

EXPERT REPORT OF DR. JEFFREY M. BALE

7 April 2023

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Dear Mr. Honickman:

Re: Islamic Relief Canada v. Thomas Quiggin et al

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Court File No.: CV-18-00611629

I am preparing this report in response to your request that I provide relevant background information about

- the problems with political “phobia” terms and their frequently abusive application;
- the common characteristics of ideological extremism;
- the nature of Islamism (and its relationship to Islam); and
- the standard operational methods used by Islamist groups, including the Jama‘at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Society of the Muslim Brothers or Muslim Brotherhood, hereafter the MB) and its satellite organizations, to achieve their goals.

This will help to demonstrate that the arguments made by Thomas Quiggin in his 9 October 2018 report, *The Government of Canada is Funding Terrorism with Taxpayers’ Money: A Criminal Investigation is Required*, as well as those of his co-defendants, are reasonable inferences based on evidence in the public domain. To the extent that this is the case, they cannot be considered “defamatory.” Nor can they fairly be construed as “malicious,” which suggests that the defendants intentionally disseminated false or misleading information to damage the reputation and undermine the legitimate charitable work of Islamic Relief Canada (IRC). Whether the activities of IRC and the GOC constitute criminal acts under the Criminal Code of Canada, as Quiggin urges, is a matter for Canadian lawyers to determine, but arguing that certain alleged and potentially problematic

funding activities of IRC and Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) should be further investigated by the RCMP should not be controversial.

The background material herein should also serve to illustrate several problems with the arguments made by those who authored reports for the plaintiffs. Perhaps the most striking thing about these two plaintiff reports is that very few substantive attempts are made in either report to rebut the arguments made by the defendants about Islamism, the MB, and IRC and IRW, much less to address their specific factual claims – that IRC and IRW are charities with affiliations to the MB, which is undeniable; that some IRC funds have been transferred to IRW, which can apparently be documented; and that IRW can be creditably believed to be funneling some of its funds to Hamas, which several foreign governments and observers, Muslim and non-Muslim, have asserted. One would think that the determining factor in such a case would be whether the defendants' claims about IRC and IRW are or are not supported by evidence, as well as whether there are good reasons to believe that their conclusions are warranted. On the contrary, the primary strategy adopted by Zine and Perry is to try and smear the defendants as irrational “Islamophobes” and then to suggest, without providing any actual evidence, that their supposedly “bigoted” opinions could unfairly damage the reputation of IRC and possibly even lead to “hate crimes” against innocent Muslims. Whereas Perry has no discernable background and displays no demonstrable expertise in her report on the subjects of Islam and Islamism, some of Zine’s arguments seem designed mainly to confuse or mislead poorly informed non-Muslims about the nature of those phenomena.

Part I: Qualifications

I am an Emeritus Professor in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies (NPTS) Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS), where for many years I taught both the introductory survey course on terrorism and advanced seminars on state terrorism and several varieties of political and religious extremism, including global jihadism, militant Islamic organizations (i.e., fundamentalist and Islamist organizations that do not rely primarily on military *jihad*, such as the MB and its offshoots, the Jama‘at-i Islami in Pakistan, the Tabligh-i Jama‘at, and Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami), the American radical right, eco-radicalism, and apocalyptic millenarianism (including cults). I obtained my B.A. in Middle Eastern, Islamic, and Central Asian history at the University of Michigan, my M.A. in social movements and political sociology at the University of California at Berkeley, and my Ph.D. in contemporary European history at Berkeley. While I was an undergraduate and graduate student, I took introductory and/or advanced courses on Historical Methods, World History, Ancient History, Medieval History, East Asian History, Inner Asian History, South Asian History, Military History, Intellectual History, Modern European History, and – most relevantly in this context – Medieval and Modern Near Eastern and Islamic History and associated foreign languages – as well as courses in other departments on political theory, tribal societies, political sociology, and social movements. I later taught courses on related topics at Berkeley, Columbia University, and the University of California at Irvine, and have also taught specialized courses on a visiting basis at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), a U.S. Department of Defense graduate school for military officers.

I have been studying violence-prone political and religious extremists for over four decades – long before it suddenly became “fashionable” in the wake of the tragic 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States – and have published numerous scholarly articles, book chapters, monographs (including *Jihādist Cells and I.E.D. Capabilities in Europe: Assessing the Present and Future Threat to the West*, published in 2012 by the U.S. Army War College), encyclopedia entries, and research reports for government agencies on terrorism, right-wing extremism, Islamism, apocalyptic millenarianism, and covert political operations. In the fall of 2018, Routledge released *The Darkest Sides of Politics*, a 900+-page, two-volume collection of many of my specialized published and unpublished scholarly studies, including several articles on Islamism and jihadist terrorism and major portions of my doctoral dissertation dealing with neo-fascist terrorist networks in Cold War Europe. I am the co-author (with Tamir Bar-On) of *Fighting the Last War: Confusion, Partisanship, and Alarmism in the Literature on the Radical Right* (Lexington Books, 2022), which severely criticizes the literature on the post-World War II radical right in the West, and am currently finishing a 600+-page scholarly study, *The Other Face of Rock ‘n’ Roll Rebellion: The International “Fascist” Music Underground, 1978 to the Present*, for Routledge’s Studies in Fascism and the Far Right series. Before my retirement, I was on the editorial staffs of the *Politics, Religion, and Ideology* journal (formerly known as *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*), as well as the online journal *Perspectives on Terrorism*. I read numerous foreign languages, have carried out specialized archival research in several European countries as well as in the U.S., have personally interviewed extremists from several political and religious milieus, and have accumulated an extensive collection of primary source materials produced by or dealing with a wide array of extremist and terrorist groups. I have often served as a consulting Subject Matter Expert (SME) for government agencies and private organizations on matters related to terrorism and ideological extremism. For further information, see the details in the CV that I provided to Mr. Honickman.

Part II: Documents Examined

In preparation for writing this report, I have relied on my decades of scholarly research and academic teaching experience about matters related to political and religious extremism (including Islamism), terrorism (including jihadist terrorism), and covert operations, along with the following documents:

- Statement of Claim
- Statement of Defense
- the Quiggin Report
- the Perry Statement
- the Zine Statement
- the Levitt Statement

As will soon become clear, I have also made use of a large number of primary and secondary sources dealing with ideological extremism, Islam, Islamism, and jihadist terrorism.

Part III: Expert Opinions

In the SOC and the two affidavits in support of the plaintiff's case, much ado is made about the alleged "Islamophobia" of the defendants, their supposed use of "Islamophobic" tropes and narratives, their allegedly sinister connections to a so-called "Islamophobia industry" that serves as a kind of closed "echo chamber", their ostensibly misleading characterization of Islamism, and their purportedly false association of the MB (and, by extension, of IRC and IRW) with "extremism," all of which are characterized as "impugned words" that are legally sanctionable. Such harsh accusations demand to be challenged given that they are, at the very least, distorted exaggerations and, at worst, dishonest and malicious smears of the kind they accuse the defendants of making in connection with IRC.

IIIA: Summary of Conclusions

Here are my main conclusions in this report:

- that the term "Islamophobia," along with other "political phobia" terms and "hate," are not neutral social science terms, but rather partisan, politicized concepts that have often been weaponized and abusively misapplied by activists (Section IIIB);
- that all types of ideological "extremism" share certain common characteristics, and that political or religio-political doctrines that display those characteristics, including Islamism, can be fairly characterized as extremist (Section IIIC);
- that Islam is a bona fide religion that has been and can be interpreted in a variety of different ways, but that Islamism is an extremist, right-wing, totalitarian, and Islamic supremacist interpretation of core Islamic doctrines (Section IID);
- that the MB is an Islamist movement – indeed, the largest and most important Sunni Islamist organization in the world – that has repeatedly espoused the aforementioned intrinsically anti-democratic beliefs and agendas, and that it nowadays relies primarily on the gradualist "Islamization from below" strategy, which often involves various types of stealth and deception, rather than military *jihad* (*jihad bi al-sayf*) (Section IIIE); and thus
- that the views expressed by Quiggin and his co-defendants are entirely reasonable – rather than "Islamophobic" or defamatory – given what is known about the MB, and by extension IRC and IRW, which are both part of the MB's worldwide organizational network (Section IV).

By clarifying these matters further, it should become clear that the plaintiff's allegations against the defendants are unfounded since the supposedly "impugned words" they use – "extremist" and "Islamist" – are not only commonly used by academics, journalists, and pundits but, if defined properly, are entirely applicable in this context. Even worse, these allegations seem designed to punish Canadian citizens for freely expressing ostensibly protected political and social opinions

that they dislike by means of “lawfare,” which is itself a standard harassment, bullying, and punitive technique used by Islamists and others to silence their critics.¹

IIIB: “Islamophobia” and the Ongoing Weaponization of Language

This section is specifically intended as a response to the plaintiff’s arguments that the concerns of the defendants about the activities of IRC and IRW are examples of “Islamophobia.”

The first point to emphasize is that the term “Islamophobia” and similar “political phobia” terms are by no means legitimate scientific or “social scientific” terms. Although the usage of the “phobia” suffix has become ever more commonplace precisely because it has proven to be an effective epithet, all of these supposed “phobias” are in fact partisan political labels used by activist groups to smear, delegitimize, and demonize their critics, and indeed often to justify their “deplatforming,” censorship, demonetarization, and repression. Much like today’s frequently indiscriminate accusations of “racism,” “sexism,” “white supremacism,” “far right,” and “fascism,” which are nowadays widely attributed to anyone who expresses opinions that activists (and, increasingly elites) find “offensive.” In the case of those latter insults, at least, one can easily undermine their spurious misapplication by providing precise definitions of those concepts that clearly reveal how they are being misused and abused.² It is important to do the same when challenging the careless, indiscriminate, and often malicious use of the “political phobia” terms. More will be said below about phobias, real and imagined.

The second point to note is that political activists and extremists, in particular those on the radical left, have long been masters of appropriating or weaponizing language in such a way that it furthers their own causes. (The conservative right and radical right also make efforts to weaponize language, e.g., by too often simplistically labeling their opponents as “socialists,” “communists,” or – in the current era – “cultural Marxists,” but generally not as effectively as the left.) A few examples should suffice to illustrate this. One would be the Bolshevik appropriation of the appellation “progressive,” which previously had positive connotations, to describe themselves and those who embraced their totalitarian, anti-democratic ideological agenda. Of course, whenever someone adopts the term “progressive,” no matter how disingenuously, the implication is that everyone who disagrees with that person is intrinsically “regressive.” Hence, it is a highly loaded term, one that is nowadays used

¹ For more on “lawfare,” especially in the context of free speech suppression, see Geoffrey Robertson KC, *Lawfare: How the Russians, the Rich and the Government Try to Prevent Free Speech and How to Stop Them* (London: TLS Books, 2023). For the Islamist use of the “Islamophobia” smear to restrict free speech, see Paul Marshall and Nina Shea, *Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes are Choking Freedom Worldwide* (New York: Oxford University, 2011); and Bassam Tibi and Thorsten Hasche, “The Instrumental Accusation of Islamophobia and Heresy as a Strategy of Curtailing the Freedom of Speech,” in Erich Kolig, ed., *Free Speech and Islam* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 187-208. One could cite many more such books, although the plaintiffs would no doubt attempt to discredit their conclusions by claiming that they were published by a component of the “Islamophobia industry.” See, e.g., Brooke M. Goldstein and Aaron Eitan Meyer, *Lawfare: The War Against Free Speech: A First Amendment Guide for Reporting in an Age of Islamist Lawfare* (Washington, DC: Center for Security Policy, 2011).

² As has been done by Jeffrey M. Bale and Tamir Bar-On, *Fighting the Last War: Confusion, Partisanship, and Alarmism in the Literature on the Radical Right* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022), especially in Chapter 5.

by many well-meaning people who consider themselves, rightly or wrongly, to be especially “enlightened” (as well as by extremists who are trying to disguise their actual ideological beliefs). Another would be the use of the term “fascist” as an epithet, which is now becoming the norm given that most self-styled “anti-fascists” could not correctly describe the core characteristics of fascist ideology if their lives depended upon it. Needless to say, the label “fascist” was dishonestly and maliciously applied by Grigory Zinoviev, the Comintern, and pro-Bolshevik communists in Germany, in the form “social fascists,” to their rivals in the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD: Social Democratic Party of Germany), it has often been propagandistically (and hilariously) applied by extremist Marxist-Leninist sects to each other, it was oft times used inappropriately in the 1960s by student radicals to refer to the regents of the University of California and other prestigious research universities, and it is now often being falsely and abusively applied to virtually everyone to the right of the Liberal Party in Canada and the Democratic Party in the U.S.³ A third example was the partisan definition of the “authoritarian personality” concept by Theodor Adorno et al so that it could only be applicable to people on the right – this, during the late Stalinist period and in the aftermath of the Maoist takeover in China!⁴ A fourth example was the promotion of the concept of “repressive tolerance” by Herbert Marcuse in the 1960s to justify censoring only the opinions of the New Left’s political opponents.⁵

Another illustrative example of this type of weaponization of language which is certainly relevant to this case is the obsessive contemporary use of the term “hate,” both as both as a general appellation for those with supposedly “hateful” views and in the specific formulations “hate groups,” “hate speech,” and “hate crimes,” all of which have now taken on a repressive institutionalized legal meaning given that they are used not merely to demonize, but also to criminalize particular political milieus, the ideas they espouse, and the actions they undertake.

In these contexts, the left has managed to abusively define the term “hate,” much like Adorno and his colleagues did with the term “authoritarian,” in such a way that it can only be applied to the right and its particular objects of hatred, especially to certain types of ethnic, racial, and religious hatreds that are commonly associated with elements of the right. *It should be apparent that any pejorative general term which is defined so that it can only be applicable to certain types of political actors and that automatically excludes other actors who display the same sorts of fervent abhorrence and animosity, is not a neutral scholarly term, but rather an activist-oriented, politicized term that is intrinsically biased.* This is undeniably the case with the term “hate,” since by definition it is never applied by self-styled civil rights “watchdog” organizations (or in activist-oriented fields like “Hate Studies” and by entities like Perry’s own Centre on Hate, Bias, and Extremism) to the outright hatred that is so often espoused by the left. As will become clear below, every type of activist or extremist group “hates” those whom they designate as societal “enemies” or “villains,” yet the aforementioned terms are never used to characterize virulent “haters” on the

³ For an extended analysis criticizing the often malicious misuses of the “fascist” label, see *ibid*.

⁴ T.W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1950). Other authors have since adopted a similarly biased approach. See, e.g., Bob Altemeyer, *Right-Wing Authoritarianism* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1981).

⁵ Herbert Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” in Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (Boston: Beacon, 1965), pp. 81-123.

left side of the spectrum. For example, the term “hate group” is never used as a label for communist organizations that vehemently “hate” the bourgeoisie, for self-proclaimed “anti-fascists” who hate real or (mostly) imagined “fascists,” for misandrist feminists who “hate” males because they are supposedly all “toxic” or “potential rapists,” for eco-radical organizations that “hate” proclaimed “despoilers of the environment,” for transgender extremists who “hate” the majority of regular people who view biological sex as binary, for racist non-white minority activists who “hate” the majority population and/or all policemen, for “alter-globalist” radicals who “hate” capitalists, or for Third Worldist revolutionaries who “hate” the West and blame it for all of their own problems. Nor are they usually applied, as they frequently are to bigoted Christian traditionalists and fundamentalists, to bigoted right-wing Islamic religious extremists, including Islamists, who openly “hate” non-Muslim “infidels,” Muslim “apostates,” and homosexual “sinners.” Similarly, the virulent hostility expressed towards Christianity and Christians by secularists, some indigenous activists, or Islamists is rarely labeled or prosecuted as “hate speech,” even though religious bigotry falls within the narrowly partisan definition of that concept.

The term “hate speech” is thus primarily employed to justify censoring the freedom of expression of the opponents of activists, especially in countries (like Canada) that do not have a First Amendment. One could therefore argue, somewhat sardonically, that the best definition of “hate speech” is “speech that other people really, really hate.” Finally, the category “hate crime” is applied to justify giving much longer prison sentences to certain perpetrators than would be normal, based solely on the ideological motivation of those perpetrators. *In my opinion, everyone who launches unprovoked attacks on an innocent person should be severely punished, irrespective of their specific motivations.* There is no logical reason why a perpetrator who launches such an attack for criminal gain or idiosyncratic personal reasons, say, because they did not like the victim’s hair or clothing style, should receive any less punishment than one who attacks someone of a different ethno-cultural, racial, religious, or sexual orientation group for ideological reasons. All the more so because “hate crime” incident statistics are based primarily on unverified self-reporting, and because in practice “hate crime” statutes have never been applied fairly to all varieties of perpetrators. For example, violent leftist perpetrators are never accused of “hate crimes,” no matter how openly they claim to hate their victims for political, religious, or at times ethnic reasons.

On to “Islamophobia.” As noted above, a stratagem that is nowadays frequently employed by activists is to claim that their designated enemies have supposed “phobias,” including about foreigners (“xenophobia”), Jews (“Judeophobia”), homosexuals (“homophobia”), Muslims (“Islamophobia”), transsexuals (“transphobia”), and the list goes on to the point of absurdity (“fatphobia”). The first two of those terms have been around for some time, but the list of imagined “phobias” keeps being expanded in an effort to delegitimize more and more opponents of the “progressive” or radical left (as well as by radical right Islamists who have skillfully appropriated its language for their own purposes). In short, many contemporary concerns and fears, no matter how reasonable and legitimate, are now labeled as a “phobia” by the left – excluding, of course, the left’s own overwrought fears about the resurgence of “fascism,” its histrionic obsession with “racism,” or its apocalyptic prognostications about a looming environmental catastrophe. As I have argued at some length elsewhere, these neologisms have a built-in conceptual bias insofar as they suggest that critics of particular individuals or groups who are branded thusly must necessarily have

an irrational “phobia,” i.e., an “extreme fear of or aversion to” those objects, one that is both allegedly groundless and effectively pathological.⁶ No one familiar with history would deny that extremists of various kinds have unwarranted, irrational, paranoid, conspiratorial, and bigoted views towards such minority groups and other designated outgroups – and increasingly nowadays towards the majority population in Western countries – but to what extent is the term “phobia” really applicable in these contexts? Not very much, it turns out. In fact, the designation phobia has a very specific meaning in the scientific literature. According to the psychiatric and medical literature, the term “phobia” refers to a *clinical psychological anxiety disorder*, specifically an irrational fear about something specific that causes distress and is typically debilitating for the phobic individuals, one that is in the same “class” as panic disorders and post-traumatic stress disorders.⁷ Typical symptoms of phobias, according to the American Psychiatric Association, include dizziness, trembling, increased heart rate, breathlessness, nausea, and a sense of unreality.⁸ How these observable symptoms could possibly be applicable to alleged “political phobias” is anyone’s guess, since those imagined “phobias” neither cause such diagnosable physiological reactions nor have debilitating psychological effects on bigoted people that prevents them from living normal lives. Although even the most inveterate and dishonest purveyors of the “phobia” trope in the context of partisan political polemics rarely if ever explicitly claim that the “phobias” in question are actual clinical conditions, their biased usage of such neologisms to characterize others subtly implies that this is the case. This is not to say, of course, that there are not various reprehensible forms of prejudice and bigotry directed against Muslims and other groups, but only that such attitudes cannot be accurately characterized as “phobias.”

In short, the argument herein is that the pejorative term “Islamophobia” is inherently problematic. Consider the famous definition proffered by the Runnymede Trust, a self-styled “race equality” think tank in the UK, as an example, since it has become one the most influential definitions of that term following the appearance of its 1997 report, *Islamophobia: A Challenge for us All*.⁹ The short definition provided by this report is “dread or hatred of Islam – and therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims.”¹⁰ It then goes on to add another definitional criteria, “unfounded hostility towards Islam” and the practical consequences resulting therefrom.¹¹ Note that the first formulation unfairly conflates fearing or disliking the religion of Islam with fearing and disliking all or most Muslims, even though one can legitimately dislike many aspects of Islam without fearing, disliking, or hating most of its adherents, just as some people might strongly dislike Christian religious doctrines but nonetheless have many Christian friends. As regards the second, there is very little

⁶ Cf. Jeffrey M. Bale, “Denying the Link between Islamist Ideology and Jihadist Terrorism: ‘Political Correctness’ and the Undermining of Counterterrorism,” in idem, *The Darkest Sides of Politics II: State Terrorism, “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Religious Extremism, and Organized Crime* (Abingdon, UK and New York: Routledge, 2018), chapter 7, pp. 278-80, note 39.

⁷ See Lea Winerman, “Figuring Out Phobia,” [American Psychological Association] *Monitor on Psychology* 36:7 (July-August 2005), at <https://www.apa.org/monitor/julaug05/figuring>; and “What Are Anxiety Disorders?,” American Psychiatric Association website, at <https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/anxiety-disorders/what-are-anxiety-disorders>.

⁸ Kendra Cherry, “What is a Phobia?,” *VeryWell*, 3 February 2020, at <https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-a-phobia-2795454>.

⁹ Runnymede Trust, *Islamophobia: A Challenge for us All* (London: Runnymede Trust, [November] 1997).

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 1.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 4.

discussion at that juncture of which concerns about Islam or Muslims are “unfounded” and which, if any, might be warranted, much less who should have the authority to make such a determination. If one feels compelled to employ the term “Islamophobia,” which would be a mistake given that it is intrinsically political, perhaps a more neutral definition would be “an acute fear of or aversion to Islam.” Whether such a fear and aversion is necessarily “unfounded” or “irrational” is a matter for debate in specific contexts.

The Runnymede report also associated “Islamophobia” with a “closed” view of Islam that allegedly exhibited the following traits:

- Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change;
- it is seen as separate and "other". It does not have values in common with other cultures, is not affected by them, and does not influence them;
- it is seen as inferior to the West. It is seen as barbaric, irrational, primitive, and sexist;
- it is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, and engaged in a clash of civilizations; and
- it is seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage.¹²

Three other features of “closed views” were added to the five above, but these actually refer to the presumed effects of those first five features, viz., that criticisms made of the West by Muslims are rejected out of hand, that hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society, and that anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural and normal.

In any event, the reality is that these “closed attitudes” towards Islam are typically only embraced in the West by Christian religious fanatics or poorly-informed bigots. No serious scholar or political analyst would support these overgeneralizations, at least not as enumerated. None would claim, for example, that Islam constitutes a “monolithic bloc”, that it is completely “static and unresponsive to change”, that it has no values “in common with other cultures”, that it neither affects nor is affected by other cultures, that it is inferior in every way to the West, that it is invariably violent and aggressive, or that it is a “political ideology” rather than a religion. However, many would make valid and nuanced critical points about aspects of Islam that reflect certain realities underlying these crude formulations. For example, that the Islamic world has generally been more resistant to change than many other cultures (due both to its archaic tribal social structures, its “honor-shame” culture, and the belief that the Qur'an is the literal word of Allah), that Islam contains core doctrinal elements that do indeed separate it from the rest of the “infidel” world, that features of Islam (such as attitudes towards “infidels,” minority Muslim sects, women, and homosexuals) are quite regressive when compared to those in the post-Enlightenment West, that Islam is relatively intolerant and warlike compared to many other religions (given that Muslim armies in the 7th and 8th centuries quickly conquered one third of the known world in the name of Islam and then, in later centuries, repeatedly tried to conquer additional territories whenever they had the military capability to do so), that (according to survey research and other indicators) significant segments of the Muslim population in various countries are nowadays supportive of jihadist terrorism and see

¹² Ibid, pp. 5-8.

themselves at war with other civilizations, and that the Islamic religion is meant to be all-encompassing, which means that, unlike in Christianity, there is no scriptural support for a clear separation between the religious sphere and the political sphere. Some of these issues will become clearer below, when Islam and Islamism are discussed in more detail.

