and Security System’s basic principle is that a citizen is primarily responsible for their own safety, and that otherwise this responsibility rests with the organisation to which they belong, and the relevant local authorities. In addition to this, the central government has a special responsibility for a certain group of people (for example, politicians), property (for example, International Criminal Court), and services (for example, civil aviation): this is the so-called government domain. The NCTb has a coordinating task with regards to the security of these people, property and services and to that end makes use of threat-related information provided by services such as the AIVD, MIVD, and KLPD.

**Salafism**
A broad ideological movement within Islam which wishes to return to the ‘pure Islam’ of the time of the Prophet. Often conservative and ultra-orthodox.

**Security screening**
A security investigation (or vetting inquiry) is an investigation aimed at finding information which may, on the grounds of national security, be relevant to fulfilling a position involving confidentiality.

**Self-radicalised person**
Someone who radicalises without direct external influence.

**Sigint**
Sigint stands for Signals Intelligence and concerns the interception and localisation of electronic signals which are sent into the ether in order to gather information regarding a specific purpose. Sigint is also often known by its full name: signals intelligence.

**Special intelligence resources**
These are technical and other instruments which are deployed in the exercise of a special power as referred to in the Wiv 2002 and which usually have a secret character.
Terrorism
Committing or threatening to commit violence against people or causing serious socially-disruptive property damage, with a goal to bring about social change and to influence political decisions.

Terrorism list
On the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 126, a UN-terrorism list exists of persons and entities affiliated to Al-Qaeda who are suspected of terrorist activities. To complement this list, the EU has drawn up a terrorism list of persons and entities suspected of terrorist activities who are not affiliated to Al-Qaeda.

Third party principle
A rule employed by intelligence and security services stipulating that information received from a service can only be employed for the receiver’s own use and cannot be provided to third parties without prior permission of the service providing the information (also called third country rule).

Ummah
Global Islamic community.

Vital sectors
Some sectors and parts of the infrastructure are so vital to Dutch society that failure or serious disruption can cause major damage.

Virtualisation
Virtualisation is the increasing role of the Internet in spreading extremist range of ideas, in the formation of networks and in communication between radical individuals.
1 Trends and developments in the field of national security

The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) received a lot of attention in society in 2006, especially from politicians, the government and the press. This is understandable as the service has special powers available to it. This annual report is one of the ways in which the AIVD renders account to parliament. At the same time, the report enables society to gain an insight into the different spheres of activity of the AIVD. This chapter describes the foremost trends and developments of these spheres in the area of national security which the AIVD has observed in 2006 as part of its statutory duties. Furthermore, the role which the AIVD plays together with a variety of (governmental) organisations in order to protect national and international security will be further looked into.

1.1 Terrorism, radicalisation and salafism

In 2006 many countries were directly impacted by the threat of jihadist terrorism. Foiled attacks in the United Kingdom, Canada and Denmark and failed attacks in Germany have made clear that the (international) terrorist threat in 2006 was still substantial. The AIVD has not observed any concrete indications that jihadists were preparing for an attack on property or people in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, a jihadist attack within the Netherlands remains conceivable.

The concrete and known terrorist threat in the Netherlands from national networks seems to have become less acute in comparison to 2005. Among other things, this is the result of the government being successful in criminal prosecution of terrorism suspects and the deportation of members of jihadist networks declared persona non grata, partly on the basis of information from the AIVD. The threat also seems to have diminished by internal discord and the temporary or long term absence of real leaders within the known networks in the Netherlands.

However, the relative and possible short term weakening of so-called home-grown networks does not give a complete picture of the threat in the Netherlands. The AIVD deems an attack on a Dutch politician, for example, still conceivable. After all, Western politicians are legitimate targets in the minds of jihadists. AIVD investigations have also shown that the (sometimes rapid) processes of radicalisation among mainly young
Muslims in the Netherlands have continued. This is partly due to the influence which the Internet exerts and the so-called trigger events: emotionally and politically charged incidents, such as the violence in Iraq and the Danish cartoon affair.

The Internet still plays an important role in radicalisation and the dissemination of jihadist matter. Muslim youngsters make intense use of the Internet; it is the usual hang-out place for them, just like the school playground or the corner of the street. Because of the relative anonymity radical-Islamic utterances are more easily made via the Internet, but these are not always an expression of deeply rooted radical-Islamic thoughts and feelings. It seems that an Islamic youth subculture exists, where Islamic clothing, symbols, and extreme enunciations are rather an attempt to belong and to express their own social identity. It is important to make a distinction between radical Muslim youngsters who support and preach violent jihad and Muslim youngsters who by their appearance and extreme statements are endeavouring to create their own social identity within Dutch society.

The AIVD is concerned about the growing influence of foreign jihadists on local autonomous networks. In 2006 it turned out that in the United Kingdom there are several of such networks, consisting of second or third generation Muslims who were born and bred in the United Kingdom. They are of Pakistani origin and are under the influence of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan. Also, terrorist networks are showing a high degree of creativity and flexibility in the choice of attack weapons and the selection of targets. Against this background it is of eminent importance to continue to carry out intensive investigations into recent developments in North Africa where several terrorist groups seem to have united in the ‘Al-Qaeda of the Maghreb,’ under the leadership of the Algerian ‘Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat’ (GSPC).

Another development which the AIVD is concerned about is the expansion of the Salafist sphere of influence in the Netherlands. Salafism is a broad ideological movement within Islam which wants to return to the ‘pure Islam’ from the time of the Prophet. Salafism often has a conservative and ultra-orthodox nature. In 2006 the AIVD has observed more and more clearly that the Salafist mission is carried out in an active and organised manner. A few youth preachers hold lectures in several big mosques and Islamic youth centres for mainly Moroccan migrant youngsters of second and third generation. These primarily theological lectures are often organised without foreknowledge or approval of the mosque committees and have as goal to gain more support for the Salafist way of thinking. The preachers stir up feelings of marginalisation and deprivation by some migrant youngsters which encourages their
radicalisation. Although the Salafists by their preaching in the Netherlands usually do not incite to violence, their message is one of intolerance and of an anti-integration nature. They often turn against other population groups and people with different views, and are fiercely against achievements, such as the emancipation of women. In general they reject the open, pluralistic society and the democratic state under the rule of law such as we know it in the West. The further expansion of Salafism in the Netherlands can therefore lead to polarisation and inter-ethnic tensions within society.

The known Salafist centres in the Netherlands are conscious of the fact that the government and the press follow them closely. Partly because of this, the centres are increasingly putting up a façade. Imams and administrators of Islamic organisations avoid for the most part radical enunciations which are sensitive to Dutch society so that they do not cause any political or public commotion. This does not imply however that they have distanced themselves ideologically from radicalism. In closed, more exclusive circles these ideas are still propagated.

1.2 Other developments

Apart from focusing on the phenomena terrorism and radicalisation, the AIVD also conducts investigations into other areas of special attention and fields of activity, such as left-wing and right-wing extremism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, security screening, protective security, unwelcome interference of foreign powers, and relevant developments abroad.

In the field of left-wing and right-wing extremism, the AIVD has established in 2006 that the extreme right movement is disintegrating further. Confidence in the success of extreme right political parties is waning, while non-political collaboration is growing. In this sense, a shift can be discerned from real politics to street politics. In addition, the AIVD has observed that during incidents between left-wing and right-wing extremists, mainly anti-fascists actively search for right-wing extremists and sometimes endeavour to disrupt their activities with violence.

Espionage is, even more than fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, by no means a thing of the past. In 2006 the AIVD established that diverse foreign intelligence services and governments were secretly active within the Netherlands with as goal to pursue their own national interests. This forms a violation on Dutch sovereignty and can furthermore clash on several levels with Dutch interests. For example, there is at
the moment an increasing interest in vital Dutch ICT-infrastructures. The intelligence threat from foreign powers and organisations has become more diverse and more diffuse. In addition to carrying out investigations, the AIVD also invests in enhancing resistance with respect to the threat emanating from espionage.

Many different countries see the (threatening with) possession and development of weapons of mass destruction as a way to get and exercise influence on a global and regional level. The international community continues to devote itself against the further proliferation of these weapons by extending and intensifying export control. It seems that these measures have effect. Despite this, countries of concern are sometimes successful in procuring goods in a clandestine way. Mainly, these goods are used for peaceful but also military goals. Also, countries of concern are increasingly forced to settle for goods of a lesser quality; the reason being that they do not fall under export control.

Through diverse social developments, the demand for personnel in positions involving confidentiality is increasing. This has led to an increase in the number of requests for the AIVD to carry out security screenings (or, vetting inquiries). From these investigations, it can be seen that the incurring of debts is a major problem. Incurring large debts can lead to vulnerability when fulfilling a position involving confidentiality. If the employer actively involves himself in guiding the individual so that the debts are reduced, in many cases this vulnerability can be taken away.

1.3 The role of the AIVD in the security system

The AIVD’s core task is the gathering of intelligence through in-depth investigations in order to reveal unknown threats and risks. The service processes this information and shares it with many (governmental) organisations. The cooperation with the Regional Police Services (RID) is especially important. The RIDs strengthen the access to information on a local and regional level which is indispensable for carrying out the work of the service. Thanks to the growth of the Regional Police Services and the intensification of cooperation with the AIVD, the service’s access to information has grown tremendously in 2006.

Threats and risks to national security are not limited within national borders. This is why the AIVD also carries out investigations abroad. International cooperation is hereby of crucial importance due to the complexity and the global aspects of security.
This is the reason why the AIVD exchanges operational intelligence with counterpart services abroad in order to discover new insights together. This also strengthens Dutch security.

The AIVD has considered just as much to have a picture of the concerns against which a threat is aimed. This means that the AIVD builds up a position of knowledge from this perspective; where can a potential threat manifest itself, what are the vulnerabilities and the aspects attracting danger? In the protective security function as well as in the contribution to the Safety and Security System, the AIVD gains insight into conceivable threats from the perspective of the ‘possibly threatened.’ These could be people, property, or services which represent national security interests. On the basis of information which the AIVD holds regarding conceivable threats and possible risks, other organisations can decide which security measures they can take.

In 2006 the AIVD has intensified the cooperation with local authorities and wishes to further strengthen this in the coming years. Cooperation is especially needed in order to stand up to radicalisation. It is important though to realise that radicalisation does not always have to lead to terrorism, but can also form a threat in itself. Groups of radical Muslims can reject violent jihad, but be anti-integration and anti-Western in their orientation. In this way they can bring about inter-ethnic tensions and polarisation within society. Such ideological movements are growing and can eventually bring into danger the continued existence of the democratic legal order.

The AIVD carries out investigations into the deeply lying roots of risks and threats to national security. The service has the position, powers and expertise to gain insight into this and to share the results. This is in essence a different task to the investigation of criminal offences. The AIVD identifies the threat and advises government administrators and policymakers on national and local levels, as well as other concerned bodies on how they can deal with AIVD information. They subsequently have a crucial role in further devising and producing strategies. It is after all the responsibility of all to make society able to defend itself. Only then can the Netherlands be safe.
2 Terrorism

2.1 Jihadist terrorism

In the year 2006 several Western countries have felt a direct impact concerning the threat of jihadist terrorism. The foiled attacks in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Denmark, as well as the failed attacks on German trains, have made clear that the terrorist threat in 2006 was still substantial. These matters also showed that trends, described by the AIVD in the report *Violent Jihad in the Netherlands*, have arisen in similar ways in other Western countries. The basic trend which this publication describes is that jihadist terrorism has developed since 2001 from being a mainly external threat to an increasingly home-grown phenomenon. This means that the core lies with diffuse local jihadist networks, which are mainly autonomous in character.

This general development is closely linked with other trends described in the report *Violent Jihad in the Netherlands*. Transnational networks continue to play a role, but have formed in 2006 through decentralisation and disintegration less of an organised global threat than in the past. This does not take away the fact that in some countries, such as in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al-Qaeda as an organisation for example remains a significant factor and sometimes even seems to have become stronger. A second important trend which was recounted in the report is the continuing virtualisation of jihad. For jihadist-terrorist groups virtual jihad, with propaganda as its foremost weapon, is often just as important as the physical struggle itself. Also, the Internet plays an important and especially an accelerating role in the radicalisation process of young Muslims all over the world. The last trend which was mentioned was that this radicalisation - also partly due to influence of the Internet - has mainly a disorganised, interactive, and spontaneous character. For this reason, it is often referred to as autonomous radicalisation. This kind of radicalisation is fuelled by a mixture of political, religious, and socio-cultural factors. The most important political motivator is the identification with the worldwide Muslim community (ummah) which in the eyes of many Muslims is being threatened by for example the West. The religious hotbed is formed by the emergence of fundamentalist movements within Islam, which exert a big attraction on Muslim youngsters who are (re)discovering their faith. The most important socio-cultural factor is the search for an identity to call their own; this is often most complex, especially for second generation immigrants.

The above-mentioned terrorist issues have once again shown that intelligence and
security services are faced with a complex task. It is evident that radicalisation processes sometimes proceed very quickly, resulting in networks and cells emerging over a short period of time. This means that very little time remains for intelligence and security services to investigate them while rapid action is of essential importance. In addition to the rapidity of processes, a large and often unpredictable role is laid out for specific events which plays a major part in the ultimate decision to attack. These trigger events can take many forms, from emotionally or politically charged incidents elsewhere in the world (Danish cartoons, the war in Lebanon) to the emergence of (new) leaders within networks or the creation of links with transnational networks. Finally, jihadist terrorists demonstrate a high degree of creativity and flexibility, in their target selection as well as in their modus operandi. This was seen very clearly in the frustrated attacks on transatlantic flights departing from the United Kingdom, when jihadists had found a way to circumvent the extremely strict security measures. The trigger events as well as the flexibility in their modus operandi and target selection make uncertainty and unpredictability important factors in the fight against terrorism.

In 2006 the Netherlands made important progress in the fight against jihadist terrorism. In March 2006 a decision was made in the proceedings against the Hofstad group which was considered by the court as a terrorist organisation. The case is known as the ‘Hofstad trial.’ Of the eleven suspects in the so-called Piranha case who were arrested in June and October 2005, six were eventually sentenced. In December 2006 the court judged that, although the group could not be characterised as a terrorist organisation, Samir A. had indeed been preparing a terrorist attack. At the beginning of November 2006 once again six persons closely linked to the Hofstad group were arrested, after an investigation was launched by the Nations Crime Squad on the basis of an official report of 2005 from the AIVD. Six individuals were indicted on account of recruitment for an armed conflict, membership of a terrorist organisation, forgery of travel documents, and incitement to violence as well as distributing seditious publications. In addition to this, the AIVD, due to increase in capacity together with beneficial international cooperation, has in 2006 been able to gain better insights into some networks and in some cases to act in a preventative way.

2.1.1 International developments

In 2006 the terrorist threat within and outside Europe again emanated mostly from local jihadist networks and cells. These home-grown networks operate autonomously
and in general dictate their own, mostly local agenda practically without any international control. A substantial part of their motivation and ideological foundation is found in the international arena however. As a consequence of the extension of the international jihadist agenda, the threat is seen to be broadened, illustrated this year by many (foiled) attacks and arrests worldwide. As regards ideology, they can be considered to be inspired by Al-Qaeda; although there are often no organisational nor hierarchical links between Core Al-Qaeda and the local operating jihadist networks and cells, they feel to be closely involved in the global struggle and Al-Qaeda’s aim is also their own. This aim is in the long term the return of the Caliphate in the Islamic world, in the short term this means the weakening of the position of perceived renegade governments in the Islamic countries of today. One of the most important strategies to weaken this position is to force the West to stop their support of these regimes by committing attacks on Western interests. Although Osama Bin Laden among others laid emphasis on the West’s large dependency on energy before, and the oil infrastructure was already a target for terrorist attacks, the possibility of an attack on energy facilities have had increasing attention in 2006 on jihadist websites.

The strategic struggle against the West forms for many local jihadist networks an important source of inspiration. The war in Iraq - seen as an American attack on Islam - , the Palestinian-Israeli conflict - where the West and ‘Zionists’ are seen as archenemies -, and the war in Afghanistan are for many local networks a *cause célèbre*. These conflicts determine for a large part the enemy perception of these networks, forming the frame of reference for judging the situation of the Muslims (in and with respect to the West) and play a foremost role in (internet) discussions. Some networks actually interfere with the struggle in conflict areas and so, on top of their own local agenda with international sources of inspiration, there is also a concrete international component. The conflict in Iraq especially has exerted a certain amount of attraction in the past year and many jihadists from countries in North Africa and the Middle East travelled to Iraq to join the fighting factions there. Also jihadists have joined the war from Europe but their numbers are marginal for the time being. Networks in surrounding countries, and especially in Syria and Saudi Arabia, support these jihadists. Until now not many fighters come back from Iraq. In view of the continuation of the war, jihadists are still not yet in search of other theatres of war. Also, only few international jihad fighters survive the conflict for a longer period of time. Therefore, large groups of experienced veterans do not exist. Changes in the role Iraq has taken on as a theatre of war and/or changes in the modus operandi can still lead to the return of jihadists. However, repercussions in the area are not yet to be expected.
Several North African jihadist networks have linked up with each other under the name of ‘Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb.’ In addition to continuing their efforts to realise locally-aimed goals under their own name, these networks also contribute to the realisation of internationally orientated goals by facilitating and recruitment, training, and transporting jihadists to Iraq under the collective denominator ‘Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb’. The international aspect of this jihad facilitation can also be seen in the use of Sahel countries as bases for training camps. By widely sharing motivation and strategy as well as the use of the name Al-Qaeda by autonomous groups, the impression is maintained that there is a structured international terrorist organisation, while in actual fact a fluid framework of loose networks exists.

In the course of 2006 there have been reports suggesting a return or recovery of Al-Qaeda as a globally operating terrorist organisation. Indeed, several recent terrorist cases in the United Kingdom included indications that Al-Qaeda has been controlling home-grown terrorist cells. However, for the time being there are no concrete cases which would show that this is a pattern also applying to other European countries.

The war in Iraq has flared up even more in 2006 and given that so many parties are now taking part in the daily violence, the importance of the contribution of international jihadists has lost its value. The sectarian conflict between Sunnites and Shiites have gained the upper hand, certainly after the attack at the end of February on the Shiite mosque in Samarra. The internationally orientated ‘Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia’ network (‘Al-Qaeda in Iraq’) has played especially a major role in the escalation of these sectarian differences by fiercely attacking Shiites in the past year. It is notable that the (Sunnite) network has turned away from Core Al-Qaeda’s agenda which puts attacks on Western and Jewish targets first and has explicitly rejected an inter-Islamic conflict. The point of view that Shiites are not ‘good Muslims’ has seemingly gained the upper hand. Additionally, the sectarian conflict forms a part of the ‘struggle of all against all’ which makes the construction of a democratic form of government practically impossible. The death of ‘Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s’ leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June 2006 has not changed the role and agenda of his organisation. In September the Mujahedin Shura Council - an organisation consisting of ‘Al-Qaeda in Iraq’ and a number of smaller jihadist groups - proclaimed a united Islamic emirate in parts of Iraq. For the time being, this emirate seems little more than to lead a virtual existence and in Iraq there has hardly been any reaction to it. However it seems that a stir has been made and a subsequent worldwide propagandist coverage has been disseminated as regards the proclamation of this united Islamic emirate.
Violent jihad in the Netherlands

Jihadist threat is becoming more and more an indigenous product and is no longer only something from abroad, concluded the AIVD in March 2006 in the report *Violent Jihad in the Netherlands - Current trends in the Islamic terrorist threat*. Increasing recruitment and radicalisation among young Muslims who are born and bred in the Netherlands are principal causes of this. The Internet plays an increasingly important role in this process. International developments, such as the war in Iraq, play a motivating role in recruiting activities as well as the carrying out of a terrorist attack. This report gives insight into the way how fluid jihadist networks, which are present in the Netherlands, emerge and have developed in the last few years. Although the number of extremists is limited in the Netherlands, the AIVD expects more interaction between members of different jihadist networks. With the aid of the Internet, in the long term an undifferentiated, informal pool of volunteers for jihad could arise which could develop violent activities in changing combinations with each other or individually. Intelligence and security services and the police should be able to anticipate this quickly. Radicalisation processes among migrant and indigenous groups not only ensure that acute violent threats can develop in the Netherlands in a very short period of time, but also threaten the cohesion and solidarity in our society...and therefore also the democratic legal order in the long term.

