FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription   01/06/2005

On 01/04-05/2005, [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)], a United States citizen originally from [   ] was interviewed under proffer agreement, in the presence of his attorney, [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] at the office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Dallas, Texas. Also present during the interview was Assistant United States Attorney [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, the nature of the interview, the terms of the proffer agreement, and the necessity to provide truthful information, [(b)(6),(b)] provided the following information:

[(b)(6),(b)(7)]

and [(b)(6),(b)(7)]   [(b)(6),(b)(7)] came to the United States as a student   [(b)(6),(b)(7)]
received his Bachelor of Science

then [(b)(6),(b)(7)] also became a United States citizen in

When asked about the Muslim Brotherhood, [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] stated that he is no longer a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, also referred to as the "Ikwan." However, [(b)(6),(b)(7)] admitted that he was part of the Brotherhood for many years. He provided his history in the Muslim Brotherhood as follows:

estigation on   01/04-05/2005 at Dallas, Texas

File # [(b)(7)(E)]   Date dictated 01/05/2005
        SA [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)]

by SA

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(b)(7)(E)

Continuation of FD-302 of   (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)   , On 01/04-05/2005 Page 2

When (b)(6),(b)(7) first came to the United States,

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) approached the Muslim
Brotherhood's Masul El Am (leader) at the time, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) who
was Tunisian. Another top leader in the Brotherhood at the time
was an Egyptian named (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) The Brotherhood welcomed the

During the early-to-mid 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood was
run by the Tunisians who believed that the US-based Muslim
Brotherhood should maintain independence from the International
Muslim Brotherhood whose leadership sat in Egypt. Other members
and leaders of the Brotherhood, who were of Egyptian, Kuwaiti, or
Jordanian origin, wanted a direct and official relationship with
the International body.

The structure of the Muslim Brotherhood (from bottom to
top) was as follows: (1) USRA was the most basic unit where small
groups of members met to discuss the Koran and their activities,
and USRAs were led by Naqeebs; (2) Multiple USRAs constituted a
(b)(6),(b)(7) which was headed by a Masul El Am (responsible party); (3)
Multiple SHARBAs constituted a Region, also known as a Muktaha,
which was run by the captain; (4) Members from the various regions
were elected to be a part of the General Assembly which was
responsible for electing the Brotherhood's highest council (number
of members was proportionate to the size of the region), (5) the

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(b)(7)(E)

Administrative (also referred to as Organizational) Council managed all of the regional leaders; (6) the Executive Council was the main Executive Committee and consisted of 5-7 people who were the heads of the different departments within the Brotherhood (5) the Majlis Al Shura was the Brotherhood's highest governing council and it consisted of approximately 12-15 people who were elected by the General Assembly; (6) the Council elected the Masul El Am who was the leader of the US Brotherhood; (7) the Masul El Am nominated the individuals for appointment to the Executive Council, and the Majlis Al Shura approved those appointments. The Majlis Al Shura are elected for four year terms, and they elect their Masul El Am who also serves a concurrent four year term.

The Brotherhood had the following departments: (1) Organization (Administration); (2) Public Works (managed the different organizations that fell under the Brotherhood's umbrella like ISNA and MSA); (3) Education; (4) Finance; and (5) Political.

The Brotherhood had several organizations during this time period including the Cultural Society, the Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA), the Muslim Student's Association (MSA), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), and the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP). These groups were under the control of the Brotherhood because they were founded by Brotherhood members. AHMED AL QADI founded the MSA in the late 1960s as a Brotherhood organization. The Kuwaiti Brotherhood members founded MAYA in the late 1970s because they wanted an Arab-speaking group because English was spoken at most ISNA and MSA events. Most of the larger Muslim organizations in the United States are controlled by the Brotherhood. If a Brotherhood member plans to open a new organization, the Brotherhood prefers that the member request and receive approval from them. The old organizations like MAYA and MSA were sort of adopted by the Brotherhood as they were established when the Brotherhood was in its infancy here. For each of these groups, the Brotherhood nominated an individual to chair these organizations, and the organizations' members elected the actual chairperson.

The Brotherhood nominated the Chairman and the Executive Committee for MAYA and always succeeded in having those persons elected as the Brotherhood had major influence in this organization, and almost all of the members were Brotherhood. _____ was shown Exhibit 2E (attached hereto), which is a Semi Annual Report of the Executive Committee, for MAYA in June 1988. The report was prepared by SHUKRI ABU BAKER. Based on Exhibit 2E,

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(b)(7)(E)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)_____ , On 01/04-05/2005 Page 4

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) stated that it appears (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was MAYA's Executive Committee Secretariate General, which is a position that would have been nominated by the Brotherhood.