There are also identifiable problems with Runnymede's list of "open views" of Islam:

- Islam is seen as diverse and progressive, with internal differences, debates, and development;
- it is seen as interdependent with other faiths and cultures – having certain shared values and aims, being affected by them, and "enriching" them;
- it is seen as distinctively different, but not deficient, and as "equally worthy of respect";
- it is seen as an actual or potential partner in joint cooperative enterprises and in the solution of shared problems; and
- it is seen as a genuine religious faith, practiced sincerely by its adherents.¹³

With respect to the first of these views, although Islam should be recognized as being diverse and as having internal differences, there is no reason to subscribe to the view that it is necessarily "progressive," which is a value judgment that may or may not be agreed upon. Regarding the second, although Islam clearly interacts with other faiths and cultures and may display certain shared values with them, one need not accept that it invariably "enriches" them. That too is a value judgment. Regarding the third, Islam may in fact be considered "deficient" in certain respects according to the standards of other cultures, and thus need not be considered by everyone to be worthy of particular respect. Likewise, should everyone in the world be required to "respect" other major religions, such as Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism? That is clearly not always the case, both for some legitimate and for less legitimate or tolerable reasons. Should it also be necessary for Westerners and the Chinese to accord respect to other tribal religions that, say, sanction headhunting and cannibalism? Regarding the fourth, Islam may well be a valuable potential partner in certain cooperative enterprises or in helping to resolve particular international problems, but in other contexts it might be considered the primary source of the problems that need to be resolved. Regarding the fifth, Islam is undeniably a "genuine religious faith", even if it has worrying political manifestations. To these Runnymede added three other signifiers of "open views," that Muslim criticisms of the West should be considered and debated rather than rejected outright, that [civil] debates and disagreements with Islam should not increase the discrimination and exclusion of Muslims, and that critical views of Islam should themselves be subjected to criticism. Those are all fair points.

Despite these conceptual problems, the Runnymede report at least had the merit of insisting that certain types of criticisms of Islam should not be characterized as "Islamophobia":

It is not intrinsically phobic or prejudiced, of course, to disagree with or to disapprove of Muslim beliefs, laws or practices. Adherents of other world faiths disagree with Muslims on points of theology and religious practice. By the same

¹³ Ibid.

token agnostics and secular humanists disagree with Muslims, as with all religious believers, on basic issues.

In a liberal democracy it is inevitable and healthy that people will criticise and oppose, sometimes robustly, opinions and practices with which they disagree.

It can be legitimate to criticise policies and practices of Muslim states and regimes, for example, especially when their governments do not subscribe to internationally recognised human rights, freedoms and democratic procedures, or to criticise and condemn terrorist movements which claim to be motivated by Islamic values.

Similarly, it can be legitimate to criticise the treatment of women in some Muslim countries, or the views and attitudes which some Muslims have towards ‘the West’, or towards other world faiths. Debates, arguments and disagreements on all these issues take place just as much amongst Muslims, it is important to recognise, as between Muslims and non-Muslims.¹⁴

Unfortunately, this initial attempt to bring some balance and fairness into the discussion has since been almost totally abandoned in the increasingly shrill literature on “Islamophobia.”

Indeed, more recent definitions of “Islamophobia” tend to be far more biased, partisan, and expansive, especially those proposed by Islamists themselves. See, for example, the convoluted “working definition” proposed by the Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project at UC Berkeley, which is headed by an Islamist named Hatem Bazian, who also teaches at Zaytuna College, an Islamic college in Berkeley:

Islamophobia is a contrived fear or prejudice fomented by the existing Eurocentric and Orientalist global power structure. It is directed at a perceived or real Muslim threat through the maintenance and extension of existing disparities in economic, political, social and cultural relations, while rationalizing the necessity to deploy violence as a tool to achieve “civilizational rehab” of the target communities (Muslim or otherwise). Islamophobia reintroduces and reaffirms a global racial structure through which resource distribution disparities are maintained and extended.¹⁵

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 4.

¹⁵ Islamophobia Research & Documentation Project, “Defining “Islamophobia.” Center for Race & Gender, University of California at Berkeley, undated, at <https://web.archive.org/web/20170309201925/http://crg.berkeley.edu/content/islamophobia/defining-islamophobia> .

Incredibly, the authors of this text falsely claimed that “[t]he term ‘Islamophobia’ was first introduced as a concept in a 1991 Runnymede Trust Report.” In reality, the term *islamophobie* dates back to the early 20th century, when it was used by certain French colonial administrators who were sympathetic to Muslims. See Jean-Loïc Le Quellec, “Histoire et mythe de la conceptionniste du mot ‘islamophobia’,” *Fragments sur les Temps Présents*, 19 June 2019, at <https://tempspresents.com/2019/06/19/histoire-et-mythe-de-la-conceptionniste-du-mot-islamophobie/> . Alas, the same mistake has also been made by many critics of Islam and Islamism, although – contrary to the claims of Le Quellec – they do not constitute “conspiratorial myths.” The latter authors are absolutely correct to emphasize that the Islamists of today have adopted and weaponized the term to try to suppress all criticism of Islam and Islamism, no matter how legitimate it may be.

One can only scratch one's head when encountering this kind of postmodern, post-colonialist jargon and gobbledegook.

Predictably, given their penchant for using such overheated, "politically correct" rhetoric, Bazian and other Islamists are prone to accuse virtually everyone who criticizes Islam and Islamism, including analysts who make nuanced overall arguments and draw clear distinctions between the two terms, of "Islamophobia." So too do most of today's peddlers of the "Islamophobia" narrative, who tend to apply the label indiscriminately, and often dishonestly and maliciously, to everyone who expresses opinions about Islam that they find objectionable. For example, some of the main sources on "Islamophobia" and the "Islamophobia industry" that are referred to by Perry and Zine in their reports, which were either published by "progressive" watchdog organizations or by Islamist groups, themselves embody and thus serve to illustrate these very characteristics.¹⁶ All one needs to do is pay careful attention to the alarmist and dismissive rhetorical techniques of vilification that these sources consistently employ to confirm their biased approach. In fact, what can be fairly described as a transnational "anti-Islamophobia industry" has now developed that has been churning out masses of polemical studies in recent decades. Such studies typically fail to make clear distinctions between a) bigoted "Islam-hating" ignoramuses, b) severe critics of Islam in general, for more or less legitimate reasons, and c) astute, knowledgeable people whose primary goal is to defend Enlightenment values, individual freedom, and democratic pluralism from the threat of Islamist totalitarianism. Indeed, they devote most of their energies and efforts to targeting and smearing the more serious critics of Islamism, those who have done the most thorough work exposing the agendas and activities of Islamist networks, such as – in the U.S. – Lorenzo Vidino of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, Daniel Pipes and the Middle East Forum (MEF), and Steven Emerson and the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT).¹⁷ Similarly,

¹⁶ See, e.g., Nathan Lean, *The Islamophobia Industry: How the Right Manufactures Fear of Muslims* (London: Pluto Press, 2012); Wajahat Ali et al, *Fear, Inc: The Islamophobia Network in America* (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, [August] 2011), at <http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/08/pdf/islamophobia.pdf>; Thomas Cincotta, *Manufacturing the Muslim Menace: Private Firms, Public Services, and the Threat to Rights and Security* (Somerville, MA: Political Research Associates, 2011), at http://www.publiceye.org/liberty/training/Muslim_Menace_Complete.pdf; Muslim Public Affairs Council, *Not Qualified: Exposing the Deception Behind America's Top 25 Pseudo-Experts on Islam* (Los Angeles, CA: MPAC, undated [2013]), at <http://www.mpac.org/assets/docs/publications/MPAC-25-Pseudo-Experts-On-Islam.pdf>. Most of these reports were published by "progressive" watchdog groups (like the CAP and PRA) or by Islamist groups (like MPAC). Among other things, Lean has been associated with Georgetown University's Bridge Initiative, a "multi-year research project" on "Islamophobia" established by well-known academic "Islam apologist" and "Islamist apologist" John Esposito. It defines "Islamophobia" as "an extreme fear of and hostility toward Islam and Muslims which often leads to hate speech, hate crimes, as well as social and political discrimination", thereby seeking to link "Islamophobia" and "hate," and produces reports denigrating even serious scholarly critics of Islam. See the Bridge Initiative's website at <https://bridge.georgetown.edu/>. Cf. also David Williams and Nick Lowles, *The 'Counter-Jihad' Movement: The Global Trend Feeding Anti-Muslim Hatred* (London: Hope Not Hate, 2012), another leftist "watchdog" group; Øyvind Strømmen, *Det mørke nettet: Om høyreekstremisme, kontrajihadisme og terror i Europa /The Dark Net: On Right-Wing Extremism, Counter-Jihadism and Terror in Europe* (Oslo: Cappelen, 2011); and the Loonwatch website (which is arguably the most dishonest and malicious of them all).

¹⁷ Indeed, Zine herself singles out the MEF for special criticism in her report, pp. 30-2, and uses the most unfair and abusive language to characterize Pipes and his organization. As it happens, Pipes has a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern History from Harvard University, and is an analyst who – unlike genuine anti-Islam bigots and conspiracy theorists – has long differentiated between moderate Muslims and radical Muslims (i.e., Islamists). The same is true of Vidino and Emerson.

they falsely endeavor to depict alleged “Islamophobes” as “hateful” right-wing extremists, even though many of the most indefatigable critics of Islam and Islamism are either genuinely liberal and politically moderate Muslims (including ex-Muslims and former Islamists, who Zine denounces using the pejorative formulation “native informants”) or intellectuals on the left, who are then likewise smeared as “bigots” and “Islamophobes.”¹⁸ Moreover, Islamist activists themselves often play the most prominent, albeit at times behind-the-scenes, role in enunciating this “anti-Islamophobia industry’s” characteristic themes and talking points.

Even worse, the biased application of the term “Islamophobia” (and other “political phobia” terms) is increasingly conjoined by activists in and outside of academia with the biased application of the term “hate,” especially in the form of “hate speech.” The underlying purpose of this stratagem is all too obvious: to justify censoring criticism of Islam (and Islamism), no matter how accurate it may be, by categorizing it as a form of “hate speech.” For example, the Jeddah-based organization of Muslim countries in the United Nations, the Munazzamat al-Ta‘awun al-‘Islami (OIC: Organization of Islamic Cooperation, previously known as the Organization of the Islamic Conference), has for many years been pressuring the UN to designate criticism of Islam and Muhammad as forms of “hate speech” that should be outlawed, thus effectively declaring such criticisms to be “blasphemy” and seeking to impose it on non-Muslim countries.¹⁹ It scarcely needs to be pointed out that such a policy, if enacted, would severely curb free speech in Western democracies. One suspects that this is precisely why the plaintiff solicited reports from two people, one a self-proclaimed expert in “Hate Studies,” the other a self-appointed expert in “Islamophobia Studies,” both of whose reports are long on accusations (despite being covered with a patina of “social science” jargon) and short on the provision of actual evidence that the arguments of Quiggin

¹⁸ These critics include, in the first category, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Mamoun Fandy, Tarek Fatah, Chahdortt Djavann, Ibn Warraq, Mohamed Sifaoui, Wafa Sultan, Salim Mansur, Chala Chafiq, ‘Ali Sina, Naser Khader, Irfan al-Alawi, Zuhdi Jasser, Asra Nomani, Irshad Manji, ex-Islamist Muslims from the Quilliam Foundation in the UK, ex-MB member Mohamed Louizi, Walid al-Kubaisi, Raymond Ibrahim, Magdi Cristiano Allam, Antoine Sfeir, Walid Phares, Kamal Nawash, members of the secularist Zentralrat der Ex-Muslime [Central Council of Ex-Muslims] in Germany and other European countries). In the second category, one can mention the signers of the Euston Manifesto in the U.K., the “new atheists” (e.g., Sam Harris, the late Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, Bill Maher, Maryam Namazie, Taslima Nasrin), and a number of academics, journalists, artists, and intellectuals (e.g., Bassam Tibi, Nick Cohen, Paul Berman, Kurt Westergaard [almost murdered, and the object of other murder plots, by jihadists], Caroline Fourest, Bernard Henri-Lévy, Kanan Makiya, Pascal Bruckner, the late Theo van Gogh [murdered by a jihadist], Alain Finkielkraut, Lars Hedegaard [almost murdered by a jihadist], Salman Rushdie [under the perpetual threat of death from Islamists], Gregorius Nekschot [pseudonym for a Dutch cartoonist], Lars Vilks [almost murdered by jihadists], Helle Merete Brix, Oriana Fallaci [who admittedly later crossed the line into “Islam bashing” or even “Muslim hating”], Robert Redeker, Daniel Krause, Farhad Khosrokhavar, Philippe Val, Afshin Ellian, the publishers of *Charlie Hebdo* [whose office has been attacked and firebombed and its staff members murdered by jihadists]). For criticisms of these calumnies, see the responses of Sam Harris, “Response to Controversy, Version 2.3,” *Sam Harris*, 7 April 2013, at http://www.samharris.org/site/full_text/response-to-controversy2/; Jeffrey Tayler, “Richard Dawkins is Not an Islamophobe,” *Salon*, 24 August 2013, at http://www.salon.com/2013/08/24/richard_dawkins_is_not_an_islamophobe/; and Hartmut Krauss, ed., *Feindbild Islamkritik: Wenn die Grenzen zur Verzerrung und Diffamierung überschritten werden* (Osnabrück: Hintergrund, 2010), a collection of left-of-center authors who oppose both Islamic obscurantism and the hysterical demonization of critics of Islam. The grim truth is that critics of Islam and Islamism from all across the political spectrum have often been smeared, uniformly, as “racists,” “bigots,” “extremists,” and “Islamophobes” by self-styled experts on “Islamophobia.”

¹⁹ For a good overview, see Shea and Marshall, *Silenced*, part III, especially chapter 11.

and his co-defendants are “hateful” and “Islamophobic,” much less “defamatory.” It should also be noted that “Hate Studies” and “Islamophobia Studies” are neither long-standing, respected academic disciplines nor widely accepted interdisciplinary subject areas (such as Security Studies, Intelligence Studies, and Terrorism Studies). On the contrary, they are far more comparable to other politicized academic programs that were created (or otherwise emerged) in direct response to political agitation by activists, such as ethnic studies, women’s studies, queer studies, etc. Of course, the serious study of issues affecting minority groups, women, and LBGT people is entirely legitimate, and should therefore be incorporated into existing academic disciplines. But that is quite different than creating entire departments staffed mainly by radicals who promote only “victim” and “oppression” narratives or other overtly politicized and non-scholarly activist agendas (such as the revisionist “Afrocentric” interpretations of black history) rather than disinterested scholarship.

It is now time to turn to defining extremism and Islamism, which should in turn help to demonstrate the falsity of most of these “Islamophobia” accusations, as well as to challenge IRC’s claim that associating it with “extremism” is defamatory.

IIIC: Ideologies and the Nature of Ideological Extremism

This section is specifically intended as a response to the plaintiff’s arguments that the use of the term “extremist” is an “impugned word” when applied to the activities of the MB, and by extension, IRC and IRW.

In the materialistic world of the contemporary West, it is very common for political and military analysts to downplay the importance of ideological beliefs in motivating the behavior of our state and non-state adversaries. The result has often been that those analysts, as well as politicians and the general public, have engaged in “mirror imaging,” an intelligence community term referring to a phenomenon in which analysts unconsciously project their own ways of thinking, their own values, their own frames of reference, and indeed their own fantasies onto their adversaries, including those emanating from very different cultures with very different histories and values, instead of trying to view the world from their adversaries’ own perspectives and points of view. This sort of parochial approach is widely regarded – and rightly so – as problematic, counterproductive, harmful, and potentially catastrophic insofar as it can easily lead to serious misunderstandings about the nature of the adversary, which can in turn result in the adoption of misguided policies and ineffective responses. Yet this myopic, self-referential mirror imaging approach is nowadays practically the norm in the West (especially amongst academics), particularly in relation to the threat posed by Islamists, whose actions are inspired primarily, and usually quite explicitly, by their Islamist interpretations of core Islamic doctrines. Surely it is both analytically and methodologically unsound to ignore the influence or deny the importance of the fervently held beliefs of protagonists, all the more so when one is analyzing groups that explicitly define themselves by their beliefs, generally act in accordance with those beliefs, and indeed feel compelled to justify all of their actions on the basis of those beliefs. And it is even more foolish to contemptuously dismiss what the actual protagonists keep telling everyone about their own

motivations, and instead to ascribe other preferred motivations to them in the absence of any verifiable evidence.²⁰

Unlike many blinkered Western analysts, ideological extremists themselves clearly recognize the vital importance of firm ideological convictions in motivating their actions and otherwise affecting their behavior. For example, a leading jihadist strategic thinker, Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, drew a clear conceptual, moral, and behavioral distinction between “ideological fighters,” in this case Islamists, and ordinary fighters who lack such an all-encompassing belief system:

Whoever does not fight for an ideology and an idea is incapable of showing resistance to defeat and prolonged suffering, and might soon reach a state of submission of honor and conscience to the enemy, and possibly even crossing over the enemy if his material desires are satisfied or fulfilled more than others have provided: possessions, women, high status, recognition, primacy, etc. He thus becomes an enemy or a traitor, or at least submits and retreats into his private life in order to be calm and safe, to make due with what he has attained or to be happy to be alive. By contrast, the ideological fighter stands firm, does not betray...does not collaborate with his enemy and does not submit unless forced to do so if surrounded...He shows resistance and assumes that his suffering will earn him recompense in the next world [i.e., in Paradise]. His peace of mind and his thoughts of his end constitute an incentive for him to show resistance and stand firm. His soul yearns for jihad and his conscience impels and stimulates him to carry out jihad for the sake of his lofty idealism. There is a huge difference between an ordinary fighter and an ideological fighter.²¹

Other types of ideological extremists have made similar arguments extolling the value of their beliefs, perhaps above all in situations when they are engaged in life-or-death struggles against their designated enemies. Such statements lauding “ideological fighters” typically involve some degree of idealization and exaggeration, but they are nonetheless essentially valid. That is, after all, precisely why extremist movements so often form elite vanguards, party cadres, or military units consisting of their most ideologically committed and fanatical members, such as the black-garbed Nazi Schutzstaffel (SS: Protection Squadron) created by Adolf Hitler.

This does not mean, however, that ideology or any other single factor is alone responsible for the behavior of violent ideological extremists, since all monocausal explanations for complex social phenomena are oversimplifications inasmuch as a multiplicity of intersecting factors are always at play.²² But not all of those factors are equally important, no matter what the context, and ideology

²⁰ For a longer discussion of this topic, see Jeffrey M. Bale, “Introduction: Ideologies, Extremist Ideologies, and Terrorism,” in *idem, The Darkest Sides of Politics I: Postwar Fascism, Covert Operations, and Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2018), chapter 1, pp. 3-8.

²¹ See Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s 1600-page strategic treatise, *Da‘wa al-muqawwama al-islamiyya al-‘alamiyya [The Call for Global Islamic Resistance]*, p. 887. The author’s real name is Mustafa ‘Abd al-Qadir Sit Maryam Nasar.

²² Cf. further the cautionary analysis of Jeroen Gunning, “Critical Reflections on the Relationship between Ideology and Behavior,” in Jeevan Deol and Zaheer Kazmi, eds., *Contextualising Jihadi Thought* (London: Hurst, 2012), pp. 219-42. Even so, however, Gunning rightly emphasizes (p. 220) the following: “That beliefs must be taken seriously

is arguably the single most important factor in understanding the behavior of political and religious extremists. As Sam Harris rightly notes, “[a] belief is a lever that, once pulled, moves almost everything else in a person’s life...Your beliefs define your vision of the world; they dictate your behavior; they determine your emotional responses to other human beings.”²³ This applies no less to Islamists than it does to sectarian Maoists, radical environmentalists, fascist revolutionaries, violent Christian anti-abortionists, messianic Jewish settlers in Israel, and Hindu nationalists in India. That is why it is necessary at this point to undertake a preliminary discussion of both ideologies in general and extremist ideologies in particular.

The Nature and Function of Ideologies

The exact meaning of the term “ideology” remains a contentious and much debated one to this day. It is generally agreed, however, that ideologies should not be mistaken for or confused with the vague presuppositions or notions that most people hold, more or less unconsciously, about how the world operates, which are a normal product of their socialization. Rather, *ideologies are systematic, relatively coherent, well-articulated, and often all-encompassing sets of ideas about the nature of social reality, whether or not those ideas have a solid factual basis.*²⁴ In short, they are elaborate intellectual constructs that embody certain distinctive beliefs and fundamental principles. Once one fully adopts or embraces such an ideology, it thenceforth serves as a crucial perceptual lens through which all information from the outside world is filtered, and in the process refracted and distorted. In short, and virtually by definition, political ideologies provide an explanatory framework for interpreting and understanding human socio-political interaction. And like all intellectual constructs, including social science theories, mathematical models, and conspiracy theories, such ideologies invariably present only a partial picture of – and thereby inevitably oversimplify – reality. This is in fact one of the primary reasons for their appeal: they make the inordinately complex, extraordinarily fluid, seemingly incomprehensible, and often frightening external world seem more understandable, and thus potentially more manageable.²⁵

In addition to purporting to explain the world, political ideologies have other important functions and characteristics. First, they inevitably contain normative elements. They are not only formulated

has been emphasized across different disciplines, and this chapter too will start from the premise that ideas matter: we cannot explain, let alone understand, why people behave the way they do without studying their beliefs, and ideas are not merely derivative of other, supposedly more fundamental, factors such as material context.”

²³ Sam Harris, *The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), p. 12. This statement is even more true of those who adhere fanatically to extremist political and religious ideologies.

²⁴ This is my own definition. For a more extended discussion of the development of interpretations of the term “ideology,” see Bale, “Introduction: Ideologies, Extremist Ideologies, and Terrorist Violence,” in *idem, Darkest Sides of Politics I*, chapter 1, pp. 11-23, where extensive citations to the literature are provided.

²⁵ Indeed, some have made even harsher criticisms along this line. See, e.g., the remarks of Farhang Rajaee, *Islamism and Modernism: The Changing Discourse in Iran* (Austin: University of Texas, 2007), p. 4: “Any ism denotes an ideology – not a way of approaching the world as a thinking agent, but a seeming certitude that claims to possess all the answers. An ideology is a project with a clear blueprint that requires only mechanical implementation. It provides assurance because it offers easy answers to the most difficult and fundamental questions. Approaching the world through the lens of an ideology renders redundant the human processes of constantly thinking, evaluating, facing hard choices, and balancing.”

in such a way as to describe the world, but also in such a way as to evaluate, judge, and perhaps criticize it, implicitly if not explicitly. That does not mean, however, that all ideologies are oppositional in the sense that they advocate resistance to the existing status quo. On the contrary, some ideologies aim to buttress the existing political and social order, others to reform it from within, and still others to overthrow and replace it.²⁶ Second, political ideologies have an important affective dimension. Whether an ideology is seeking to promote the maintenance of the status quo or to justify its overthrow, it must appeal to the emotions of the individuals or social groups its exponents hope to influence, convince, or mobilize the support of. As Mostafa Rejai notes, “a most distinctive feature of all ideologies is an appeal to human passion, an eliciting of emotive response.”²⁷ Some analysts have gone so far as to claim that ideologies appeal mainly to the emotions rather than to the intellect.²⁸ However that may be, politically influential ideologies, past and present, are both psychologically seductive and emotionally resonant, which explains why they have so often been capable of inducing certain segments of particular communities to make extraordinary sacrifices on behalf of the causes they espouse. Finally, political ideologies function as a powerful source of social solidarity, since they effectively divide – intellectually, psychologically, and perhaps also socially and organizationally – the “righteous” group members from all of the “dark” or “alien” forces operating outside of and allegedly against the interests of the group. They therefore help to provide both a sense of collective identity to individual group members and to bond them socially and emotionally to each other, thus offering them a profound feeling of fellowship as “comrades” or “brothers” who are all ostensibly working together harmoniously and making common (and perhaps even at time extraordinary) sacrifices for a great and noble cause.