The complete paper can be found on the website of the AIVD, under the heading 'Publications.'

2.1.2 National developments

International developments have had a great influence on the activities of jihadist networks in the Netherlands. A part of these networks is transnational and occupy themselves with supporting jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan. But also the local jihadist networks, which at the moment set the scene in the Netherlands, are being inspired by jihadists fighting elsewhere. An event which had a minimal influence in Iraq, such as the proclamation of an Islamic emirate, indeed stirred enthusiasm among ‘jihadised’ youth in the Netherlands. However, local autonomous jihadist networks are not only dependent on propaganda and spiritual leadership from outside the country. The AIVD has in 2006 observed a marked increase of the number of jihadist texts translated into Dutch on the Internet. Some of these texts glorify the war, not only on Islamic terrain, but also worldwide, any place where ‘the enemies of Islam’ are located. The
dissemination of reading matter in the Dutch language of this type of glamorisation of violence, in which martyrdom is praised just as much, has a radicalising and jihadistist effect on young people especially.

In 2006, it has become evident that also Dutch youngsters of Turkish extraction - still on a small scale but on the increase - were susceptible to Salafist, ultra-orthodox and sometimes even jihadist ideology. They seem to feel connected with the global struggle which is being undertaken in the name of Islam. Partly because the language barrier does no longer exist for Dutch speaking youths, people with a Turkish background are turning up more and more in multi-ethnic jihadist networks.

In the annual report of 2005, it was reported that radical young female Muslims were increasingly coming to the fore within the Hofstad network. In 2006, the trend has continued. The core of the activities of radical young female Muslims is to try and convert other women to the jihadist range of ideas and the propagandising of these ideas in general. To that end they actively occupy themselves with Dawa (act of preaching Islam) often via the Internet. In the physical world group processes and arranged marriages with male members of the network play a big part in the binding of new recruits. Although the willingness to carry out violent activities in the future does exist, women in the Hofstad group have not yet made this step. In at least one particular incident it can be proven that a female member of a jihadist network has been involved in the carrying out of violent activities.

Looking back on the developments in 2006 within jihadist networks in the Netherlands, a few matters catch the eye. To begin with, it can be concluded that dealing with jihadists in the Netherlands has had a substantial disruptive effect on known networks and cells. Criminal prosecution have lead to the fact that central figures from several networks have been detained, some for a longer period of time. Others were after their release declared as persona non grata and were subsequently deported to their country of origin. This has happened not only to those in the Hofstad network, but also important individuals of other networks have been deported from the Netherlands in the past year. These deportations seem to have an effect on other members of the networks. Jihadist networks are not only weakened by government activities, however. Within the network itself developments also occur which negatively influence the level of organisation and striking power. There was at the time of writing an absence of real figures of authority who could play a binding and active role within the networks. Especially in local (autonomous) networks in the Netherlands there is a continuing internal discord. These two factors seem the foremost reasons of the
increasing gap within most networks between the desire to realise the jihadist ideal and the capability to realise this in practice.

Analysing the relative weakening of known networks ultimately does not give a complete picture of the threat in the Netherlands. Namely, at the same time it has been observed that the radicalisation of mainly young Muslims in the Netherlands continues. This can be seen in the continuing growth of (mostly local) jihadist networks, but also in patterns in radicalisation processes becoming visible through for example the Internet. A lively ‘jihad culture’ exists of which a proportion of Muslim youngsters in the Netherlands are attracted to. However, to regard this subculture a nuanced perspective is called for. It fits partly within the general cultural patterns youngsters usually adhere to in which it is attractive to create one’s own identity with the aid of provocative and radical utterances. In doing this, the style of radical ideologies and groups are often taken over by youngsters, though in many cases it is not taken further and radical utterances are not followed up by any violent actions. In addition, this subculture is part of a broader movement within Islam in the Netherlands where emphasis is laid on conservative and fundamentalist interpretation of this religion. The Jihadist subculture as well as the emergence of radical Islam in most cases does not lead to terrorism. Although both phenomena fuel the information of jihadist networks, they do not automatically need to be interpreted in terms of a heightened terrorist threat.

The threat of jihadist terrorism in the Netherlands poses a real danger, keeping in mind the events in other Western countries. An attack in the Netherlands, committed by a home-grown terrorist cell or from internationally operating networks, is and remains conceivable. This so-called conceivable threat therefore needs to be taken seriously. For a general assessment of the threat, not only the conceivable needs to be looked at but also developments which have been concretely observed, the so-called known threat. The investigation which the AIVD has undertaken into jihadist terrorism in 2006 shows that the latter threat seems to have been reduced; this applies mainly for local jihadist networks. The threat from transnational networks, which operate mainly outside the Netherlands, is more difficult to assess. The AIVD has investigated several times during the year possible threats towards Europe (and thus also the Netherlands) from the Middle East and Afghanistan, but these threats cannot as yet be confirmed. However, a careful conclusion can be made from this that Europe, as target of transnational networks, will again play a more prominent role after 2006.
2.2 Other terrorist groups

In 2006 the AIVD has given its attention to a number of separatist-terrorist movements who may have contacts in the Netherlands. It has been established that although it has become more quiet on the Northern Irish separatist terrorism front, separatist tensions in Spanish Basque country and in Sri Lanka increased in the second half of 2006. The AIVD is therefore also keeping an eye out for possible consequences of this in the Netherlands in the coming year.

2.2.1 Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)

The AIVD’s investigation into the Marxist-Leninist organisation DHKP/C in the Netherlands focuses on recognising supportive activities for terrorist attacks in Turkey. The organisation’s activities maintain a modest level. Members and sympathisers in the Netherlands occupy themselves with cultural manifestations and demonstrations against the - in their eyes - brutal treatment of prisoners in Turkish detention centres. The organisation seems, with their ideology, to be barely capable of recruiting new sympathisers within the Turkish community in the Netherlands. The criminal prosecution of the DHKP/C in Belgium and Germany, whereby diverse important leaders were given long prison sentences, have not led to any organisational changes in the Netherlands.

2.2.2 PKK

In the annual report of 2005, the AIVD reported about reforms within the PKK which were focused to make the organisation more forceful and more ready for battle. In the meantime, the internal conflict has been settled to the advantage of the hard liners. The reforms have continued in the Netherlands in 2006. Dissident voices are no longer tolerated within the organisation. The leaders have endeavoured to strengthen their influence organisationally and financial-wise, urged on by an even more controlled international leadership.

As a consequence of diverse occurrences, such as the arrest in Limburg of European PKK leader Nedim Seven in August 2006, the PKK believes that repression by the government has increased. Also in the rest of Europe, the PKK has encountered more resistance to their ideas. At the same time, tensions and violence have increased in south eastern Turkey. These two factors have led to an increase in sympathy for the PKK among the Kurdish community in the Netherlands. In 2006, the Turkish tourist sector has been targeted again by bomb attacks responsibility for part of them was
claimed by the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), a militant Kurdish organisation which has been operating since 2004. In June 2006 a Dutch woman was killed in one of these attacks near the Turkish resort of Antalya. The Turkish authorities consider the TAK to be part of the PKK. Although the PKK denies any involvement with the TAK, they are closely related ideologically-wise. It cannot be ruled out that the TAK has originated from the PKK, and whether or not with their permission has run a violent campaign. However, violent actions in the Netherlands are not expected.

2.2.3 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)

The violent Basque separatist movement ETA has been placed on the terror list by the European Union. The AIVD is therefore focusing their attention on the developments surrounding the movement, although the ETA is not active in the Netherlands. In March 2006 the ETA announced a ceasefire with the Spanish government on the basis of which circumspect peace talks have been started. However, after the initial euphoria, a growing mutual mistrust is developing. The ceasefire has been broken regularly in the last months of 2006 by many individual operating ETA sympathisers and culminated in an attack on 30 December 2006 at Barajas Airport in Madrid. A delivery van full of explosives was detonated in a multi-level car park after the usual warning calls. Despite the warning, the bomb killed two people. This last attack was claimed in the first days of 2007 by ETA. The tensions in Spain do not influence the situation among the Basque community in the Netherlands for the time being.

2.2.4 Irish and Northern Irish terrorist organisations

The Netherlands has in the past been repeatedly confronted with activities undertaken by Northern Irish terrorist groups. Seeing that violent (splinter) groups are still active on the European continent, international intelligence and security services, including the AIVD, are focusing their attention on these groups. The largest republican movement, the Provisional IRA (PIRA), has handed in their weapons and has formed practically no threat for nearly a year. However, a splinter group called the Real IRA (RIRA) still poses a real threat, who has refused to this day to adhere to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Also some Northern Irish loyalists still resist, sometimes violently, against the political involvement of republicans in the government. It remains difficult to distinguish between political and criminal intentions by the above-mentioned groups, on the loyalist as well as on the republican side. The loyalists especially are still faced with internal discord over the distribution of drug-trafficking profits and other matters.
In the future radical splinter groups will continue to tamper with the peace process. The incident in November 2006 when the infamous loyalist terrorist Michael Stone forced his way into a meeting of the Northern Irish parliament, weapon in hand, can be seen as an omen of things to come.

2.2.5 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

A practical ceasefire exists on Sri Lanka since 2002 but the situation worsened in 2006. Peace talks between the government and the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) suddenly escalated in bloody conflict and attacks with already some thousand of casualties. During 2006 the AIVD focused its attention on the LTTE due to the fact that it was placed on the EU terror list in June. As a consequence, their assets were frozen immediately and it has become more difficult for them to draw from funds collected by the Tamil community. This has resulted in unrest within the Tamil community, also in the Netherlands, where the number of public activities by LTTE sympathisers instantly increased. The diverse number of demonstrations in the country had nonetheless a peaceful character.

2.3 Attack weapons

The AIVD is investigating weapons which could be used in a terrorist attack. The investigation focuses especially on chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and (home-made) explosives. In addition to monitoring the domestic situation regarding weapons for an attack, the AIVD also examines terrorist-related incidents abroad to gain an insight in the modus operandi of terrorist networks. With this understanding, the AIVD endeavours to timely recognise the acquisition and fabrication of such weapons and to provide its partners with relevant information. The AIVD is also taking part in national and international consultant groups with other involved parties and experts regarding CBRN weapons and home-made explosives.

In the past year there have been no incidents related to terrorism with CBRN weapons and explosives in the Netherlands. On an international level, there has been a decrease in the number of CBRN incidents and an increase in incidents with home-made explosives. The AIVD therefore considers that such an attack with the aid of home-made explosives is more probable at the moment than a CBRN attack, although the latter should not be ruled out entirely. Ingredients for the making of such an explosive are relatively easy to obtain and there is less specialised knowledge required so that experimenting is no longer reserved for experts only.
2.3.1 Explosives

Important incidents regarding home-made explosives from local autonomous networks in 2006 are the failed attacks in Germany and the rounded up networks in Denmark and Canada. The gas cylinder bombs found in trains in Germany did not explode due to a technical problem. These bombs could have resulted in many casualties if they had exploded. In Denmark and Canada the networks had the necessary knowledge at their disposal as well as the necessary ingredients in order to make a bomb. They were indeed at an advanced preparation stage at the time of their arrest.

Incidents abroad can have a direct effect on the security measures in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe. Clear examples of this are the consequences of the foiled attacks of August 2006 in the United Kingdom: air passengers are now expected to take fluids out of their hand luggage in advance of getting on board. The suspects of this conspiracy wanted namely to use liquid explosives and in order to circumvent the security measures they smuggled separate components onto the aircraft.

2.3.2 CBRN

The risk of a CBRN attack remains small but real nonetheless. A successful CBRN attack will probably be a small-scale (as regards used weapons, damage, and casualties) and technically simple operation. However, the effect will in all probability be bigger and more disproportionate regarding the disruption to society that such an attack can effectuate.

Despite the observed reduction, international jihadists remain interested in CBRN weapons, given the appeal made by Al-Qaeda leader Abu Ayyub Al Masri on 28 September 2006. In a statement, Al Masri called upon scientists to travel to Iraq to carry out experiments with unconventional dirty bombs and to deploy these against American targets. According to Al Masri the fighters in Iraq are in need of (nuclear) scientists, chemists, physicists, electronic and explosive experts.

Last year there are only two international CBRN incidents worth mentioning; these took place in the United Kingdom. In June 2006 an anti-terror action took place on the basis of indications that a chemical dirty bomb had been produced by two British Muslims of Bengali extraction. However, evidence was not found. A second incident regarded the sentence of a 34-year-old Briton of Pakistani extraction in November who was convicted for the preparation of an attack with a radioactive dirty bomb, among other matters.
2.4 Financing terrorism

Financial investigation is one of the means used by the AIVD to gain insight into methods of financing terrorism and radicalisation. The AIVD also fulfils a role in activities which result from UN and EU freeze lists. These lists contain the names of terrorism-related people and organisations whose financial assets need to be frozen in order to prevent any financing of terrorist activities. Financial institutions to that end give the AIVD the names of those individuals and organisations who may be mentioned in those lists and who may be an asset holder. In 2006, as a result of these reports, two official reports were sent to the Ministry of Finance. These official reports give the Ministry of Finance a definite answer if the people or organisations reported by the financial institutions are indeed identical to those on the freeze lists.

2.5 Travel patterns

Members of terrorist networks make use of all possible migration channels in order to travel across international boundaries, including channels to and via the Netherlands. For this reason, the AIVD keeps track of the entry, departure and transit of all aliens who may form a risk to national security. Border control is an important way to do this. The AIVD maintains therefore close contact with those organisations who are involved with the admittance of aliens and where necessary exchanges information with these institutions.

The AIVD has strengthened her cooperation with these organisations involved with alien policy by developing risk indications which enable the organisations involved to become alert to signs of (potential) involvement in terrorism. In addition, the giving of awareness briefings has been started up for Dutch diplomatic representatives based abroad as well as the giving of advice to the relevant departments of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service and the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary. The development of risk indications is a continuing process whereby a high level of cooperation is of crucial importance. Apart from that, it is important to keep an eye on trends and developments which could show a possible shift in the area of travel movements and the modus operandi of potential terrorists.
2.6 The use of the Internet by terrorists

Modern information and communication technologies play an important and ever growing role in developments in the threat emanating from jihadist terrorism. The Internet is seen by the AIVD and her international partners as one of the driving forces behind violent Jihad. It is the most prominent means of radicalising and recruiting (often quite young) Muslims independently. These are mainly autonomous processes in which Muslims radicalise of their own accord and present themselves as fighters for Islam. Also, the Internet plays an important role with the ideological and organisational development of jihadist networks and in the preparation and planning of attacks. In 2006 the AIVD made a substantial contribution to the NCTb (National Counter-terrorism Coordinator) publication on Internet use by terrorists.

Because of perceived developments in the area of Internet use by terrorists, the AIVD decided in 2006 to invest extra effort to research into the radical Islamic part of the Internet.
3 Radicalisation

3.1 Developments

In 2006 an important part in the investigative activities carried out by the AIVD was focused on the recognition at the earliest stage possible of radicalisation processes within Dutch society. They investigated radicalisation processes which might lead to terrorist action as well as other forms of radicalisation processes which could lead to disruption in society. The investigation into these last forms were focused on tendencies of intolerant isolationism in some groups, which in some instances are combined with taking the law into their own hands by putting their own, religious laws before Dutch laws. Such intolerant isolationism in some groups can lead on the one hand to oppression of those considered to belong to their own community and on the other hand to polarisation and tensions between diverse population groups.

The AIVD, in its role as a provider of insight into the phenomenon of radicalisation, has in 2006 been involved with the development of a broad approach to radicalisation. This has been done together with various national government bodies, but also with the local authorities, community-based organisations and in the case of Muslim radicalisation with the moderate forces within the Muslim communities. By implementing a broad approach, it is important that the possibilities to intervene takes place not only in a repressive but also in a preventative and pro-active atmosphere.

In 2006 the AIVD cooperated closely with several national government bodies, such as departments of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK), the Ministry of Justice, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (including the schools inspectorate), as well as the National Counter-terrorism Coordinator (NCTb), and the National Police Agency (KLPD). Also contacts with local authorities have strongly intensified. The local government received information regarding general trends. In addition to that, the AIVD informed municipalities regarding more specific matters. The AIVD will continue to stay on top of this.

The efforts of the AIVD in 2006 regarding the above-mentioned government bodies were especially made to provide more insight into the phenomenon of radicalisation in a more general way, and the interpretation of specific hotbeds in a more specific way. Many lectures and presentations were presented for local councils and for diverse
departments of the national government concerning the growth of specific forms of radicalisation, and trends regarding how radicalisation has manifested itself. The AIVD also played an important advisory role in the development of governmental measures to counter and disrupt radicalisation processes. This was realised by cooperating closely with the Ministry of BZK, the Ministry of Justice, and the NCTb.

Additionally, renewed cooperation with academic institutions must also be mentioned. In 2006 the AIVD was directly involved with initiatives focused on further development of and a more in-depth academic research in the Netherlands concerning radicalisation by working together with several scientific institutions.

In 2006 again many international incidents took place at which Dutch Muslims of various backgrounds were incensed and which sometimes even brought about radicalisation. In particular the cartoon affair, the Israeli attack on Lebanon, and the Pope’s comments on Islam were incidents which incited anger and frustration. These incidents were for radical Muslims again a confirmation in their perception that the West would wish to destroy Islam. The examples mentioned above involve religious radicalisation. However, radicalisation can also be political or ethnically motivated.

3.2 The Iranian community in the Netherlands

The AIVD is making an assessment on the sentiments within the Iranian community. This is relevant in view of the position Iran has taken on the political world stage, the unstable situation in the Middle East, and the role of ideological model Iran has taken up on a regional and international level. In 2006 the AIVD has made an exploratory investigation into the Iranian community in the Netherlands. The most important conclusion of this investigation is that the reactions from the Iranian community on major situations in the Middle East have been in general calm and restrained. The investigation has also proven that within this community there is little cause for possible radicalisation. Iranians are, in comparison with other minorities, relatively well adjusted to Dutch society. Usually they also have a rather good command of the language, are generally well educated, and a relatively large number participate in the labour market.