In the late 1980s (before 1987), (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) became a member of the Majlis Al Shura. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was on the Majlis Al Shura with (b)(6),(b)(7) Prior to sitting on the Majlis Al Shura, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) headed the Brotherhood's Political Department. In the late 1980s, MOUSA ABU MARZOOK was elected by the Majlis Al Shura to be the MASUL EL AM. During the late 1980s, (b)(6),(b)(7) recalled the following sat on the council. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) could not immediately recall. The Majlis Al Shura had an official Secretary who maintained all of the records. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was the Secretary when (b)(6),(b) was on the Majlis Al Shura, and the Brotherhood's office was in Chicago. The office was not publically labeled as a Brotherhood office. Brotherhood membership lists were maintained in the regional offices by the Regional captains or their representatives.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Brotherhood was divided into committees for the various nationalistic factions. For example, the Palestinians and Jordanians comprised the Palestine Committee. Each of these nationalistic committees had an appointed representative who reported to the Brotherhood's Organizational Committee. When (b)(6),(b)(7) was in the Brotherhood in the United States, including his term as Masul El Am, he was the President of the Palestine Committee. The Palestine Committee was the largest and most powerful nationalistic committee within the Brotherhood at that time.

In the early 1990s, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) left the United States about half way into his term as Masul El Am. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) moved to Jordan to serve the Palestinian Cause. Brotherhood regulations require that members live in the United States; thus, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) had to resign as Masul El Am when he left the country. (b)(6),(b)(7) was elected to replace (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) as the Masul El Am of the Brotherhood in 1991 or early 1992. There were approximately 1500-2000 US Brotherhood members at that time. (b)(6),(b)(7) served the remainder of that term. and he

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(b)(7)(E)

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the elections for a new council in the summer of 1996. When
questioned further about dates and events,

After the outbreak of the first Intifadah in the late
1980s, all Brotherhood members recognized HAMAS as the leader of
the Intifadah. All Brotherhood members supported the Intifadah and
sought to assist the Palestinian Intifadah. The Palestine
Committee created the HOLY LAND FOUNDATION which was known by the
Brotherhood members to be an organization created to support the
Intifadah. During that time, and until the designation of HAMAS as
a terrorist organization, the Intifadah and HAMAS were openly
praised and donations were openly solicited by the HLF for their
support. The Brotherhood always supports Intifadahs led by its
international members, and they always support those Intifadahs
through Brotherhood organizations. In this instance, the HLF was
the Brotherhood's primary organization to support the Intifadah.
After the designation of HAMAS as a terrorist, Brotherhood members
continued to support the Palestinian cause in their hearts, but
they realized that they had to follow the laws of the United States
and could not legally support HAMAS without violating US law.

During the early 1990s, the Palestine Committee wanted to reap
all of the benefits of being a Brotherhood organization, like
raising funds at Brotherhood events, etc. However, the Palestine
Committee did not want to be directly controlled by the
Brotherhood. The Palestinians wanted the majority of the
Brotherhood's resources to be devoted to the Palestinian cause, and
other groups within the Brotherhood were upset by this. The
Palestinian Committee's resistance to the Brotherhood's actual
control and their demand for resources and attention caused major
problems within the US Brotherhood and led to the ultimate split
within the Brotherhood around 1996. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) heard rumors that the
Palestinians, and other Nationalistic factions, met separately
prior to the General Assembly meetings so that they could be united
in the efforts. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) believed that these types of meetings were
counterproductive to the Brotherhood as the Brotherhood was
supposed to be one adhesive group, not a collection of groups.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) did not have a lot of involvement with the Palestine
Committee OMAR SOBANI was the head of the
Public Works Department, which was the department that managed the

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(b)(7)(E)

various committees and organizations within the Brotherhood.
[(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] would know the reporting requirements and guidelines for the
committees. Each committee had a representative who acted as a
liaison to the Public Works Department, and those committee
representatives met twice a year with OMAR SOBANI. [(b)(6),(b)(7)] would
know if the Brotherhood authorized the creation of the HLF, but
[   ] does not know. [(b)(6),(b)(7)] believes that the IAP and the HLF were
under the umbrella of the Palestine Committee, and [(b)(6),(b)] was told
that the IAP reported to the Brotherhood as it was an official
Brotherhood organization. [(b)(6),(b)] does not know if the Brotherhood
authorized the HLF to open. [(b)(6),(b)(7)] would know if the HLF had the
Brotherhood's authority to open and operate as he met twice per
year with the Palestine Committee's leader.