In any case, all political and religio-political ideologies, extremist or otherwise, claim to provide the answers to three interrelated questions:

- what is wrong with the world?
- who is responsible for those wrongs?
- what needs to be done to correct those wrongs?

This means, effectively, that political ideologies all contain both diagnostic element – the answers they provide to the first and second questions – and prescriptive elements that are intended to serve

²⁶ Cf. Max J. Skidmore, *Ideologies: Politics in Action* (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993), p. 8; and Roy C. Macridis, *Contemporary Political Ideologies: Movements and Regimes* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), pp. 16-17.

²⁷ Mostafa Rejai, *Political Ideologies: A Comparative Approach* (Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 7. However, he also emphasizes (*ibid*, pp. 6-7) that, although “[i]n any ideology there are elements of emotionality alongside elements of rationality”, “the balance between the two...varies from ideology to ideology.” For his part, Michael Freeden makes a more interesting point in *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University, 2003), p. 120: “On a more profound level, ideologies are the main form of political thought to accept passion and sentiment as legitimate, indeed ineliminable, forms of political expression. Ideologies reflect the fact that socio-political conduct is not wholly or merely rational or calculating, but highly, centrally, and often healthily emotional.” Or, one must insist in many cases, unhealthily emotional.

²⁸ Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 400: “What gives ideology its force is its passion...One might say, in fact, that the most important, latent, function of ideology is to tap emotion.”

as a guide for action – the answer they provide to the third question. The above is a shorthand way of formulating ideas that many other scholars have discussed at greater length. For example, Neil Smelser emphasizes these same three aspects of ideologies, among others. First, ideologies claim to “identify and explain what is wrong or threatened in the world of believers and hoped-for believers,” thereby structuring and making concrete “the more diffuse dissatisfactions experienced by a group and [lumping] the diverse reasons for these dissatisfactions into a single explanation.”²⁹ Second, they typically “identify one or more target groups who are responsible for the dangers to and suffering in a given group,” i.e., they tend to ascribe both the world’s and their own group’s problems to the actions supposedly initiated by certain designated villains.³⁰ Third, and more optimistically, they provide “an ideal vision of a better society and a better life.”³¹

Here it needs to be emphasized that rank-and-file members of extremist political and religious movements and organizations do not need to have a sophisticated understanding of the complex ideological doctrines developed by intellectuals within their respective milieus in order to be inspired to take revolutionary, violent, or even self-sacrificial actions on the basis of those ideas. On the contrary, all they need to do is embrace a simplified, reductionist, and easily comprehensible version of those doctrines, one that is constantly reinforced by inspirational slogans, sound bites, repetitious ritualistic actions, elaborate ceremonies, and exhortatory hymns and songs (such as jihadist *anashid* [vocal chants]). All that is necessary is that they readily accept, internalize, and thence act upon the answers provided by their particular ideologies to the three aforementioned questions.

For example, all that would-be jihadists need to understand about Islamism is its explanation for what is wrong with the world (“unbelief” [*kufr*]), who its designated enemies are (“infidels” [*kuffar*], “pagans” [*mushrikun*], Muslim “apostates” [*murtaddun*], and Muslim “hypocrites” [*munafiqun*]), and what its simplistic, all-encompassing vision for creating a utopian *shari‘a*-dominated world order that is purportedly sanctioned by Allah is (for Sunni Islamists, the idealized image of a global Caliphate). Needless to say, jihadist recruits come to believe that Islam’s irremediably “evil” enemies must be fought against relentlessly, defeated decisively, and subjected thoroughly in order for the Islamists to be able to establish their imagined utopian world order, even though such a grandiose, imperialistic scheme for global Islamic domination is obviously unachievable in the real world given current Muslim military weaknesses. Understanding these basic principles does not require a detailed knowledge of the Qur’an, an awareness of the authenticity and reliability problems concerning the sources for early Islamic history, jurisprudential expertise in the interpretation of the *shari‘a*, or a full comprehension of the philosophical ideas of brilliant past Islamic thinkers like al-Ghazali (ca. 1058-1111) and Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406).

Similarly, only a naïve analyst would claim that the average communist militant could not really be inspired by communist ideological doctrines and slogans unless he or she had spent inordinate

²⁹ Neil J. Smelser, *The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions* (Princeton: Princeton University, 2007), p. 65.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid, p. 50.

amounts of time and effort mastering the convoluted arguments presented in the three volumes of Karl Marx's opus, *Das Kapital (Capital)*. On the contrary, all communist militants really needed to know was that capitalism was "evil" and exploitative and had to be destroyed, that the "bourgeoisie" were the class enemy who must be fought and eliminated, and that the end goal was the creation of a utopian, worldwide "classless" society free of all exploitation and injustice. To understand those core ideas, it would have sufficed for them to listen to exhortatory speeches by charismatic revolutionary militants or read short polemical pamphlets like Marx's *Das Kommunistische Manifest (The Communist Manifesto)* or Vladimir Lenin's *Chto delat?* (What Is to Be Done?).

The Common Characteristics of Extremist Political and Religious Ideologies

A good deal of the current conceptual confusion about the nature of extremism is attributable to a basic failure to distinguish between, or a misleading attempt to conflate or commingle, two distinct types of extremism. The first is *extremism of goals*, which is almost entirely the product of a group's political or religious ideology. The second is *extremism of means*, which may or may not be linked to ideological extremism.³² Extremism of means refers to the employment of methods, means, or techniques that are regarded as extraordinary, disproportionate, unnecessary under the circumstances, or morally beyond the pale within particular social and cultural contexts, such as the use of unconstrained, indiscriminate violence or the carrying out of otherwise violent, destructive, and harmful actions that explicitly or implicitly violate existing cultural taboos (as opposed to similar actions that do not violate such taboos because they are widely regarded as legitimate, such as committing acts of violence in self-defense, executing violent criminals, or carrying out military actions considered vital to national security).

However, the primary concern at this juncture is to identify the common characteristics of ideological extremism, which in turn often leads to the stubborn and destructive pursuit of delusional (in the non-clinical sense), utopian agendas or goals, rather than focusing on the use of extreme means to achieve those goals. The argument herein is that all forms of ideological extremism, irrespective of their specific, variable, and unique doctrinal contents, share certain common characteristics or features that are both identifiable and easily recognizable. Some of those specific features are of course applicable, in varying degrees, to many other kinds of beliefs and attitudes. However, it is the combination, interaction, and mutually reinforcing nature of all these problematic individual characteristics that together serve to mark ideological extremism. These characteristics include the following:³³

³² Indeed, this is a major flaw of the short book by J. M. Berger, *Extremism* (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T., 2018).

³³ For a more extended treatment, see Bale, "Introduction: Ideologies, Extremist Ideologies, and Terrorist Violence," in idem, *Darkest Sides of Politics I*, chapter 1, pp. 26-30. Cf. also the characteristics of extremism or fanaticism enumerated by other authors, e.g., John George and Laird Wilcox, *American Extremists: Militias, Supremacists, Klansmen, Communists, and Others* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1996), especially chapter 2; Laird Wilcox, *The Hoaxer Project Report: Racist and Anti-Semitic Graffiti, Harassment and Violence. An Essay on Hoaxes and Fabricated Incidents* (Olathe, KS: Laird Wilcox Editorial Research Service, 1990), pp. 39-41; Maxwell Taylor, *The Fanatics: A Behavioural Approach to Political Violence* (London: Brassey's UK, 1991), pp. 37-56. From this point of view, the appellations "extremism" and "extremist" are not necessarily relational, as many have argued

- *Manicheanism* – viewing the world in stark black-and-white terms, devoid of shades of grey, wherein the extremists supposedly represent the “forces of righteousness” and their designated enemies supposedly represent the “forces of evil.” Given this “you’re either with us or against us” perspective, there can be no neutral parties or innocent bystanders.
- *Monism* – in this context, the opposite of pluralism, the idea that there is only one correct interpretation of the world, one correct solution for transforming the world, and/or one correct form of action or behavior. Everything else is impermissible.
- *Collectivism* – the thoroughgoing subordination of the rights of the individual to the proclaimed interests and supposedly “higher” goals pursued by the extremist movement.
- *Authoritarianism or totalitarianism* – the first term refers to leaders and cadres whose aim is to exert heavy-handed control over the external behavior of others, the second to those whose aim is to exert control over both the external behavior and the inner thoughts of others by systematically “re-educating” them and thereby transforming their consciousness. In short, as the name implies, in contrast to authoritarians, totalitarians aspire to attain a much more comprehensive, totalistic level of control over all aspects of life, first within their own movement and later, should they come to power, over everyone else they rule. The goal is usually to create a “new man” motivated by a spirit of loyalty, heroic self-sacrifice, and service to the group and its cause rather than by baser individual material interests and greed.
- *Utopianism* – the pursuit of all-encompassing or world-transformative goals that are essentially impossible to achieve in the real world. Extremists aim to create “perfection” on Earth in the form of restoring an imagined past “golden age” or building a “brave new world” in which all major existing problems will finally be overcome and everyone will thenceforth be cooperating harmoniously for the common good.
- *Hyper-moralistic puritanism* – contrary to the claims of some outsiders, extremists are anything but “amoral” or unconcerned about morality. If anything, they are moralistic and self-righteous to a fault. They are firmly convinced of their own moral “goodness,” as well as that the achievement of their goals will lead to the creation of a kind of Paradise on Earth. Consequently, anyone and everyone who opposes them or does not enthusiastically support their actions must ipso facto represent the embodiment of “evil.” Hence the expression “the road to Hell is paved with good intentions.”
- *Conspiratorial (albeit non-clinical) paranoia* – the belief that a vast array of “evil” forces, both within and without their movement, are conspiring to destroy them and prevent them from achieving their supposedly noble, utopian goals. “Enemies” are all around, and it is necessary for them to wage a continuous struggle until those enemies have been vanquished once and for all. Of course, it is not possible for them to completely eliminate opposition or totally defeat their foes, so this struggle can never end.
- *Dehumanization and demonization of dissenters and designated enemies* – since extremists believe that they are heroically striving to create a better world, who could possibly wish to oppose them other than truly villainous enemies who continue to benefit from the existing “corrupt” and “unjust” world order they are fighting to overthrow? In the case of religious extremists, their opponents are literally demonized, i.e., viewed as the minions of Satan or other demonic forces. The result is usually the creation of mounds of corpses.

These, then, are the common characteristics of virtually all forms of ideological extremism, and it would be easy enough for anyone who was sufficiently motivated to find innumerable quotations from a diverse array of extremist ideologues or ideological treatises that would perfectly illustrate all of those characteristics. It should be apparent that extremist movements and organized groups that embrace such notions constitute a very severe danger to others.

The ultimate goal of most political and religio-political extremists is to establish some form or system of “political rule in the name of a monistic ideology,” i.e., an “ideocracy.” This term, which combines the ancient Greek root terms *kratía* (“[political] rule”) and *idéa* (“idea”), refers to a polity or society that is in theory ruled in accordance with various ideological tenets, in this context those that embody extremist characteristics, albeit in practice one that is actually ruled by particular leaders who claim to adhere to those tenets. In the words of the American esoteric historian Arthur Versluis,

[a]n ideocracy is a form of government characterized by an inflexible adherence to a set of doctrines, or ideas, typically enforced by criminal penalties....An ideocracy is monistic and totalistic; it insists on the total application of ideology to every aspect of life, and in it, pluralism is anathema....In an ideocracy, the greatest criminal is imagined by ideocrats to be the dissenter, the one who by his very existence reveals the totalistic construct imposed on society to be a lie.³⁴

The proponents of such aims can thus be referred to generically as ideocrats, and the political systems they hope to establish can be referred to as ideocracies. Although most ideological extremists fortunately fail either to mobilize mass movements or to seize political power, those who do so typically endeavor to establish ideocratic political systems. That is precisely why one must always take the political or religio-political ideologies they espouse seriously, since those worldviews normally provide a blueprint, however vague and inconsistent it may be, for the regimes and societies they hope to establish should they succeed in coming to power.

Distinctive Features of Religious Extremism

Note, however, that although all forms of extremism share these particular characteristics, there are certain qualitative differences between secular and religious extremists that deserve to be highlighted herein because they arguably make the latter even more dangerous. This point is especially relevant as one attempts to weigh the relative dangers and levels of extremism of the secular radical right and Islamists (including jihadists). First, religious extremists, unlike secular extremists, view conflicts between humans as the terrestrial manifestations of a larger cosmic struggle that is being waged between the supernatural forces of “good” and “evil.” Second, inasmuch as they tend to interpret mundane natural processes and cause-and-effect relationships as signs and portents of divine favor or disfavor, they live in a fundamentally different mental universe

³⁴ Arthur Versluis, *The New Inquisitions: Heretic-Hunting and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Totalitarianism* (New York: Oxford University, 2006), pp. 7-8.

than secular extremists, no matter how utopian the latter may be.³⁵ Third, since they are convinced that everything they do is divinely sanctioned or prescribed, including carrying out brutal and ruthless acts of violence against the “enemies of God,” and since “divine commands” necessarily take precedence over man-made laws and moral codes, religious extremists arguably operate under less moral or ethical constraints than other types of extremists.³⁶ After all, once people fervently believe that invisible supernatural entities have enjoined them to wage war against and eradicate “evildoers,” there is virtually no way to dissuade them and no limits on what actions they might be willing to carry out.³⁷ This is confirmed by actual statistics, which demonstrate that acts of terrorism carried out by religious extremists have a significantly higher body count than those perpetrated by secular revolutionary extremists.³⁸ For these and other reasons, once political conflicts have been sacralized or “religionized,” they usually become even more brutal and intractable.³⁹

Finally, it should be emphasized that there are two principal varieties of religious extremism. The first is what one might call *ultra-orthodox religious extremism*, i.e., a type of religious extremism that derives from a strict, literalist, puritanical interpretation of the “sacred scriptures” associated with various mainstream religious traditions. This type is exemplified by fundamentalist religious movements of most types, including Protestant Christian, Jewish, Islamic, and Hindu fundamentalism, as well as by Catholic ultratraditionalism (which the French call *intégrisme*). What makes this type extreme is precisely its rigid orthodoxy and insistence upon following core religious injunctions, whether prescriptions or proscriptions, to the letter. The second is *idiosyncratic religious extremism*, i.e., forms of religious extremism that derive from radical reinterpretations of religion that are heterodox and idiosyncratic rather than orthodox. This is exemplified, for example, by anti-Semitic and racist Christian Identity churches, eccentric syncretistic apocalyptic millenarian cults like Aum Shinrikyo (Aum Supreme Truth), occultist secret societies such as the Ordre du Temple Solaire (OTS: Order of the Solar Temple), and perhaps also certain intolerant and radical nationalist strains of Buddhism in Sri Lanka.⁴⁰ Alas, the type of religious extremism that will later

³⁵ This is well-illustrated by a former leader of the rural Christian Identity paramilitary group, The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord. See Kerry Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate: Seduction into Right-Wing Extremism* (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 2011).

³⁶ See, e.g., Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University, 21994), pp. 94-5; and Magnus Ranstorp, “Terrorism in the Name of Religion,” *Journal of International Affairs* 50:1 (Summer 1996), pp. 51-4.

³⁷ Cf. Charles Selengut, *Sacred Fury: Understanding Religious Violence* (Lanham, MD: Altamira Press, 2003), pp. 6-7; and Neil J. Kressel, *Bad Faith: The Danger of Religious Extremism* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), especially chapter 1.

³⁸ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 95.

³⁹ As one can see with the conflicts in Israel, Kashmir, and Chechnya.

⁴⁰ See, respectively, Michael Barkun, *Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian Identity Movement* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1996), especially Part Two; Ian Reader, *Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo* (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 2000); James R. Lewis, ed., *The Order of the Solar Temple: The Temple of Death* (New York: Routledge, 2016); and Neil DeVotta, *Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology: Implications for Politics and Conflict Resolution in Sri Lanka* (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2007), who emphasizes its radically ethno-nationalist and statist orientation. Note, however, that the latter may also embody a politicized form of Buddhist fundamentalism rather than being wholly atypical. See Peter Schalk, “Operationalizing Buddhism for Political Ends in a Martial Context in Lanka: The Case of Simhalatva,” in John Hinnells and Richard King, eds., *Religion and Violence in South Asia: Theory and Practice* (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 141.

be discussed in this report, Islamism, is a fundamentalist, ultra-orthodox interpretation of Islam. In that sense, far from “having nothing to do with Islam” or signifying the “hijacking” of a supposedly “peaceful” Islamic religion, as ill-informed or dissimulating “Islam apologists” insist, Islamism is far more appealing to and popular amongst Muslims than idiosyncratic fringe interpretations of Islam that are regarded by sectarian Sunnis as heretical – such as the Ahmadi or Alawi variants of Islam – could ever become.

It is thus perfectly reasonable for analysts to conclude that, whereas in other historical epochs fascists and communists undeniably espoused the most dangerous and murderous extremist ideologies, today it is the Islamists that represent the greatest transnational non-state security threat and the greatest ideological danger, both for other Muslims and for humanity in general.

IIID: What is Islamism?

This section is specifically intended as a response to the plaintiff’s arguments that the use of the term “Islamist” is an “impugned word” when applied to the activities of the MB, and by extension, IRC and IRW.

Before discussing Islamism itself, it is perhaps best to begin by clarifying the relationship between Islam in general, i.e., the Islamic religion, and Islamism. As will soon become clear, Islamism is an extremist ultra-orthodox and overtly politicized ideological interpretation of core Islamic religious doctrines. Although it is an ideology and movement that first appeared in the third decade of the 20th century, Islamism is also only the most recent iteration of a long series of reactionary Islamic revivalist movements that have appeared throughout Islamic history whose goal was to restore the imagined pure, pristine, uncorrupted form of Islam that allegedly existed at the time of Muhammad and his immediate successors. This means that Islam and Islamism are not identical and hence should not be confused or conflated with one another, since Islamism is only one of many possible interpretations of Islamic theological and legal tenets.⁴¹ However, it also means that Islamist ideology is inconceivable without reference to Islam, in the same way that, say, the ideology of Christian Reconstructionism is inconceivable without reference to Christianity.

It should also be emphasized at the very outset that it is usually impossible for any person, no matter how knowledgeable, to establish a “consensus definition” of a major political concept. Note, for

⁴¹ As I have noted elsewhere, this is the primary mistake that less well-informed or more biased Islam critics, who I label “Islam bashers,” typically make. See Jeffrey M. Bale, “Islamism and Totalitarianism,” in *Darkest Sides of Politics II*, chapter 6, pp. 216-17. Others have argued that “Islamism” is a Western term, as with other political “isms,” not an authentic Arabic term, with the implication that is inapplicable in the Islamic context. Yet although the word “Islamism” and its other forms do have Western linguistic origins, the term “Islamists” is in fact comparable, if not exactly equivalent, to certain Arabic terminology. E.g., the word *islamiyyun* (“Islamic ones”), in contradistinction to standard terms like *muslimun* (“Muslims”) or *mu’minin* (“believers”), is used by both Islamists themselves (in a favorable sense meaning “only true Muslims”) and their Muslim opponents (in a pejorative sense meaning Islamic zealots or fanatics). One further comparable Arabic term might be *usuliyyun* (“foundationalists”). Still another potential cause of confusion is that in the past the terms “islamisme” or “islamismo” were, in Romance languages, used as synonyms for Islam in general. This still occurs sometimes. See, e.g., Claudio Lo Jacono, *Islamismo* (Florence: Giunti, 2001), a book about Islam, not Islamism.

example, the bitter ongoing scholarly debates about how to define terms like “democracy,” “populism,” “fascism,” and many others. First, even recognized experts will invariably disagree with one another about certain matters when it comes to defining such important terms. Second, assorted activists (including extremists) will often deliberately muddy the waters by promoting intrinsically biased and distorted definitions that are intended to serve their own partisan ideological agendas. Both of these phenomena are operative in this context. Moreover, delineating what Islamism is has become a more difficult task than it should be because Islamism has so often been sloppily defined or mistakenly used as a synonym for other concepts with which it is related but *not* identical. On the one hand, for example, the term “Islamism” has been used as a synonym for “political Islam.”⁴² On the other, it has been used as a synonym for “Islamic fundamentalism.”⁴³ Neither of these common usages is sufficiently precise. In order to clarify these matters, all three terms need to be defined properly.

The term “political Islam” properly refers to all Islamic ideologies and movements that explicitly aim to “politicize Islam” or “Islamize politics.”⁴⁴ However, as is also the case with “political Christianity” and explicitly political interpretations of other religions, there are many different ways of, or approaches to, politicizing Islam or Islamizing politics, ranging on a spectrum from left to right (see figure 1).⁴⁵ On the left side of the political Islam spectrum is “Islamic socialism.” This phrase does not refer to Marxism or other Western variants of socialism, but rather to attempts by some Muslim intellectuals to argue that certain traditional Islamic institutions are compatible with

⁴² See, e.g., Joseph Morrison Skelly, “Political Islam from Muhammad to Ahmadinejad,” in *idem, ed., Political Islam from Muhammad to Ahmadinejad: Defenders, Detractors, and Definitions* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2010), p. 3, where it is simply asserted that “political Islam” is also called “Islamism.” Note also that the French title of the book by François Burgat, *L’islamisme en face* (Paris: Découverte, 1996), has been translated as *Face to Face with Political Islam* in its English-language version (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003).


⁴³ See, e.g., Youssef M. Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism: The Story of Islamist Movements* (London and New York: Continuum, 2010).

⁴⁴ It should be emphasized, however, that Islam is a religion that is meant to encompass all aspects of the lives of its adherents, including in the political sphere. There is no scriptural or theological support for a separation of spheres, e.g., between the temporal/profane and the religious, between the public and the private, or between church and state, as there is in Christianity. In the latter, a key New Testament passage in the Gospel of Matthew (22:21) provides scriptural justification for just such a separation: “Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s, and unto God that which is God’s.” (This helps to explain why one of the leitmotifs of medieval European history was the ongoing rivalry and struggle for supremacy between Popes and political rulers, including Emperors.) Nor, alas, was Islam originally unconcerned with politics. As Shabbir Akhtar notes, “Islam did not suddenly acquire its political temper from the rivalries and intrigues of Medina [following the *hijra*]....[Its] early, pervasive and continuing stress on the only God’s exclusive sovereignty shows that even [the earlier] Meccan Islam can be understood as a political monotheism.” See *Islam as Political Religion: The Future of an Imperial Faith* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 99.

⁴⁵ Yet oddly enough, most analysts who use the term “political Islam” as a synonym for “Islamism” usually end up dealing *only* with Islamism, as if there were not other, very different political interpretations of Islam. See, e.g., Mohammed Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2007), which deals exclusively with Islamist movements and organizations. In any case, by analogy with the scheme used for “political Islam” herein, one could likewise create a “political Christianity” spectrum, in which the far left pole would be occupied by quasi-Marxist “liberation theology” proponents, the center-left by liberal “social Gospel” promoters, the center-right by relatively mainstream conservative Christian movements that advocate involvement in politics, and the right pole by the various components of the activist Christian right and radical right.

certain modern socialist ideas. Some examples would be the annual requirement of Muslims to pay alms to the poor (*zakat*), the prohibition against usury (*riba*), and a generic emphasis on social justice (*al-‘adalah al-ijtima‘iyya*). Moving rightward on the political Islam spectrum, there is “Islamic liberalism.” Again, this phrase should not be confused or conflated with Western liberal ideas, but instead represented an attempt to reconcile certain traditional Islamic customs with aspects of modern democracy. Among these were the pre-Islamic Arab tribal institution, the consultative assembly (*majlis al-shura*), which was later incorporated into Islamic practice, and the promotion of the idea of consensus (*ijma‘*) amongst leading Muslim scholars in matters of Islamic law not covered in the Qur'an or found among the customary practices (*sunna*) of Muhammad (as per accounts in the canonical *hadith* collections and prophetic biographies [*al-sira al-nabawiyya*]). Moving further rightward, one encounters various forms of “conservative Islamic reformism” with an explicit political orientation, which can perhaps be viewed as the most “mainstream” manifestation of political Islam. As the phrase implies, these tend to be very conservative political interpretations of Islamic doctrines, but ones that are not opposed to all change and adaptation. Finally, on the far right pole of the political Islam spectrum, one finds the Islamic radical right. The term Islamism should not be used a synonym for political Islam in general, but rather only for these highly politicized variants of the Islamic radical right.