Due to the crisis in Lebanon, in which the Iran-focused fundamentalist Shiite Hezbollah played a key role, the AIVD has focused extra attention on the existing
sentiments within the various Shiite communities in the Netherlands. The Iranian community forms the largest Shiite community in the Netherlands. This investigation has not led to any sensational results. The AIVD has not observed any special disquiet within this community in 2006.

In the annual report of 2005, the AIVD reported activities made by the Iranian opposition movement Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation (MKO) in the Netherlands. The activities of the MKO in the Netherlands have mainly been focused on demonstrations, petitions, and fundraising. In order to raise funds, the MKO has deployed various front organisations. Because of the aggressive way of raising money, the AIVD had explicitly mentioned several of these organisations in the annual report of 2005. These are the foundation Solidariteit met Iraanse Mensen (Solidarity with Iranian People Foundation, SIM), the Stichting voor Mensenrechten Vrienden (Foundation for Human Right Friends, SMV), and the foundation Het Imago van de Toekomst (The Image of the Future). Fundraising has taken place under the pretext of humanitarian aid to the Iranian population, but in reality the MKO itself solely benefits. After the annual report’s publication, the AIVD has observed that the activities undertaken by these organisations were on the decrease. Also as a result of the annual report, the AIVD has had several reports from alarmed citizens regarding the aggressive way of raising funds. The MKO’s reaction to this is to let other front organisations carry out the fundraising and other activities. A large part has been carried out in 2006 by the Stichting van de Familieleden van Iran (Foundation of the Family Members of Iran, SFVI).

Since May 2002 the MKO has been included on the list of terrorist organisations of the European Union. The organisation has been active since then to get itself off the list. To that end it has taken legal action at the Court of First Instance of the European Union. On 12 December 2006 the Court of First Instance decide that the placing of MKO on the list was unlawful due to omitted procedural rules which violated the legal protection of the organisation. The placement on the list remains in force, however.
From Dawa to Jihad

In December 2004 the paper *From Dawa to Jihad* was published regarding the diverse threats of radical Islam against the democratic legal order. There are two types of relationships to discern in this legal order: the interactions between government and citizen (vertical) and that between citizens among themselves (horizontal). Radical Islam involves two strategies aimed at drastically changing the legal order: dawa and jihad. Dawa refers to a non-violent long term strategy of continual influencing activities. Jihad refers to a short term strategy of violent activism and terrorism. Both strategies can have an either open or clandestine character. With these variables, the AIVD developed a schematic diagram showing eight different types of threat from radical Islam.

The complete paper, including a full description of the eight threat types, can be found on the website of the AIVD, under the heading ‘Publications.’
3.3 Salafist centres in the Netherlands

In the past year the AIVD has observed an increase in the number of mosques and Islamic institutes that have come under the influence of known Salafist centres. These centres disseminate in an undiminished way the Salafist message which mainly focuses on a small, but growing group of young people of Moroccan extraction who have already felt marginalised. The intensity of influence varies. It can be supposed that the influence of an itinerant Salafist preacher who preaches once-only on a Friday and uses polarising language can only be limited. However, influence can also have much farther-reaching consequences and can lead for example to attempts to take over a mosque committee. The character of a mosque can in such a case change from having a moderate nature to having anti-Western and anti-integration views. The dissemination of Salafism has the consequence that an increasing number of worshippers have proven to be susceptible to anti-integrative and intolerant isolationist Salafist views. Some of these local Salafist hotbeds have been included in a multidisciplinary project, coordinated by the NCTb focused on methods of dealing with these hotbeds. There are for that matter also centres which do not tolerate such anti-integrative views within their mosques and keep Salafist preachers out of them.

The AIVD will continue to monitor the developments within Salafism. National and local authorities will be informed so that they have the opportunity to draw the attention of the Muslim community to the intolerant isolationist character of Salafism and inform them how to resist it.

Imams and administrations of Islamic institutions will usually avoid such radical statements which are sensitive to Dutch society in their mosques in order to avoid any political or public commotion. In 2006 there have been some incidents when an imam nonetheless uttered controversial statements which led to (negative) media attention and the demand for penalisation.

3.4 The Turkish community in the Netherlands

The AIVD has observed that a form of ultra-orthodox Islam with strong intolerant and anti-integrative aspects strikes a sympathetic chord with a limited number of young Dutch-Turks. The phenomenon has occurred in groups existing practically of Dutch citizens of Turkish extraction and in multi-ethnic groups where Turks are also a part of. Youngsters who want to join such groups express an increasing
aversion to Dutch society and to the Dutch government. They uphold the Islamic law (Sharia) before Dutch law and reject democratic principles. Also, the use of violence against non-Muslims in the country and abroad is approved of, for example, in the form of a terrorist attack by radical-Islamic groups. These youngsters perceive that Islam worldwide, and hence also in the Netherlands, is constantly under threat and is therefore involved in a struggle for its survival.

In some instances these individuals make use of facilities of existing (mosque) organisations. Also via the Internet the dissemination of ultra-orthodox religious beliefs takes place in the Turkish community. The Turkish language seems to be here a distinguishing element in comparison with other radical websites.

A large majority of people within the Turkish community in the Netherlands disapprove of radical religious ideas and therefore have a negative view of radicalism. However, within the community the social climate is seen as hostile, more than before. In September, candidate parliamentarians of Turkish descent were struck off by some political parties because of their opinion regarding the Armenian situation. This was seen as a curtailing of the freedom of speech.

3.5 The Moroccan community in the Netherlands

There is a lot of resistance against (the propagation of) religious violence within a large number of mosques in the Netherlands. At the same time, it can be established that the influence of an orthodox form of Islam is growing within many mosques. Muslim youngsters are becoming more influential within mosques and seem to prefer a more orthodox interpretation of Islam to the more traditional and cultural beliefs of the first generation of immigrants. If Muslim youngsters in the mosque are confronted with older generation committee members who want to have nothing to do with the orthodox message, they then develop initiatives themselves outside the mosque. Spread throughout the Netherlands, orthodox preachers give lectures in hired rooms. Sometimes many hundreds of strictly pious Muslim youngsters from every corner of the country come to hear these orthodox preachers talk.

Where before youngsters were responsible for incidents with a radical character within the Dutch educational system, in 2006 there have been some instances where teachers were open about their orthodox, if not radical, Islamic beliefs. A case which has become public concerns a female teacher who taught at an educational institute in Utrecht and
who refused to shake the hand of any male teacher. It has been established that the woman was influenced by Salafist ideology.

The AIVD has already established that Dutch Muslim youngsters seem to have developed an Islamic counter or youth subculture. The mostly Moroccan youngsters which make up part of this subculture react against the dominant culture of Dutch society in a sometimes provocative manner. The youth subculture is expressed by the use of symbols of orthodox, and in some cases extreme variants of Islam. This is most clearly visible on the Internet. Youngsters adorn themselves with aliases which refer to violent jihad, they pepper their texts with the citations of radical Sheiks and use photos and video clips with extremist contents in order to advertise themselves as supporters of violent jihad. However, in some cases it is proven that the youngsters who are responsible do not lead an orthodox or radical lifestyle and do not have contact with extremists.

It is at the moment still unclear what the emergence of an Islamic youth subculture means for the threat emanating from radical Islam. Orthodox and even extremist variants of Islam are becoming fashionable which means that these variants may lose their sharp edge and eventually even can go out of fashion. But then again, through this youth subculture, radical Islam and its ideas can be made much more accessible to youngsters.

### 3.6 The Moluccan community in the Netherlands

In 2006 diverse small-scale demonstrations took place held by Moluccans, without causing any disruption of public order. The social position of a part of third generation Moluccan youngsters is still a concern however, which could form a hotbed for possible radicalisation.

### 3.7 Other minorities in the Netherlands

In 2006 the AIVD conducted a general investigation into several smaller ethnic communities within Dutch society, including the Somalian, Pakistani, Afghan, Iraqi, Lebanese, Palestinian, and Chechnian communities, thus gaining insight into a possible hotbed for radicalisation within (parts of) these communities. However, this analysis on a community level, from which a general profile emerges, does not alter
the fact that individuals are indeed able to radicalise under the influence of their own personal issues.

Results from the AIVD investigation carried out up to now has proven that the situation in the countries of origin of the above-mentioned communities has only led to unrest in the Netherlands on a limited level. This is evident, for example, concerning the Palestinian and Lebanese communities. The electoral victory of Hamas and the Israeli military activities in the summer of 2006 have not led to any upheavals within the Palestinian community, nor within the Lebanese community. Diverse demonstrations have taken place, but they did not cause any trouble. The Iraqi community seems to be resigned towards the civil war in their country. In the Netherlands there have been no heightened tensions between Sunnites and Shiites. News of the relatively small Chechnian community has hardly been worthy of mention in the past year.

Rather, a hotbed for radicalisation seems to be determined by how a community in the Netherlands experience their living conditions. Poor socio-economic circumstances can lead to the taking on of the role of victim, where the blame is fully laid on Dutch society.

Because of the involvement of persons within the Pakistani community in the United Kingdom in the 7 July attacks in 2005 in London and the involvement of a group of Pakistani in the foiled attacks on airplanes in the United Kingdom in August 2006, the AIVD is analysing if the Pakistani community here in the Netherlands has a similar hotbed for radicalisation as that in the United Kingdom. The community in the Netherlands seems to have a fairly stable social position. However, when it comes to religion, people within the Pakistani community hold many different views and this can create internal tensions.

Because of the deployment of Dutch troops in Afghanistan and the interrelations between Pakistan and Afghanistan as regards Islamic radicalisation processes, the Afghan community in the Netherlands is also a focus for attention. The Afghan community in the Netherlands is relatively well integrated and has mixed religious and political stances. A great number of people have fled the Taliban. The calm reaction of the Afghan community concerning the Dutch military presence in Afghanistan has so far also persisted concerning the Uruzgan mission.

The position of the Somalian community within Dutch society is still a concern and is characterised by isolation and poor socio-economic integration. In 2006 several
revolutions took place in Somalia. It seems that the Somalian community in the Netherlands is hoping for more stability and smaller clan differences as a result of the construction of a central authority in the country but at the same time it fears that this will create a radical-Islamic image of the country and that the country will become a pariah within the international community. The revolution in Somalia can work as a magnet on radical Muslims of Somalian origin, but also of other nationalities.
4 Left-wing and right-wing extremism

4.1 Left-wing extremism

A growth in the number of violent incidents inspired from anti-fascist circles was discerned in 2006 regarding left-wing extremism. Violence was no longer limited to verbal abuse. In some cities there have been pursuits and personal violence against (alleged) right-wing extremists. The asylum policy of the Minister for Immigration and Integration has also led to more manifestations of civil unrest.

In the area of left-wing as well as right-wing extremism, in 2006 there have been regular disturbances of public order and violent offences. For this reason, the AIVD has frequent contact with the police and municipal council regarding this subject and has been able to offer clarifying insights as well as timely warnings of threatening attacks to for instance the public order.

4.1.1 Anti Fascistische Actie (Anti Fascist Movement) (AFA)

Dutch anti-fascists are monitoring right-wing extremists, broadly defining the term. On the basis of results gained from their investigation into right-wing extremism, the anti-fascists endeavour to counter the activities of these (alleged) right-wing extremists; by pursuing this route, human rights (including freedom of speech, freedom of assembly) are liable to be pushed aside. Anti-fascists approach those who rent out meeting areas, but also the (local) authorities in order to prevent proposed meetings. Violence as consequence of confrontations between extreme right groups and anti-fascists are as a rule initiated by the anti-fascists themselves and is often aimed against the Riot Police who act as a buffer.

In 2006 a growing number of incidents have been observed from the anti-fascist movement. After local authorities were intimidated, several municipalities decided to withdraw permits approving their right to demonstrate from extreme right groups. At other instances, anti-fascists, including members of new group Militant AFA, sought physical confrontations with right-wing groups or individuals. This occurred for example in the cities of Amsterdam, Arnhem, Utrecht, and Nijmegen.

The AIVD expects in the future a stability in the current anti-fascist trend. The activists involved will continue to sabotage what they perceive as right-wing extremism, partly
combating it with a heavy hand. The kind of violence described above is what the AIVD defines as ‘political violent activism.’

4.1.2 Resistance against asylum policy

The Dutch (and also European) asylum and aliens policy has held the attention of activists for a long time. Government members of both left and right of the political spectrum were confronted with actions. In 2006 the Minister for Immigration and Integration had to deal with a growing resistance by the so-called citizen’s initiative and activist groups (Generaal Pardon, Werkgroep Vluchtelingen Vrij, Werkgroep Stop Deportaties) to her integration policy. In November approximately 4000 individuals protested against the asylum policy and for a general pardon. In addition, the Minister for Immigration and Integration was systematically, also on campaign for the elections, verbally abused by one or two obstinate individuals.

A new subject in 2006 was the blockade and/or occupation of detention boats, the so-called ‘bajesboten’ (lit. jail boats). In Rotterdam, Dordrecht, and Zaandam several (peaceful) occupations of detention boats took place. Also detention centres in Zeist and Alphen aan de Rijn were targets for protest actions.

4.2 Animal rights activism

The year 2006 saw an increase in the willingness to take action. This was seen in intensifying actions such as the ‘home visits,’ aimed at persons who were associated with animal testing and who were threatened and harassed within their own homes. Dutch activists played a bigger role than before in coordinating and carrying out actions on the European continent.

The AIVD is investigating radical utterances of animal rights activism. Large scale vandalism, including for example arson, are manifestations. There is an increase of harassments, as well as threats, to people employed in the animal testing industry and/or their partners and children, both in their work environment and at home. Also in 2006 most of these actions originate from Respect voor Dieren (Respect for Animals) (RvD). This organisation has grown rapidly and has in the meantime factions in Rotterdam, in the north of the country, and Belgium. Respect voor Dieren focuses on the fur trade, but especially on animal testing.
Respect voor Dieren is in fact the Dutch representative of the British ‘Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty’ (SHAC), which takes action with violent means against animal testing giant Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS). Also business relations of HLS have had again to deal with actions carried out by SHAC and Respect voor Dieren. Indeed SHAC and Respect voor Dieren are closely entwined which reveals itself in joint actions on the street. Respect voor Dieren was nearly weekly occupied with actions against pharmaceutical businesses in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe. The activities carried out by Respect voor Dieren are split in ‘legally’ approved demonstrations at companies and (nightly) noise protests in the home environment of company employees. Vandalising regularly occurs in the last instance. The AIVD sees a further growth of animal right activism in the future. Active individuals within Respect voor Dieren and like-minded groups have hardly or no interest in the gain of seats of the by them pulverised Partij voor de Dieren (Party for the Animals). They see no political solution to the problem and continue to believe in hard action.

4.3 Right-wing extremism

The threat to the Dutch democratic legal order by right-wing extremists is still relatively low. The scattered right-extremist culture in the Netherlands is partly the cause. The past year has seen some growth in support of non-politically active neo-Nazi organisations, such as Blood&Honour. Those who do take the political route to reach their goals have not substantially grown in the past year or even have seen a decrease in their numbers. The expectation is that the growth of non-politically active groups will continue to grow in the year 2007. The emergence of radical splinter groups of right-wing orientated youth cultures, such as components of the Lonsdale youth (‘gabber’ movement) has remained limited in 2006. Despite the fact that individuals in right-wing extremism remain to be fascinated with weapons and violence, at the moment there is no right-extremist terrorist threat. This does not take away the fact that frustration broadly felt in this youth culture regarding the multiculturalism of society can stimulate further polarisation and with that can threaten the democratic legal order in the long run. Furthermore, radical actions of solitary individuals, the so-called ‘self-radicalised individuals,’ cannot be totally excluded. Especially developments within, and the growth of, non-politically active groups will have the attention of the AIVD.

The emergence of new extreme right groups or parties which have their roots in youth cultures such as the ‘gabber’ movement is hardly a factor, or not at all. An exception is Jeugdstorm Nederland (JSN) (see below). Youth movements such as the gabber
movement can be an attractive recruitment ground for extreme right-wing parties or organisations. Timely identification of systematic recruitment initiated by extreme right-wing parties within these youth cultures or the emergence of radical extreme right-wing organisations from these cultures therefore still requires painstaking monitoring. Furthermore, it is important to timely recognise radicalising factors such as the Internet (i.e. extreme right websites) and triggers from extreme right-wing environments, as well as where possible to counter their radicalising effects.

4.3.1 Neo-Nazis

There are two branches of Blood&Honour active within the Netherlands: the small, but extremely radical Racial Volunteer Force (RVF) and Blood&Honour-Nederland, which is on a larger scale and is growing. The RVF is strongly ideologically developed and is more politically active. Blood&Honour-Nederland involve themselves more with extreme right music, but is also prepared to physically involve themselves with the expected racial struggle in the (far) future. For that purpose, survival training is regularly organised. Blood&Honour-Nederland has become more structured in the past year and has become more internationally orientated.

Despite its small size, the RVF plays a clear role in Dutch right-wing extremism. Permanent attention to contacts between RVF members and several recently set up radical splinter groups is needed. Via these contacts import of neo-Nazi ideas can take place, so that these splinter groups are able to radicalise even further. One of these groups is Jeugdstorm Nederland (JSN). This organisation emerged from circles of radical so-called Lonsdale youth in Zoetermeer. JSN took part in several demonstrations in the past year organised by the neo-Nazi Nederlandse Volks-Unie. Individual members of JSN came into contact with police as a consequence of violent offences. There are also contacts between radical neo-Nazi splinter group Aktiefront Zuid Holland Zuid and the RVF. The Aktiefront became compromised after serious physically assaulting an Antillean man in Papendrecht. It also turned out that an utmost radical leader of the RVF was involved in this.

The neo-Nazi Nederlandse Volks-Unie was active in 2006 in particular during the municipal elections. These elections did not result in any seats for the NVU. The party also focused its attention outside Dutch borders. Within the NVU, but also within the RVF, a certain kinship is felt with like-minded individuals in Iran. This has mainly to do with their shared hatred of the United States of America and of Israel. On 1 July 2006 the NVU and the RVF organised a demonstration in The Hague against Zionism.
and the American imperialism. It was also meant as a means of showing support to Iran and the present Iranian president Ahmadinejad.

4.3.2 Ultra-nationalism

Since the disappointing municipal elections for the Nationale Alliantie (National Alliance), the party has kept a relatively low profile. Due to dissatisfaction regarding the electoral result, some members of the NA withdrew their membership and formed their own party, the Nationalistische Volks Beweging (National People’s Movement, NVB). In December 2006 the NVB demonstrated in Middelburg against the construction of a mosque. As well as concerning themselves with matters regarding the multicultural society and integration, the NA are also active with themes which are often seen as ‘left-wing’ by Dutch society. For example, the NA fight against paedophilia and the hunt on baby seals.

The ultra-nationalist ‘Voorpost’ celebrated their thirty years anniversary in 2006. They have been relatively quiet in the last several months. Despite individual contacts with other extreme right organisations in the Netherlands, Voorpost wants to remain an independent action group.

4.3.3 Extreme right terrorism?

The arrests at the beginning of 2006 of members of the Belgian Blood&Honour organisation BBET (Bloed Bodem Eer en Trouw) (Blood, Soil, Honour and Loyalty), caused some commotion in the Dutch press and within extreme right circles in the Netherlands. The arrested members of BBET are suspected, among other matters, of preparing a terrorist attack in Belgium. There have been contacts in the past between Dutch extreme right organisations and the BBET, but these were mainly discussions regarding the political ideology of the BBET, NVU, RVF, and the Nationale Alliantie. There are no indications that Dutch right-wing extremists are in league with the BBET, or that the BBET serves as an example, in order to prepare, or have prepared, a terrorist attack in the Netherlands.