When shown Exhibit 8, entitled the CENTRAL COMMITTEE ORG.
CHART for the year 1991, [(b)(6),(b)(7)] stated that he had never seen it.
[(b)(6),(b)(7)] stated that, based on the content, it appeared to be a chart
of the Brotherhood's Palestine Committee. [(b)(6),(b)(7)] did not believe
that the chart was created to submit to the Brotherhood, but that
it was likely something created by and for the Palestine
Committee's use.

When [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] departed the United States, OMAR YEHIA assumed
the role as President of the Palestine Committee. When asked how
[(b)(6),(b)(7)] knew this, [(b)(6),(b)] stated that YEHIA approached [   ] and asked
the Brotherhood's permission to start the CAIR organization. When
[   ] was asked why he recalled that the Palestine Committee asked
for authority to start CAIR, but he could not recall if they asked
for authority to start the HLF, [(b)(6),(b)(7)] responded that CAIR was more
of an Islamic organization than a Palestinian organization. YEHIA
requested the Brotherhood's approval for CAIR's by-laws, etc.
YEHIA wanted CAIR to work for all Muslim causes in the United
States. The Brotherhood authorized the opening of CAIR because,
unlike the HLF, it was not an organization that was concerned only
about activities taking place in the Eastern part of the world.
[   ] never spoke with AL AGHA regarding CAIR.

When asked if [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] ever led the Palestine
Committee, [(b)(6),(b)] stated that he did not think so because [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] was
never a real leader in the Brotherhood. [   ] admitted that [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)]
chaired the Brotherhood's Social Committee, as evidenced in Exhibit
4C and 2d (attached hereto), but [(b)(6),(b)] stated that the Social
Committee was very small and therefore [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] s position was not
esteemed. [(b)(6),(b)(7)] met [(b)(6),(b)(7)] in the late 1980s at a MAYA convention
and was closer to [(b)(6),(b)(7)] than he was to [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] because [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] goes

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on Hajj trips with [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] did not consult with [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] about the creation of the HLF at the time the HLF was created.

When asked about his knowledge of the conflict between the HLF and ABDEL HALEEM ASHQAR's organization, the AL AQSA EDUCATIONAL FUND, [b)(6),(b)] stated that he did not know much about it, was not officially informed about it, and had nothing to do with it. [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] stated that he knew [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] and [b)(6),(b)(7)], but he did not have a strong relationship with either. [ ] said that he did not speak to [b)(6),(b)] or [b)(6),(b)(7)] about the conflict, nor did he speak to [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] about it. [b)(6),(b)(7)] heard about the conflict "from one of the guys on the HLF side." When asked the individual's identity, [b)(6),(b)(7)] stated that OMAR YEHIA is the one who mentioned that [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] opened some Palestinian organization without obtaining the permission of the Palestinian Committee. [ ] repeatedly stated that he did not recall speaking with [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] or anyone from the IAP in Dallas regarding the issue. [b)(6),(b)] denied knowing [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] at all. [b)(6),(b)] denied having any contact at all with IAP in Dallas. [b)(6),(b)(7)] knows [b)(6),(b)] [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] personally, but he did not speak with him about the HLF issue.

[b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] knew [b)(6),(b)(7)] from the time that [b)(6),(b)(7)] lived in Los Angeles. [b)(6),(b)(7)] recalled that [b)(6),(b)(7)] was once the Secretary for the Cultural Society in the 1980s. When shown Exhibit 1A (attached hereto), [b)(6),(b)(7)] identified [b)(6),(b)] as an elected member of the Brotherhood's General Assembly from the "Plains" region. [b)(6),(b)(7)] also identified [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] as an elected member to the General Assembly from the "Pacific" region. [b)(6),(b)(7)] was questioned regarding the "Invited Guests" who are listed in Exhibit 1A, and [b)(6),(b)] stated that [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] was a "wealthy Saudi businessman." When interviewers pointed out to [ ] that the guests were obviously esteemed as Sheikh MAHFOUZ EL NIHNAH is the leader of HAMAS Algeria. [ ] acknowledge that NIHNAH is the leader of HAMAS Algeria who is also a close personal friend of [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] admitted that he heard AL AGHA was well-known as being active in Palestinian circles, and that he was a leader in the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. At this conference, AL AGHA spoke in favor of the Palestinian Intifadah. [b)(6),(b)(7)] identified [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] another of the invited guests, as the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. He identified [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] another of the guests, as the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq.