Figure 1: “Political Islam” Spectrum



In general, the term “fundamentalism” refers to attempts by pious believers within various religious movements to return to what they regard as the pure, pristine, uncorrupted foundational elements within their own religious traditions. In practice, this generally involves an ostensibly literalist interpretation of sacred religious texts and a strict adherence to the tenets supposedly laid down by divinities or the authoritative religious figures claiming to speak for them.⁴⁶ In the Islamic context,

⁴⁶ There is a vast and ever-growing literature on religious fundamentalism. Perhaps the best starting point for those who are interested in learning more about fundamentalism and its diverse manifestations can be found in the volumes published by a team of researchers under the rubric of the Fundamentalism Project. See Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991); *eidem*, *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1993); *eidem*, *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1993); *eidem*, *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994); and *eidem*, *Fundamentalisms Comprehended* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1995). See also

this typically means adhering as strictly as possible to Qur'anic injunctions and emulating the example set by Islam's prophet Muhammad during his life in the 7th-century Arabian peninsula, as recorded in the aforementioned canonical accounts of his reported statements and deeds. However, fundamentalists – Islamic and otherwise – fall into two broad categories: quietists and activists. *Quietist fundamentalists* typically seek to insulate or isolate themselves from the corrupt, “sinful” external societies they live in and, in their personal lives, to live in accordance with their strict, puritanical interpretations of their religions. In contrast, *activist fundamentalists* endeavor to impose their religious interpretations on outsiders, not only on their more moderate co-religionists but also often on “sinful” unbelievers. Hence one can say that Islamism is a type of activist Islamic fundamentalism, one that is explicitly and aggressively political in its orientation. This differentiates Islamists both from quietist Islamic fundamentalists and from activist Islamic fundamentalists who claim to eschew or at least de-emphasize politics (e.g., the international Tabligh-i Jama'at [Association for the Propagation of the Faith] movement). In that sense, all Islamists are Islamic fundamentalists, but not all Islamic fundamentalists are Islamists.⁴⁷

Having dispelled some of the terminological confusion that has marred so many analyses of Islamism, it is now possible to present a more explicit definition. *Islamism is a right-wing, theocratic, totalitarian, and Islamic supremacist interpretation of core Islamic doctrines with both revivalist and revolutionary dimensions.*⁴⁸ It is revivalist because it wishes to restore the supposedly

Bruce B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern Age* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989); Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, *Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003); Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur, eds., *Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); David Zeidan, *The Resurgence of Religion: A Comparative Study of Selected Themes in Christian and Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2003); Charles B. Strozier et al, eds., *The Fundamentalist Mindset: Psychological Perspectives on Religion, Violence, and History* (New York: Oxford University, 2010); Simon A. Wood and David Harrington Watt, eds., *Fundamentalism: Perspectives on a Contested History* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 2014); and Sathianathan Clarke, *Competing Fundamentalisms: Violent Extremism in Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2017).

⁴⁷ Some specialists have argued that Shi'i Islamists are not necessarily fundamentalists. E.g., Ervand Abrahamian has rightly noted that, based upon which definition one employs of the term “fundamentalism,” the Ayatollah Khomeini was not a fundamentalist. See his *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1993), pp. 13-17. However, although it is certainly true that the relative lack of scriptural literalism, the emphasis on *ijtihad* (independent reasoning), the diversity and sophistication of Shi'i religious scholarship, the general absence of higher clerical control and discipline, the quite different interpretations that the Shi'a espouse of early Islamic history, and the resultant persecution of the Shi'a by the Sunnis, have all meant that the Shi'i clergy do not have the exact same idealized vision of the proper Islamic socio-political system, either as each other or as their Sunni counterparts do, they nonetheless want others to conform to whatever religio-political vision they do have, and are willing to punish other Muslims who supposedly behave in “Islamically incorrect” ways. In that sense, they are no less strict, puritanical, and intolerant in certain respects than Sunni Islamists. Moreover, Lynda Clarke has argued that Khomeini and other Shi'i Islamists were increasingly influenced by Sunni Islamism, and thus became more fundamentalist than their clerical predecessors in earlier centuries generally were. See Lynda Clarke, “Fundamentalism and Shiism,” and idem, “Fundamentalism, Khomeinism, and the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Wood and Watt, eds., *Fundamentalism*, pp. 163-98.

⁴⁸ See further Bale, “Islamism and Totalitarianism,” in idem, *Darkest Sides of Politics II*, chapter 6, pp. 222-3. For more on Islamist doctrine(s), cf. Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1990); Abderrahim Lamchichi, *L'islamisme politique* (Paris: Harmattan, 2001);

pure, pristine form of Islam that existed at the time of Muhammad and his Companions (*sahaba*) and the two subsequent generations of Muslims – the so-called “pious forefathers” of the faith (*al-salaf al-salih*).⁴⁹ It is revolutionary because in order to achieve its undeniably utopian religio-political goals, it would have to overturn the entire existing world order. Like all extremist ideological milieus, the Islamist ideological milieu comprises numerous currents and subcurrents, beginning with the division between Sunni and Shi‘i Islamism and continuing on with the many distinct ideological subcurrents within those two broader categories. However that may be, all forms of Islamism share certain common core beliefs, or else they would not fall within the same ideological milieu. The principal ideological characteristics of Islamism in all of its forms are

- a radical rejection of Western secular values;
- intransigent opposition to all forms of “infidel” influence in the Muslim world, whether it be political, military, social, economic, cultural, or intellectual;
- extreme hostility towards less strict, puritanical, and militant Muslims; and
- a demand for the creation of a truly Islamic state (*al-dawla al-islamiyya*) or Islamic order (*al-nizam al-islami*) modeled on the strictest tenets of the *shari‘a*.

Since these are intrinsically radical and uncompromising ideas, both individually and collectively, it is misleading to speak of “moderate Islamism” and “radical Islamism,” and even more ridiculous to talk about “democratic Islamism” – the true distinction is between Islamists who are willing, for purely tactical reasons, to adopt accommodationist, pragmatic policies such as participating in elections and lobbying whilst retaining their intrinsically anti-democratic values, and the jihadists who unceasingly advocate the waging of military *jihad* against Islam’s “enemies.”

Ideological Currents and Subcurrents of Sunni and Shi‘i Islamism

Johannes J. G. Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1997); and Ibrahim M. Abu- Rabi‘, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (Albany: SUNY, 1996). See also the contrasting interpretations found in Martin Kramer, ed., *The Islamism Debate* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University/Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1997). See also the Hudson Institute journal, *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, available at <https://www.hudson.org/policycenters/6-current-trends-in-islamist-ideology>. Like Sivan, Daniel Lav has rightly emphasized the medieval sources of modern Islamist doctrines, albeit in a more narrow theological context. See his *Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University, 2012).

⁴⁹ For an excellent short analysis of the precise meaning and broader significance of the term *salaf al-salih*, see Ali Merad, “*Islāh*,” *Encyclopedia of Islam: New Edition* [hereafter *EI2*], ed. by Bernard Lewis et al (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983 [1965]), volume 4, pp. 148-50. Essentially, this is a technical term for the first three generations of Muslims, the generation of Muhammad, the last of whom died around 690; the second generation (the *tabi‘in*), the last of whom died around 750; and the third generation (the *tabi‘ tabi‘in*), the last of whom died around 810. It stemmed from a statement attributed to Muhammad in a *hadith*: “‘A‘isha reported that a person asked Allah’s Apostle (may peace be upon him) as to who amongst the people were the best. He said: Of the generation to which I belong, then of the second generation (generation adjacent to my generation), then of the third generation (generation adjacent to the second generation).’” See *Sahih Muslim*, Book 31, no. 6159. This phrase is the basis for those Islamic revivalist and reform movements that later referred to themselves as Salafist. See further below.

It is now time to identify the different currents and subcurrents of Islamist ideology. In the case of Sunni Islamism, one can identify its three main ideological currents as Wahhabism, Salafism, and Deobandism. Wahhabism was the name applied (by its enemies) to a puritanical revivalist movement that arose in the Arabian Peninsula in the 18th century that was headed by an itinerant cleric named Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). This religious zealot was convinced that most Muslims living in the region had been corrupted and fallen away from the true path of Islam, most notably by venerating the tombs of saints, sacralizing natural objects, and believing in astrology and soothsayers, which he regarded as idolatry and polytheism in the form of *shirk* (i.e., “associating” other entities with the divinity of Allah), a major sin in Islam. He and his followers therefore took it upon themselves to “correct” and “purify” the degenerate practices of their fellow Muslims, if necessary by force, and went around violently attacking such scofflaws and destroying their shrines. These *muwahhidun* (fanatical supporters of *tawhid*) would probably have constituted only a minor footnote in history had Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab not forged a political alliance in 1744 with the tribal chief Muhammad ibn al-Sa‘ud, which eventually resulted in his particularly austere interpretation of Islam becoming the official religion of the 20th-century Saudi regime.⁵⁰ Among the many noxious effects of this alliance was that in the 1920s the Saudi regime institutionalized the earlier efforts by the Wahhabis to impose strict moral rectitude on the population and correct its “deviations” by creating the notorious religious police (*mutawwa‘in*).⁵¹ In any case, although predating the appearance of Islamism by almost two centuries, Wahhabism has since become one of the leading currents of 20th-century Sunni Islamism.

Turning now to Salafism, in the broadest sense, the term “Salafist” refers to all Muslims who are obsessed with emulating the example set by Muhammad, his Companions, and other early Muslims (*al-salaf al-salih*). Of course, all Muslims look to those earliest Muslims, above all Muhammad himself, as exemplary models for their own behavior, but Salafists carry this much further by making an effort to follow their example to the letter. That not only includes adopting stricter, more literalist interpretations of the Qur’ān, but also trying to copy the customary behavior (*sunna*) of Muhammad and his earliest companions in all ways, including with respect to their clothing styles.⁵² More narrowly, however, the appellation “Salafist” was specifically adopted by a number

⁵⁰ The literature on Wahhabism is vast but often tendentious. For an overly sanitized if not blatantly apologetic interpretation of Wahhabism, see Natana Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (New York: Oxford University, 2008). For a hostile but well-informed Shi‘i polemic against Wahhabism, see Hamid Algar, *Wahhabism: A Critical Essay* (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2002). For more balanced accounts, see David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006); Namira Nahouza, *Wahhabism and Rise of the New Salafists: Theology, Power and Sunni Islam* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2018); and Tarik Firro, *Wahhabism and the Rise of the House of Saud* (Sussex, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2018).

⁵¹ For a detailed historical account of the idea and application of *hisba* (accountability), i.e., “commanding right and forbidding wrong” (*al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa naḥy ‘an al-munkar*), see Michael Cook, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University, 2000). For the Saudi institutionalization of the earlier Wahhabi approach to *hisba*, see *ibid*, pp. 180-91; Commins, *Wahhabi Mission*, pp. 34-5.

⁵² Different attempts have been made to distinguish between different categories of Salafists. Cf., e.g., Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29:3 (2006), pp. 208, 216-28;

of late 19th-century and 20th-century Islamic movements. This was true of both relatively moderate and modernist reform movements, such as the Salafiyya movement in Egypt associated with Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), and also of some of the most regressive and puritanical movements, especially that associated with 'Abduh's intellectual associate, Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935).⁵³ It is unfortunate that Rida, especially in response to the 1924 abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate by modernist Turkish ruler Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, ended up adopting a far more radical and intolerant interpretation of Salafism. Rida thence supported the House of Sa'ud in its struggle with the Hashemites, and in the process there was a process of reciprocal intellectual and ideological borrowing between Rida and the Wahhabi religious establishment.⁵⁴ As a result, the latter increasingly referred to itself as Salafist, thereby explicitly signifying its supposed fidelity to the earliest Muslims. Some have referred to this Rida-Saudi variant of Salafism as Neo-Salafism. Nor was that all. In reaction against the corrupt Saudi royal family and regime, which had also allied with and become militarily dependent upon "infidel" Western powers, more radical Islamist elements associated with jihadist cells, like that of Juhayman al-'Utaybi, leader of the neo-Ikhwan group that attacked and seized control of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979, embraced a far more militant *tafsiri* version of Salafism, which later became known as jihadist Salafism.⁵⁵ This is precisely the ideology that is nowadays espoused by globally oriented jihadist networks and organizations, including Qa'idat al-Jihad (the Base/Basis of the Jihad, better known as al-Qa'ida)

Mohammed M. Hafez, *Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), p. 65; and Shiraz Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea* (New York: Oxford University, 2016), pp. 8-13.

⁵³ See, e.g., Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt: A Study of the Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by Muhammad 'Abduh* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968 [1933]); Malcolm H. Kerr, *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida* (Berkeley: University of California, 1966); Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1970), pp. 103-60; and Mark Sedgwick, *Muhammad Abduh* (London: OneWorld, 2010). There is, as one would expect, a vast Arabic-language literature on 'Abduh, Rida, and this Salafiyya movement.

⁵⁴ Henri Lauzière, *The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Columbia University, 2015), chapter 2; Ana Belén Soage, "Rashid Rida's Legacy," *The Muslim World* 98:1 (January 2008), pp. 1-23; and Micah Ben David Naziri, *Neo-Salafism: Rashid Rida and the Wahhabification of Salafism* (no place: New Dawn, 2011).

⁵⁵ For the armed attack in Mecca led by al-'Utaybi, see Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, *The Meccan Rebellion: The Story of Juhayman al-'Utaybi Revisited* (Bristol UK: Amal, 2011). The best general scholarly introduction to contemporary Salafism is Roel Meijer, ed., *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (New York: Oxford University, 2014). For jihadist Salafism, see esp. Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*. Therein Maher identifies (p. 14) the "five essential and irreducible features" of the Salafi-Jihadi movement as *tawhid* (the oneness/unity of Allah), *hakimiyya* (sovereignty [of Allah]), *al-wala' wa al-bara'* (loyalty and disavowal), *jihad* (warfare against Islam's enemies), and *takfir* (labeling other Muslims as "infidels," which means they can be targeted with violence). The rest of his book analyzes these concepts in detail. Left out of his list, however, is the phenomenon of *hisba*, which has been aggressively practiced by many Salafists.

and al-Dawla al-Islamiyya (the Islamic State).⁵⁶ Note, however, that there are also internal ideological subcurrents of, and subdivisions within, the jihadist Salafist current.⁵⁷

The third main current of contemporary Islamism is Deobandism. The origins of Deobandism are traceable to the response of 19th century South Asian Muslim intellectuals, such as Muhammad Qasim Nanotvi (1833-1880), to the impact of British colonialism, which they feared was corrupting the faith of believers. These religious scholars ('ulama) established a seminary in 1867 in the northern Indian town of Deoband, the Dar al-'Ulum Deoband, which later became a major Islamic educational center. Like the Salafiyya movement in Egypt, the seminary in Deoband originally sought to reconcile traditional aspects of Islamic theology and law, in this case those associated with the Hanafi *madhab*, one of the four official schools of Sunni Islamic law, with certain educational approaches adapted from the West. The ultimate goal was always the preservation and renewal (*tajdid*) of Islam, however, which resulted in an emphasis on political engagement, scriptural literalism, *hadith* study, and *taqlid*, i.e., conformity to accepted religious doctrines (in contrast to *bid'a*, inappropriate religious innovation).⁵⁸ However, as time wore on, Deobandi doctrines became increasingly rigid, puritanical, and Islamist in their political orientation.⁵⁹ These developments arguably came to full fruition during the rule of Pakistani general Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who sought to make use of Deobandi *madrasas*, among other institutions and mechanisms, to radically "Islamize" or "Sharizize" his country from above.⁶⁰ The children of many Afghan refugees who had crossed the border into Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet invasion ended up being "educated" in just such *madrasas*, where they learned to recite the Qur'an by rote, were indoctrinated with very bellicose, anti-"infidel" interpretations of Islam, and sometimes even received basic weapons training.⁶¹ The students who graduated from such schools later formed the backbone of the Islamist Taliban ("students") movement. When such intolerant teachings were then intermingled with archaic Pashtun tribal customs and honor codes (*pashtunwali*), Deobandism became even more parochial, insular, and regressive.

In the case of Shi'i Islam, the main currents of Islamism are all associated with particularly influential clerical figures. As with other religions, in both Sunni and Shi'i Islam, certain individuals

⁵⁶ The official name of al-Qa'ida (the Base or Foundation) was changed to Qa'idat al-Jihad in June 2001. The Arabic term *qa'ida* can signify base, basis, foundation, principle, standard, etc. The Islamic State organization underwent a number of name changes over the years before adopting that more all-encompassing moniker.

⁵⁷ See, e.g., Jarret M. Brachman, *Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), chapter 2, for one attempt to categorize those subcurrents.

⁵⁸ Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1982), chapters 3-6.

⁵⁹ See, e.g., Muhammad Moj, *The Deobandi Madrassah Movement: Countercultural Trends and Tendencies* (London and New York: Anthem Press, 2015).

⁶⁰ Cf. Surendra Nath Kaushik, *Politics of Islamization in Pakistan: A Study of the Zia Regime* (New Delhi: South Asian, 1993); Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), chapter 4; and Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2010), chapter 6.

⁶¹ Arshi Saleem Hashmi, "Historical Roots of the Deobandi Version of Jihadism and Its Implications for Violence in Today's Pakistan," in Jawad Syed, Edwina Pio, Tahir Kamran, and Abbas Zaidi, eds., *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 133-62.

had to be specially trained to interpret and transmit core theological and legal doctrines. This broad class of teachers, religious scholars, and legal functionaries, collectively known as the '*ulama*', first emerged during the Umayyad period (661-750 CE). In Islam, there has never been a hereditary priestly or clerical caste, as in certain ancient Near Eastern societies, or a centralized, elaborately organized hierarchical church, like the Catholic Church in the West. Instead, in Sunni Islam the '*ulama*' generally tended to be subservient to current Muslim political rulers and elites, in which case they were rewarded with patronage, whereas that stubborn minority of religious scholars who adopted an oppositional attitude towards the powers-that-be were usually marginalized if not persecuted. In either case, Sunni '*ulama*' were rarely able to establish an independent base of institutional and financial support that was separate from and thus not beholden to existing regimes.

In Shi'i Islam, however, the '*ulama*' managed to attain more institutional and financial independence, and have therefore been able to play a much greater political role in particular eras. Qualified Shi'i religious scholars are known as *mujtahids*, a term deriving from *ijtihad* or "independent reasoning" in the interpretation of Islamic law.⁶² In Twelver (*ithna 'ashariyya*) Shi'ism, it has sometimes been argued since the early modern period that top scholars collectively functioned as the "general deputies" (*niyabat-i 'amm*) of the "Hidden Imam" (*al-Imam al-Gha'ib*).⁶³ That Hidden Imam was identified as Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-'Askari (al-Mahdi, born 868), the twelfth descendant in a line from 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth Caliph that the Shi'a believe was the rightful successor of Muhammad, until his anticipated return from "occultation" (*ghayba*) at the "end of time."⁶⁴ The most renowned of these Shi'i religious scholars serve as a "source of inspiration" (*marja 'al-taqlid*) to others, and for this reason they receive religious tithes as income as well as some property, which provide them with greater independence and more resources to exercise their authority.⁶⁵ In practice, they are often charismatic leaders who attract

⁶² Apart from the *mujtahids*, a lower category of Shi'i clerics are known as *muqallids* (those who emulate or follow the legal rulings of the *mujtahids*). See Abbas Amanat, *Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), p. 149. In Twelver Shi'ism, the four sources of Islamic law are the Qur'an, the *ahadith*, *ijma'*, and *aql* ("intellect," meaning the use of dialectical reasoning and logic to interpret Islamic law), which replaced the Sunni concept of *qiyyas* (analogical reasoning). In Shi'i Islam, the "gate of *ijtihad*" was never closed, as it "officially" was in Sunni Islam. See Said Amir Arjomand, *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984), pp. 51-6, 137-44. In fact, it was never fully closed amongst the Sunnis either, although it was substantially narrowed or blocked at certain times. Cf. Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1982), chapter 10; W. Montgomery Watt, "The Closing of the Door of *Ijtihad*," *Orientalia Hispanica* 1 (1974), pp. 675-8; and Wael B. Hallaq, "Was the Gate of *Ijtihad* Closed?," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 16 (1984), pp. 3-41.

⁶³ Amanat, *Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism*, p. 155; and idem, "Messianic Islam in Iran: A General Survey," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, volume 14, number 2, [April 2012], pp. 130-4, online version, at <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/islam-in-iran-v-messianic-islam-in-iran>.

⁶⁴ For more on the Hidden Imam, see Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, *Islamic Messianism: The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism* (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1981), chapters 2-5; Arjomand, *Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam*, pp. 39-45; Moojan Momen, *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism* (New Haven: Yale University, 1987), chapter 8; and Najad Haider, *Shi'i Islam: An Introduction* (New York: Cambridge University, 2014), chapter 7.

⁶⁵ For aspects of the history of this institution, see Linda S. Walbridge, ed., *The Most Learned of the Shi'a: The Institution of the Marja' Taqlid* (New York: Oxford University, 2001).

large followings and are venerated by significant segments of the populace. Yet even within this rarefied strata of Shi‘i ‘ulama, there are further hierarchical gradations. At the top of the pyramid is the “Grand” Ayatallah Uzma (Great Sign of Allah), then the Ayatallahs (Signs of Allah), then the Hujjat al-Islam (Proofs of Islam).

Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Ayatallah Ruhullah Musawi Khumayni, there has been behind-the-scenes infighting between leading Shi‘i clerics and their factional supporters within seminaries, the government, the military, the intelligence services, and the Sipah-i Pasdaran-i Inqilab-i Islami (Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, better known as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC]), as well as amongst elements of the population such as the *bazari* (merchant class). This, coupled with the complex hybrid structure of the Islamist regime in Tehran, makes it extraordinarily difficult for outsiders to sort out the different currents within Shi‘i Islamism, not only in Iran but also in Iraq and other countries, in part because they periodically evolve over time in response to internal and external developments. Suffice to say that leading Iranian and Iraqi *mujtahids* espouse different variants of Shi‘i Islamist ideology, and that the influence of these different ideological currents and factions ebbs and flows over time.⁶⁶ Among the most influential of these recent and current *mujtahids* were, in Iran, Khumayni, Husayn ‘Ali Muntazari, Murtada Mutahhari, Muhammad-Taqi Misbah-Yazdi, and Muhammad Yazdi; in Iraq, Abu al-Qasim al-Khu‘i, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (father of Muqtada al-Sadr), and ‘Ali al-Sistani; and, in Lebanon, Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, ‘Abbas al-Musawi, and Hasan Nasrallah. Although Khumayni’s interpretations of Islam clearly exerted a disproportionate influence during his tenure as Supreme Leader of Iran (Rahbar-i Mu‘azzam-i Iran), since his death the ideological and political rivalries have become more contentious and fluid.

