



1 Exhibit Number: 151-A
2 Translator: CG
3 (July 12-15, 1990)

4 *[Portion redacted by the government]*

5 **Sami Amin Al-Arian:** I believe one of the fundamental problems is that there is no unified
6 concept, or a concept close between us [sic] to the main Islamic problem. Although this is a
7 simple problem through a cultural debate between people. Also there must be an attempt to find
8 a way, or a formula, for a solid cooperation and not a coordination, because coordination in itself
9 means an acknowledgement that people are in disaccord. We want solid cooperation in the
10 absence of a unified movement, so that the positions would be unified, joint projects would be
11 created, and intellectual diversity within the Islamic situation would be accepted. As to the
12 intellectual and political matters, a common ground must be adopted to reconcile the different
13 points-of-view, through a positive and peaceful debate among the different sides, through
14 organizing broad academic meetings where scholars, experienced men and men who have
15 organizational knowledge will be present. We need to reach a level of high Islamic morals and
16 humbleness, by admitting to the mistakes, and by giving credit to the ones who deserve it, and by
17 a peaceful self criticism. We need to identify our friends and our enemies, and we need to open a
18 debate among each other, and with our enemies, as we see the debates in the Quran. We open a
19 dialogue with the nationalists, with the secularists and with non-Muslims; it is all right. More
20 deserving is that the dialogue should be amongst Muslims. We need to identify the concept of
21 the national cause, and how the Islamic movement can adopt the ideas of the nationalist groups,
22 meaning the groups that express the society's true and principal causes. This means that we need
23 to identify our priorities and agree on them. We need to go to the people and be involved with
24 them and their causes. We have to have, or the Islamic activity has to have, hard positions,
25 especially toward the regimes supporting the West and toward the West itself. Truly, until now
26 the Islamic movement's position toward America has been a weak one, the least to say is that it
27 has been weak; it is not straightforward and does not express the magnitude of the American
28 administrations' continuing enmity toward Islam, and the Islamic activity. This cannot be
29 accomplished without setting the example, without true armed Jihad against the enemy in Israel;
30 also with the creation of a true Jihad, possibly non-violent, to change the circumstances in the
31 Arabic and Islamic countries through the fronts.

32 This is what we see today in the Sudan and Algeria, for example, and this is an example
33 of this kind of change.

34 *[The rest of the tape has been redacted by the government.]*