At the time of this General Assembly meeting, the Palestinians were attempting to obtain the Brotherhood's support for the

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[b)(7)(E)]

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Intifadah, and it was widely accepted within the Brotherhood that
HAMAS was the leader of the Intifadah. The Palestinians in the
United States explained that the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood
inside Palestine created HAMAS to be the military side of the
Brotherhood. [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] acknowledged that it was known that HAMAS was
much more than merely a military group, and that the Brotherhood
understood that HAMAS had a humanitarian component.

When asked about camps held by the Brotherhood, [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] stated
that the Brotherhood had regional camps, and the various groups
within the Brotherhood held their own camps. [ ] reviewed
Exhibit 2E (attached hereto), and [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] does not know what training
was offered at all of the camps. [ ] stated that when
Brotherhood members attended camps, they usually brought their
wives, and there were usually some physical activities in which
they participated. Additionally, there were instruction sessions
wherein the individuals were taught various things like how to
perform during interviews by governments and how to support their
causes.

[b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] stated that Jihad camps were camps that involved a very
intense physical course to prepare the individual to challenge the
governments in their homelands. [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] admitted that in the early
1980s, [ ] camps in the United States where
they were trained in the use of firearms. [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] explained that the
US Brotherhood did not support violent activities against the
United States, but in the late 1980s, it supported and encouraged
its members to fight for their causes/jihad abroad. For example,
[b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] trained in preparation for returning to Libya to fight
Ghadafi. Brotherhood members who trained to fight in Afghanistan
in the late 1980s were praised by the Brotherhood. Brotherhood
members who trained to fight against the Israelis inside Israel
would also have been praised.

[b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] is unaware of any explosives training occurring at any
Brotherhood camps in the United States. The Brotherhood has always
supported its members in fighting legitimate jihad in their home
countries, but would never support that activity after it became
illegal in the United States. [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] denied that he ever trained or
had interest in explosives. When shown Exhibit 4B, [b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] admitted
that it was a Brotherhood document that listed him as having
interest in explosives, but [ ] does not know who wrote it or
why.

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[(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] explained that Brotherhood leaders met annually with the leader of the International Muslim Brotherhood, known as the MURSHAD, and with other Brotherhood leaders. [(b)(6),(b)(7)] [   ] one in London and one in Istanbul, Turkey. [(b)(6),(b)(7)] was confused about the dates of the trips, and informed interviewing agents that he would provide copies of his passports to confirm the dates of these conferences. At the Istanbul meeting, which may have occurred between 1992 and 1994, [(b)(6),(b)(7)] recalled that the following individuals were present: [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] , the Murshad at the time; [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] ; the Yemeni Brotherhood leader whose name [(b)(6),(b)(7)] could not recall; a Brotherhood leader from Pakistan; and other world Brotherhood leaders. [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] , and [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] were not there. [(b)(6),(b)(7)] recalled that they discussed the Yemeni elections at this meeting. [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] briefed the group regarding a committee he was creating for the International Support of Al Quds. The Pakistani leader agreed with [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)] idea and stated that Jerusalem is an Islamic issue, not just an Arab issue. During this trip, [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)] attended a side meeting which was a celebration for the Turkish Islamic Party.

The other annual international meeting that [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)] attended occurred in London. The main topic of that meeting was presented by [(b)(6),(b)(7)] , the representative of HAMAS Algeria, who explained how they parted from the traditional Brotherhood and aligned themselves with the Algerian government in order to furth[er their g]als. [(b)(6),(b)(7)] recalled the following attendees: [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] who was the Murshad at that time; (fnu) [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] who was the Tunisian Brotherhood leader; (fnu) [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] , the head of the Egyptian Brotherhood's Political Committee; (fnu) [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] who was the head of the Brotherhood in Jordan; an Egyptian from London; possibly an Iraqi from London; and others whom [(b)(6),(b)] could not recall. [(b)(6),(b)(7)] did not recall if [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] were there. [(b)(6),(b)(7)] recalled telling the [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)] that the Egyptians and Palestinians were causing problems for the Brotherhood in the United States as the Palestinians were always trying to use their "cause" to get their way, regardless of the overall needs of the Brotherhood. [(b)(6),(b)(7)] stayed at a house as opposed to a hotel, and he believes the meetings were held in someone's home.