Analysis of the Main Features of Islamist Ideology

⁶⁶ For more on the convoluted factions within the Iranian regime, cf. Maziar Behrooz, “Factionalism in Iran under Khomeini,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 27:4 (October 1991), pp. 597-614; Wilfried Bucht, *Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000); Mehdi Moslem, *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, 2002); and Payam Mohseni, “Factionalism, Privatization, and the Political Economy of Regime Transformation,” in *Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation*, ed. by Daniel Brumberg and Farideh Farhi (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 2016), pp. 37-69. However, I have major problems with all of these categorizations of the currents and factions within the clerical establishment, since they mistakenly use terms like “left” (e.g., to characterize factions advocating state control over the economy) or “moderate” (e.g., to characterize those that are less isolationist in their foreign policies) in a context in which *all of the currents are right-wing and extremist*. The most that can be said of some is that they are a) to the left *relative to* other factions, or b) more flexible and pragmatic than others. Similarly, one can speak of “left” and “right” factions within the Bolshevik party without erroneously concluding that any of those factions were really right-wing on the broader right-left political spectrum. E.g., the Ayatallah Mahmud Taliqani and non-clerical Iranian intellectual ‘Ali Shari‘ati tried to reconcile Islamist ideology with aspects of socialism. Hence they constituted the “left-wing” current within, and *relative to* the rest of, the Iranian Islamist milieu and movement. But they were not leftists in the Western sense of the term, and their ideas were in part formulated in order to fend off the potential appeal of Marxist ideals to “anti-imperialist” Iranians, as well as to make Islamism more attractive to the masses. See, e.g., ‘Ali Shari‘ati, *Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980).

Lest anyone doubt that Islamism is a right-wing, theocratic, totalitarian, and Islamic supremacist ideology, some basic evidence should be presented. First, although it is theoretically possible that fundamentalist religious movements might espouse tenets and values that are compatible with those associated with the left, in practice this is almost never the case. As is well known, the political terms “left” and “right” stemmed from the period of the French Revolution, when supporters of the revolution against the Old Regime sat on the left side of the Estates-General/National Assembly, whereas its opponents sat on the right. If we consider the fundamental values associated with the French Revolution, which were the product of doctrines enunciated by intellectuals associated with Enlightenment movement, to be paradigmatic of the left, what were those values? To simplify a far more complex set of ideas, they were the following:

- rationalism – the idea that the application of human reason can enable humans to resolve fundamental societal problems;
- the belief that human nature is basically “good” – the idea that the innumerable barbarities and dysfunctionalities that are so readily observable in human behavior are attributable not to the intrinsically flawed nature of human beings, but rather to defects and imperfections in the larger society as well as improper socialization processes;
- optimism regarding inevitable human progress – if one believes that reprehensible human behavior is essentially attributable to structural flaws in the larger society, and that the application of human reason can correct those societal flaws, there is no reason not to be optimistic about the future;
- egalitarianism – in this context, the idea that all individuals have certain intrinsic “natural rights” than cannot be abridged by political authorities, which is arguably the most radical idea in the history of political thought inasmuch as it directly challenges the communitarian, collectivist ethos of all traditional societies;
- cosmopolitanism – the idea that all human beings, no matter how seemingly different their cultures, histories, and societies may be, nonetheless have more in common with each other than not, which means that humanity can be seen as one large family with different subdivisions;
- republicanism – in the 18th century context, this means being opposed to the monarchy, and especially to the idea that kings and royal dynasties rule by “divine right”;
- secularism – the idea that religion should be separated from the public sphere and consigned to the private sphere, and that there should be no official state religion

In response to these core Enlightenment ideas, intellectuals opposed to the French Revolution instead adopted concepts that were directly at variance with those ideas, including

- philosophical anti-rationalism – the idea that there are limits on human reason, and that human behavior is driven in large part by emotions and non-rational behavioral drivers, the implication being that applying rationality cannot resolve all fundamental societal problems;

- the belief that human nature is essentially “evil” – the idea that most of the reprehensible characteristics that are observable in human behavior are due to intrinsic flaws in human beings, and not primarily to structural defects in the larger society, which was to some extent derived from the Christian notion of “original sin” even when it was couched in non-religious, materialistic terms;
- pessimism regarding inevitable human progress – if one believes that observable human flaws are intrinsic to human nature, and that these cannot be radically altered through the application of human reason, there is no reason to be overly optimistic about the future;
- elitism – the idea that all human social organizations are marked by social and political hierarchies, and that those hierarchies – “natural” or otherwise – are necessary to maintain order and otherwise ensure that societies continue to exist and function properly;
- particularism – the idea that, even if all human beings are part of the same species, humans nonetheless owe their primary loyalties to their own particular communities (e.g., tribes, ethno-cultural groups, religious communities, or, later, nation-states);
- monarchism – the belief that societies should continue to be ruled by royal dynasties, a key cornerstone of *ancien régime* Europe;
- clericalism – the conviction that the Catholic Church – or, in other national and regional contexts, Protestant religious authorities – and its privileges must be defended as a necessary bulwark of society

Although these last two anti-Enlightenment or counter-Enlightenment ideas were specific to the 18th and 19th century historical context, the other ideas listed above are still generally associated with the right. Of course, it is perfectly possible to support some ideas associated with the left and others associated with the right. One need not dogmatically accept all of these left- or right-wing ideas.

If one accepts the above summary of the key ideas associated with the left and right, at least as originally articulated, it is manifestly obvious that Islamism – like most other types of religious fundamentalism – is a thoroughly right-wing ideology.⁶⁷ First and foremost, in both Islam in general and in Islamism, the emphasis is not primarily on the application of human reason by believers, but rather on their following supposedly divine injunctions, more or less to the letter. Since the Qur'an is viewed by all Muslims as the literal word of Allah, and Allah is regarded as both omniscient and omnipotent, no Muslim has the right to challenge His ostensible prescriptions and proscriptions.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Oddly enough, far too many analysts and observers, including Perry (who claims to be an expert on the radical right), seem not to recognize something that should be obvious. As Algerian-French scholar Latifa ben Mansour rightly notes in *Frères musulmans, frères féroces: Voyage dans l'enfer du discours islamiste* (Paris: Ramsay, 2002), back cover text: “The movements that claim to speak in the name of Islam, and above all to ‘purify’ their society, and then the [entire] world, are in reality organizations of the extreme right.” That is, of course, a reference to Islamism.

⁶⁸ Cf. Tilman Nagel, *The History of Islamic Theology: From Muhammad to the Present* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2000), p. 1: “For the Muslim believer, the Koran contains the supreme knowledge accessible to humankind, the ultimate, final truth, for it contains God’s own words. Quoting its verses equals proclaiming the unshakeable truth and being comforted in all adversities. Human reason will never be able to get to the bottom of God’s word, whose turns of phrase, forever resisting any attempt at emulation, are distinguished by their amazing accuracy and beauty.”

Faith in divine revelations is therefore paramount.⁶⁹ In that sense, Islamists explicitly repudiate interpretations of Islam that they disapprove of which derive primarily from the application of human reasoning – even though they often engage in *ijtihad* themselves – and instead demand that other Muslims obey and rigorously follow the ostensibly divine injunctions in the Qur'an and the *sunna* of Islam's prophet Muhammad (as recorded in the *ahadith*). Indeed, most Islamists regard attempts by Muslim scholars to adjudicate theological and legal matters by relying too much on rationalist arguments – including at times in the traditionally accepted Islamic forms based on the consensus (*ijma'*) of leading religious scholars or the use of analogical reasoning (*qiyas*) – instead of relying primarily on the Qur'an and canonical *hadiths* for guidance as not only as flawed, dangerous, and forbidden, but also see them as inevitably leading to the corruption of Allah's authentic message. Such views are hardly compatible with the Enlightenment emphasis on the centrality and value of human reason.

Second, neither Muslims in general nor Islamists regard human nature as being basically good. Although there is no doctrine of “original sin” in Islam, as there is in Christianity, Muslims believe that humans can easily be tempted to do evil by Satan and his minions. For Islamists, this means that the only way to ensure that other Muslims remain on the “straight path” (*al-sirat al-mustaqim*) and avoid such temptations is for them to follow Allah's commands to the letter.⁷⁰ Islam is a religion that is obsessively concerned with orthopraxy, which means that Muslims must carry out certain prescribed practices and ritual duties to demonstrate their commitment to the faith, above all the so-called five “pillars” (*arkan*) of Islam: the declaration of faith (*shahada*), engaging in (at times

⁶⁹ This does not mean, of course, that Muslim religious scholars did not employ rational argumentation in support of their theological interpretations, even those that discouraged intellectual innovation. Here one has to distinguish between a) Islamic traditionalists, who adopted a literalist understanding of revelation, promoted literalist interpretations of the Qur'an, and insisted on the conformity of laypeople to the teachings of recognized Muslim religious authorities (*taqlid*); b) exponents of the Ash'ari theological school, who embraced the traditionalist emphasis on the normative centrality of the revealed texts, but defended their views by means of rational theological discourse instead of abandoning rationalism outright; and c) the Mu'tazila, who believed that applying human reason could better help Muslims understand Allah's actions. As Najam Haider has put it, “It is important to bear in mind that the Ash'ari were as ‘rational’ as the Mu'tazila in that they utilized similar tools of dialectical theology to support their central principles. The difference between the two schools centered on the relationship between revelation and reason in ascertaining the divine will.” See *Shi'i Islam: An Introduction* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University, 2014), p. 15. In Twelver Shi'i Islam, which was influenced greatly by the Mu'tazila and generally adopted *ijtihad*, there was a similar division between the Akhbari traditionalists, who reject the use of *ijtihad*, and the Usuli, who promote *ijtihad* and consider it obligatory for Shi'i Muslims to obey a recognized *mujtahid* concerning “Islamically correct” behavior. For more on Islamic theological conceptions and disputes, see Ignaz Goldziher, *Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1981), esp. chapter 3; W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology* (New York: Routledge, 2017 [1962]); Binyamin Abrahamov, *Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 1998); Tim Winter, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University, 2008); Sabine Schmidtke, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology* (Oxford UK: Oxford University, 2016); and John Renard, ed., *Islamic Theological Themes: A Primary Source Reader* (Oakland: University of California, 2014).

⁷⁰ See, e.g., the comments made by two Islamists encountered by journalist Graeme Wood, whose views epitomized such a perspective. One told him that “[w]ithout Islam, you are like an animal”, since you will make decisions based on instincts and be ruled by base pleasures. Another said that a human being was potentially “worse than an animal”, since “[a]n animal has to obey Allah. It has no soul, no will. You can disobey. You can be worse.” Cited in Graeme Wood, *The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State* (New York: Random House, 2017), p. 5.

communal) prayer (*salah*) five times per day, the annual giving of alms (*zakat*), fasting (*sawm*) during Ramadan, and making a pilgrimage (*hajj*) to Mecca at least once. Conversely, they must assiduously avoid certain behaviors that are regarded as forbidden (*haram*), i.e., proscribed by Islamic law, which includes everything from apostasy and homosexuality to seemingly trivial matters related to personal hygiene. These ideas are characteristic of Islam in general, but are especially emphasized by Muslim traditionalists and fundamentalists (including Islamists).

Third, Muslims (including Islamists) tend to be fatalistic, since they believe that an all-powerful Allah has already determined a life course and fate for all of his followers (and, of course, also for “infidels”). In short, although they may be optimistic that Islam will eventually triumph over “infidelity” and its other enemies, as proclaimed in the Qur'an, they are not necessarily optimistic about their own personal futures. They certainly do not believe that applying human reason can solve all of the man-made problems in their societies. Quite the contrary. Yet even so, the Islamists often display an optimistic faith that their *jihad* will ultimately be successful, since Islam is supposedly destined to rule the entire world and Allah has therefore guaranteed them final victory if they remain steadfast.

Fourth, although most Muslims and all Islamists may be egalitarians in the sense that they profess to believe, in theory, that all Muslims are equal, they are most certainly not egalitarian in the Western Enlightenment sense of that term.⁷¹ In other words, they do not accept the idea that individuals have certain intrinsic rights that cannot be abridged. Not only are their rights as individuals subordinated to the will of Allah, to which they must meekly submit – here it must be recalled that the Arabic word “Islam” means “submission,” specifically to the will of Allah – but also to the collective interests of the *umma* (the Muslim community of believers). The idea that Muslims, as autonomous individuals, have certain rights that take precedence over the interests of their larger community, whether it be their own tribal groups or the entire *umma*, is only supported by a tiny handful of Westernized intellectuals. Such an “infidel” notion is, not surprisingly, totally rejected by the Islamists as being “un-Islamic.” Moreover, like all types of ideological extremists, the Islamists believe that individual rights must be subordinated, both to the collective interests of their own organizations and to the fanatical pursuit of their supposedly higher cause.

Fifth, both Muslims in general and especially the Islamists are extremely particularistic. Their primary loyalty must be to Allah, to Islam, and to fellow believers, not to “humanity” in a wider sense. Passages in the Qur'an explicitly enjoin Muslims to offer their primary loyalty and feelings

⁷¹ In practice, many Muslims regard other Muslim believers as unequal and inferior to themselves. For example, many Arabs consider Arabs to be superior to other Muslims because the Qur'an was revealed in Arabic and because Muhammad, the last Islamic prophet, was an Arab. Many Persian Muslims, the heirs to a great Iranian civilization that predates Islam, tend to look down on Arabs as uncivilized barbarians. Many Turks, who provided the military muscle for many Muslim empires in the medieval and early modern periods, view themselves as tougher and more “manly” than other Muslims. The same goes for the many Pashtuns in South Asia, who tend to view Muslims associated with other ethnic groups in their region to be weaklings. Finally, many Muslims exhibit racially biased and discriminatory attitudes towards black Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa. These kinds of non-egalitarian attitudes have caused fissures within jihadist groups with a multi-ethnic and multi-national composition.

of solidarity to other Muslims, instead of to non-believers.⁷² And this scriptural injunction has led Islamists to develop a particular doctrine known as *al-wala ‘wa al-bara* ‘ (loyalty and disavowal) to further enshrine and operationalize it, a doctrine that enjoins eternal enmity towards, as well as disassociation from, unbelievers.⁷³

Finally, a radical opposition to any and all forms of secularism is a characteristic feature of all variants of Islamism. Hence, to the extent that secularism is regarded as a key aspect of Enlightenment and most subsequent Western leftist thought, the Islamist belief that the sovereignty of Allah (*hakimiyyat Allah*) supersedes human sovereignty, i.e., all man-made customs and laws, and indeed that the two systems cannot permanently be allowed co-exist together on earth, marks Islamism as an intrinsically right-wing, anti-modernist, and anti-Western ideology.

Moving on to the characterization of Islamism as theocratic, this should be self-evident. The term “theocracy” derives from the ancient Greek terms θεός (*theos*), meaning “god,” and κρατέω (*krateo*), meaning “to rule.” Hence it literally means the “rule of God.” In practice, of course, it refers to political systems in which the rulers claim to be governing strictly in accordance with specific religious tenets, or sometimes even on the basis of direct commands they claim to be receiving from divinities. The human leaders of theocratic regimes are effectively trying to establish an ideocratic state derived from particular theological-legal religious doctrines. This is undeniably the aim of the Islamists, whose goal is to establish a puritanical Islamic state in which the *shari‘a* is made to be all-encompassing and is strictly and rigorously applied, a state where violations of *shari‘a*-compliant measures and ordinances are severely punished. As the Ayatollah Khumayni (1902-1989) himself put it, in an Islamic government,

the laws are not made by the will of the people, but only by the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet. The constitution, the civil code, and the criminal code should be inspired only by Islamic laws contained in the Qur'an and transcribed by the Prophet. Islamic government is the government of divine right, and its laws cannot be changed, modified, or contested... The Islamic government is subject to the law of Islam, which comes neither from the people nor from its representatives, but directly from Allah and His divine will. Qur'anic law, which is nothing other than

⁷² Qur'an 3:28: "Let not believers take disbelievers as allies rather than believers. And whoever [of you] does that has nothing with Allah, except when taking precaution against them in prudence. And Allah warns you of Himself, and to Allah is the [final] destination." See *Quran.com*, at <https://quran.com/3/28?translations=20>. Qur'an 5:51: "O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you - then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing people." See *Quran.com*, at <https://quran.com/5/51?translations=20>.

⁷³ See, e.g., Ayman al-Zawahiri, "Loyalty and Enmity: An Inherited Doctrine and a Lost Reality," in Raymond Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader* (New York: Broadway, 2007), pp. 66-115. Cf. [Usama b. Ladin], "Moderate Islam is a Prostration to the West," in *ibid*, pp. 31-2, where he makes an implicit allusion to that doctrine when criticizing Muslims who advocate peaceful co-existence with non-Muslims. See further Muhammad al-Qahtani, *Al-Wala 'Wa'l-Bara' According to the 'Aqeedah of the Salaf* (London: Al-Firdous, 1999), in three parts. For a scholarly analysis, see Mohamed Bin Ali, *The Roots of Religious Extremism: Understanding the Salafi Doctrine of Al-Wala 'wal-Bara'* (London: Imperial College, 2016). See further Menad Abdurrahmani, *Aimer et détester pour Allah, dogme d'Al-Wala et Bara'a* (No place: Zinky, 2016).

divine law, constitutes the essence of any Islamic government and unfailingly governs all individuals who are a part of it. The Prophet, the Caliphs, and the people all owe absolute obedience to these eternal laws of the Almighty...which remain immutable until the end of time.⁷⁴

Yet the exact form of such an Islamic state can vary considerably, ranging from a regime ruled by a self-proclaimed Caliph (like the Islamic State headed – until his death on 26 October 2019 – by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi), by an ‘amir (like Mullah ‘Umar, former head of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan), by an official but factionalized clerical establishment (like the one ruling the hybrid regime in the Shi‘i Islamic Republic of Iran), or by a member of a royal family supported by a powerful Wahhabi clerical establishment (like in Saudi Arabia [although this may be changing under the reformer Muhammad b. Salman] and certain other Gulf states). Whatever its precise form – and the ideal Sunni variant would be a newly-reestablished Caliphate – regimes established by Islamists are theocracies.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ *The Little Green Book: Selected Fataawah and Sayings of the Ayatollah Mosavi Khomeini* (New York: Bantam Books, 1985), p. 7. Oddly enough, despite these unequivocal statements to the contrary, Khomeini also claims (*ibid*) that an Islamic government “cannot be totalitarian or despotic, but must be constitutional and democratic.” Such claims can hardly be taken seriously, given the pseudo-constitutional and pseudo-democratic nature of the regime. Others have tried to argue that the populist dimensions of the Iranian Revolution undermined or subverted its theocratic tendencies. See, e.g., Amr G. E. Sabat, “*Wilayat al-Faqih* and the Meaning of Islamic Government,” in Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, ed., *A Critical Introduction to Khomeini* (New York: Cambridge University, 2014), pp. 82-5. I do not find this argument convincing, however, any more than, say, an argument that Nazism had populist elements and a “polycentric” state system, which was the case, signified that it was not totalitarian in its character. Similarly, although a hybrid political system, clerical factionalism, and popular resistance may have undermined the theocratic totalism of the regime in practice, in essence it was theocratic since the system was under the effective authority and control of a regressive, puritanical clerical establishment whose rule was supposedly sanctioned by Allah.

⁷⁵ For earlier notions and versions of an Islamic state, see Abu al-‘Abbas al-Baladhuri, *The Origins of the Islamic State: Kitab Futuh al-Buldan* (New York: Columbia University, 1916); Thomas W. Arnold, *The Caliphate* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965); Patricia Crone, *God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam* (New York: Cambridge University, 2003 [1986]); and Hugh Kennedy, *Caliphate: The History of an Idea* (New York: Basic Books, 2016). See further E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1958); and Patricia Crone, *God’s Rule – Islam and Politics: Six Centuries of Islamic Political Thought* (New York: Columbia University, 2004). For varying attitudes towards the Caliphate, past and present, see Mona Hassan, *Longing for the Lost Caliphate: A Transregional History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2016); Madawi al-Rasheed, Carool Kersten, and Marat Shterin, eds., *Demystifying the Caliphate* (London: Hurst, 2013); and Reza Pankhurst, *The Inevitable Caliphate?: A History of the Struggle for Global Islamic Union, 1924 to the Present* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2014). For Shi‘i religio-political doctrines, see Abdelaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, *The Just Ruler in Shi‘ite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence* (New York: Oxford University, 1988); and Hamid Mavani, *Religious Authority and Political Thought in Twelver Shi‘ism: From Ali to Post-Khomeini* (New York: Routledge, 2015). Today’s Sunni Islamists want to restore an idealized, hopelessly nostalgic image of the early Islamic Caliphate, whereas their Shi‘i Islamist counterparts seek to create and maintain an Islamic revolutionary regime that will lay the groundwork for the eventual establishment of an idealized Imamate under the aegis of the Hidden Imam. Cf., e.g., Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005 [1982]), chapters 2-3; Abdellilah Belkaziz, *The State in Contemporary Islamic Thought: A Historical Survey of the Major Muslim Political Thinkers of the Modern Era* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), chapters 4-7, 9-11; Haider, *Shi‘i Islam*, chapter 2; Hamid Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New Brunswick, NJ:

Much has already been written, including by myself, on Islamism as a totalitarian ideology.⁷⁶ Hence I will confine myself herein to citing two revelatory statements. The first is by one of the leading Islamist ideologues of the 20th century, the South Asian Sayyid Abu al-A‘la Mawdudi (1903-1979):

A state of [the Islamist] sort cannot evidently restrict the scope of its activities. Its approach is universal and all-embracing. Its sphere of activity is coextensive with the whole of human life. It seeks to mould every aspect of life and activity in consonance with its moral norm and programmes of social reform. In such a state, no one can regard any field of his affairs as personal and private. Considered from this perspective the Islamic state [i.e., the Islamist state] bears a kind of resemblance to the fascist or communist states.⁷⁷

The second is by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1909-1977), founder of the Islamist group Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic Liberation Party), who insisted that Islam was “a complete and comprehensive regime for the totality of human life, which Muslims are obligated to implement and execute completely.”⁷⁸ These quotes alone, together with many others that could be cited by different Islamist ideologues, makes it clear that the “pure” Islamic state that the Islamists envision creating is totalitarian in its very essence. Indeed, Islamism can be described as the last of an

Transaction, 2006); Najibullah Lafraie, *Revolutionary Ideology and Islamic Militancy: The Iranian Revolution and Interpretations of the Qur'an* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009); and Imam Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution I: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, 1941-1980* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981). Khumayni’s main ideological innovation was the *wilayat al-faqih/velayet-i faqih* (Guardianship of the Faqih, i.e., Islamic Jurist) doctrine, for which see *ibid*, pp. 27-149; Amanat, *Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi‘ism*, pp. 189-96; and Adib-Moghaddam, ed., *Critical Introduction to Khomeini*, chapters by Amr G. E. Sabet, Ali Rahnema, and Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi. He essentially argued that the leading figure in the Iranian Shi‘i clerical regime functioned as the deputy (*na‘ib*) of the Hidden Imam until his return.

⁷⁶ Bale, “Islamism and Totalitarianism,” volume 2, chapter 6; Bassam Tibi, *Die neue Totalitarismus: “Heiliger Krieg” und westliche Sicherheit* (Darmstadt: Primus, 2004); *ibid*, “The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8:1 (2007), pp. 35-54; Alexandre del Valle, *Le totalitarisme islamiste à l’assaut des démocraties* (Paris: Syrtes, 2002); Amir Jahanchahi. *Vaincre le IIIe totalitarisme* (Paris: Ramsay, 2001); Fouad Laroui, *De l’islamisme: Un réfutation personnelle de totalitarisme religieux* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2006); Thomas Vollmer, *Der militante Islamismus als neuer Totalitarismus: Dschihadistischer Terrorismus und westliche Sicherheitsarchitektur* (Saarbrücken: AV Akademiker, 2012); Michaël Prazan, *Frères musulmans: Enquête sur la dernière idéologie totalitaire* (Paris: Grasset, 2014); and Mehdi Mozaffari, *Islamism: A New Totalitarianism* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2017).