The speculations made by the press that right-wing extremism in the Netherlands is just a fraction removed from terrorism were fanned by the arrest of two extreme right individuals at the beginning of September in Rotterdam. At their home it was discovered that they were sheltering a criminal who was in the possession of a number of weapons including semi-manufactured explosives. Investigations have not led to any indications suggesting that this person supports extreme right ideology.
Lonsdale youth in the Netherlands

In 2005 the AIVD published a study into the phenomenon ‘Lonsdale youth,’ partly in connection with an incident at an Islamic school in which ostensibly right-wing, indigenous youngsters were involved. Lonsdale is a designer label worn by these youngsters. The extreme right label which was given to them by the press and by some local and national government administrators has not been taken over by the AIVD. The frequent use of the label ‘racist’ as a description for these youngsters is in practice not justified as there does not seem to be any cause that they consciously operate on the basis of reasons of biological inferiority. ‘Lonsdale’ as a characterisation of youth category therefore seems more a sociological term than a political one. The Lonsdale youth is a part of the so-called ‘gabber’ movement. The investigation showed that ‘gabbers’ do not form a real extreme right threat. In the Netherlands only a few individuals from the small hard core of the gabber culture are members of an extreme right group or party. In general, gabbers are seen as untrustworthy and are of no use for the political struggle, and although they have the potential to form an electoral pool for extreme right parties in the Netherlands, at the moment there is no evidence of a mass flow of gabbers joining right-wing groups.

The complete paper can be read in Dutch on the website of the AIVD, under the heading ‘Publications.’
5 Unwelcome interference of foreign powers

The AIVD’s investigation into foreign powers engaging in unwelcome intelligence activities in the Netherlands is not a subject that can be described in detail in a public report, with a view to the protection of the AIVD’s current level of knowledge in this field. For this reason, this chapter simply gives some general information on the subject.

Espionage and unwelcome foreign interference are subjects for investigation for the AIVD which have not yet lost their relevance to current issues. Also in 2006 the AIVD has identified intelligence activities in the Netherlands and where possible foiled these activities. This phenomenon involves a whole range of activities, carried out by a large spectrum of foreign participants. The AIVD investigates ‘traditional’ forms of threats, such as clandestine intelligence-gathering by foreign parties on political matters, and in scientific, military, and economic fields. Additionally, the AIVD also carries out investigations on new threats, such as the growing number of large-scale attacks on Dutch vital ICT networks carried out abroad which affect parts of the national government and the business community. The AIVD also focuses on the infringement of migrant civil rights as well as the manipulation of migrant communities by foreign powers.

In addition to carrying out investigations, the AIVD focuses on increasing resistance in connection with the threat emanating from espionage. A large number of companies and governmental bodies which possibly are at risk of espionage have sought advice from the AIVD in 2006. During such an informative session, the AIVD points out those concerns which foreign governments may have and those methods they employ in order to look after these concerns.

Espionage and security risks

Together with the MIVD, the AIVD compiled the brochure *Espionage and Security Risks*. In this brochure, the idea that with the end of the Cold War, the threat of espionage would also end has been shattered. Countries always still endeavour to gather secret political, military, and economic information. They do this via their intelligence services, but also through the efforts of other (semi) governmental bodies and private enterprises.

If these activities threaten national security, we can speak of espionage. Espionage has
many forms. It can be focused on influencing politicians, the clandestine gathering of technical and scientific information, hacking, and the deployment of (illegal) migrants to carry out spying activities. The threat has considerably broadened in the past few years. The brochure gives many examples, such as the walled-in eavesdropping equipment in the office of the European Council in Brussels, the Chinese students who were caught gathering intelligence, and imams who were actually Libyan spies. The damage done by the activities of foreign powers in the Netherlands is considerable. In the paper examples are mentioned of behaviour which suggest espionage, such as suspicious applications for job and unusual invitations. Organisations and companies must be aware that espionage can indeed affect them. The AIVD and MIVD give advice to limit the damage as much as possible. It is therefore better to determine the ‘group of insiders’ on the basis of the principle of ‘need-to-know’ principle instead of sharing information generously (nice-to-know).

The brochure can be found on the website of the AIVD, under the heading ‘publications.’
6 Proliferation

6.1 Introduction

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is a violation of the international legal order and a threat to national security. In this context the AIVD is gathering intelligence regarding the programmes for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery of countries of concern. The issues concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has a component belonging to the security function as well as one element which should be ranged under the foreign intelligence function.

In the framework of the security function the AIVD investigates the threat that the Netherlands becomes involved in the acquisition of knowledge, technology, and goods which benefit the countries of concern in their development of weapons of mass destruction and/or their means of delivery. The AIVD collects as part of its foreign intelligence task information about the status of programmes for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. In addition to this, the AIVD gathers information concerning the formation and the modus operandi of the procurement networks for the purpose of these programmes, cooperation with other countries and the political context within which these programmes are carried out. This information contributes to raising the Dutch resistance against relevant threats.

In addition to the clandestine procurement of goods, machines, and equipment, undesired transfer of knowledge is seen as a growing proliferation problem. Partly against this backdrop, the AIVD informs the Dutch business community, universities, and scientific institutions so that they can increase their resistance against clandestine proliferating activities by countries of concern. The increasing number of requests for advice and reports coming from the business community and these institutions emphasises the importance of this preventative consciousness-raising programme and by that contributes to the Dutch counter proliferation and export control policy.

The AIVD provides policy makers, executive bodies, and interested parties of relevant information. Especially the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs are interested because they are responsible for security and export control respectively. Additionally the AIVD has cooperated intensively in 2006 with the MIVD on this subject. Apart from this bilateral cooperation, the AIVD is also participating in a
consultation between interested parties in the area of export control in the Netherlands (Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs, FIOD-ECD (Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service-Economic Investigation Service), customs, and the AIVD). The AIVD has also internationally been an active participant in diverse forums in order to counter the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

6.2 Countries of concern

Many countries regard the possession and development of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery a way to exert influence on a global and regional level. Countries which are suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and of pursuing targets which could pose a threat for the international legal order and the security and concerns of the Netherlands and her allies are referred to as countries of concern. Cooperation focusing on this field of attention between domestic and foreign partners continued in 2006.

In 2006 the AIVD’s own investigation confirmed once more that countries of concern are cooperating with each other in the area of development, production, and procurement of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. By sharing knowledge, technology, and procurement networks these countries are capable of developing and producing more effective weapons.

6.2.1 Nuclear

The progress of Iran’s nuclear programme has been followed closely in order to assess its threat and in order to evaluate the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The IAEA report resulted in the beginning of 2006 in a referral of the dossier to the Security Council of the United Nations (UN), the adoption of resolution 1696 and finally on 23 December 2006 of resolution 1737. In this last resolution Iran was asked to suspend, among other matters, all enrichment and generation activities, including research and development, and to fully cooperate with the IAEA relating to verification activities and the answering of yet unanswered questions. Despite the request of the UN Security Council, the country has continued with the installation of ultracentrifuges in Natanz for the enrichment of uranium. The IAEA report of November 2006 confirms this and states that Iran already has two cascades (an unbroken series of
ultracentrifuges) in operation existing of 164 P1-ultracentrifuges in the pilot plant in Natanz.
On the basis of what is now known it can be concluded that Iran is making advancements in the field of nuclear fuel production. In several periods of time in 2006 Iran has fuelled both cascades with Uranium hexafluoride (UF$_6$). This has resulted in the successful enrichment of small amounts of UF$_6$. This concerns low enriched uranium that is suitable for civil purposes, but is not applicable for a nuclear weapon.

6.2.2 Means of delivery

During two big military exercises in April and November 2006 Iran carried out for the first time launching tests with the Shahab-3, a ballistic missile with a reach of 1300 kilometres. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) was involved in the last test. The operational use of the military was striking as the Shahab-3 has been launched previously only for testing purposes. As a result of this exercise, the Iranian Minister of Defence declared that Iran was in the possession of a modified version of the Shahab-3 with a reach of 1800 kilometres.

6.2.3 Procurement

In 2006 the AIVD was frequently in contact with the Ministry of Economic Affairs regarding the export of goods to countries of concern. Despite the best efforts the international community are making in preventing the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, countries of concern are still succeeding in procuring dual-use goods. However, a trend can be seen that the tightened up export controls are beginning to reap their reward. Also, resolution 1737 of the UN Security Council imposed a sanction on the export of nuclear and rocket-related goods now requiring a permit and technologies. Countries of concern are increasingly forced to settle for goods of a lesser quality, which have a less tight control on them.
The Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002) prescribes that one of the tasks of the AIVD, the so-called D-task is: ‘to conduct investigations regarding other countries concerning subjects designated by the Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs, in accordance with the ministers of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations and Defence.’ In practice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is also closely involved with the drawing up of the designation order, which is updated on a yearly basis. This order can, if international developments call for it, and if it is necessary be supplemented by means of an interim designation.

The designation order 2006 designates the following four focus areas:
- developments in the area of international terrorism;
- the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
- tensions or disputes in countries or areas which could pose a threat for the international stability or international legal order;
- developments which may endanger the Dutch or European security of energy supply.

The question of who is accountable for the carrying out of these investigation activities with respect to the first two mentioned focal areas is also described in Chapters 2 and 6 of this annual report.

The appendix of the designation order, in which the matters to be investigated are further specified, is classified SECRET. These are not subjects that can be described in detail in a public report as this would mean that subjects of investigation and its linked questions would be made public. The parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services are further informed if necessary regarding the investigations which result from the designation order of the Prime Minister.

The investigations carried out by the AIVD as part of the foreign intelligence function are in aid of:
- the contribution to the determination of positions of the Dutch government as to foreign policy;
- to provide the government with information which cannot be obtained, or is difficult to obtain, via other channels, when holding international talks;
- to better comprehend and sooner identify existing and latent national security threats;

65
• contribute to the protection of the Dutch presence and interests abroad.

Reports on these investigations are sent to the Ministers of General Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs, Interior and Kingdom Relations, and Defence. Communications regarding the developments in the area of international terrorism are furthermore made available to the NCTb. Reports are also sent to foreign official bodies, such as NATO and the Joint Situation Center of the European Union. Background information is distributed to the Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) of the United Nations on an ad-hoc basis.

Where necessary discussions with the MIVD took place regarding the contents of the communications. If the subjects were suitable, it was decided to draw up joint reports of both services. The AIVD is participated in an Energy platform together with the Ministries of General Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Economic Affairs as regards the investigation of the issue of security of energy supply.
8 Protective security

8.1 Developments

One of the AIVD’s statutory tasks is to promote that the responsible and competent authorities and bodies ensure adequate security. The AIVD’s protective security activities are focused on the areas special information, vital sectors, persons, objects, and services belonging to the government domain, and other focus areas designated in relation to national security.

The AIVD has in 2006 developed a new vision on the protective security function. This new vision will give the interpretation of this function a different perspective. Giving resistance enhancing advice is no longer central to the AIVD’s activities in the area of promoting security. The focus has been shifted to giving specific information on a threat, geared to acquired knowledge and expertise on the interest in question. Special attention is given to specific vulnerabilities with regard to that interest (for example, critical industrial operations within a vital sector) so that the consumer can take the necessary measures independently. In rare cases it will be still necessary to analyse a resistance level in order to produce a risk analysis. The largest part of the AIVD’s products will be focused however on interests and threats.

The need for forming a vision is inspired by the fact that in practice the AIVD does not fulfil an unequivocal role with respect to protective security, which is undesirable when managing expectations towards the outside world. The AIVD sometimes functions as a supplier of threat information, and sometimes as advisor regarding concrete security measures, where the AIVD also sometimes fulfils a verifying role to check whether these measures have been taken. The new vision on the protective security function ensures an unambiguity in the role of the AIVD and is in line with the newly formulated mission statement of the service in which the emphasis is laid on informing interested parties about invisible threats so that these can take measures independently. By forming a new vision, the AIVD also responds to comments from the outside world. From contacts with users of AIVD information, it is consistently proven that mainly the need for threat information - focused on stakeholders - is quite large.

The year 2007 will see the implementation of the new vision on the protective security function. Attention will also be given to an adequate transfer of tasks that will be given up and to discussing with clients the time of the transformation.
In addition to the new vision on the protective security function, work has been done in the development of a review of the relationship between the National Communications Security Agency (NBV) and its customers. Talks with the customers for this reason have taken place in 2006. The revision will take place in 2007.

8.2 Safety and Security System

The basic principle of the Safety and Security System is that the responsibility for personal security lies primarily with the citizens themselves, the organisation which they belong to, and the local authorities. Supplementary to this, special responsibility for certain groups of people, property, and services lie with the central government.

For the benefit of the Safety and Security System, the AIVD provides diverse threat-related products to the Protection and Security Coordinator (CBB), who falls under the NCTb. In these products, the AIVD points out what the concrete and potential threats are, from the perspective of the person or organisation under threat. The CBB, indicates on the basis of the information given by the AIVD, KLPD, and MIVD, what the threat level is for the person or organisation under threat, and advises those organisations who will be dealing with the matter.

In November 2006 Parliament adapted the bill to amend the Intelligence and Security Services Act (Wiv 2002) for the Safety and Security System. The Wiv 2002 is for the AIVD extended with a provision for the so-called e-task, in which it has been laid down that the AIVD, for the benefit of the Safety and Security System, draws up threat and risk analyses. The e-task enables the AIVD to begin a specific investigation, from the perspective of the person or organisation under threat, into possible threats against a person, service or property which fall within the so-called Government domain. This investigation can be focused on potential threats outside the regular focal areas of the service and takes place without implementing special intelligence resources.

The coming into effect of the amendment to the Wiv 2002 enables the AIVD to fully implement the new approach: identifying and analysing potential threats from the perspective of the threatened person or organisation.

In 2006 the AIVD drew up 200 threat reports, threat assessments, threat and risk analyses, and 41 statements for the CBB. Most of the products were threat assessments and many products were concerned diplomats or diplomatic property, foreign visits, ICTY witnesses, national politicians, and big events.
In 2006 a number of subjects attracted special attention and the AIVD formulated several threat assessments regarding these. At the beginning of 2006 the so-called cartoon matter led to much international unrest. Muslims worldwide took offence at images of the Prophet Mohammad in a Danish newspaper. The AIVD investigated if this had possible repercussions for the threat to individuals and property in the Netherlands. In 2006 the AIVD also investigated if the deployment of Dutch troops to Uruzgan had consequences for the threat level in the Netherlands. As a result of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah threat assessments were formulated concerning the possible consequences for the threat against Israeli objects, nationals, and Jewish institutions in the Netherlands.

From 9 June to 9 July 2006, the football World Cup took place in Germany. In close cooperation with foreign counterpart services, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CBB, and the KLPD, among other organisations, the AIVD investigated the threat against this international event and drew up a threat analysis.

In the run-up to the parliamentary elections of 22 November 2006, the AIVD investigated the possible threat against the elections in general and specifically against the (candidate) politicians. The AIVD cooperated closely with the CBB and the KLPD and many threat assessments were drawn up.

8.3 Protection vital sectors

The AIVD focuses on the promotion of measures in order to protect vital sectors of Dutch society. These are sectors which in the opinion of the responsible minister, are of vital importance for the preservation of society. The AIVD employs the designation of the cabinet of 2003 as starting point for its work in the vital areas. In this, the twelve vital sectors in the Netherlands are defined, among which are energy, drinking water, transport, nuclear and chemistry, finances, and telecommunication. A part of the vital products and services are included in the Counter-Terrorism Alert System, for which the AIVD formulates its threat analyses (see 8.4).

8.3.1 National Advice Centre Vital Infrastructures (NAVI)

In 2006 the AIVD took part in a project group which, under the chairmanship of the Ministry of BZK, focuses on the development of the National Advice Centre Vital Infrastructures (NAVI). The NAVI has as its goal to realise a permanent and solid
protection of the structure and durability of the vital infrastructure and does this by focusing on identifying and sharing relevant knowledge regarding security as well as information on threats.

Also, the NCTb as well as the Ministries of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment (VROM), Transport, Public Works, and Water Management (VW) and Economic Affairs, took part in the project. The project group has examined the desired tasks, organisation and position of the NAVI and in November 2006 the council of ministers, on the basis of the project group’s proposal, agreed to establish the NAVI. At first the NAVI is set up for two years falling under the responsibility of the Ministry of BZK. Then it will be evaluated after which the definitive format, positioning and its financing will be determined.

The AIVD contributes to the realisation of the NAVI’s goal by sharing available threat information on the basis of its core tasks. It concerns information regarding developments, trends, and modus operandi. The NAVI will not take over any tasks from the NCTb nor from the AIVD.

8.3.2 National Information Centre Cyber Crime (NICC)

The National Information Centre Cyber Crime (NICC) must form the beginning for a future information exchange in the context of national vital infrastructure in order to combat cyber crime. The AIVD has agreed to contribute to the NICC by providing information regarding ICT-related threats. In September 2006 the information centre was started up by way of a model which was based on the information exchange model developed in the United Kingdom by the National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre (NISCC).

The experiment was started at the end of 2006 with two vital sectors, namely finance and drinking water. Gradually the number of vital sectors which will take part in the information centre will be expanded. The experiment terminates in July 2008. Apart from the AIVD, Govcert.nl and the KLPD will take part and will cooperate with the NAVI (see 8.3.2). Govcert.nl supports governmental organisations in preventing and dealing with ICT-related security incidents.

8.3.3 Interdepartmental working group chemistry

The AIVD has participated in the interdepartmental working group Chemistry which is under the leadership of the Ministry of VROM. In the pilot ‘security in the chemical sector’ the working group looked at the security of chemical companies who are considered representative for the chemical sector. The AIVD has drawn up a threat
picture and at the request of the Ministry of VROM has shared this with the responsible security managers, in the context of the new vision of the protective security function. In addition, the AIVD has used its resistance-related expertise for examining the security of these companies. On the basis of insights gained by this pilot, VROM will make an agreement with the chemical sector. It is expected that this agreement will begin to operate in the course of 2007.

### 8.4 Counter-terrorism alert system

The goal of the Counter-Terrorism Alert System (ATb) is that after a threat of a terrorist attack has been confirmed, governmental departments and business sectors can quickly take measures to prevent such an attack or at least limit its effects. The choice of measures is linked to up-to-date threat information given to governmental departments and business sectors by the NCTb. The NCTb bases its information on several sources, including the AIVD.

At the request of the NCTb, the AIVD has drawn up in 2006 threat analyses for the sectors which are connected to the ATb: airports, the Rotterdam Harbour and the petrochemical industry in Rotterdam, drinking water, public transport, gas, electricity, nuclear and finance. The sectors in the ATb overlap the vital sectors (see 8.3), but are not exactly the same.

On the basis of the threat analyses, the NCTb has decided to determine a basic threat level for most sectors. However, in 2006 a light threat level was determined for the sector airports (Schiphol).