During [(b)(6),(b)] s terms on the Majlis Al Shura, the US Brotherhood underwent many changes and problems. There were struggles for power among the various ethnic groups, and there were other issues. When [(b)(6),(b)] first joined the Brotherhood, the Tunisians were in power. They attempted to maintain independence

(k)(2),(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)

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between the US Brotherhood and the International body and the Murshad. The Tunisians were also in favor of having an open, non-secretive organization. When the Palestinians rose to power, they shifted the Brotherhood to be more secretive and to be more directly connected to the International body and the Murshad.

Conferences were held in the late 1980s to discuss the move to create the Muslim American Society (MAS) as the open, non-secretive Brotherhood organization in the United States. Many brotherhood members opposed this move, as they feared that their home country governments would find out their involvement and have them or their families killed. Additionally, when the Palestinians were in charge of the Brotherhood, the Brotherhood's ideals and goals got "messed up."

Despite the arguments and in-fighting, and after [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] took over as the Masul El Am, [(b)(6),(b)(7)] forced the vote on the issue of MAS. As a result, MAS was finally created in 1992. When asked if the intent in creating MAS was to maintain part of the Brotherhood's activities and members secret [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] said no. When presented Exhibit 2A (attached hereto), examined the document and stated that the document likely represented the proposal for solution by members who wanted part of the Brotherhood to remain secret. [(b)(6),(b)] denied that the document represented the actual decisions of the Brotherhood regarding MAS. [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] was one of the individuals who wanted the Brotherhood to remain secretive.

Disagreements continued to occur among the members over whether or not the organization would be directly connected to the Murshad in Egypt. At the international Muslim Brotherhood meeting in London, [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] discussed the US Brotherhood's trials and tribulations that resulted from the creation of MAS, and [(b)(6),(b)] attempted to gain support for MAS. [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] met with the [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] who agreed to allow the US Brotherhood to maintain some independence and to operate with no direct connections to the Brotherhood. Although the [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] understood the need for this method of operation, many US Brotherhood members did not. Even though MAS became the Americanized-Brotherhood, may USRA meetings were still closed and many memberships remained secret.

When [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] [(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)] an Egyptian who tried to appease the members of the Brotherhood who opposed the council's decision to be independent of the Murshad in Egypt. This conflict

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(k)(2),(b)(7)(E)

came to a head around 1996, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) and the entire council resigned from the Brotherhood. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) has never returned to the Brotherhood. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) took over as Masul El Am at that time.

When asked if the Brotherhood, prior to it becoming MAS, had security guidelines, (b)(6),(b)(7) said that there may have been some loose guidelines early on, but nothing serious or sophisticated. When asked if the Brotherhood had a document classification system, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) stated that they did not. (b)(6),(b)(7) did not recall that certain information could not be communicated on the telephone for security reasons. When shown Exhibit 4F (attached hereto), (b)(6),(b)(7) identified the hand-writing as his own. (b)(6),(b) did not recall writing the document, but admitted that it was his hand-writing. Based on this document, (b)(6),(b)(7) conceded that the Brotherhood did, in fact, have an established security policy. This policy was the result of the secretive ideology of the Brotherhood overseas. When presented with a document labeled Exhibit 4A (attached hereto), (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) denied that it looked familiar.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) was shown Exhibit 1 (attached hereto). (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) stated that the document listed various committees within the Brotherhood, including some that he had not mentioned in the interview. Among those were the Sisters Committee, the Planning Committee, the Legal Committee, the Conflict Committee, and the Security Committee. (b)(6),(b) read from the document that (b)(6),(b)(7) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k) were members of the Security Committee. When asked about (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) stated that he knew (b)(6),(b)(7)(C), to be a Brotherhood member who lived in Louisiana, but who left the United States in the early 1990s. When asked about (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) stated that he met him in Chicago once in the late 1980s or early 1990s. (b)(6),(b)(7) needed a place to stay for the night, and (b)(6),(b) was a Brotherhood member who had a room over his grocery store that stayed in. (b)(6),(b)(7) stated Exhibit 1 accurately listed the following as members of the Majlis Al Shura (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2)

When asked about Exhibit 2C, which references the Planning Committee (See Exhibit 1 supra), (b)(6),(b)(7) denied having any knowledge of a Planning Committee or the Exhibit 2C. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) stated that MAS had a Planning Committee, but its purpose was to steer the organization to openness. (b)(6),(b) reviewed Exhibit 2C and stated that it appeared to have been drafted by (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) who is called (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

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(k)(2),(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) stated that he had no idea why the document discussed the need to identify individuals who could benefit the Brotherhood in "its missionary and jihad against the camp of the infidels." (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) could not explain why the document recommended forming groups to help the "Cause," including a "Nutrition and chemicals' group." (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) could not explain why the proposed projects included the following: (1) Chemicals project, (2) Laser project, and (3) Airplanes with pilot project. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) stated that he was not aware that the Brotherhood every supported any of these projects.