⁷⁷ Abul A‘la Maududi, *Islamic Law and Constitution* (Delhi: Taj Company, 1986 [1960]), pp. 144-5. He then adds, unconvincingly, that “despite its all-inclusiveness, it is something vastly and basically different than totalitarian and authoritarian states. Individual liberty is not suppressed under it nor is there any trace of dictatorship in it.” One may well ask, however, how a state that intrudes itself into every aspect of life and that must “be run only by those who believe in the ideology on which it is based and in the Divine Law which it is assigned to administer” can avoid suppressing individual liberty. See *ibid*, pp. 146-7.

⁷⁸ See Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani in ‘Abd al-Qadir Zallum’s expanded and revised 2002 online version of *Nizam al-hukm fi al-islam [The System of Rule in Islam]*, pp. 13-14. This book was originally published in the early 1950s, then updated in 1990 by the Beirut publisher Dar al-Umma. For an English translation, see Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, *The System of Islam*, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/39/3953224645A52EE1867998C77B303BBB_The_System_of_Islam.pdf. For more on Hizb al-Tahrir, an international Islamist organization founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by al-Nabhani, which was thence transferred to Jordan before establishing its headquarters in Britain, see Suha Taki-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate* (London: Grey Seal, 1996).

influential triad of destructive totalitarian ideologies and movements that arose in the early decades of the 20th century, following in the wake of the Marxist-Leninist variant of communism and diverse national manifestations of fascism.

Finally, there is abundant evidence that Islamism is an Islamic supremacist and imperialistic ideology, i.e., an ideology that aggressively promotes the conquest, subordination, and conversion of unbelievers until the entire world is brought under the rule of Islam. This is hardly surprising, given that Islam is a missionary monotheistic religion whose followers are explicitly enjoined to spread their faith throughout the world.⁷⁹ It is also enshrined in the classical medieval Islamic doctrine of international relations, which sharply divides the world into those portions ruled by the *shari'a* (the *dar al-Islam*, or “abode of Islam”) and those portions that are not under Islamic rule (the *dar al-harb*, or “abode of war”).⁸⁰ Muslim missionaries and religio-political rulers alike therefore have a religious duty to expand the boundaries of the *dar al-Islam*, the former by means of proselytization (*da'wa*) and the latter by waging offensive military *jihad* “in the path of Allah” (*jihad [al-talab] fi sabil Allah*).⁸¹

⁷⁹ Cf. Akhtar, *Islam as Political Religion*, p. 167: “...Muslims interpreted this finalized universality [of Islam] to be a divine mandate for imperial expansion (Q[ur'an] 48:28). The theological foundations for Arabo-Islamic imperialism are contained in Islam’s self-image as a religion perfected.” This is precisely why so few Muslim thinkers have ever “wondered...about the legitimacy of Islamic imperialism. Muslim apologists have never felt obligated to justify the use of force in the service of extending the witness to Allah’s dominion beyond the confines of the Arabian peninsula.” See *ibid*, p. 171. Muhammad himself was reported to have said, in a *hadith* that is considered reliable, that “I have been commanded [by Allah] to fight against people till they testify that there is no god but Allah, that Muhammad is the messenger of Allah, and they establish prayer, and pay Zakat and if they do it, their blood and property are guaranteed protection on my behalf except when justified by law, and their affairs rest with Allah.” In short, to fight against non-Muslims until they convert to Islam. See, e.g., *Sahih Muslim*, book 1, hadith 33, University of Southern California, Center for Muslim-Jewish Engagement website, at <http://cmje.usc.edu/religious-texts/hadith/muslim/001-smt.php>; *Sahih Bukhari*, volume 1, book 2, hadith 25, in *ibid*, at <http://cmje.usc.edu/religious-texts/hadith/bukhari/002-sbt.php>.

⁸⁰ See, respectively, A[rmund] Abel, “*Dār al-Islām*,” *Encyclopedia of Islam: New Edition* [hereafter *EI2*], ed. by Bernard Lewis et al (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983 [1965]), volume 2, p. 127; and *idem*, “*Dār al-Harb*,” *EI2*, volume 2, p. 126. This bipartite division of the world seems to have first emerged during the ‘Abbasid period, specifically in the later 8th century. See Roy Parviz Mottahedeh and Ridwan al-Sayyid, “The Idea of Jihad before the Crusades,” in Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, eds., *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World* (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2001), p. 28. Later, Muslim scholars developed other concepts – such as the *dar al-sulh* (Abode of Truce) and the *dar al-‘ahd* (Abode of the Covenant), that allowed Muslims to temporarily co-exist without fighting with non-Muslims, although these were in theory meant to last for a maximum of ten years. For these notions, see D. B. McDonald and Armand Abel, “*Dār al-Sulh*,” *EI2*, volume 2, p. 131; and Halil Inalcik, “*Dār al-‘Ahd*,” *EI2*, volume 2, p. 116.

⁸¹ For a scholarly analysis of the “call to Islam” (*da'wa*) in the Qur'an, the *hadith* collections, the *sira*, early Islamic history, and finally in the present, see Matthew J. Kuiper, *Da'wa and Other Religions: Indian Muslims and the Resurgence of Global Islamic Activism* (New York: Routledge, 2018), part I. For a more critical account of the role of *da'wa* in the contemporary context, see Patrick Sookhdeo, *Da'wa: The Islamic Strategy for Reshaping the Modern World* (McLean, VA: Isaac Publishing, 2015). As for *jihad*, the claim that the term *jihad* does not refer, among other things, to offensive warfare against the enemies of Islam with the goal of expanding the *dar al-Islam* until the entire world is brought under the aegis of Islam is blatantly false. Such a sanitized definition of *jihad*, a noun deriving from the verb *jahada*, meaning “to struggle” or “to exert oneself,” conveniently ignores the fact that *jihad bi-al-sayf* (“jihad of the sword”) has always been the most commonplace meaning of the term, both historically and at the present time. See E[mile] Tyan, “*Djihād*,” *EI2*, volume 2, p. 538: “In law, according to general doctrine and in historical tradition,

In this context, however, one must distinguish between the propaganda and public relations statements made by the major spokesmen for jihadist groups, which are typically misleading and “sanitized” and thus cannot be taken at face value, and their underlying bellicose, imperialistic agendas, which are revealed in other statements as well as in internal documents. For example, in his public statements, Bin Ladin often sought to divert attention from or otherwise disguise his aggressive and expansionist underlying designs by continually harping on seemingly more reasonable and legitimate grievances in an effort to both rally support from the Muslim masses and foment divisions within “infidel” ranks in order to prevent the formation of a common anti-jihadist front.⁸² However, even in his own public propaganda statements, Bin Ladin regularly juxtaposed seemingly rational and morally justifiable objectives with expressions of outright religious hatred and bizarre theological imperatives that could only be said to “make sense” within an Islamic cultural and historical context that has long since been superseded.⁸³ Indeed, even the most

the djihād consists of military action with the object of the expansion of Islam and, if need be, of its defence... The notion stems from the fundamental principle of the universality of Islam: this religion, along with the temporal power which it implies, ought to embrace the whole universe, if necessary by force.” Cf. further Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2006); David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 2005); Reuven Firestone, *Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University, 1999); Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Marcus Weiner, 1996); Alfred Morabia, *Le gihād dans l'Islam médiéval* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1993); and Lahoud, *Jihadists' Path to Self-Destruction*, pp. 182-91. For scholarly but far more apologetic analyses, see Ahmed al-Dawoody, *The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); and Asma Afsaruddin, *Striving in the Path of God: Jihād and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought* (New York: Oxford University, 2013). For a more forthright and bellicose analysis by other Muslims, see “The Reason Why Jihaad is Prescribed,” *Islam Question & Answer* website, undated, at <http://islamqa.info/en/34647>, wherein the following reasons are elucidated (and supported by relevant citations from the Qur'an and hadith): 1) “The main goal of jihad is to make the people worship Allaah alone and to bring them forth from servitude to people to servitude to the Lord of people...”; 2) “Repelling the aggression of those who attack Muslims”; 3) “Removing fitnah (tribulation)” [i.e., internal strife]; 4) “Protecting the Islamic state from the evil of the kuffaar” [infidels]; 5) “Frightening the kuffaar, humiliating them and putting them to shame”; 6) “Exposing the hypocrites” [i.e., those who feign support for Islam]; 7) Purifying the believers of their sins and ridding them thereof”; 8) “Acquiring booty”; and 9) “Taking martyrs” [i.e., producing martyrs]. This particular website is supervised by Riyadh-born Salafist Muhammad al-Munajjid, but was later banned in 2010 by the Saudi government for issuing independent *fatwas*. Cf. also the analysis of the radical pro-jihad Saudi cleric, Shaykh Yusuf al-'Uyayri, “The Ruling on Jihad and Its Divisions,” reprinted and translated for al-Tawhid Publications, undated, at http://www.e-prism.org/images/The_Ruling_on_Jihad_and_its_Divisions_-_Yousef_Uvery.pdf. As Akhtar sums things up, “Jihad [i.e., offensive jihad] permanently remains a collective duty when Islam is ascendant and reaching for imperial extension; it [i.e., defensive jihad] becomes an individual duty only when an existing Islamic territory is threatened by non-Muslims.” See *Islam as Political Religion*, p. 172.

⁸² The more seemingly reasonable grievances expressed by Bin Ladin have been usefully categorized and summarized by Michael Scheuer in *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Potomac, 2004), pp. 11-14.

⁸³ Examples of Bin Ladin's religious hatred and perception of a religious war between “infidels” and Muslims can be clearly seen, e.g., in his 23 August 1996 “Declaration of Jihad,” where he identified his foes as the “Judeo-Christian alliance,” i.e., described his designated enemies in explicitly religious terms. See his “Declaration of Jihad,” in Bruce B. Lawrence, ed., *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden* (London: Verso, 2005), p. 25. In the 23 February 1998 statement of the World Islamic Front, the signatories insisted (“The World Islamic Front,” in *ibid*, p. 61) that Allah authorized the killing of Americans and the “soldiers of Satan” because they were waging a de facto “war against God, his Messenger, and the Muslims”. In his December 1998 interview with al-Jazira, Bin Ladin proclaimed (“A Muslim Bomb,” in *ibid*, pp. 71, 89-90) that Muslims would never let “dirty pestering Jews and

restrained and *proximate* demands of al-Qa‘ida and other global jihadist groups – the complete withdrawal of foreign military forces from “Muslim lands,” the abandonment of all Western support for “apostate” Muslim regimes and Israel, the elimination of all “corrupting” Western cultural influences from the *dar al-islam*, and the end of Western “exploitation” of Muslim resources, above all the paying of artificially low prices for oil – are in large part non-negotiable and therefore virtually impossible to achieve, whatever their moral merits or demerits might be.

Worse still, when one considers jihadist *long-term* objectives, one has truly entered the realm of total unreality. These long-term goals can be divided into three categories: minimal, intermediate, and maximal. The *minimal* objective of the jihadists is to “liberate” all Muslim-majority territories that are currently “occupied” by hostile “infidel” military forces, including Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir, southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, and “Eastern Turkestan,” which effectively brings them into direct conflict with Israel, the United States, Russia, India, the Thai and Philippine governments, and China.⁸⁴ The *intermediate* long-term objective of the global jihadists is to recover all of the territory that was once under Muslim control but then subsequently lost to “infidel” powers, including Spain, Sicily and parts of southern Italy, a substantial portion of the Balkans, huge swaths of territory in Turkic Central Asia, all of northern India, and large segments of northwestern China, which adds Spain, Italy, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece to their list of enemies.⁸⁵ Their *maximal* long-term goal, of course, is the very same one promoted by both the “rightly-guided” Caliphs and several later Umayyad, ‘Abbasid, and Ottoman rulers – to spread the word of Allah to the “unbelievers” (*kuffar*), by force if necessary, and ultimately to Islamize every corner of the globe at the expense of both the *ahl al-kitab* (“People of the Book,” i.e., Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians) and the “polytheists,” which in practice would nowadays amount to completely overturning and transforming the existing world order. As Walid Phares sums it up, al-Qa‘ida and other such groups aim to humiliate and ultimately destroy America, the military and

Christians”, “infidel asses”, or “American and Jewish whores” into the Ka‘ba in Mecca. In his 21 October 2001 interview with al-Jazira (“Terror for Terror,” in *ibid*, pp. 111-12, 124-5, 121), he praised the 9/11 attacks, argued that the “clash of civilizations” was a reality “proven in the Qur‘an” and *hadiths* of Muhammad, in contrast to the “fairytales” of “world peace” promoted by the Jews and Americans, which has “no substance whatever”, and promoted the unification of the umma and establishment of a “righteous Caliphate” as prophesied by Muhammad. See further below, p. 137, for some other examples.

⁸⁴ This was essentially the objective of ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, who sought to form a jihadist “rapid deployment force” that could come to the aid of Muslims being subjected to “infidel” military control. See Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (New York: Cambridge University, 2005), pp. 135-8. Compare also the key texts of ‘Azzam himself, such as *Ilhaq bi al-qafila* [Join the Caravan] (London: ‘Azzam, 2001); and *idem*, *Al-difa’ ‘an ard al-muslimin, aham furud al-‘ayn* [The Defense of Muslim Lands: The Most Important of the Individual Duties] (Jedda: Al-Mujtama‘, 1987). Both can also be found online, with partial English translations, on the Islamist Watch website: www.islamistwatch.org.

⁸⁵ For one illustrative example, note the Islamist obsession to recover control over al-Andalus, i.e., Spain. See Gustavo de Arístegui, *La Yihad en España: La obsesión por reconquistar Al-Andalus* (Madrid: Esfera de los Libros, 2003), especially pp. 119–55. Compare Bin Laden’s remarks in his December 1994 letter to Saudi religious scholar ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz, head of the pro-regime “palace ‘ulama,” which he closes by asking Allah to help the *umma* re-establish *tawhid* (belief in the unity of God) in “stolen” Islamic lands such as Palestine and Spain. Cited in Lawrence, ed., *Messages to the World*, p. 14.

economic bastion of the *dar al-harb*, in order to lay the groundwork for Islam's final triumph over the West and other non-Muslims.⁸⁶

Nevertheless, many jihadists recognize that this envisioned process of ultimate world conquest can only occur in successive stages.⁸⁷ See, e.g., the following remarks by jihadist strategic thinker Abu Bakr Naji:

If Allah were to grant [the *mujahidin* victory in Saudi Arabia], on the following day (by the permission of Allah) they must prepare immediately to begin conquering the smaller states which these paltry regimes in Jordan and the Gulf rule. By the permission of Allah, with the exit of America from Iraq, what remains of its deceptive media halo will collapse and every regime which supports it will fall. The noble people in [these] states will renounce [the regimes] and restore the rights of the *umma* which these collaborating regimes had snatched away. The masses of these states will open their arms to the conquerors, by Allah's grace and beneficence...the throngs will apply themselves (with the aid of Allah) to liberating Jerusalem and that which surrounds it and liberating Bukhara, Samarkand, Andalusia, and all of the lands of the Muslims. Then we will begin liberating the earth and humanity from the hegemony of unbelief and tyranny through the power of Allah. This is a prophecy of His messenger [Muhammad].⁸⁸

The key strategic bone of contention between jihadists, however, was which targets they should prioritize attacking. Earlier Islamist organizations that had resorted to armed *jihad* mainly focused on attacking local incumbent regimes, whether these were nominally Muslim (as, e.g., in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Chechnya) or non-Muslim (as, e.g., in Kashmir, the Philippines, and Thailand). However, a long history of jihadist defeats and their almost complete failure to unseat those regimes, most of which were highly authoritarian, caused several *mujahid* leaders and Islamist ideologues to reconsider their targeting priorities. Increasingly, they concluded that the alleged "apostate" local Muslim regimes could not be ousted because they received extensive support from, and thus effectively acted as the "puppets" of, imperialist "infidel" powers such as the U.S., France, and Russia. This analysis eventually led to a shift in targeting away from that so-called "near

⁸⁶ Walid Phares, *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America* (New York: St. Martin's, 2005), pp. 134-5, 161-9.

⁸⁷ See, e.g., the schematic, unrealistic – and in part numerologically-based – successive strategic phases outlined by Abu Bakr Naji, Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi, and other al-Qa'ida leaders. Cf., respectively, Abu Bakr Naji, *Idarat al-tawahhush: Akhṭar marḥala satamurru biha al-umma* [*The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through which the Umma Will Pass*], translated by William McCants (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University/John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006), pp. 36ff, available at <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf>; Abdel Bari Atwan, *The Secret History of al-Qa'ida* (London: Saqi, 2006), pp. 221-2; and Fu'ad Husayn, *Al-Zarqawi, al-jil al-thani li-al-Qa'ida* [*Al-Qa'ida's Second Generation*] (Beirut: Dar al-Khayyal, 2005), parts 14 and 15. See further Jeffrey M. Bale, "Jihadist Ideology and Strategy," in idem, *Darkest Sides of Politics II*, chapter 5, pp. 179-81; and, more comprehensively, Brian Fishman, *The Master Plan: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory* (New Haven: Yale University, 2016).

⁸⁸ Abu Bakr Naji, *Idarat al-tawahhush*, pp. 144-5. Note that I have modified McCants' translation slightly.

enemy” (*al-‘adu al-qarib*) and against the “far enemy” (*al-‘adu al-ba‘id*), the alleged “puppet masters” operating behind the scenes. Indeed, this new focus on directly attacking the U.S. and other distant powers constituted Bin Laden’s and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s chief strategic innovation, one which has already had incalculable geopolitical implications.⁸⁹ Since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, however, many jihadist groups have adopted what Steven Brooke has referred to as a “hybrid strategy,” i.e., attacking their “infidel” enemies both in “occupied” Muslim countries and in their own countries.⁹⁰

Be that as it may, it must be emphasized that it is not only Islamist organizations relying upon armed *jihad* and a violent “Islamization from above” strategy, e.g., jihadist groups such as al-Qa‘ida and the Islamic State, that have explicitly promoted Islamic supremacist goals. So too have larger and more influential Islamist organizations that, for purely pragmatic and tactical rather than principled moral reasons, have generally preferred to employ a gradualist “Islamization from below” strategy, such as the Jama‘at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Society of the Muslim Brothers, better known as the Muslim Brotherhood). Note, e.g., the official motto or slogan of the MB:

Allah is Our Objective (*Allah ghayatuna*)

The Prophet is Our Leader (*Al-rasul za ‘imuna*)

The Qur‘an is Our Law (*Al-Qur‘an dusturuna*)

Jihad is Our Way (*Al-jihad sabiluna*)

Dying in the Way of Allah is Our Highest Hope (*Al-mawt fi sabil Allah asma amanina*)⁹¹

Therein one can clearly note the emphasis on waging armed *jihad* and becoming a “martyr” for Allah. The founder of the MB, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), also wrote a treatise extolling armed *jihad*, and made the following telling remark (which underscores one of the most important rationales for waging *jihad*): “It is the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be dominated, to impose its law on all nations and to extend its power to the entire planet.”⁹² Equally revealing is the official

⁸⁹ For analyses of this crucial reorientation of jihadist objectives, based primarily upon internal jihadist sources, compare Gerges, *Far Enemy*, esp. pp. 143–50; and Montasser al-Zayyat, *The Road to Al Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden’s Right-Hand Man* (London: Pluto, 2004), 68–70.

⁹⁰ Steven Brooke, “The Near and Far Enemy Debate,” in Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, eds., *Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 53–60.

⁹¹ Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University, 1969), pp. 193–4. This motto sounds much catchier in Arabic than it does in English translation.

⁹² This statement has been cited in a number of sources, although I have not been able to locate the original source for it. See, e.g., Fereydoun Hoveryda, *The Broken Crescent* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), p. 56; Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism* (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987), unnumbered page directly before introduction; and Neil MacFarquhar, “Egyptian Group Patiently Pursues Dream of Islamic State,” *New York Times*, 20 January 2002. For al-Banna’s treatise, “On Jihād,” see Charles Wendell, ed., *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949): A Selection from the Majmu ‘at rasa’il al-Imam al-shahid Hasan al-Banna* (Berkeley:

seal of the MB, which depicts a Qur'an, a pair of crossed swords (not, nota bene, crossed olive branches), and the first word of *sura* 8:60 of the Qur'an, *wa a'iduwwa*, which reads "And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify [or terrorize] the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged."⁹³ This the very same MB that Islam apologists and Islamist apologists have often characterized, naively and erroneously, as "moderate" or "democratic."⁹⁴

Moving on to another key Islamist thinker, the aforementioned Mawdudi, here is an excerpt from his important and highly influential 1939 speech, which was later republished as *Jihad in Islam*:

Islam [i.e., Islamism] is a revolutionary ideology which seeks to alter the social order of the entire world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideals....Islam wishes to do away with all states and governments which are opposed to the ideology and programme of Islam....Islam requires the earth – not just a portion, but the entire planet – because the whole of mankind should benefit from Islam, and its ideology and welfare programme....Islam is not merely a religious creed... but a comprehensive system which seeks to annihilate all tyrannical and evil systems in the world and enforce its own programme for reform which it deems best for the well-being of mankind....The objective of Islamic jihad is to eliminate the rule of an un-Islamic system and establish in its stead an Islamic system of rule. Islam does not intend to confine this revolution to a single state or a few countries; the aim of Islam is to bring about universal revolution.⁹⁵

Such an explicit statement of Islamist goals needs no further elaboration.

Nor should one forget Sayyid Qutub (1906-1966), another leading Muslim Brother who was later imprisoned and thence executed by President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir but has since become – perhaps in part because of his martyrdom – the single most important ideological influence on contemporary Sunni global jihadist groups. Qutub, whose views inspired more radical elements within the Brotherhood, contemptuously rejected the concept of "defensive jihad" and repeatedly chastised those who sought to limit the meaning of *jihad* in this way as "defeatists"⁹⁶:

Islam is a general declaration of the liberation of man on earth from subjugation to other creatures, including his own desires, through the acknowledgement of Allah's

University of California, 1978), chapter 6. For the Brotherhood's positive attitude towards military *jihad*, see Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, pp. 206-8.

⁹³ *Quran.com*, at <https://quran.com/8/60>. This is the very same passage that has so often been cited by jihadists to justify their use of violence to terrorize their enemies. See, e.g., Usama b. Ladin, "Moderate Islam is a Prostration to the West," in Ibrahim, ed., *Al Qaeda Reader*, p. 54.

⁹⁴ See the final references in note 102 for examples of "Islamist apologetics" in connection with the Brotherhood. For a critical analysis of standard Islamist apologist arguments, see Bale, "Islamism and Totalitarianism," pp. 220-2.

⁹⁵ Syed Abul A'la Maudoodi, *Jihad in Islam* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 2001 [1939]), pp. 8, 9, 19, 24.

⁹⁶ See, e.g., Sayyid Qutb, *In the Shade of the Qur'an*, translated and edited by Adili Salahi (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 2003), volume viii, p. 266.

lordship over the universe and all creation...this declaration signifies a total revolution against assigning sovereignty to human beings, whatever forms, systems and situations such sovereignty may take [i.e., against all non-Islamic political systems].⁹⁷

From this it follows that *jihad bi-al-sayf* (“jihad of the sword”) must be waged to

establish Allah’s authority and to remove tyranny. It liberates mankind from submission to any authority other than Allah...It wants the system laid down by Allah to replace the [other] systems established by his creatures.⁹⁸

Moreover, as far as Qutub and his contemporary jihadist disciples are concerned, this armed struggle against worldwide disbelief (*kufr*) or *jahiliyya* (pre- and un-Islamic ignorance and barbarism) “is not a temporary phase but an eternal state – an eternal state, as truth and falsehood cannot co-exist on this earth.”⁹⁹ Such a conception, which is consistent with the medieval Islamic notions of international relations developed during the era of spectacular Muslim conquests, is explicitly intolerant and bellicose.