### 8.5 Special Information Security

The security of special information encompasses extra security which applies for state secrets and other vulnerable information. The AIVD promotes the security of this information by contributing to the realisation of national and international regulations, by giving security advice to government bodies and companies, and by developing and acquiring information security products.
8.5.1 Security of Information Regulation for the Government Service - Special Information (Vir-bi)

The Vir-bi provides rules for the security of special information at national government level. In 2006 an interdepartmental working group was set up to make an inventory of the state of affairs as regards to the implementation of the Vir-bi at ministries and any problems which might have come up, and if necessary, to come up with proposals to adjust the Vir-bi.

In the light of the new vision on the protective security function, discussions haven taken place with the directorate Personnel, Organisation, and Information Government (POIR) of the Ministry of BZK regarding the transfer of the coordinating task to this directorate which the AIVD has at present with respect to the Vir-bi. POIR is already responsible at the moment for the Security of Information Regulation for Government Departments (Vir) that provides rules for the security of information within the government.

8.5.2 Working Group on Special Information Security

The Working Group on Special Information Security (WBI) gives advice on government policy on special information security. The Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice, the Interior and Kingdom Relations, and General Affairs take part in the WBI. The working group meets four times a year and is chaired by the AIVD.

In 2006 the WBI deliberated about their future terms of reference and position. The reason behind this was the lack of clarity with respect to the current (interpretation of) terms of reference of the WBI and the position of the working group in relation to other cooperative groups also dealing with information security. This will be linked to the main structure of governmental security: the Coordinating Council Integral Security (CBIB). Information security is part of this integral security. By linking with this main structure, the doubling of tasks will be avoided.

On the recommendation of the WBI, in 2006 nine new products were approved of for the protection of classified government information. These products are for the encryption of data and networks and for the deleting of data. Additionally, a change was introduced in the approval for the use of a product for fax encryption. Also, the WBI asked the AIVD to broaden the portfolio of approved products to protect classified information on USB sticks and to find a safe way to e-mail on a PDA.

On the recommendation of the WBI, the head of the AIVD, on behalf of the Minister
of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, has established a renewed policy advice regarding compromised radiation. This policy advice is referred to in the Vir-bi. In this advice it is determined which methods and which norms the equipment must be measured against in order to ascertain if the equipment is leaking information via electromagnetic radiation. The policy advice is in agreement with NATO regulations.

8.5.3 National Security Authority (NSA)

At national level, the National Security Authority (NSA) is responsible for the security of classified information from NATO, the EU and the Galileo project. In the Netherlands the Ministers of Defence and the Interior and Kingdom Relations are responsible for the NSA. The latter minister has delegated her tasks to the AIVD. The Ministry of Defence addresses the security in the military sector and the AIVD on the civil sector. The coordination lies in the hands of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

In 2006, within the context of the fight against terrorism, the NATO and the EU Security Committees put emphasis on the further development of cooperation with third party countries and on facilitating the exchange of classified information with these countries. In addition, the Security Committee of the EU is concentrating on a treaty that makes exchange possible of classified EU information with the International Criminal Court which is based in the Netherlands.

On request of the ESA member states, the AIVD had conducted an inspection of the Galileo Project Area in 2006, which is carried out by ESTEC (European Space Research and Technology Centre), based in the Netherlands. This resulted in the issue of a security clearance to ESTEC for the period of one year. This makes it possible to handle classified information within the Galileo project originating from those taking part in the programme.

In 2006 the AIVD, in the capacity of the so-called ‘ Appropriately Qualified Agency’ (AQUA), has carried out a second party evaluation of crypto-equipment developed in Germany on behalf of the EU. In addition, the concept of a secure GSM, which was developed in the Netherlands together with Sectra, a producer of crypto-equipment, underwent a second party evaluation in 2006. The formal accreditation of this secure GSM for the EU is expected at the beginning of 2007. After this, Sectra can be used to communicate classified EU information.
The Netherlands is host to a number of international organisations and has a task to ensure as much as possible the undisturbed functioning of these organisations. These institutions may encounter security risks regarding premises, staff, and visitors. The AIVD has provided several with security advice. In 2006 talks were commenced with several international organisations in order to draw up a Memorandum of Understanding which will set the boundaries of what the AIVD and the international organisations can do within the sphere of cooperation in the light of the new vision of the protective security function.

8.6 Other activities

8.6.1 Screening candidate ministers

The Committee administrative evaluation (CBE) has recommended to create a formal authorisation on the basis of which the AIVD will be enabled to conduct investigations into the background of candidate ministers and secretaries of state. At present the AIVD does not have such an authorisation. As a result of this recommendation, in 2006 the Ministries of General Affairs and Interior and Kingdom Relations have been in consultation with each other. It was considered to create this authority by means of a legislative amendment. It was concluded though that at that moment there was insufficient need for such a legislative change. The existing role of the AIVD as regards the screening of candidate ministers is maintained, which is to say that the AIVD will consult its own records at the formateur’s behest (the person putting a cabinet together), and that the formateur will receive information regarding the results of the AIVD’s consultation of its records.

8.6.2 Risk information accessible to the public

In September 2006 Parliament agreed upon an amendment in Article 6a of the Disasters and Major Accidents Act (Wrzo). Through this legislative change, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations can limit accessibility of information on risk maps on the Internet for the interest of national security. The AIVD contributed to the preparation phase of this legislative change. In an earlier stage, the AIVD recommended the Minister of the Interior not to provide full transparency with respect to risky situations, including insight into effect distances. This is the first time that a link has been made between national security and accessibility of risk-related information.
8.6.3 Voting machines

During the course of 2006 reports were seen in the press expressing doubts regarding the security of voting machines. As a result, at the request of the Minister of Government Reform and Kingdom Relations (BVK), the AIVD investigated if it was possible if others than the voter in and/or outside the polling station could see or hear what was voted. The results of the investigation showed that the interception of voting machines was indeed possible. On the basis of the AIVD report, the minister of BVK decided to withdraw the approval of two types of voting machines.

In January 2007 measurements were taken on an adapted SDU type voting machine. These measurements showed that this adapted machine was also vulnerable to interception by the receiving of electromagnetic radiation past the maximum distance which was considered acceptable by the minister. The minister of BVK maintained the withdrawal of approval for the voting machine concerned. Subsequently, SDU, after commencing interlocutory proceedings, demanded that the minister for BVK via the AIVD carry out new measurements. The court in interlocutory proceedings decided in the manufacturer’s favour. Once again, new measurements proved that the delivered voting machines were vulnerable to attack from distances larger than the mentioned maximum and the withdrawal remained in force.

8.6.4 Integrity Violations Reporting Centre

In the context of the protective security task of the BVD/AIVD, the Integrity Violations Reporting Centre (Mepia) was set up in the middle of the 1990s: a service where anybody can report a (possible) violation to integrity within the public administration.

In June 2006 the minister announced that Mepia would be discontinued in the foreseeable future at the AIVD. This is the result of an earlier made conclusion that the continuation of Mepia as institution with the AIVD is no longer the most obvious option. Under the Wiv 2002 the AIVD of course will keep its task in the area of integrity violations if these pose a threat to national security.

The moment of discontinuation of Mepia with the AIVD is linked with the establishment of a new national integrity violations reporting centre where everybody can anonymously report alleged dishonourable conduct of government officials. At the moment the Ministry of BZK is working on accommodating and the realisation of this reporting facility. During the course of 2007 a definitive decision will be made about this.
Positions involving confidentiality and security screening

A position which has the possibility to damage national security can be designated as a position involving confidentiality. The minister responsible for the policy domain to which a position involving confidentiality belongs or the competent authority of a High Institution of State designates the position involving confidentiality, in accordance with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK). A position involving confidentiality can only be fulfilled when the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations has issued a security clearance (or certificate of no objection (VGB)) for the official in question. A security screening (or vetting investigation) is conducted to establish whether a security clearance can be issued or should be refused.

There are three categories of positions involving confidentiality: A, B, or C positions. The category indicates the vulnerability of the positions, in which context position A is the most vulnerable. The scope and intensity of the security investigations (vetting inquiries) correspond to the degree of vulnerability involved in these positions. In addition to these three categories, there are more specific positions involving confidentiality at the police (P-category), in civil aviation (BL-category), and with the Royal Household (KH-category). The security investigations are tailored to the positions concerned.

9.1 Developments

The increasing duration of security screenings have been a recurring problem for many years. In the last five years the number of category A security investigations conducted by the AIVD has grown considerably; from 1,055 in 2001 to a peak of 2,969 in 2005. In 2006 2,584 category A investigations were handled. In fact, there is an unsatisfactory balance between demand and available production capacity. The A category security investigations are the most labour intensive, not only because they involve an administrative phase, but also a field investigation. Because of this, the waiting times before and during the course of the investigation increase considerably and therefore also the duration of procedures. Due to several social developments, the demand for security screenings has grown and changed:
- the call for trusted staff has increased;
- companies and institutions are more often network organisations;
- the environment in which people live has become more complex. In order to get the same picture of an official in a position involving confidentiality as before, more and different investigations are necessary. The AIVD believes that the quality of security screening should remain on the same level. The importance of national security goes before all.

The AIVD has started a three-step plan with as goal not only to overcome the growing duration of investigations, but also to strategically view the carrying out of security investigations. The three-step plan involves solutions in the short, medium and long term. All contribute to the predictability and manageability of designating positions involving confidentiality and the execution of security investigations, and they anticipate a reaction on the increasing demand for security screening.

The first step is making production agreements with clients. In 2006 the AIVD made production agreements with the KLPD for the security screening of their own staff. This has resulted in gearing available production capacity to the demand of carrying out security investigations. Agreements will also soon be made with other clients. Also, guidelines designating positions involving confidentiality have been implemented in 2006 (see 9.2.1). The second step will be formed by several projects which has as goal to increase the efficiency and manageability of security screening, i.e. Energisation, Control of positions involving confidentiality, and Predictability (9.3.1). The third step, which was started mid 2006, is a strategic revision of the designation of positions involving confidentiality and the carrying out of security investigations.

9.2 Designating positions involving confidentiality

In 2006 the AIVD began with bringing lists of positions involving confidentiality at the Ministries up to date. The new Guidelines for the Designation of Positions involving Confidentiality, one of the measures of the three-step plan, will help with this.

9.2.1 Guidelines for the Designation of Positions involving Confidentiality

In the Security Investigations Act (Wvo), it is stated that positions which may damage national security can be designated as positions involving confidentiality. The relevant minister or the High Institutions of State designate the positions involving
confidentiality in accordance with the Minister of BZK. The notion of national security has been translated into three grounds of designation for positions involving confidentiality:

- dealing with state secrets;
- vital positions in society;
- integrity violations.

These grounds of designation are covered by existing rules and policy. The AIVD brought out in 2006 the Guidelines for the Designation of Positions involving Confidentiality. These guidelines give unequivocal and concrete criteria for the designation of these positions and provide clarity for the ministries and the High Institutions of State where and when they can and should appoint security officers in consultation with the AIVD. The Guidelines for the Designation of Positions involving Confidentiality can therefore be seen as a clarification of the Wvo. In 2006 the AIVD tightened the guidelines and applied them in the designation of positions involving confidentiality.

9.2.2 Developments in the designation of positions involving confidentiality

In 2006 a great number of ministries began with again specifying lists regarding positions involving confidentiality. The Guidelines for the Designation of Positions involving Confidentiality are for this purpose being used as a point of departure. The number of these positions have decreased for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. It is also expected that the number of positions involving confidentiality will fall in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education, Culture and Science. For the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, it is expected that the number will rise. Expectations are that the lists for positions involving confidentiality will be determined early in 2007.

The High Institutions of State and the Queen’s Cabinet will draw up early in 2007 a new list for positions involving confidentiality. Integrity is for these institutions an important ground for designation. The new guidelines offer for this purpose sound starting points.

In 2006 organisational changes have been the cause for sixteen police forces to update once or more times their lists of positions involving confidentiality. At the end of 2006 an investigation was started in order to examine the possibility of clustering positions involving confidentiality with the Dutch police on the basis of vulnerability levels. If clustering is possible, there will be no need to screen staff when they change
positions internally. The list of positions involving confidentiality can be adapted accordingly in 2007. Possible revision of the list of positions involving confidentiality has little influence on the number of positions involving confidentiality with the Dutch police.

On the initiative of the AIVD, the Ministry of Justice and the Board of Procurators General, in 2006 a list for positions involving confidentiality within the Public Prosecution Service (OM) was drawn up. It is expected that early in 2007 a new list for positions involving confidentiality will be drawn up. The new list means an enormous growth of the number of positions involving confidentiality at the OM. The new list does not only encompass positions at the National Office of the Public Prosecution Service, but also positions at district public prosecutor’s offices, Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of Appeal, National Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the National Public Prosecutor’s Office for Financial, Economic and Environmental Offences.

In 2006, the AIVD, in cooperation with International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), began preparatory talks to draw up Memorandums of Understanding. The goal of the MoUs is: to enable the AIVD to conduct investigations at the request of ICC and ICTY for certain categories candidate employees of these organisations. Also other agreements for the cooperation with the AIVD will be established with the ICC and ICTY in the MoUs.

Ever since 2004 there have been positions involving confidentiality at the Royal Household. The positions involving confidentiality have been introduced in phases for the Royal Household in order to prevent temporary enormous work pressure at the AIVD. In September 2007 security investigations will have been requested for all positions involving confidentiality. In addition, organisational changes in the Royal Household were in 2006 reason to revise the list of positions involving confidentiality. At the end of 2006 discussions were initiated for a revision of the list positions involving confidentiality in which the possibility to cluster the positions on the basis of vulnerabilities was one of the subjects for discussion.

9.3 Conducting security investigations

This section explains the improvements of the execution phase in the three-step plan. Furthermore, this section describes the trends in security screening and gives the production figures.
Part of the three-step plan (see 9.1) for improving the efficiency of the AIVD in security screening is the implementation of process improvements for a medium long period. In 2006 these process improvements were started. The goal was to augment the efficiency and manageability of the security screening process. For this purpose, three projects have been started.

The first project, Energisation, has been started as a result of one of the recommendations of the Committee Access Control Schiphol (Oord committee 2005). The recommendation was to energise security investigations in order to enhance the security at Schiphol. The Minister of Justice, also on behalf of the Minister of BZK and the Minister of Defence has announced to implement this recommendation. To this end, an amendment to the Security Investigations Act has been proposed to the Lower House. The proposed amendment gives the AIVD the opportunity to actively consult judicial and information pertaining to criminal proceedings and information from police records in order to determine if there is cause for a revised security investigation. Anticipating the proposed amendment to the Security Investigations Act, the AIVD started in 2006 to adapt and partly renew the provision of information in order to realise Energisation. If the proposed amendment is passed by the Lower and Upper Houses, civil aviation will be the first sector where Energisation will take place. In the next phase all positions involving confidentiality will be energised.

The second project is called Control of Positions involving Confidentiality. The implementation of the new Guidelines for the Designation of Positions involving Confidentiality (see 9.2.1) is a starting point in order to create a revised list of positions involving confidentiality per contributor. The project Control of Positions involving Confidentiality intends to set up an information system in order to have an updated list of staff holding positions involving confidentiality. A continuously updated list makes it possible to realise Energisation as well as to accurately assess the demand for security investigations.

In 2006 a beginning was made with the project Predictability. With this project, a system for the planning of capacity and production was outlined so that for 2007 a more detailed planning could be set up and more efficient arrangements could be made with applicants of security investigations regarding amounts and processing time. In 2007 this planning tool will be realised.
The three projects require the cooperation of the applicants to deliver up-to-date information about persons holding a position involving confidentiality so that a more efficient and manageable process for the designation of positions involving confidentiality and execution of security investigations is created. This should not only lead to a better execution process, but also to a better provision of information to the applicants.

9.3.2 Debt-related problems

A trend has become noticeable that in more and more investigations debt-related problems play a role. Having enormous debts can lead in some cases to vulnerability. The susceptibility of the person involved increases when accepting financial aid in exchange for clandestine information. This risk multiplies when the employer is not aware of the employee’s problems with debt. Guidance by a social worker in order to control and push back the debts and/or aid in debt repayment can take the mentioned vulnerability away in a great many cases. This problem asks an active role for employers. In order for security investigations to proceed, this means that often (a lot of) time must be spent to gain insight into the financial burdens and benefits, meaning that investigations are not always completed within the specified time limit.

9.3.3 Overviews of handled security investigations

A security clearance was applied for 45,551 times (Table 1) in 2006. The biggest rise in applications could be seen in the sector civil aviation. The main cause was the increasing employment opportunities found at the main airport. The AIVD itself has handled 11,796 applications, including 2,584 A-category investigations. A security clearance was refused 776 times (Table 3). In 2005 there were 1102 refusals. The greater part of the refusals, 735, concerned B-category investigations into the sector civil aviation. In 2006 a security clearance was withdrawn 83 times. The number of security investigations has again gone up in 2006, but the number of A-category investigations has decreased for the first time in five years. The cause is the temporary extreme drop in the number of applications by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They decided to have less new security investigations carried out until the new list with positions involving confidentiality has been determined. Table 1 shows an overview of the number of positions involving confidentiality and the amount of handled security investigations during the last three years. Table 2 shows an overview of the number of security investigations which the AIVD have handled in the last few years. Table 3 shows the reasons why people were refused a security clearance (VGB).
Table 1. Total number of positions involving confidentiality (p.i.v.) and handled and completed security investigations (s.i.), in the period 2004 to 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p. i.v.</td>
<td>s.i</td>
<td>p. i.v.</td>
<td>s.i</td>
<td>p. i.v.</td>
<td>s.i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government*</td>
<td>5,935</td>
<td>2,024</td>
<td>5,960</td>
<td>2,423</td>
<td>6,259</td>
<td>1,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Order Companies**</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>1,983</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td>2,362</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td>2,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Aviation***</td>
<td>34,894</td>
<td>34,894</td>
<td>31,330</td>
<td>31,330</td>
<td>35,437</td>
<td>35,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>15,365</td>
<td>1,054</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>4,137</td>
<td>16,147</td>
<td>4,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Household****</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vital companies</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous*****</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>1,626</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>73,882</td>
<td>42,047</td>
<td>74,265</td>
<td>42,315</td>
<td>78,159</td>
<td>45,551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Exclusive of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces, inclusive of the AIVD. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the number of FTEs for positions involving confidentiality.

** Under the column positions involving confidentiality the number of people is mentioned fulfilling a position involving confidentiality.

*** The figure under positions involving confidentiality represents the number of security investigations, because no positions involving confidentiality have been designated in civil aviation. In civil aviation a pass is required for access to protected areas. One of the conditions to obtaining such a pass is a security clearance issued on the basis of a security investigation.

**** The positions involving confidentiality at the Royal Household will be designated in phases over a period of three years.

***** Under the category ‘miscellaneous’ investigations are carried out at the request of other countries or international organisations in connection with security measures used by these countries or international organisations.

Table 2. Security investigations handled by the AIVD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-category</td>
<td>2,102</td>
<td>2,969</td>
<td>2,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-category</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KH-category</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-category</td>
<td>7,324 (4,290 via KMar)</td>
<td>8,328 (3,846 via KMar)</td>
<td>8,756 (3,708 via KMar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-category</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>10,516</td>
<td>12,433</td>
<td>11,796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Refusal of security clearances

| Category | Judicial antecedents | Insufficient information | Other reasons*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-category</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-category police</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-category</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-category</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-category civil aviation</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-category</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Other reasons for refusal are personal conduct and circumstances as well as information from AIVD records.