When asked if the Brotherhood ever destroyed any of its historical documents, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) stated that in 1992 when MAS was created, there was a desire to separate all aspects from the old, secretive Brotherhood. Many Brotherhood members believed that their secretive nature made them look guilty of things that they were not. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) believes that documents may have been destroyed at that time so that they could start fresh. (b)(6),(b)(7) denied that at any time thereafter there was a move to destroy historical Brotherhood documents. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) recalled that after the Oklahoma City bombing, Muslims were afraid that they would be targeted, and even (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) received a visit from the FBI. The Brotherhood was not responsible, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) does not believe that any documents were destroyed at that time.

When asked about _____ (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) provided the following information:

(b)(6),(b)(7) recalled a meeting in the late 1980s in Chicago at a hotel wherein he, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) _____ discussed the _____ not politics. (b)(6),(b)(7) new that AL AGHA was a Palestinian activist because at the annual Brotherhood conference in Chicago, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) saw AGHA speak as a Palestinian activist at that time.

When asked about specific individuals, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(k)(2) provided the following information:

000842

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6),(b)(7) knows that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) were definitely Brotherhood members since at least 1986. (b)(6),(b)(7) believes that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was a Muslim Brotherhood member, but he was kicked out because of some sexual allegations. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) is unsure if (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was a Muslim Brotherhood member. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) admitted that

(b)(6),(b)(7) knew (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) as a Brotherhood member because he came to (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) asking for authority to create his SOLIDARITY organization.

(b)(6),(b)(7) knows NABIL SADOUN, (b)(6),(b)(7) and SADOUN met sometime in the late 1980s at a MAYA conference. SADOUN was once the head of MAYA, and he was always a part of the Brotherhood's General Assembly. At one time, SADOUN may have been part of the Majlis Al Shura. (b)(6),(b) the Masul El Am, forced SADOUN to step down from his Executive Committee position at MAYA because SADOUN's practices were too in line with the Saudi/ultra-conservative school of thought. When SADOUN was younger, he went to an Islamic University in Saudi Arabia so he is extremely conservative regarding issues like having women in the same room as men at the conventions. SADOUN was also very particular about the speakers he would allow at conventions. (b)(6),(b)(7) believed SADOUN was too conservative for mainstream Muslims so he forced SADOUN to step down. SADOUN still holds a grudge for removing him from that position. (b)(6),(b)(7) estimated that it was approximately 1992 (b)(6),(b) removed SADOUN from the position at MAYA. SADOUN was very close to Brothers from the Gulf who had similar ideologies. SADOUN was very close to (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) as they both lived in Colorado together. (b)(6),(b) has no idea if SADOUN is currently a member of the Brotherhood. (b)(6),(b)(7) last saw him at a recent ISNA conference. At that ISNA conference, (b)(6),(b) talked to the CAIR people and sought legal advice (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) told him to get a good lawyer.

(b)(6),(b)(7) does not know (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) personally and does not know if he is a Brotherhood member.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) knows (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) as (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) attended Hajj with him one year and sang for (b)(6),(b)(7) s Hajj tour group. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) had no leadership position in the Brotherhood, but (b)(6),(b) believes that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) is a Brotherhood member because someone on the Hajj trip said that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was one of "our Brothers."

000843

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

(b)(7)(E)

Continuation of FD-302 of _____ (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) _____ .On 01/04-05/2005 Page 14

(b)(6),(b)(7) does not really know (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) but he knows that ELBARASSE was very active in Palestinian issues and with the Brotherhood in the Capital Region.

When presented with Exhibit 6C (attached hereto), (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) examined the letter from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) but stated that he had no idea who (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) is.

Regarding current events and status, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) provided the following information:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) estimated that MAS now has approximately 10,000 members.

When (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) left the Brotherhood, he did not return to membership (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) but he is well-respected by them and is "in the know."

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) is also very close to the political Algerians.

The current leader of MAS is (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

The current leader of the International Muslim Brotherhood is (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

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