If anyone still doubts that defeating and destroying “infidel” powers and spreading Islam throughout the world is the global jihadists’ ultimate objective, one can cite many similar statements. Consider these remarks from Bin Ladin himself, who bitterly criticizes Muslims who believe that Islam should engage in a dialogue with “infidel” civilizations and promote peaceful coexistence with them:

As for this atmosphere of shared understandings, what evidence is there for Muslims to strive for this? What did the Prophet, the Companions after him, and the righteous forebears [*al-salaf al-salih*] do? Did they wage *jihad* against the infidels, attacking them all over the earth, in order to place them under the suzerainty of Islam in great humility and submission? Or did they send messages to discover “shared understandings” between themselves and the infidels in order that they may reach an understanding whereby universal peace, security, and natural relations would spread – in such a satanic manner as this? We never thought that such words [promoting dialogue and understanding] would ever appear from those who consider themselves adherents of this religion. Such expressions, and more like them, would lead the reader to believe that those who wrote them are Western intellectuals, not Muslims! Those previous expressions are true only by tearing down the wall of enmity from the infidels [an allusion to *al-wala’ wa al-bara’*]...and by rejecting *jihad* – especially Offensive *Jihad*. The problem, however, is that Offensive *Jihad* is an established and basic tenet of this religion. It is a religious duty rejected only

⁹⁷ Qutb, *In the Shade of the Qur'an*, volume vii, pp. 133-4.

⁹⁸ Ibid, volume viii, p. 306.

⁹⁹ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (Beirut and Damascus: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1978), p. 139.

by the most deluded. So how can they call off this religious obligation [offensive *jihad*], while imploring the West to understandings and talks “under the umbrella of justice, morality, and rights”? The essence of all this comes from right inside the halls of the United Nations, instead of the Divine Foundations that are built upon hating the infidels, repudiating them with tongue and teeth until they embrace Islam or pay the *jizya* with willing submission and humility.¹⁰⁰

See also the inflammatory, unequivocal remarks of Abu Qatada al-Filistini, a jihadist Salafist cleric who was an open supporter of the brutal Algerian jihadist terrorist group, al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya al-Musallaha/Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA: Armed Islamic Group) and has been characterized by many observers as the “spiritual leader” of al-Qa‘ida in Europe:

Muslims’ target is the West. We will split Rome open. The destruction must be carried out by sword. Those who will destroy Rome are already preparing their swords. Rome will not be conquered with the word but with the force of arms.¹⁰¹

Once again, the imperialistic rhetoric is unambiguous.

Such ideas have been expressed by numerous other groups that are open supporters of or active participants in the global *jihad*. One organization in the former category is the UK-based group al-Muhajirun (the Émigrés or Exiles), an offshoot of Hizb al-Tahrir.¹⁰² In June 2003, its spokesman Anjem Choudary made the following militaristic remarks:

One day the black flag of Islam will be flying over [Number 10] Downing Street. Lands will not be liberated by individuals, but by an army. It’s just a matter of time before it happens.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Usama b. Ladin, “Offensive Jihad is a Prostration to the West,” pp. 31-2.

¹⁰¹ Abu Qatada, as cited in Philip Webster and Richard Ford, “Extremist clerics face prosecution for backing terror,” *[London] Times*, 14 July 2005, at <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/extremist-clerics-face-prosecution-for-backing-terror-cf6jbqhrd9f>. In this passage the term “Rome,” although based upon an alleged prediction of Muhammad concerning the Muslim seizure of the city of Rome, refers not simply to the capital of Italy and the locale of the Papal States, but to Christendom as a whole, i.e., the West. Similar sentiments concerning the coming “opening” (*fath*), i.e., conquest, of the West appear frequently on jihadist websites.

¹⁰² For al-Muhajirun, which was named after the 70 Companions who accompanied Muhammad on his *hijra* from Mecca to Medina in 622, and its leader ‘Umar Bakri Muhammad, see Irene Favalli, “Il caso al-Muhajiroun: L’opportunismo come mezzo di indottrinamento jihadista” (Unpublished Thesis: Università Ca’Foscari Venezia, 2017), available at <http://dspace.unive.it/bitstream/handle/10579/12527/841700-1213565.pdf?sequence=2> ; Maureen Cofflard, *L’émir: La peur aura-t-elle le dessus?* (Paris: Fayard, 2004); Dominique Thomas, *Le Londonistan: La voie du djihad* (Paris: Michalon, 2003), pp. 97-100; and Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), an ethnographic study.

¹⁰³ Cited by Oni Golan, “One Day the Black Flag of Islam will be Flying over Downing Street,” *Jerusalem Post*, 2 July 2003. Al-Muhajirun is the very same group that organized demonstrations in Britain in early 2006, ostensibly to protest the Danish cartoons satirizing Muhammad, at which marchers carried signs with messages such as “Islam Will Dominate the World,” “Exterminate Those Who Slander Islam,” “Be Prepared for the Real Holocaust,” “Freedom Go to Hell,” “Europe is the Cancer, Islam is the Answer,” and “Europe You Will Pay, Your 9/11 is on Its Way!” The group is named after the early Muslims who migrated together with Muhammad from Mecca to Medina

World Islamic domination is also, not surprisingly, explicitly advocated by the Islamic State. For example, issue 5 of the IS' earlier English-language magazine *Dabiq* is devoted to the theme of "Remaining and Expanding," which signifies that the Caliphate will remain in control of the lands it has seized and will continue to expand by conquering new territories. Therein it is argued that the IS intends to "expand" its territorial control until the shade of its "blessed flag...covers all eastern and western extents of the Earth, filling the world with the truth and justice of Islam and putting an end to the falsehood and tyranny of *jahiliyya*..."¹⁰⁴ To illustrate this goal, the IS has even produced various maps that display its black *jihad* battle flags covering the entire world.¹⁰⁵ How anyone can mischaracterize such extreme expansionist views as "limited" in their focus or "defensive" in their aims is beyond comprehension.

Nor, contrary to the claims of some analysts, who fail to distinguish between proximate and long term jihadist goals, is it only globally-oriented jihadist networks and organizations that espouse these Islamic supremacist goals. For an example that is directly relevant to this case, in an 11 April 2008 Friday sermon broadcast on the al-Aqsa television channel of the Harakat al-Muqawwama al-Islamiyya (Hamas: Islamic Resistance Movement), Yunis al-Astal, a cleric and Hamas Minister of Parliament, made the following remarks to his congregation:

Allah has chosen you for Himself and for His religion, so that you will serve as the engine pulling this nation [*umma*] to the phase of succession, security, and consolidation of power, and even to conquests through *da'wa* and military conquests of the capitals of the entire world....Very soon, Allah willing, Rome will be conquered, just like Constantinople was, as was prophesized by our Prophet Muhammad....Today, Rome is the capital of the Catholics, or the Crusader capital, which has declared its hostility to Islam, and has planted the brothers of pigs and apes [i.e., the Jews] in Palestine in order to prevent the reawakening of Islam. This capital of theirs will be an advanced post for the Islamic conquests, which will spread throughout Europe in its entirety, and then will turn to the two Americas, and even Eastern Europe....I believe that our children, or our grandchildren, will inherit our jihad and our sacrifices, and, Allah willing, [that] the commanders of the conquest [of the world] will come from among them.¹⁰⁶

in 622. Note, however, that other jihadists have expressed the same goals. See the statement made by Abu Usama, a Briton fighting in Syria with the Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham (Support Front for the Syrian People): "If and when I come back to Britain it will be when this *khilafah* [Caliphate] – this Islamic state – comes to conquer Britain and I come to raise the black flag of Islam over Downing Street, over Buckingham Palace, over Tower Bridge and over Big Ben." See "British jihadist warns of 'black flag' of Islam over Downing Street," *[London] Guardian*, 4 July 2014, at <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jul/04/british-jihadi-black-flag-islam-downing-street>.

¹⁰⁴ "Foreword," in *Dabiq* 5 (October-November 2014), p. 3.

¹⁰⁵ See, e.g., Aymenn [Ayman] Jawad al-Tamimi's useful "Comprehensive Reference Guide to Sunni Militant Groups in Iraq." Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi website, 23 January 2014, figure 2, at www.aymennjawad.org/14350/comprehensive-reference-guide-to-sunni-militant.

¹⁰⁶ Cited in "Hamas MP/Cleric's Friday Sermon: We Will Conquer Rome, the two Americas, and Eastern Europe," MEMRI, 14 April 2008, at www.memri.org/bin/articles/cgi?Page=countries&Area=Palestinian&ID=SP189508.

Another example can be seen in the August 2011 interview response by Shaykh 'Adil Shihat, a senior official of the Egyptian Tanzim al-Jihad (Jihad Organization) group:

Of course we will launch a campaign of Islamic conquest throughout the world. As soon as the Muslims and Islam control Egypt and implement the *shari'a* [there], we will turn to the neighboring regions, [such as] Libya [to the west] and Sudan to the south. All the Muslims in the world who wish to see the *shari'a* implemented worldwide will join the Egyptian army in order to form Islamic battalions, whose task will be to bring about the victory of [our] faith. We hope that, with Allah's help, Egypt will be the spark [that sets off this process]...¹⁰⁷

So much for the misleading notion, expressed by many academicians, that Islamist and jihadist groups with a seemingly local or "nationalist" focus have no wider global ambitions.¹⁰⁸

III: Main Strategies Employed by Islamists, including the MB, to Achieve their Goals

This section is specifically intended as a response to the plaintiff's arguments claiming that Islamist groups like the MB, and by extension IRC and IRW, make use of *taqiyya* and other deceptive techniques in pursuit of their goals is an illustration or manifestation of "Islamophobia."

One of the main assertions in the Zine and Perry reports is that the MB and other Islamist networks operating in Western countries have been falsely accused of creating a multitude of "front organizations" that are together waging a "stealth jihad" or "civilization jihad," and thus effectively of constituting a "Trojan horse" or "fifth column" that is leading to "creeping *shari'a*" in those countries. Indeed, their claim is that such allegations amount to nothing more than baseless conspiracy theories designed to demonize innocent Muslims and justify their marginalization,

¹⁰⁷ "Senior Official in Egyptian Islamic Jihad: If We Come to Power, We will Launch a Campaign of Islamic Conquests to Instate Shari'a Worldwide...," MEMRI, 29 August 2011, at <http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/5601/htm>.

¹⁰⁸ Here I must respectfully disagree with those specialists who characterize various jihadist groups that focus on targeting the "near enemy" or neighboring adversaries as "nationalists," or who argue that they do not have more expansive Islamic supremacist long term goals. Although there is no doubt that Hamas, e.g., is focused above all on eliminating rival Palestinian groups, "liberating" Palestinian territories, and destroying the "Zionist entity" (Israel), that does not mean, as the late Reuven Paz has argued, that the group "has not wavered from its narrow geographic focus..." See Reuven Paz, "Jihadists and Nationalist Islamists: Al-Qa'ida and Hamas," in *Fault Lines in Global Jihad*, p. 203. First, Islamist groups do not, in the final analysis, recognize the legitimacy of national borders or separate Islamic nations, since these have created unnecessary divisions within the *umma* that have undermined Muslim efforts to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate or Imamate. Even so, they are understandably focused, at least initially, on "liberating" their own countries from apostate or "infidel" enemies. If that task is ever accomplished, however, there is no reason to believe that they would not promote the further geographic extension of the *shari'a*-compliant Islamic order they have created in their own territories, or that they would not be willing to cooperate with other jihadist groups in such an endeavor.

exclusion, and repression.¹⁰⁹ Zine also complains that “Islamophobes” assert that “Muslims routinely engage in deceptive practices to hide their true subversive aims and intent” by employing *taqiyya*, which she calls a “conspiracy theory.” Such assertions might well fall into that conspiratorial category if they were indiscriminately applied to all Muslims, but these kinds of deceptive practices are very much characteristic of Islamist groups like the MB, which do in fact regularly rely on *taqiyya*. Other, subsidiary dimensions of Zine’s general argument are that a) the MB entities established in different countries are very different from one another, b) that not all MB entities and figures espouse identical ideologies or values, and c) that the MB in the contemporary West is a “moderate” or “mainstream” Islamic organization that has embraced or at least conformed to “democratic” norms and is therefore fully compatible with Western values.¹¹⁰

It has already been demonstrated above, in large part by citing the statements of the most influential Islamist ideologues – including MB founder Hasan al-Banna – that Islamism is an extremist right-wing, theocratic, totalitarian, and Islamic supremacist ideology that is intrinsically anti-democratic. Thus far the focus has been mainly on jihadist groups, but as will become clear below, Islamist

¹⁰⁹ See Zine report, 28-9, wherein she brusquely dismisses the “fifth column,” “Trojan horse,” “civilizational jihad,” and “creeping shari‘a” narratives without providing any evidence to counter them; and pp. 24-6, wherein she uncritically reiterates the disputable arguments of other academics and journalists that portray Islamism as “not monolithic”, “plural”, “diverse,” incorporating a “wide spectrum” of beliefs that are not “static”, “mainstream”, “moderate”, and “democratic” rather than “violent, predatory, and triumphalist.” Here one must distinguish between her legitimate points (e.g., that the Islamist milieu is not monolithic or static, that it is not invariably violent, and that it is filled with ambiguities and contradictions); her exaggerated claims (e.g., that the Islamist milieu encompasses a wide spectrum of beliefs, since as noted above all Islamist movements share certain doctrinal commonalities and agendas); and her false assertions (e.g., that the Islamists are “mainstream,” “moderate,” and genuinely “democratic”). In reality, the statements she cites by Quiggin and other co-defendants (*ibid*, pp. 22-3) are in fact more accurate than most of her own misleading characterizations of Islamism. See also Perry report, pp. 5-6, where she claims that “seemingly benign organizations” are viewed as “fronts for terrorism.” Although such fronts may not be fronts for terrorism *per se*, they are certainly fronts for promoting the Islamist agenda. “Seemingly benign” is ironically an accurate statement.

¹¹⁰ Zine report, p. 27, citing the claims of Farid Hafiz (an analyst for the Bridge Initiative), “The Global Muslim Brotherhood Conspiracy,” *Bridge Initiative*, 19 September 2017, at <https://bridge.georgetown.edu/research/the-global-muslim-brotherhood-conspiracy-theory/>. Yet this section of Zine’s report is rather contradictory, since after dismissing “insinuations” that Muslim politicians who appear at MB meetings might be promoting an “Islamist agenda”, she then acknowledges that the MB is “one of the oldest and largest Islamist organizations in the world”, one that she later rightly notes (*ibid*, p. 28), citing Mohammed Nimer, that the MB is “active in over 77 countries.” Why, then, would it be unreasonable to suppose that such a powerful worldwide Islamist organization would be promoting an “Islamist agenda”? Zine also cites well-known Islamist apologists, including John Esposito and Robert S. Leiken to back her unsupportable claim that the MB is “mainstream, “moderate,” and actively engaged in promoting “democracy.” For examples of their approach, see John Esposito, “The Muslim Brotherhood, Terrorism and U.S. Policy,” *Huffington Post*, 22 March 2016, at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-muslim-brotherhood-te_b_9329246; and Robert S., and Steven Brooke. 2007. “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood.” *Foreign Affairs* 86:2 (2007), pp. 107–21 at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20032287>. Esposito has been the author of numerous apologetic books about Islam and Islamism, the most ill-timed of which was *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University, 1999), which argued – precisely at the moment when the global jihadist movement was spreading like wildfire and carrying out more and more acts of terrorism, which were soon to reach their most spectacular apogee on 9/11 – that the “Islamic threat” was overblown. That alone should have been enough to permanently discredit his academic reputation. On the contrary, it enabled his center at Georgetown University, the Alwaleed Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, to raise considerable funds from wealthy Gulf States and princes to continue spreading sanitized narratives about Islam and Islamism.

groups that do not prioritize military *jihad* share the very same ultimate goals. Where they mainly disagree, at times fractiously and vociferously, is about the best methods to utilize in order to achieve those objectives. Due to the repeated failures of the armed jihadist strategy to achieve its goals, both in Egypt and many other countries, the MB has generally adopted a gradualist, mainly non-violent strategy to try to expand its societal influence, radicalize other Muslims, and promote its *shari‘a*-compliant agenda, especially in Western countries. But choosing stealthier, less confrontational methods by no means indicates that it has abandoned its defining Islamic supremacist orientation. Indeed, one can make the case that the gradualist method it has adopted presents a greater long-term security threat than the violent jihadist method, since it can slowly and steadily proceed apace without provoking widespread public concern or government crackdowns.

It is therefore a serious mistake to believe that only those Islamist groups that prioritize the use of armed *jihad* aim to establish the suzerainty of Islam over the entire world. Before citing some additional evidence, it is first necessary to acknowledge that there are in fact bitter disputes between Islamist groups concerning what methods are best suited to achieve their Islamic supremacist goals. One is the violent “Islamization from above” strategy. This is the strategy employed by jihadist groups that aim to seize power by force and then impose a rigid, *shari‘a*-compliant Islamic order, first upon the Muslim nations and societies they gain control of and then, ultimately, upon the entire world. The second main Islamist method, which is much more relevant to this case, is best characterized as a gradualist “Islamization from below” strategy.¹¹¹ As the name implies, this is a much longer-term strategy whose goal is the attainment of Islamist ideological and cultural “hegemony” over Muslim civil society. This is to be accomplished by means of preaching (*da‘wa*), providing social services to the poor, creating a host of sectoral organizations for different segments of society (e.g., women, students, engineers, teachers, laborers, etc.), establishing front organizations to lure unwary people into their orbit, employing modern techniques of mass mobilization and agitation and propaganda (“best revolutionary practices” which they borrowed in large part from communist and fascist movements), and infiltrating other Islamic organizations, student and labor unions, and finally the state apparatus, above all the military and security forces.¹¹² The aim is to transform the consciousness and behavior of believers, both individually and collectively, so much so that the best organized groups, if not outright majorities, within particular societies will reach a critical pro-Islamist mass, at which point they will work assiduously

¹¹¹ Zine herself notes in her report (p. 25) that the MB and other supposedly “mainstream” Islamist organizations are “distinguished by their focus on societal change through a process of gradualism...”, but then goes on to suggest that their “embrace of parliamentary polities” and “willingness to work within existing state structures, even secular ones” signifies that they are genuinely democratic with respect to their values. This is hardly the case.

¹¹² One major example of efforts by the MB to infiltrate, establish cells, and proselytize within the Egyptian military was the establishment of the Tanzim al-Dubbat al-Ikhwan (Organization of Brotherhood Officers). In 1949, during the period when the Brotherhood was cooperating with Nasir’s Free Officers Movement, the group’s leader Major Mahmud Labib provided a secret list of the names, ranks, and divisions of those officers to Nasir, and members of the group even coordinated actions with Nasir in 1952. See further Omar Ashour, *Collusion to Crackdown: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt* (Washington, CD and Doha, Qatar: Brookings Institution, 2015), pp. 10-11, at <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/en-collusion-to-crackdown.pdf>. Later, after he had a falling out with the Brotherhood, Nasir arrested many of its leaders and cadres.

to transform those societies in the desired Islamist direction. When the Islamist organizations pursuing this approach obtain a large enough base of popular support, they will sometimes even create electoral parties and run their own candidates in elections. By applying this strategy, the Islamists may actually eventually be able to triumph in certain Muslim countries without resorting to violence at all. This is the strategy that has mainly been employed over the decades, both at home and abroad, by groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Mawdudist Jama‘at-i Islami (Islamic Association) party in Pakistan.¹¹³

Even so, the adoption of a gradualist “Islamization from below” strategy does not mean that such groups are pacifistic or are otherwise philosophically opposed to the use of violence. It is well-known, e.g., that the MB not only created various secret paramilitary squads, above all al-Nizam

¹¹³ There is a vast literature analyzing and describing the history, agenda, and activities of these two movements. For the MB in Egypt, see Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*; Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt* (London: Ithaca Press, 1998); Xavier Ternisien, *Les Frères musulmans* (Paris: Fayard, 2011); Barbara H. E. Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology* (New York: Routledge, 2011), although she unfortunately mischaracterizes al-Hudaybi’s cautious pragmatism as “moderation”; Mariz Tadros, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt: Democracy Redefined or Confined?* (New York: Routledge, 2014); Annette Ranko, *Die Muslimbruderschaft: Porträt einer mächtigen Verbindung* (Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung, 2014); Hazem Kandil, *Inside the Brotherhood* (Malden, MA and Cambridge UK: Polity Press, 2015); Chérif Amir, *Histoire secrète des Frères musulmans* (Paris: Ellipses, 2015); Marie Vannetzel, *Les Frères musulmans égyptiens: Enquête sur un secret public* (Paris: Karthala, 2016); Khalil al-Anani, *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics* (New York: Oxford University, 2016). Cf. also the useful recent contribution of Jeffry R. Halverson, *Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam: The Muslim Brotherhood, Ash‘arism, and Political Sunnism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), esp. chapters 3-4. For the international spread and implantation of the MB, see Barry Rubin, ed., *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), chapters 7-11; Alison Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power* (London: Saqi, 2013), chapter 3; and Johannes Grundmann, *Islamische Internationalisten: Strukturen und Aktivitäten der Muslimbruderschaft und der Islamischen Weltliga* (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2005), pp. 15-74. For more detailed studies of the MB in other Arab countries, see, e.g., Marion Boulby, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945-1993* (Atlanta, GA: Scholar’s Press, 1999); and Raphaël Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria* (New York: Oxford University, 2013). For the Jama‘at-i Islami, see Kalim Bahadur, *The Jama‘at-i Islami of Pakistan: Political Thought and Political Action* (New Delhi: Chetana, 1977); Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama‘at-i Islami of Pakistan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1994); and Maidul Islam, *Limits of Islamism: Jamaat-e-Islami in Contemporary India and Bangladesh* (Delhi: Cambridge University, 2015). See also Anne Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda* (New York: Oxford University, 2017), for the al-Nahda (Renaissance) Party of Rashid al-Ghannushi, another gradualist Islamist movement. Sadly, but all too predictably, many newer academic works on the first two of these organizations (or their founders) have tended to be overly solicitous and apologetic. See, e.g., Raymond William Baker, *Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2006); Christian Wolfe, *Die ägyptische Muslimbruderschaft: Von der Utopie zur Realpolitik* (Hamburg: Diplomica, 2008); Brigitte Maréchal, *The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2008); Irfan Ahmad, *Islamism and Democracy in India: The Transformation of the Jamaat-e-Islami* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2009); Muhammad Sameer Murtaza, *Die ägyptische Muslimbruderschaft: Geschichte und Ideologie* (Berlin: Rotations, 2011); Bruce K. Rutherford, *Egypt After Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2013), chapter 3; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2015); and Gudrun Krämer, *Hasan al-Banna* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009). In marked contrast, an overly conspiratorial analysis, which nonetheless provides many fascinating and little-known details about the activities of the MB, is that of Egyptian-American émigré Cynthia Farahat, *The Secret Apparatus: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Industry of Death* (New York and Nashville, TN: Bombadier Books, 2022). Cf. also the revelations by former Muslim Brother Mohamed Louizi, *Pourquoi j’ai quitté les Frères musulmans: Retour éclairé vers un Islam apolitique* (Paris: Michelon, 2016).

al-Khass (the Special Apparatus) in the 1940s, but also that members of the group carried out a series of assassinations and other acts of violence against officials and other enemies.¹¹⁴ After such acts of violence and insurrection caused the Egyptian regime to crack down heavily on the MB, most of the latter's remaining leaders abandoned violence and primarily embraced the gradualist strategy outlined above. However, many radicals within the organization then left to establish or join jihadist terrorist groups such as the Tanzim al-Jihad (the Jihad Organization, also known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad) and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group). Some hotheads remained within the Brotherhood, however, and periodically challenged its more cautious leadership group, albeit without success. However, in the wake of the 2013 ousting of Muhammad Mursi from power by the Egyptian military, elements of the Brotherhood again began advocating, organizing for, and carrying out acts of violence, both against the regime and the Copts.¹¹⁵ This indicates that the adoption of the gradualist strategy for pragmatic, tactical reasons does not preclude Islamist groups from having recourse to armed *jihad*. Moreover, the gradualist and violent strategies have often been promoted simultaneously within the same organization. For example, groups like Hamas, an offshoot of the Palestinian branch of the MB, and Hezbollah (the [Shi'i] Party of Allah) in Lebanon have both pursued the gradualist strategy and engaged in *jihad*. In both cases, the "political wing" of these organizations made use of the gradualist strategy, whereas their "military wings" waged *jihad*.¹¹⁶ The example of Hamas has relevance to this particular case.