9.3.4 International organisations

In the context of the NSA task of the AIVD (see 8.5.3), the AIVD issues clearances for the EU and NATO in order to deal with special information of these organisations. In 2006, 272 clearances were given out for the EU and 90 clearances for NATO.

9.3.5 Security screening under the AIVD’s mandate

In 2006 the police forces, the National Police Agency (KLPD), and the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary (Kmar) carried out security investigations under mandate of the AIVD. This concerns, respectively, positions involving confidentiality at the police, Royal Household, and in civil aviation. In cases in which it appears that it is not possible to issue a security clearance, the authorities involved will pass on the investigations to the AIVD. This is done when there are judicial antecedents or when a security investigation has initially produced insufficient information to assess whether or not a security clearance can be issued. An investigation is also passed onto the AIVD when the person involved has been previously refused a security clearance, or when the person has been found in AIVD databases. To view the number of security investigations, see 9.3.3.

The police forces have started, under the responsibility of the AIVD, 2,637 P-category security investigations. This is including 60 which have been passed on to the AIVD. In 2006 the AIVD have handled 1,377 A-category security investigations for the police forces. In 2006 1,420 A-category security investigations have been completed. The
planned capacity amounted to 900 security investigations.

In 2006, the AIVD, the directorate Police of the Ministry of BZK and police forces started a course of action together in order to reduce the increasing duration of A-category investigations at the police. Together they concluded that the main cause of the long duration of procedures was due to the fact that the amount of applications by the police largely exceeded the reserved capacity. In 2007 the parties involved will implement measures to solve this.

Due to capacity problems, the KLPD has been able to carry out less investigations than planned. This has led to the necessity to extend the long-term planning. Fortunately, the capacity problems at the KLPD were solved during the course of 2006. As a result all the planned investigations could be carried out and they even caught up with the long-term planning. In total, the KLPD carried out 79 KH-category investigations, of which 16 were passed on to the AIVD.

The AIVD carried out 28 A-category investigations in 2006 for the Royal Household.

### 9.3.6 Objection and appeal cases regarding security screening

The overview below schematically shows the numbers and results of the objection and appeal procedures instituted against the outcome of security investigations.

**Numbers of objection and appeal procedures 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Provisional arrangements (VoVo)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objections</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court Cases</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals before the Council of State</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals before the Council of State by Minister</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Ruling (VoVo)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part of the below-mentioned completed objection and appeal procedures concerns cases which were instituted in 2005.
Results of completed objection and appeal procedures in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unfounded</th>
<th>Founded</th>
<th>No cause of action</th>
<th>Withdrawn</th>
<th>Denied</th>
<th>Allowed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objections</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court Cases</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals before the Council of State by appellant</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals before the Council of State by Minister</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Ruling (VoVo)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2006 the number of objections submitted under the Security Investigations Act showed a decrease of 136 to 120. Fifteen objections concerned rejections based on insufficient information of the candidate for the position involving confidentiality or his/her partner. The other objections pertained to mainly refusals and withdrawals of the security clearance on the basis of judicial antecedents.

The number of lodged appeals has increased from 18 to 23. One appeal was declared founded by the court, although the legal consequences of the decision were upheld by the court. The lodged appeal procedures have dropped in comparison to 2005. In 2006 two appeals were lodged. Both were lodged by the candidate for the position involving confidentiality and will be dealt with in 2007. Both cases concern the partner of the candidate. One case pertains to the definition of ‘partner’ and the other pertains to insufficient information of the partner of the candidate.

In 2006 the Council of State also gave a decision to appeal cases which were instituted in 2005. In four of the appeals lodged by the candidate involved, the Council of State confirmed the contested decision; the same applies for one of the appeals lodged by the minister. One appeal lodged by the minister has led to the reversal of the judgement of the Amsterdam court, while the Council of State made its own decision by dismissing the appeal as unfounded.

The Council of State upheld in this decision the viewpoint of the minister that the use of soft drugs by a candidate for a position involving confidentiality at the police is not compatible with the vulnerabilities of the position involving confidentiality, which include of combating heavy crime, including combating (soft) drug trafficking.
Other decisions of the Council of State in 2006 were the confirmation of the restrictive policy conducted by the AIVD regarding transgressions in youth and the confirmation by the Council of the State of the analogous application of the ‘Policy rule positions involving confidentiality and security investigations at civil airports' when the security clearance is withdrawn.

9.4 Civil aviation

9.4.1 Designation order positions involving confidentiality civil aviation

On 21 February 2006 the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) approved a new order designating positions involving confidentiality in civil aviation security. The order substitutes three old orders. The reasons for introducing a new order included, in addition to the wish to combine earlier orders, European legislation (regulation 2320/2002) and the legal obligation to regularly revise the designation, as well as some Parliamentary questions in the summer of 2005.

The new order has been changed on three points in comparison to the old orders. Firstly the staff employed in the so-called second-line hangars have been designated as officials holding a position involving confidentiality. This also applies to staff working at Schiphol (outside the air site), who are responsible for entrance control and issuing passes. In addition, by taking adequate security measures, the order also regulates that staff present at the terminal do no longer fall under the designation. This applies also for air cargo staff who are employed as couriers and chauffeurs.

9.4.2 Conducting security screening

In 2006 the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary (Kmar) under the AIVD mandate handled 35437 investigations in civil aviation. The Kmar passed on 3708 investigations to the AIVD, 138 less than in 2005. It concerned repeat investigations in 141 cases.

The project Energisation (see 9.3.1) is an important development in carrying out security investigations for the sector civil aviation. If Parliament agrees with the amendment to the Security Investigations Act, civil aviation will be the first sector where Energisation will be realised. As a result, one of the recommendations of the Committee Access Control Schiphol will be carried out in order to enhance security at Schiphol Airport.
10 Oversight

10.1 Control

10.1.1 The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK)

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is responsible for an adequate functioning and adequate performance of its tasks by the AIVD and consequently for the steering of the AIVD and the setting of priorities and posteriorities in all of the AIVD’s tasks.

It is the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations’ task to ensure that the steering and planning of the activities is performed in such a way that the interests of the various parts of the public administration are best served. This requires, on the one hand, setting clear priorities in one administrative hand and, on the other hand, the gearing of such priorities to the various interested parties. With respect to the focus area counter-terrorism there is close consultation between the Minister of Justice, who is also the coordinating Minister for counter-terrorism. With regard to the foreign intelligence task the focus areas have been laid down in the Designation Order.

In this context the Prime Minister formulates the designation in consultation with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Defence.

In practice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is closely involved in the decision-making.

In order to clarify the steering and setting of priorities within the AIVD’s performance of its tasks, in 2005 a new system was introduced for drawing up an AIVD year plan. In this context the AIVD sets priorities based on its own knowledge and insights. Subsequently the AIVD conducts talks with the main political and official relations of the AIVD in order to hear about their need for information. Based on the outcome of both trajectories a draft year plan is prepared and discussed with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The draft year plan is discussed in the Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee, submitted to the Council for National Security and adopted by the Council of Ministers.

The year plan gives insight into the AIVD’s focus areas for any specific year, and into the choices the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations has made relating to the deployment of people and resources. On 24 January 2006 the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations informed for the first time the Lower House by letter the outlines of the AIVD year plan for 2006.
10.1.2 The Council for National Security

The Council for National Security (RNV) was founded as a sub-council of the Council of Ministers following the attacks in Madrid in 2004. It addresses various issues concerning national security. Preparatory activities for the RNV are concentrated in two official bodies; the Joint Counter-terrorism Committee and the Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee (see also sections 10.1.3 and 10.1.4). The RNV meets periodically. In 2006 the Prime Minister (chairman), the vice-Prime Ministers, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice, and Aliens Affairs and Integration sat on the RNV.

In 2006 the following subjects were discussed in the RNV: jihadist networks in the Netherlands, lessons learned in connection with a number of important incidents of terrorism in, for example, the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, Germany and Morocco; energy supply security; the possible development of a nuclear programme in Iran; threat assessments relating to operations of the Dutch armed forces and in particular the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan; the freezing of credit balances to prevent or impede terrorist attacks; the progress reports on counter-terrorism to the Lower House, and the Current Terrorism Threat in the Netherlands, which is drawn up every three months by the NCTb in cooperation with organisations such as the National Police Agency (KLPD), the AIVD, the MIVD, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

10.1.3 Joint Counter-Terrorism Committee

In the Joint Counter-Terrorism Committee (GCT) items are discussed in particular with regard to terrorism and counter-terrorism. The GCT meets monthly and is chaired by the National Counter-terrorism Coordinator (see also Chapter 11 paragraph 1.4 on cooperation). All relevant organisations which are involved in counter-terrorism at national level, have a seat in the GCT.

10.1.4 Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee

In addition to the GCT, the Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee (CVIN) is an official preparatory body of the RNV. Unlike the GCT, whose agenda focuses only on issues directly related to terrorism, the CVIN has a broader scope within the context of national security issues. The CVIN meets in principle monthly and is chaired by the coordinator of the intelligence and security services of the Ministry of General Affairs.
Apart from the heads of the AIVD and MIVD, the director-general Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the director-general Security of the Ministry of BZK, the director General Policy Affairs of the Ministry of Defence, the director-general Law Enforcement of the Ministry of Justice, the deputy Coordinator of the Intelligence and Security Services and the NCTb have a seat in the CVIN.

10.2 Parliamentary matters and legislation

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is responsible for the AIVD and renders account to parliament in this context. In general account is rendered publicly to the Lower House. However, when subjects are involved which cannot be discussed publicly, account is rendered to the Lower House’s Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services.

At the request of the Lower House the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations has performed a comparative study into the way in which the supervision and democratic control over the Intelligence and Security Services is arranged in a number of other relevant countries. In addition to mapping supervision systems and democratic control in other countries, the investigation resulted in a positive picture of democratic control in the entire area of the Intelligence and Security Services in the Netherlands.

10.2.1 The Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services

In the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services of the Lower House, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations renders account on issues relating to the AIVD which cannot be handled in public. In 2006 the Committee consisted of the chairmen of the political parties represented in the Lower House, with the exception of the chairmen of the political parties who during the current parliamentary period split off and the chairman of the Socialist Party (SP), who did not wish to be included on the Committee. On invitation, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations gives a more detailed explanation of the subjects brought forward by the Committee relating to the AIVD’s operational activities. If desired the Minister also provides the Committee with written information. The Minister also informs the Committee at his own discretion.

In 2006 the Committee consulted with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations four times. Items discussed included background information relating to the
leaking of state secrets to the daily newspaper *De Telegraaf*, the protection of sources and the various supervisory reports issued by the Supervisory Committee (CTIVD). The Committee also discussed the way in which security investigations are performed at the AIVD, as well as various terrorism-related subjects. The Minister of Justice was also present at these meetings, in view of his coordinating task in this field. In 2006 the Committee made a working visit to the AIVD, in which context there was an emphasis on the AIVD’s internal security policy.

The agreements made in 2005 with the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services on informing this Committee (more) timely (and if possible in advance) and more structurally and systematically, were continued in 2006.

### 10.2.2 The Lower House

In the communication with the Lower House in 2006 the emphasis lay on the threat posed by terrorism and counter-terrorism measures. In this context both the Lower House’s standing committees for the Interior and Kingdom Relations and for Justice often acted together. Both ministers jointly sent several letters to the Lower House and answered questions from the members of the Lower House on the threat posed by terrorism and on counter-terrorism measures, both at the national and international level. In 2006 letters were also sent to the Lower House on the AIVD year plan 2006, on the annual report 2005 of the AIVD, on the integrity policy public administration and police and the threat posed by right-wing extremism.

An important subject of correspondence and debate with the Lower House in 2006 was the security regime within the AIVD in connection with two cases in which state-secret information of the AIVD had ended up with the media. The first case concerned the loss of a diskette containing state-secret information by a former staff member of the Regional Intelligence Service who was employed by the AIVD at the time. This diskette ended up with Peter R. de Vries, who spent an entire television programme on it. The second case concerned state-secret information relating to a BVD investigation into organised crime, completed in the late 1990s (the so-called Mikado investigation), which ended up outside the AIVD and at the newspaper *De Telegraaf*. In the latter case the AIVD officially reported unknown third parties on account of the violation of state secrets. A criminal investigation was started. In this matter the AIVD itself also performed an intelligence investigation into the damage of the compromising of the information to national security. Also, based on article 18 of the Security of Information Regulation for the Government Service - Special Information (Vir-bi), an investigation...
was conducted into the question how this compromising of state-secret information could have taken place and which organisational and protective measures were needed to avoid this happening again. During the whole of 2006 correspondence and debates took place with the Lower House on this so-called Mikado matter.

In late 2006 the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, also on behalf of the Minister of Justice, sent a letter to the Lower House on the evaluation of the government actions relating to the murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004.

The main consultations and debates with the Lower House concerned two incidents in which state-secret information had ended up outside the AIVD and with the media (on 26 January 2006 and 8 February 2006), on the AIVD’s 2006 year plan (on 16 March 2006) and on (counter-) terrorism.

For an overview of the public letters sent by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to the Lower House and responses to written questions from members of the Lower House, we refer to the AIVD’s website (www.aivd.nl). For an overview of the most important parliamentary documents sent by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to the Lower House, see Appendix III.

10.3 Communication

In 2006 there was hardly a day without the AIVD being in the news. For example, in connection with publications such as *The violent jihad in the Netherlands. Current trends in the Islamist Terrorist threat*. But also for example in connection with publications in the daily newspaper *De Telegraaf*. In late January the newspaper published an article on state secrets having been stolen from the AIVD building and ending up in the hands of criminals. The AIVD investigation into the leak that followed received much attention in the media during the year.

As it did in 2006, the service seeks to realise greater transparency. Staff speaking on behalf of the AIVD must however always find a balance between the desired openness and the necessary reticence. The first is based on the wish to explain the role the service plays within the security system. Open communication indicates what the AIVD is and is not permitted to do and what it is expected to do; its intention is to create support within society. But the desired openness sometimes loses out to the statutory tasks the AIVD is held to perform, which prescribes, among other things, that reticence is observed on matters such as procedures and sources. Owing to this limitation,
sometimes incorrect views of the AIVD continue to exist.
More than in the past the AIVD itself nowadays is also going public, both towards the
public at large and towards our partners. A proactive and strategic use of internal and
external communication therefore has a widely endorsed priority. This is expressed
among other things on the AIVD’s website, www.aivd.nl. The communication
investments in the area of recruitment have also been intensified.

10.4 Applications under the Freedom of Information Act

Everyone is entitled to file a request to inspect files held by the AIVD. The procedure to
be followed and the conditions governing the inspection of files are to be found on the
AIVD website.

Only information that is no longer relevant to the AIVD’s current activities may in
principle be released for inspection, unless the release of such information could
compromise AIVD sources or operational methods. Personal data pertaining to third
parties may only be disclosed if the information concerns a deceased spouse, registered
partner, child or parent of the applicant.

In 2006 there were fewer requests for inspection than in 2005. Despite the fact that
also in 2006 a number of requests were received which resulted in providing several
sizeable dossiers for inspection, all the requests were handled within the statutory
period of three months.

The number of requests submitted over the year under review is 134. Of these requests,
76 concerned data possibly in existence about the applicant him or herself, 24 requests
concerned data about deceased family members, 18 requests concerned the inspection
of data other than personal data, and 16 related to data of third parties.

It should be noted that the number of requests submitted is not representative for the
intensity and duration of the processing. As already indicated, in 2006 several requests
were received which required labour-intensive processing and which led to providing
extensive dossiers for inspection.

In 2006, fourteen applicants filed a notice of objection against refusals to permit the
release of files for inspection, nine applicants lodged an appeal against decisions on
an objection and four applicants instituted appeal proceedings against decisions of the
District Court. Of the proceedings still pending in 2006, 16 objections, nine court cases and two appeals were dealt with.

10.5 Complaints

The AIVD, the Lower House’s Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services, the Supervisory Committee (CTIVD), the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the National Ombudsman occasionally receive complaints from citizens relating to (alleged) actions of the AIVD. Such complaints are initially handled by the Minister, who seeks the advice of the Supervisory Committee. If the Minister’s response does not satisfy the complainant, he or she may turn to the National Ombudsman.

In 2006 the Minister submitted one new complaint to the Supervisory Committee. This complaint came from *De Telegraaf* and co.

In addition, two complaints received in 2005 were settled in 2006 (see Annual Report 2005, second and third complaint). The complaint stating that the AIVD had prepared official reports on the basis of untrue information and that the AIVD constantly modified its official reports, was declared unfounded by the Minister in accordance with the Supervisory Committee’s advice. The complaint to the effect that the complainant was allegedly misled, abused and abandoned by the AIVD, on the advice of the Supervisory Committee was declared to be largely unfounded. Lastly, the complaint received and settled by the Minister in 2005 which was submitted to the National Ombudsman in 2005, stating that the AIVD had wrongly instituted an investigation into the complainant (see Annual Report 2004, third complaint), was declared unfounded by the National Ombudsman in 2006.

10.6 Supervisory Committee

The Supervisory Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services is an independent committee that exercises supervision over a lawful implementation of the Act on the Intelligence and Security Services 2002 and the Security Clearances Act. The committee issues supervisory reports based on its investigations. To the extent that the nature of the information contained in these investigations allows this, these reports are public. Any information in these reports that may provide insight into sources, the method of working and the current knowledge level of the
AIVD, is presented to the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services of the Lower House for confidential inspection. The Supervisory Committee also acts as a complaints advisory committee.

In 2006 the Supervisory Committee prepared five supervisory reports on the AIVD. These reports concerned an investigation into politically violent activism, more in particular violent animal rights activism, a counter-terrorism operation, the deployment of informers and agents abroad, issuing official reports, and an investigation into the leaking of state secrets to *De Telegraaf*. The Committee’s findings were generally positive.

These positive findings were in particular also relevant as far as issuing official reports by the AIVD is concerned. Based on information processed in these official reports the recipients may take measures against persons or organisations. Moreover, official reports can play a role in the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences. In the Committee’s opinion the official reports investigated had come about in accordance with the law and in an appropriate way, with due care having been applied. Besides, the Committee concluded that the contents of the official reports investigated had been substantiated by information collected by the AIVD and that the establishment of the reliability of this information had involved sufficient guarantees.

In 2006, at the request of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Committee also rendered an advice on the set-up and arrangement of an investigation based on the Security of Information Regulation for the Government Service - Special Information into the security aspects of the leaking of AIVD information to *De Telegraaf*. This resulted in an adjustment of the way in which the investigation was structured.

In 2006 the Committee was also still investigating the exchange of data between the AIVD and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, the implementation of the Security Clearance Act, the unsolicited interference of foreign powers, the functioning of Regional Intelligence Services and the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary in the context of article 60 of the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, the use by the AIVD of a number of special powers and the functioning of the CT-Infobox.

The Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 contains a notification obligation. This obligation means that five years after the termination of the exercise of several serious special competences, such as tapping, and after this period annually, it will
be investigated whether a report can be issued to the person regarding whom the competence was exercised. The obligation to perform such an investigation lapses if the issue of a notification report will reasonably result in the disclosure of the identity of a source or person who has assisted the AIVD, or if international relations are seriously harmed. Issuing a report is postponed as long as the necessity of protecting the AIVD's current knowledge level so requires. If it is established that a notification report can be issued, this should be done as soon as possible. In 2007 the first notification reports are to be performed. The AIVD has taken all the necessary measures for this purpose. Consultations have taken place with the Supervisory Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services on the policy to be pursued within the context of notification. The Committee will be informed in accordance with the law on the cases in which issuing a report will not be possible and the underlying motives on which this decision is based.
11 Cooperation

As stated in the mission statement of the AIVD, is the cooperation with (strategic) partners, interested parties, and foreign intelligence and security services of vital importance to the AIVD for the performance of its tasks. Cooperation is important to obtain new information and additional intelligence and is focused to share knowledge and information. This is in order to enable partners to take appropriate action with the aim to reduce identified threats and/or enhance the resistance capability.

11.1 Cooperation in the Netherlands

11.1.1 Local authorities

In 2006 contacts with the local authorities have been considerably intensified. Approximately fifty town mayors or the Municipal Executive were informed, at their own request or at the AIVD’s initiative, on the subject of radicalisation. In addition to supplying general information regarding trends and/or phenomena to the local authorities, the AIVD informed them about general and more specific matters. The supplying of information was combined with suggestions for taking appropriate action. The AIVD will continue to invest in this together with the RID.

11.1.2 Counter-terrorism Infobox

The counter-terrorism (CT) Infobox is a special partnership of the AIVD, IND, KLPD, the MIVD, and the OM. In 2006 the FIOD-ECD and the Financial Intelligence Unit Netherlands (FIU-NL, previously MOT-BLOM) definitively joined the partnership. The CT Infobox comes under the AIVD and is subject to the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002). The goal of the CT Infobox is to contribute to the fight against terrorism by comparing and compiling to a central point information regarding networks and individuals who are in any way involved in terrorism, specially Islamic terrorism, and terrorism-related radicalisation. Via consultation and comparison of information which have been supplied by the participating services, a multidisciplinary analysis is drawn up. Depending on the results, it is assessed which measures (concerning intelligence operations, criminal and aliens law, fiscal law, or a person-focused approach) taken by the participators will be possible or desirable. The CT
Infobox draws up an advice on the basis of these conclusions. The information needed to follow up on this advice is as much as possible directly exchanged between the different partners within their own applicable statutory regime.

Both combining the information available with the participating organisations and combining the expertise of these services have added value. In order to speed up the collecting and storing of information, as well as its processing and analysing, the AIVD started a project ‘Improvement CT Infobox’ in 2006 as part of its Security improvement through Information Awareness (VIA) programme. The VIA programme is aimed to implement an innovation in the area of counter-terrorism among other matters and is coordinated by the National Counter-terrorism Coordinator (NCTb). The AIVD, KLPD, and the Dutch Forensic Institute (NFI) are the participating partners.

11.1.3 Police and the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary

In 2006 the AIVD worked together with the police and the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary (Kmar) to improve quality in the context of the programme Keten en Kwaliteit (Information Chain and Quality). Emphasis is put on intensified and more professional cooperation. The foremost tangible results of the programme are the Intelligence Need Plan (IBP) and the Regional Information Box. Otherwise, attention was given to improve the training programme for the RID and BD/Kmar.

The intelligence need plans specify per regional police force (including ID/KLPD and the Kmar) which activities will be carried out by the RIDs concerned (and ID/KLPD and BD/Kmar) in the context of statutory AIVD tasks. These plans are adapted on a yearly basis.

The Regional Information Boxes are new consulting structures within the Regional police forces, aimed at radicalisation and jihadist terrorism. In this consultation, information needs of the participating partners are geared to one another. The AIVD participates within the statutory framework of the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002). This consultation enables to set up an analysis within an RID environment in which information gathered by the police (art. 62 Wiv 2002) and AIVD information are incorporated. The added value of such an analysis is that the police force management team may see the total picture of the information generated by police tasks, such as maintaining public order, as well as by the AIVD task carried out within the force. As a result, they can more adequately respond to the need for information within the different tasks of the force, the OM, and public administration.
In the context of the further improvement of the professional performance of the RIDs, ID/KLPD, and the BD/Kmar, the AIVD has given an impulse to the development and the giving of training and traineeships for officers of those services.

11.1.4 Public Prosecution Office (OM)

As a consequence of certain developments pertaining to criminal law and prosecution, there is a greater risk that counter-terrorist investigations carried out by the police and judicial authorities (can) interfere with those carried out by the AIVD. Coordination and cooperation is necessary for this reason. In 2006 coordination has been increasingly sought in diverse levels of consultation between the AIVD and the Public Prosecution Office. However, the point of departure is that the separation between intelligence work and criminal investigation must be maintained.

11.1.5 Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD)

In 2006 the relationship between the AIVD and the MIVD intensified even further. The action points from the Covenant of 2005 were mostly completed and a new covenant has been set up. This new covenant is more generic in structure than the previous one and will for this reason have a more long-term character. That the cooperation between the two services has deepened is mainly seen in the fact that in the covenant the possibility to establish task groups has been introduced. In this way, it is intended to combine resources from both services in investigative fields of joint interest in order to improve access to information.

Another aspect of intensified cooperation can be seen in the second phase of the National Sigint Organisation, also covered by the new covenant. This second phase, in which the organisation must actively become established, must be completed in 2007.

Cooperating with the MIVD, the AIVD has developed several initiatives. In 2006 the procedure was refined for the coordination with the MIVD as regards production in the area of Foreign Intelligence. It has been made possible for the MIVD in this way to make comments beforehand on AIVD products in the area of Foreign Intelligence. In addition, the AIVD has actively worked on the realisation of several task groups. Also on a number of occasions the AIVD actively provided information for the benefit of the MIVD and the defence system. In this context, discussions have been carried out with counterpart services and a usable solution has been found for the application of the third party principle.
The National Counter-terrorism Coordinator (NCTb) body was set up in 2004 in order to reinforce the coordination concerning policy-making and policy implementation in the field of counter-terrorism. In 2006 the cooperation between the AIVD and the NCTb further intensified. The AIVD again cooperated with the NCTb in a large number of areas.

The AIVD’s knowledge on phenomena in the field of terrorism and terrorism-related analyses produced by the AIVD are systematically shared with the directorate Kennis en Analyse (Knowledge and Analysis) of the NCTb. For instance, the AIVD shares information on a three-monthly basis with the directorate Kennis en Analyse of the NCTb regarding trends in the threat picture concerning radical Islam and jihadist terrorism. On the basis of this information, in addition to information from parties such as the MIVD, the police, the IND, and other parties, the NCTb draws up the Terrorism Threat Picture for the Netherlands.

The NCTb’s directorate Beleid en Strategie (Policy and Strategy) and the directorate Regie (Direction) use the terrorism-related analyses by the AIVD and before-mentioned other parties for drawing up appropriate policies. Within the latter directorate a way of combating chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism is developed for example. For the benefit of tackling CBRN terrorism, the AIVD provides threat analyses which can serve as a basis for determining the appropriate policy measures.

Four important cooperation areas in the context of cooperation between the AIVD and the NCTb are: the security of civil aviation, which is taken care of by the directorate Protection Civil Aviation of the NCTb, the further development of the Safety and Security System, Counter-Terrorism Alert System, and the project relating to local Salafist hotbeds of radicalisation. Both the Safety and Security System and the Counter-Terrorism Alert System are covered by the Unit Safety and Security within the NCTb. Also in these areas, the AIVD shares information with the NCTb regarding existing threats, so that the NCTb can use it as a basis for appropriate security measures. Finally, under the control of the NCTb, a multidisciplinary project is carried out concerning local Salafist hotbeds of radicalisation, to which the AIVD also contributes.
11.1.7 Financial Expertise Centre

In 2006 the AIVD took part in several projects of the Financial Expertise Centre (FEC). The FEC is a partnership between organisations which have a government task regarding the integrity of the Dutch financial sector. In the FEC, participating parties are: the OM, KLPD, Amsterdam-Amstelland police force, the board of supervisory directors, Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM), Tax and Customs Administration, Bank of the Netherlands (DNB), and the FIOD/ECD. Taking part in the Underground Banking project yields up-to-date knowledge about underground banking which can be used for detecting and combating the financing of terrorism.

The AIVD and the Tax and Customs Administration have worked together for a long time on the basis of a covenant. In addition, in 2006 several employees were appointed at the Tax and Customs Administration in accordance with Article 60 Wiv, which results in the development of further cooperation.

11.2 Cooperation with the overseas parts of the Kingdom

The Security Service of Aruba (VDA), the Security Service of the Netherlands Antilles (VNA) and the AIVD work together in diverse areas. The security services of the Kingdom exchange information and carry out joint investigations or aid each other in (security) investigations. Especially in the area of combating terrorism there are agreements concerning intensive exchange of information and expertise.

11.3 European Cooperation

In 2006 the AIVD cooperated in several ways with the organisations of the European Union. Contributions were made via an interdepartmental coordination process for working groups in Brussels such as COTER (Terrorism Committee) and WGT (Working Group on Terrorism). In addition, the AIVD assessed several proposals of the European Commission which touched upon the AIVD’s area of expertise and propagated its opinions interdepartmentally. In one or two cases, in connection with weighty interests about the proposals of the European Commission, the AIVD took care of the coordination of the Dutch point of view and of adequate arrangement of the follow-up process. The AIVD frequently consulted with its officers stationed in Brussels about dossiers and developments important to the Netherlands and the
AIVD. This has resulted in the AIVD decision to post an extra officer in Brussels (at the European Commission), among other matters. In the area of technical assistance to third-countries, regular consultations were carried out with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other parties in The Hague. The AIVD took part in the Interdepartmental International Counter-terrorism Consultation, organised and chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The AIVD spoke many times with the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator.

Finally, the AIVD has contributed in the formulation of the government’s position regarding the alleged CIA flights. This matter was fuelled by the European Parliament and the Council of Europe. The AIVD gave an explanation mainly to the European Parliament.

11.3.1 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

In 2006 at the request of the OSCE, the AIVD had received a delegation from Albania who was responsible for the setting up of parliamentary supervision on the Intelligence and Security services in Albania. The delegation received an extensive explanation on the way the Netherlands has arranged this supervision.

11.3.2 Counter Terrorist Group

The Counter Terrorist Group (CTG) is an informal partnership of the intelligence and security services of the EU member states, Norway and Switzerland. The CTG was set up immediately after the attacks in the United States in September 2001. In 2006 cooperation and the exchange of information received a further impulse within the CTG. The AIVD has contributed substantially to this. The project, initialised in 2005 in which a comparative analysis was made of known radicalisation cases and recruiting in European countries, was completed at the end of 2006 under the leadership of the AIVD. The results of this project will be brought to the attention of relevant policy makers on national and European level. Furthermore, the AIVD actively took part in diverse CTG expert meetings regarding, among other matters, CBRN-terrorism, the financing of terrorism, and the use of the Internet by terrorists.

Finally, in connection with the CTG, information has been intensively exchanged in the aftermath of the foiled attacks in the United Kingdom (August, 2006), the failed attacks in Germany (July, 2006), and the arrests in Denmark (September, 2006). Because of this, the AIVD was able to inform the relevant ministers and interested partners about the backgrounds of these events and about the possible consequences for the threat level in the Netherlands.
11.3.3 Club of Bern

The Club of Bern (CdB), an informal partnership of security services of the countries of the EU, Switzerland and Norway, was expanded further in 2006. The security service of Lithuania was welcomed to the Club. Although cooperation in the area of combating international terrorism is concentrated within the CTG, it remains also an important matter for Club of Bern. Furthermore, exchange of information and best practices takes place in areas such as counter-proliferation, counter-espionage, and Internet investigation.

11.3.4 Middle Europe Conference

The Middle Europe Conference (MEC) is an informal consultative forum for services of Central European countries. Some West European services, including the AIVD, also take part. In 2005 the AIVD started to reduce its active role in this forum, which was continued in 2006. The MEC remains to play an important role in helping and supporting services of new countries in the Middle European region, such as security services of new countries in the territory of former Yugoslavia.

11.3.5 Joint Situation Centre

In 2006 the AIVD contributed substantially to the products of the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) via an AIVD officer posted there by means of some dozens of contributions in many areas. Because SitCen produces assessments regarding events worldwide, the AIVD has concentrated on its own investigative areas. The SitCen assessments were used in diverse forums in Brussels, mainly in COTER and WGT. The AIVD has established that the follow-up in policy of such assessments have indeed improved in comparison to 2005, but still only a few activities are being developed which are based on SitCen assessments.

In 2006 SitCen shared many assessments, with contributions by the AIVD, with Europol. A start has also been made to share SitCen analyses with Europol.

11.4 International cooperation

11.4.1 NATO

The NATO Special Committee (NSC) is a committee where the members of which are
the security services of NATO Member States sit on. The AIVD has been responsible for the realisation of a widely supported memorandum regarding CBRN-terrorism. In addition, the AIVD participates in a NATO working group which advises the Ukrainian intelligence and security services on the formulation of proposals to the strengthening of democratic control and embedding in the democratic system of the security institutions of Ukraine.

11.4.2 United Nations

The initiative, started in 2005, to see if cooperation with the UN was possible in the area of counter-terrorism, was further given shape in 2006. This has specifically led to talks with representatives of UN CTED (Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate) during which agreements were made for the exchange of information.

11.4.3 The AIVD’s network of liaison officers and bilateral contacts

In 2006 the network of liaison officers abroad was strengthened along two lines. New liaison stations were opened in Ankara, Turkey and in Oranjestad on Aruba. In agreement with the Chinese authorities a liaison officer will be stationed to Beijing in 2007 with respect to security aspects surrounding the Olympic Games held in the People’s Republic of China in 2008.

The second line is the expansion of already existing stations of the AIVD with attachés of the AIVD who will work at the liaison station in question for a short or long period of time. This has taken place at the station in Jakarta, Indonesia. The AIVD assisted the NCTb in 2006 in making contact with intelligence and security services abroad with whom the NCTb, in accordance with the covenant between both organisations, does not have an independent relationship. This assistance takes place via secure networks of the AIVD and the liaison officers stationed abroad.
12 Organisational development and management

12.1 Organisational development

In July 2005 the AIVD started with the implementation of the development programme for quality and growth, Prospect 2007. This long-term development programme is the result of the recommendations adopted by the cabinet from the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD, supplemented with the AIVD’s own views. The programme seeks to enhance the four core competences (investigative, indicative, mobilising and acting) with the purpose of increasing the AIVD’s external orientation and reinforcing its operational strength. In 2006 various results were achieved; a number of projects were terminated as per 1 January 2007, because the relevant results had been achieved and there was sufficient confidence that actions for improvement would be continued throughout the line. An overview of the main results of the development programme achieved in 2006 and the points on which this development is related to the operational management is given below.

12.1.1 Investigative competence

The power to lay bare threats that are not immediately visible was reinforced in 2006 by taking various initiatives and setting up new organisational units. Examples include the reinforcement of internet investigations in existing teams and a new, specialised internet team. Also in the area of operational cooperation important results were achieved in the form of a new cooperation covenant with the MIVD and agreements with the National Police Agency (KLPD) on developing joint training programmes in the area of human sources. In addition, investments were made in the development of the CT Infobox (see above paragraph 11.1.2). Lastly, the deployment of intelligence coordinators who advise operational teams on the optimal use of means of intelligence and supervise the embedding of new means of intelligence in the operational working procedures, turned out to be valuable also in 2006.

12.1.2 Interpretative competence

To enhance the AIVD’s power to give meaning and context to large amounts of diverse data and information, in 2006 a number of knowledge domains, including ‘jihadism’ and ‘security clearance investigations’ were identified in order to develop a system to make strategic knowledge accessible and reducible across the organisation.
Also, quality standards were established and methods of analysis tested. In addition, in the context of the external assessment of strategic knowledge a framework was developed for various possibilities for interaction and platform development relating to external research institutes. This will make it easier for the AIVD in the future to share knowledge (e.g. on phenomena) and acquire scientific knowledge.

12.1.3 Mobilising competence

In order to enhance the competence to translate the exploitation of knowledge and information by the AIVD into useful action perspectives for partners and interested parties, in 2006 Key Account Management was introduced. In addition to this a policy has been developed across the organisation with regard to developing the relation with the local administration, in connection with the recommendations of the Working Group Provision of Information - Local Administration (Holtslag Committee).

12.1.4 Acting competence

To improve the AIVD’s capability to independently reduce threats and risks, in 2006 the decision was taken to appoint so-called action advisers. After the requirements which the action adviser is to meet have been worked out in more detail, in early 2007 a start will be made with (internal) recruitment. The administrative and legal modalities of the AIVD’s acting competence have meanwhile been approved. In so doing, it has been established when and how the AIVD is able to reduce threats and risks independently. In addition, a training programme has been drawn up for managerial staff involved in the acting competence. This programme will be offered in early 2007.

12.1.5 Growing intelligently and safely

In 2006 the AIVD expanded by 198 fte from 1069 fte to 1267 fte. The growth target of 150 fte has thus been amply realised. The expansion of the AIVD up to approximately 1500 fte in 2009 is on schedule. These positive results and prospects are attributable to a considerable extra effort in the area of recruitment and selection. In addition to the traditional recruitment channels a start was made with campus recruitment. Through providing information at universities and colleges candidates are informed early of a possible career with the AIVD. The recruitment of interpreters and translators has been further intensified in 2006. By using different recruitment strategies it was possible to realise a substantial growth in this area.

In order to sufficiently prepare new employees for their new activities, they follow an
introduction programme directly after they commence employment. This way they are made familiar with the security requirements quickly and intensively.

12.1.6 Organization of information and support processes

In 2006 the AIVD’s main processes model was established and various primary processes were described. Software packages were purchased which will become part of the AIVD’s modernised organisation of information. Currently the system is being designed and developed in close consultation with the user group. Attention has been paid to optimising the documentary information supply at the Regional Intelligence Services. Lastly, preparations were made for the conversion of data and the structure of the functional management.

In cooperation with the Central Archive Selection Service a large-scale project was started to improve the accessibility and material maintenance of archive documents from the period 1946 - 1990. Alignment was sought with the nationwide Project Eliminating of Arrears in Archiving Central Government, which was set up to process archives up to and including 1975.

As to the personnel policy, in 2006 all employees followed the training ‘AIVD in transition’. In addition, a new system for career policy and management development was developed, the start of the implementation of which took place in late 2006.

In the area of internal communication various improvements were completed, managers followed a communication training and the AIVD intranet was further developed. The organisation and communication in the event of policy incidents was further professionalised and the communication relating to AIVD publications intensified. As for external and internal steering, a steering model was developed and implemented in 2006 consisting of a new planning, reporting, evaluation and accountability system. By way of a contribution to the international cooperation the secured communication network for external partners was extended. The number of foreign intelligence and security systems with whom rapid and secure communication is possible, has thus been extended.

12.2 Management

12.2.1 Quality management and departmental audit service

The year 2006 was marked in particular by the development of a quality control
system as recommended by the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD, a broadening of knowledge and skills and the execution of evaluation investigations into the embedding of the Foreign Intelligence Task and the effectiveness of external hiring.

Every year the Ministry of BZK has an audit programme performed by the Departmental Audit Service (DAD). To execute the audit programme at the AIVD, separate agreements are made on the scope and depth of the investigations and the involvement of audit staff.

In 2006, in addition to the prescribed audit controls, audits were performed into the security of information and the programme management of the Development Programme Prospect 2007. The deputy head of the AIVD and the director of the DAD conducted consultations on the preliminary findings.

12.2.2 Finance

In 2006 the budget was approximately €23 million higher than in 2005, as a result of means allocated earlier. Decision-making on this took place in the context of the attacks in New York and Madrid, the murders of Fortuyn and Van Gogh and the findings of the Administrative Evaluation Committee.

These extra means facilitated the growth of personnel capacity, which allowed the execution of the AIVD’s reinforcement of its operational deployment as laid down in cabinet decisions. Investments were made in the organisation of internal information and the corresponding technical infrastructure. In addition, investments were made in the AIVD’s new accommodation, which is due to be completed in the autumn of 2007.

Budget (realisation figures):

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<tr>
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<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel expenses</td>
<td>€ 58,7 mln</td>
<td>€ 69,2 mln</td>
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<tr>
<td>Material expenses</td>
<td>€ 49,1 mln</td>
<td>€ 59,8 mln</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secret expenses</td>
<td>€ 3,9 mln</td>
<td>€ 4,4 mln</td>
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12.2.3 Management statement

Over 2006 the head of the AIVD issued the following statement: In the financial year 2006 attention was paid to the AIVD’s management in a structured way. Based on a risk analysis a systematic weighing-up took place as to the steering and control instruments to be employed.
Explanation:
In 2006 working agreements were made between the secretary-general and the management, and between the management and directors. In 2006 the year plans at directorate level were also an important instrument for working out in more detail the consequences of priorities, to which was decided in outline in a prior trajectory. Periodically during the review year account was rendered to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations on the policies adopted, via three-monthly progress reports on politically and administratively relevant results and adjustments with respect to the year plan. Reports on control aspects were made on the basis of working agreements made. In addition to reports on working agreements, in 2006 directorates also provided insight into periodical internal management reports on what targets had been realised and which means had been deployed in order to do so. In 2006 a structured evaluative investigation was performed as referred to in the Regulation on Performance and Evaluation in the Central Government, as described in the section Quality management and departmental audit service.

12.2.4 Internal security

Partly to ensure sufficient alignment with recent legislation, the AIVD has instigated a modernisation of the security plan and the implementing guidelines. This modernisation of the internal policy was necessary not only to seek connection with the new Security Regulation Central Government 2005, but also to face current developments (new threat scenarios, new developments in information technology, etc.). The new security plan was adopted in September 2006. In this plan the threats addressed to the AIVD relating to (unconscious) human actions have been identified and the plan also contains a description of the security measures the AIVD needs to take in order to optimally guarantee the uninterrupted and confidential functioning of the AIVD. The security measures have to do with physical, personal, organisational and ICT security. The personnel aspects of security (security awareness, personal integrity, (social) control) are an important pillar of security. Since the increase of AIVD staff, much has been initiated in this field, both from a policy point of view and practically. The ‘Growing intelligently and safely’ project ensuing from the Havermans committee report, forms an umbrella for the initiatives within the AIVD aimed at maintaining a security-aware organisational culture in a period of unprecedented growth. In recruiting new personnel the promotion of security awareness is a priority. In the introduction programme new employees are imbued with the legal, technical and personnel aspects of security.
On 9 May 2006 a proposal for amending the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 was submitted in connection with improving the intelligence and security services’ possibilities to conduct investigations and take measures against terrorist and other dangers relating to national security as well as several other amendments (Parliamentary documents II 2005/06, 30 553). In the legislative proposal several amendments to the Wiv 2002 were proposed, allowing the intelligence and security services to work more effectively and efficiently. For example, they provide a basis for imposing obligations to provide information upon administrative bodies and categories of transporters and providers of financial services later to be specified in more detail, to make more explicit the possibilities for specific forms of data processing (data analysis) and to expand the existing provisions on cooperation between services among themselves and with other bodies. On 28 June 2006, the Standing Committee for the Interior and Kingdom Relations issued a report. It is expected that the memorandum resulting from the report will be presented to the Lower House in early 2007.

On 8 June 2006 a legislative proposal to adopt a new scheme for higher education and research (Higher Education and (Academic) Research Act) was submitted to the Lower House (Parliamentary documents II 2005/06, 30 588). Article 9a.1 of this legislative proposal provides for a technical amendment of article 65 of the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002. The reference laid down in article 65 to the Higher Education and Research Act is replaced by a reference to the Higher Education and Research Act (WHOO), taking into account the fact that in the WHOO the term ‘university’ will be understood to include the Open University. On 3 October 2006 the Standing Committee for Education, Culture and Science issued a report.

On 20 September 2006 the legislative proposal to amend the Security Clearances Act in order to improve the feasibility and explain the application of this Act, was submitted to the Lower House of the States-General (Parliamentary documents II 2006/07, 30 805). This legislative proposal is largely the result of the feasibility assessment of the Security Clearances Act (Wvo) which was presented to the Lower House by letter of 11 October 2004 (Parliamentary documents II 2004/05, 29 843, no. 1). The legislative proposal also contains amendments to the Wvo in connection with the advice of the Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD (Havermans Committee) and the Oord Committee (security Schiphol airport). The proposed amendments concern, among other things, the concept of employer in the Wvo, the ‘energisation’ of security investigations (on the basis of the police’s and the judicial authorities’ own investigations and files) and the employers’ obligation to provide information. On 31
October 2006 the Standing Committee for the Interior and Kingdom Relations issued a report. The memorandum resulting from the report as well as a ministerial memorandum of amendments are expected to be presented to the Lower House in March 2007.

On 29 December the Act of 2 November to amend the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 came into force in connection with the introduction of a new Safety and Security system (Orders and Decrees 2006, 574 and Orders and Decrees 2006, 719). With the effectuation of this Act - as well as the act of 2 November 2006 for amendment of the Police Act 1993 in connection with the introduction of a new Safety and Security system for persons, objects and services (Orders and Decrees 2006, 560) - the legislative measures announced in the New Safety and Security system memorandum (Parliamentary documents II 2003/04, 28 974, no. 2) have been implemented.

Effective from 1 November 2006 the Act of 28 September 2006 for amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure in connection with effectuating an arrangement in connection with the hearing of witnesses whose identity is kept secret (Orders and Decrees 2006, 460 and Orders and Decrees 2006, 461). Under this Act the possibilities for using information originating from the intelligence and security services in criminal proceedings are extended. Under conditions in which their identity is kept secret, officers of the AIVD and MIVD can refer in more detail to the contents of an official message issued by a service before an examining magistrate, allowing a better assessment of the reliability.

With retroactive effect up until 1 September 2006 the Decree of 13 September 2006, entailing amendment of the Decree on the provision of telecommunication data and the Decree on licences mobile telecommunication became effective (Orders and Decrees 2006, 426). With this decision the Decree on the provision of telecommunication data has been amended as a result of which the data on internet users which can be requested by authorised bodies such as the intelligence and security services can be obtained in an automated way, by using their powers via the Central Information Point investigation telecommunication (CIOT), as soon as the decision is applicable to the providers of public telecommunication networks and services that enable users to access to the internet and its services. Article 11 of the decree provides for its application as from 1 September 2007.

The legislative proposal containing rules on the processing of police information (Police Information Act) (Parliamentary documents 30 227) is being handled by the Upper Chamber. This legislative proposal serves to replace the Police Files Act. As in the Police Files Act, it is provided that police information can be provided to intelligence and security
services in so far as this ensues from the Wiv 2002 (article 17). In addition, article 24 of the legislative proposal contains a separate arrangement for the immediate automated provision of police information to intelligence and security services. Such provisions are currently realised pursuant to article 17 Wiv 2002. Pursuant to article 24 of the legislative proposal on police information the categories of police information which qualify for this way of provision are to be designated by order in council on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations jointly. (The consultations with regard to this order in council between the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of BZK were not yet completed when this annual report was written.)

By regulation of the Minister of Administrative Reform and Kingdom Relations of 14 June 2006 (Government Gazette 2006, no. 121) the Passport Regulations Embassies and Consulates 2001 and the Passport Regulations Royal Netherlands Constabulary 2001 have been amended. With the amendment of said regulations the AIVD and MIVD are granted a right to the provision of information from the travel documents administration. Previously such provisions took place on the basis of a request under article 17 first paragraph of the Wiv 2002. A similar amendment was applied to the Passport Regulations Embassies and Consulates Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 2001 by regulation of the Minister of Administrative Reform of 14 June 2006 (Government Gazette 2006, no. 121).
# List of abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFA</td>
<td>Anti Fascistische Actie (Antifascist Action)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQUA</td>
<td>Appropriately Qualified Agency</td>
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<td>ATb</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Alert System</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBET</td>
<td>Bloed Bodem Eer en Trouw (Blood, Soil, Honour, and Loyalty)</td>
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<td>BVD</td>
<td>Dutch National Security Service</td>
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<td>BVK</td>
<td>Administrative Reform and Kingdom Relations</td>
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<td>BZK</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations</td>
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<td>CBB</td>
<td>Safety and Security Coordinator</td>
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<td>CBE</td>
<td>Administrative Evaluation Committee for the AIVD</td>
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<td>CBIB</td>
<td>Coordinating Integral Security Council</td>
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<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear</td>
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<td>CdB</td>
<td>Club of Bern</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CIOT</td>
<td>Central Information Point Investigation Telecommunication</td>
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<td>CIVD</td>
<td>Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services</td>
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<td>COTER</td>
<td>Terrorism Committee</td>
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<td>CTED</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate</td>
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<td>CTG</td>
<td>Counter Terrorist Group</td>
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<td>CT Infobox</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Infobox</td>
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<td>CTIVD</td>
<td>Supervisory Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services</td>
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<td>CVIN</td>
<td>Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee</td>
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<td>DAD</td>
<td>Departmental Audit Department</td>
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<td>DHKP/C</td>
<td>Revolutionary People’s Party/Front</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>ESA</td>
<td>European Space Agency</td>
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<td>ESTEC</td>
<td>European Space Research and Technology Centre</td>
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<td>ETA</td>
<td>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FEC</td>
<td>Financial Expertise Centrum</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIOD-ECD</td>
<td>Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service - Economic Investigation Service</td>
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<td>FIU-NL</td>
<td>Financial Intelligence Unit Netherlands</td>
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<td>GCT</td>
<td>Joint Counter-Terrorism Committee</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat)</td>
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<td>HLS</td>
<td>Huntingdon Life Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IBP</td>
<td>Intelligence Need Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>IND</td>
<td>Immigration en Naturalisation Service</td>
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<td>IRGC</td>
<td>Iranian Revolutionary Guard</td>
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<td>JSN</td>
<td>Jeugdstorm Nederland (Youthstorm Netherlands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLPD</td>
<td>National Police Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMar</td>
<td>Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAFA</td>
<td>Militante Anti Fascistische Actie (Militant Anti Fascist Action)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEC</td>
<td>Middle Europe Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mepia</td>
<td>Integrity Violations Reporting Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIVD</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence and Security Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKO</td>
<td>Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVI</td>
<td>National Advice Centre for Vital Infrastructures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTb</td>
<td>National Counter-terrorism Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFI</td>
<td>Netherlands Forensic Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICC</td>
<td>National Information Junction Cyber Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISCC</td>
<td>National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>NATO Special Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVB</td>
<td>Nationalistische Volks Beweging (Nationalist People’s Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVU</td>
<td>Nederlandse Volks-Unie (Dutch People’s Union)</td>
</tr>
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<td>OM</td>
<td>Public Prosecutions Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIRA</td>
<td>Provisional Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POIR</td>
<td>National Government Staff, Organisation and Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RID</td>
<td>Regional Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>RIRA</td>
<td>Real Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMS</td>
<td>Republic of the South Moluccas</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNV</td>
<td>Council for National Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVF</td>
<td>Racial Volunteer Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFVI</td>
<td>Foundation of the Family Members of Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAC</td>
<td>Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIM</td>
<td>Solidarity with Iranian People Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SitCen</td>
<td>Joint Situation Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMV</td>
<td>Foundation for Human Right Friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Freedom Falcons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN CTED</td>
<td>United Nations Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDA</td>
<td>Security Service of Aruba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VGB</td>
<td>Certificate of No Objection/Security Clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Security improvement through Information Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vir-bi</td>
<td>Security of Information Regulation for the Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service - Special Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNA</td>
<td>Security Service of the Netherlands Antilles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VoVo</td>
<td>Provisional Ruling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBI</td>
<td>Working Group on Special Information Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WGT</td>
<td>Working Group on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHOOO</td>
<td>Higher Education and Research Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiv 2002</td>
<td>Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRZO</td>
<td>Disasters and Major Accidents Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wvo</td>
<td>Security Investigations Act</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Principal Parliamentary Documents 2006

28 684  Towards a safer society
No. 106  Letter from the Minister of BZK regarding extreme right groups

28 844  Integrity policy public administration and police
No. 11   Letter from the Minister of BZK regarding investigation into integrity violations in public administration

29 284  Youth agenda
No. 17   Letter from the Minister of BZK regarding the results of the AIVD’s follow-up investigation concerning Lonsdale youth

29 754  Counter-Terrorism
No. 66   Letter from Ministers of BZK and Justice with a summary of Terrorism Threat Picture in the Netherlands (DTN)
No. 69   Letter from the Minister of BZK presenting the AIVD publication *Violent jihad in the Netherlands. Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat*
No. 73   Letter from the Ministers of BZK and Justice with fourth progress report on counter-terrorism
No. 87   Letter from the Ministers of BZK and Justice with a summary of Threat Picture Terrorism in the Netherlands (DTN)
No. 94   Letter from the Ministers of BZK and Justice with fifth progress report on counter-terrorism
29 854  The murder of Mr Theo van Gogh

No. 18  Evaluation of government action surrounding the murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004

29 876  Evaluation AIVD

No. 10  Letter from the Minister of BZK regarding the Annual Report 2004 and Annual Plan 2006 of the AIVD

No. 11  Letter from the Minister of BZK concerning the publication in De Telegraaf of classified documents of the former BVD

No. 16  Letter from the Minister of BZK regarding the amendments to the Wiv 2002 and Security Investigations Act

No. 17  Letter from the Minister of BZK regarding the judgement in the interlocutory proceedings De Telegraaf (eavesdropping on journalists)

No. 18  List of questions and answers regarding the judgement in the interlocutory proceedings which De Telegraaf instituted against the State of the Netherlands

No. 19  Letter from the Minister of BZK regarding the AIVD’s investigation into the leaking of state secrets

No. 20  Letter from the Minister of BZK regarding the results of the investigations concerning the leaking of state secret information

29 924  Supervisory reports

No. 9  Letter from the Minister of BZK presenting the supervisory report regarding the AIVD investigation into radical animal rights activism

No. 10  Letter from the Minister of BZK presenting the report concerning the legitimacy of the carrying out of a counter-terrorism operation
No. 12  Letter from the Minister of BZK regarding the supervisory report concerning the AIVD’s deployment of informants and agents (abroad)

No. 13  Letter from the Minister of BZK presenting the supervisory report concerning official reports of the AIVD in the period January 2004 to October

30 300 VII Adoption of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (VII) for the year 2006

No. 59  Letter from the Minister of BZK presenting the Annual Report of the General Intelligence and Security Service for the year 2005

30 800 VII Adoption of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (VII) for the year 2007

No. 11  Letter from the Minister of BZK presenting the report by the AIVD Violation of secret voting via electromagnetic effects
Reference list

A
Afghanistan 25, 27, 29, 31, 46, 92
Agent 11, 98, 127
AIVD investigation 46, 95, 126
AIVD year plan 91, 94
Al-Qaeda 16, 20, 25, 27, 28, 35
Anti-integration 11, 21, 23, 43
AQUA 11, 75, 121
Attack 19, 20, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 40, 44, 53, 73, 77

B
Belgium 32, 50, 53
Blood&Honour 51, 52, 53
Broad approach 11, 39

C
Canada 19, 25, 35, 92
Cartoon affair 20, 40
CBRN terrorism 104
China 108
Clearances 97, 117
Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services 7, 65, 93, 94, 97, 98, 99, 121
Consultation of records 76
Core Al-Qaeda 27, 28
Counter-terrorism Infobox 8, 101

D
Dawa 30, 42
Defence Intelligence and Security Service 122
Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) 8, 103
Denmark 19, 25, 35, 92, 106
Dirty bomb 12
Dual use goods 12
Jihadists 19, 20, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 35
Jihadist terrorism 19, 25, 26, 31, 37, 102, 104

L
Lebanon 26, 40
Local authorities 3, 15, 23, 39, 43, 49, 70, 101
Lonsdale youth 51, 52, 54, 125

M
Maghreb 20, 28
Means of delivery 6, 13, 63
Ministry of Justice 39, 40, 82, 93, 119
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 39, 121, 127
Mosque 20, 28, 43, 44, 53

N
National Counter-terrorism Coordinator (NCTb) 39, 102, 104
National Police Agency (KLPD) 39, 86, 92, 111
National security 1, 5, 14, 15, 19, 22, 23, 36, 57, 61, 65, 69, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 92, 94, 117
Network 1, 8, 12, 13, 28, 30, 80, 108, 113

O
Official report 14

P
Pakistan 20, 25, 46
Politically-motivated violent activism 14
Position involving confidentiality 14
Proliferation 6, 14, 61, 62
Prospect 3, 111, 114

R
Radicalisation 3, 5, 11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 29, 31, 36, 39, 40, 45, 46, 101, 102, 104, 106
Radicalisation process 3, 12, 25, 26, 31, 39, 40, 46
Recruitment 26, 28, 29, 52, 96, 112
Regional Intelligence Service 94, 122
Resistance 22, 32, 44, 50, 57, 61, 69, 73, 101
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk indications</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk maps</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary (Kmar)</td>
<td>86, 89, 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety and Security System</td>
<td>6, 15, 23, 70, 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salafism</td>
<td>13, 15, 20, 21, 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salafist</td>
<td>5, 20, 21, 30, 43, 45, 104, 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schiphol</td>
<td>73, 83, 89, 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of energy supply</td>
<td>65, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of Information Regulation for the Government Service - Special Information (Vir-bi)</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security screening</td>
<td>7, 21, 79, 80, 82, 83, 87, 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-radicalising person</td>
<td>7, 21, 79, 80, 82, 83, 87, 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separatist</td>
<td>32, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>28, 40, 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiites</td>
<td>28, 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigint</td>
<td>15, 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special intelligence resources</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State secrets</td>
<td>14, 73, 81, 94, 95, 98, 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunnite</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunnites</td>
<td>28, 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>T</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraaf</td>
<td>94, 95, 97, 98, 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21, 23, 25, 26, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 39, 42, 53, 65, 66, 73, 75, 91, 92, 94, 95, 98, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 122, 125, 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism list</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third party principle</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>11, 14, 15, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 33, 37, 42, 44, 45, 51, 54, 57, 58, 61, 62, 65, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 77, 92, 94, 95, 104, 106, 115, 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat-related information</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trigger events</td>
<td>20, 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>32, 108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
U
Umah 25
United States (US) 52, 106

V
Virtualisation 16
Vital sectors 6, 14, 69, 71, 72, 73

W
Weapons of mass destruction 14, 21, 22, 61, 62, 63, 65
Colophon

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