Moreover, contrary to the claims of both gullible academic Islamist apologists and dissimulating Islamists, the ultimate goal of the MB is Islamic world domination. This is revealed clearly by many of the statements and texts of its founder al-Banna, is implied in the messages found in the MB's official motto, and also alluded to, in a more subtle form, in its seal (as discussed above, on pp. 42-3), as well as demonstrated by many public and private remarks of other leading MB officials and the explicit information found in numerous secret MB documents. A few additional examples should suffice to illustrate this fact. In two recent books published by Mohamed Louizi, a long-term member of three Islamist organizations that are part of the global MB constellation, the Hizb al-'Adalat wa al-Tanmiyya (PJD: Party of Justice and Development) in Morocco and, later, both the Étudiants Musulmans de France (EMF: Muslim Students of France) and the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF: Union of Islamic Organizations of France, later renamed the Musulmans de France), aspects of this "Islamization from below" strategy were

¹¹⁴ See Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, pp. 30-2, 54-5, 62, 73-9, 133-4, 147-50, 205-8. This group has also been referred to as al-Jihaz al-Sirri (the Secret Apparatus) and al-Tanzim al-Sirri (the Secret Group).

¹¹⁵ See, e.g., Mokhtar Awad, "The Rise of the Violent Muslim Brotherhood," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 22 (November 2017), pp. 5-40.

¹¹⁶ On the Islamic legal justifications for the renewed use of violence by the MB, see the text prepared by Abu al-'Izz Diya' al-Din Asad, *Fiqh al-muqawwama al-sha'abiyya li-al-inqilab* [The Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup], 2015, at

<https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2371/f/downloads/The%20Jurisprudence%20of%20Popular%20Resistance%20to%20the%20Coup.pdf>. For a good analysis of this text, as well as some excerpts translated into English, see Awad, "Rise of the Violent Muslim Brotherhood," pp. 14-34.

described in great detail.¹¹⁷ The aim of this strategy has, from its inception, been to Islamize society step by step and level by level, starting by carefully selecting and indoctrinating individuals, then indoctrinating families, then indoctrinating entire national societies, then spreading that indoctrination to the entire world until global Islamic domination is achieved. This process is known within the MB as *tamkin*, an Arabic term with the general meaning of “enabling” or “empowering” but which is also used specifically to refer to the duty of a Muslim wife to submit to her husband’s will. However, in the Qur'an, variants of that word (*makkanna*) were twice used to describe the “consolidation of power” and “achieving a strong position and a position of authority.”¹¹⁸ More relevantly, the term has since been further transformed into a more expansive concept with the explicit connotations of possessing political, military, economic, and other sorts of power, in which the notions of power and domination, triumph, supremacy, and victory are inseparable. Specifically, it is used by the MB to refer to a “long-term strategy” that aims to “establish the power of Allah over the Earth.”¹¹⁹

This particular concept of *tamkin* has been promoted in a number of secret MB documents and speeches over the decades, but is never mentioned in Western languages, for reasons that will become apparent. Hasan al-Banna himself explained the term in one of his *Risa'il (Letters)* to his young followers by outlining a 7-step process:

- first step – to “educate,” i.e., indoctrinate each individual with the MB’s ideology, so that he or she would be loyal to this in thought, belief, behavior, emotions, work, etc.;
- second step – to similarly “educate” members of each Muslim national society – men, women, and children – so that this ideology infuses all of their thoughts and actions;
- third step – to eventually “educate” the entire Muslim community (*umma*) in order to guide it to a proper interpretation of Islam;
- fourth step – to establish an “Islamic government” because, in al-Banna’s words, “we do not recognize any regime or political system that is not based on Islam and that does not draw its laws from the *shari'a*” or “any political parties or traditional government structures that the unbelievers and enemies of Islam have imposed on us”;
- fifth step – to annex to our Islamic government those Islamic territories that are now occupied or divided up by Western powers, and thus effectively establish a new Caliphate state;
- sixth step – to again raise the banner of Islam over all of the territories previously under Muslim control but subsequently conquered by the West, such as Spain, Sicily, southern Italy, the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Red Sea; and

¹¹⁷ Louizi, *Pourquoi j'ai quitté les Frères musulmans*, pp. 147-60; and idem, *Libérer l'Islam de l'islamisme* (Paris: Foundation pour l'Innovation Politique, [January] 2018), pp. 16-20.

¹¹⁸ Louizi, *Pourquoi j'ai quitté les Frères musulmans*, pp. 152-3.

¹¹⁹ Louizi, *Libérer l'Islam de l'islamisme*, p. 16.

- seventh step – to bring the entire world under the suzerainty of Allah, i.e., planetary domination.¹²⁰

Alas, these Islamic supremacist fantasies, and the sophisticated ensemble of methods adopted to achieve them, have by no means been abandoned by the MB in the present era.

In 1992, Egyptian authorities found a 13-page document in the home of the MB’s Deputy Guide and a leading MB strategist, Khayrat al-Shatar, “Wathiqat al-tamkin” (“The Tamkin Document”), which revealed that the MB was, in great secrecy, working to seize power by building a vast, minutely structured network throughout Egyptian society, consisting of numerous entities that seemed to be independent of each other but were actually in very close communication, including banks, investment companies, schools, hospitals, and nurseries. All of these entities were components of a sophisticated plan designed to diffuse the ideology of the MB throughout all levels of Egyptian society, indoctrinate youths, build elite MB cadres, and forge alliances with small political parties to gain influence, little by little, in the Egyptian Parliament, unions, student associations, the media, business circles, the judiciary, the police, the army, and amongst the populace.¹²¹ More recently, in 2013, the newspaper *Al-Watan (The Nation)* published another MB secret document, “Al-tanzim al-‘alami muwahid li al-ikhwan” (“The International Organization Unifies the [Muslim] Brothers”), which described the cadres, the international structure of the organization, the objectives, the methods, and the necessary resources that would finally enable the MB to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate. The document divided the world into four strategic sectors: the West, Africa, the Gulf States, Iran, and Afghanistan, and Iraq, Kurdistan, Palestine, and Syria. London was designated as the command center of the Western sector. The goal promoted was *tamkin*, i.e., Islamic domination.¹²² As al-Banna himself had previously outlined, domination not solely of the Arab countries, but ultimately of the entire world, including the “infidel” West.¹²³

In non-Muslim countries, a similar “civilization jihad” strategy has long been advocated and initiated by MB (and Mawdudist) activists to enable their array of vanguard and front organizations to slowly transform the existing host societies into becoming more *shari‘a*-compliant (nowadays, cleverly employing “progressive” rhetoric that is in fact antithetical to Islamism’s intolerance of “unbelief” and “heresy,” ostensibly in support of “diversity” and the protection of minority and religious rights).¹²⁴ As Louizi notes, “between 1960 and 1982, the Muslim Brothers decided to

¹²⁰ Cf. the pyramidal diagram depicting this process in *ibid*, p. 18, and the more detailed description in *idem, Pourquoi j’ai quitté les Frères musulmans*, pp. 157-8.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, pp. 148-9.

¹²² *Ibid*, pp. 149-50. Presumably, this is a reference to the Tamzim al-Dawli, the International Organization of the MB, for which see Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood from Opposition to Power*, chapter 3; and “International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood,” *Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch*, undated, at <https://www.globalmbwatch.com/international-organization-of-the-muslim-brotherhood/>. The Tanzim al-Dawli is also known as the Jihaz al-Dawli (International Apparatus).

¹²³ Louizi, *Libérer l’Islam de l’islamisme*, p. 18.

¹²⁴ For the MB and its complex interactions with the U.S. and other Western countries, see Martyn Frampton, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the West: A History of Enmity and Engagement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University,

internationalize their Islamist project beyond the Arab countries, and established numerous Islamist centers” in Europe [that were] “affiliated directly or indirectly with the famous Tanzim al-Dawli, an international structure whose branches were established throughout all five continents.”¹²⁵ Unfortunately, these MB centers and entities in the West still fantasize about transforming current “infidel” Western countries into fully Islamic societies.

This has been made clear not only in several incautious statements made by Islamist leaders and spokesmen, but also in other secret internal documents that have been uncovered in the course of police raids in connection with legal prosecutions initiated against Islamist entities. One such revealing document, “Nahwa istratijiyya ‘alamiyya li-al-siyasat al-islamiyya” (“Towards a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy”), was discovered in the wake of November 2001 Swiss raids on the Bank al-Taqwa (founded by MB activists) and its Ikhwan directors’ homes. In this 14-page document, dated 1 December 1982, a multifaceted 12-point strategy was promoted whose aim was to “establish an Islamic government on Earth.”¹²⁶ The second was a 16-page strategy document discovered during raids conducted in connection with the case of the Holy Land Foundation, a Hamas front based in the U.S. In this 22 May 1991 document authored by Muhammad Akram, which was entitled “Mudhakkara tafsiriyya al-hadaf al-istratijiyya al-‘amm li-al-jama‘at fi amrika al-shamaliyya” (“An Explanatory Memorandum On the General Strategic Goal of the Group in North America”), one finds the following eye-opening passage:

The process of [Muslim Brotherhood] settlement [in Western homelands] is a ‘Civilization-Jihadist Process’ with all the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and Allah’s religion is made victorious over all other religions. Without this level of understanding, we are not up to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for Jihad yet. It is a

2018). For the organization’s activities and galaxy of organizations operating in Western countries, cf. Abdelrahim Ali, *L’Etat des Frères musulmans: L’Europe et la expansion de l’Organisation internationale* (Paris: Harmattan, 2017); Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (New York: Columbia University, 2010); Nina Nowar, *Ramadans Erben: Die Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e.V. (IGD)* (Hamburg: Diplomica, 2012), esp. chapter 4; Udo Ulfkotte, *Heiliger Krieg in Europa: Wie die radikale Muslimbruderschaft unsere Gesellschaft bedroht* (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 2007); Fiammetta Venner, *OPA sur l’Islam de France: Les ambitions de l’UOIF* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2005); and Lhaj Thami Breze, *Qu’est-ce que l’UOIF?* (Paris: L’Archipel, 2006).

¹²⁵ Louizi, *Libérer l’Islam de l’islamisme*, p. 18.

¹²⁶ For this document, see Sylvain Besson, *Le conquête de l’occident: Le projet secret des islamistes* (Paris: Seuil, 2005), pp. 191-205 (in French translation). It was subsequently summarized and republished in English translation in Patrick Poole, “The Muslim Brotherhood ‘Project,’” *Front Page Magazine*, 11 May 2006, available at <http://www.onthewing.org/user/Islam%20-%20Muslim%20Brotherhood%20Project.pdf>. See further Vidino, *New Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, pp. 79-80.

Muslim's destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes...¹²⁷

Moreover, in addition to the aforementioned methods, in Western countries such groups are also willing to support gullible or sympathetic non-Muslim political candidates and to engage in standard forms of political lobbying in order to promote their agendas.

If these documents and many other public and private statements by figures associated with the MB and its satellite organizations can be taken seriously, and there is no reason to assume otherwise, the claim that the MB is not waging non-military forms of *jihad* in the West cannot be taken at face value. This would in fact constitute a kind of “stealth jihad.” Given these subversive and anti-democratic aims, it is hardly surprising that the MB would rely on the technique of *taqiyya* to conceal their Islamic supremacist goals, since to express them openly would be to invite crackdowns by Western governments. Zine is correct to note that the term originally referred to “a denial of Islamic belief and practice or concealing one’s faith to prevent persecution.”¹²⁸ However, there is no doubt that this same technique is often employed by contemporary Islamists to disguise their real agenda. Indeed, it is not only the practice of *taqiyya* that such movements employ, but also a number of other related techniques. As Louizi points out, the MB not only stresses the use of *taqiyya*, which he describes as “a sophisticated technique of double discourse and dissimulation”, but also several other related stratagems, including *al-mudara*, a form of political politeness and courtesy [*politesse*] that progressively aims to implant certain convictions, in fits and starts, without openly proclaiming them; *al-mudahana*, pretending to deny those convictions so as to flatter and gain the confidence of a hostile audience; and *al-t’arid*, expressing a “truth” in a very equivocal fashion in the hopes that one’s interlocutors will interpret it in a way that is the opposite of the actual meaning.¹²⁹ In short, a veritable arsenal of linguistic artifices to confuse gullible “infidels” about the real beliefs and goals of the MB. So much for Zine’s claim that noticing and commenting upon these manipulative phenomena is a “conspiracy theory.”

Similarly, the claim that the MB has not established a constellation of satellite or front organizations in the West, as it likewise has in Egypt and elsewhere in the world, must be rejected. Since a front organization can be defined as an organization that has links to a parent organization but that portrays itself as unconnected and fully autonomous, the fact that many such front organizations claim to be independent and do not openly publicize their links to the MB is hardly evidence that

¹²⁷ See “Explanatory Memorandum,” p. 7. This document, firstly in the original Arabic, and then in English translation, can be found on the Investigative Project’s website at www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/20/pdf. For good analyses of this document, cf. Frampton, *Muslim Brotherhood and the West*, pp. 407-9; and Vidino, *New Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, pp. 90-2. Frampton also notes that “Muhammad Akram” was probably Muhammad Adluni. According to former U.S. prosecutor Andrew C. McCarthy, Adluni was an “intimate associate” of Yusuf al-Qaradawi. See *The Grand Jihad: How Islam and the West Sabotage America* (New York: Encounter Books, 2011), p. 58. If so, that would indicate that he was a significant rather than a minor MB figure, and that his strategic suggestions cannot be casually dismissed, as certain Islam and Islamist apologists have sought to do.

¹²⁸ Zine report, p. 30.

¹²⁹ Louizi, *Libérer l’Islam de l’islamisme*, p. 20.

they are not front organizations. On the contrary, assuming that documented links can be established between them, that would be damning indicators that they are.¹³⁰ In fact, most of the numerous satellite and front organizations of the MB that are operating in various countries have already been identified in the literature, so they are not really a matter of dispute. Note also that these organizations deliberately adopt innocuous-sounding names that do not hint at, much less broadcast, their connections to the MB.¹³¹

The only real question has to do with the degree to which the MB organizations in various countries, including Western countries, are under the direct or indirect control of the main MB organization in Egypt or its International Organization. Some analysts have exaggeratedly claimed that the original MB fully controls or orchestrates the activities of all of its worldwide branches and components, whereas others (mainly Islamists and Islamist apologists) have naively or disingenuously denied that that the latter exerts any significant influence over those branches and components, which are supposedly loosely-organized, structurally independent, and operationally autonomous. Neither of these extreme interpretations seem warranted on the basis of the available evidence. Despite the fact that the bylaws of the Tanzim al-Dawli require that every MB affiliate must fulfill their mandatory commitments to *jihad* (whether “clandestine jihad” (*jihad al-sirri*) in its diverse forms or military *jihad* and “martyrdom”), that the MB in Egypt (and other countries) is an authoritarian, tightly-structured organization, and that components of the MB network display certain features of both a secret society and a cult, the general consensus is that all of the elements created or directly inspired by the organization embrace the same core ideological doctrines, but that they retain some de facto operational independence and are shrewdly trying to adapt their

¹³⁰ See Lorenzo Vidino, *The Closed Circle: Joining and Leaving the Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (New York: Columbia University, 2020), pp. viii-ix: “It also soon became evident that [the MB] had created organizations that, while not calling themselves ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ and actually refuting charges of being linked to the movement, were closely linked to the movement and played a crucial role in the dynamics of Western Muslim communities. They controlled a large number of mosques and had become the de facto representatives (some would say gatekeepers) of said communities in the eyes of Western establishments.”

¹³¹ See above, note 124. Here are some the most prominent MB-affiliated organizations in various Western countries. In the U.S., the Muslim Students Association (MSA), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), the Muslim-American Society (MAS), the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), the “charitable” Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), and, more recently, an umbrella organization known as the U.S. Council of Muslim Organizations (USCMO). In Canada, ISNA, the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM, previously known as CAIR Canada), and the IRC. In Britain, the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and the charitable IRW, which is headquartered in Birmingham. In France, the aforementioned UOIF and EMF. In Germany, the Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland (IGD: Islamic Community of Germany). In Italy, the Unione delle Comunità e Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (UCOII: Union of the Islamic Community and Organizations in Italy). On a Europe-wide scale, the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE) and the European Forum of Muslim Women (EFOMW), both based in Brussels; the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), based in Dublin (and formerly headed by Yusuf al-Qaradawi); the charitable Europe Trust, based in Markfield in the UK; and the European Institute for Human Sciences (EIHS), based in Birmingham. Two points are worth emphasizing here. First, as noted in the text, none of these organizational monikers suggests that they are Islamist organizations or that they are in any way linked to the MB. Second, these are only the central nodes in a much vaster network of MB-affiliated organizations that have been implanted in the West.

strategy and tactics in different countries to the specific conditions in which they are operating.¹³² In short, the groups affiliated with the MB and its components are not like the old Comintern-controlled front organizations established by pro-Soviet communists in various countries, in the sense that they are being micromanaged or receiving all of their “marching orders” from the parent bodies. Nevertheless, they are all pursuing the same underlying Islamist agenda in their respective areas in whatever ways they are best able to do so. Hence, although they cannot fairly be described as a “fifth column,” either for the Egyptian MB or for any Muslim regimes, they can perhaps be thought of as an Islamist “Trojan horse” operating within and taking advantage of the freedoms available to them in Western democratic societies whilst assiduously, if surreptitiously, pursuing a fundamentally anti-Western and anti-democratic agenda. That would also include the charitable organizations linked to the MB, whether or not they are knowingly funding foreign jihadist groups.

There is little evidence, then, to suggest that these Islamists in the West have embraced genuinely democratic values. On the contrary, like many other types of anti-democratic extremists (e.g., Marxist-Leninists and fascists), they are all too often happy to exploit democratic freedoms to better promote their own intrinsically anti-democratic agendas. In short, Islamists pursuing a gradualist “Islamization from below” strategy have often opted to participate in “infidel” democratic processes, both in Muslim and in non-Muslim countries, for purely tactical and instrumental reasons.¹³³ Yet this participation does not alter their Islamic supremacist goals one iota, as has been made clear by many leading Islamist ideologues. For example, according to the Brotherhood’s purportedly “moderate” and recently deceased spiritual guide, Yusuf al-Qaradawi,

Islam will return once more to Europe as a conqueror and as a victorious power after it was expelled twice from the continent....I assume that next time the conquest will not be achieved by the sword but by preaching [*da’wa*] and spreading the ideology [of Islam]....The conquest of Rome and the expansion of Islam will reach all the areas where the sun shines and the moon appears [i.e., the entire world]....That will be the result of a planted seed and the beginning of the righteous Caliphate’s return....[The Islamic Caliphate] deserves to lead the *umma* to the plains of victory.¹³⁴

This, then, is what “moderation” signifies for those Islamists that eschew armed *jihad* for pragmatic reasons – eventual world domination via the utilization of mainly non-violent means such as

¹³² For the most conspiratorial interpretation of the control exercised by the parent MB in Egypt and the MB’s International Organization over its satellites, see Farahat, *Secret Apparatus*. For the most sanguine – some would say naïve – interpretation, see Maréchal, *Muslim Brothers in Europe*, p. 56, who claims that “the movement is above all composed of a variety of informal networks, themselves based upon interpersonal relationships, and the long-term objective of these networks is educational activity.” For more balanced interpretations, see Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood from Opposition to Power*, chapter 3; and Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (New York: Columbia University, 2010), pp. 38-9.

¹³³ Bale, “Islamism and Totalitarianism,” in idem, *Darkest Sides of Politics II*, chapter 6, pp. 223-4.

¹³⁴ Cited by Jonathan D. Halevi, “Al-Qaeda’s Intellectual Legacy: New Radical Islamic Thinking Justifying the Genocide of Infidels,” *Jerusalem Viewpoints* #508, 1 December 2003, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, at <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp508.htm>. In fact, al-Qaradawi was anything but moderate up until the day he died in 2022.

migration (*hijra*), missionary activity (including clandestine missionary activity [*al-da‘wa al-sirriyya*]), conversion, infiltration, subversion, and ultimately sedition.

Yet despite sharing the same long term supremacist goals, the Islamist organizations pursuing a gradualist strategy have been repeatedly accused by jihadists of heresy or apostasy for not waging *jihad bi-al-sayf* and for participating in “infidel” activities like elections. Indeed, for many decades there have been bitter back-and-forth polemics raging between these gradualist Islamist organizations like the MB and their jihadist rivals. A few examples of the arguments from both camps should be sufficient to illustrate this phenomenon.¹³⁵

Starting with jihadist criticisms of the gradualist Islamists, many years before the 9/11 attacks were launched, al-Qa‘ida “singled out” its main transnational rivals, “the *da‘wa* movements in the Middle East, especially the Muslim Brethren, as its primary target for polemic and attack...”¹³⁶ For example, in his pamphlet *Al-Hasad al-murr li-al-Ikhwan al-muslimin fi sittin aman* (*The Bitter Harvest of the Muslim Brotherhood for Sixty Years*), al-Zawahiri bitterly attacked the Muslim Brotherhood. Therein he insisted that the rejection of Sayyid Qutub and his ideas by General Guide Hasan al-Hudaybi (1891-1973) and other members of the leadership group within the Brotherhood had led it seriously astray, causing it to abandon armed *jihad*, to make repeated compromises with corrupt, “heretical” Muslim regimes in Egypt and Jordan, to align itself with similar regimes against jihadist groups in Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Malaysia, and Palestine, and to actively participate in democratic elections, thereby effectively favoring “infidel” institutions that enshrine the sovereignty of humans instead of authentically Islamic notions based upon the complete sovereignty of Allah.¹³⁷ Similar complaints have since been leveled by al-Zawahiri and many other jihadist ideologues.¹³⁸ In 2007, on the al-Ikhlas (Purity or Sincerity) jihadist forum, a primary disseminator of videos from al-Qa‘ida’s al-Sahab (the Cloud) media production company, ‘Abd al-Majid ‘Abd al-Karim Hazin complained about the MB’s supposed “conspiracies” against Islam, including its innumerable ideological deviations and its alleged alliances with “Crusaders, Communists, Jews, [and] Freemasons.”¹³⁹ Nor were members of al-Qa‘ida the only jihadist Salafists who harshly criticized Sunni gradualist Islamists. In 2007, influential Jordanian cleric

¹³⁵ For an excellent overview, see Lahoud, *Jihadists’ Path to Self-Destruction*, pp. 150-82.

¹³⁶ Meir Hatina, “Redeeming Sunni Islam: Al-Qa‘ida’s Polemic against the Muslim Brethren,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 39:1 (April 2002), p. 102. As Marc Lynch rightly notes, “[l]ike al-Qa‘ida, the MB is a global organization with a genuinely transnational scope and a universalizing mission. It competes with al-Qa‘ida at the global level in a way that few other Islamist movements can, commanding Arab media attention and a political presence that more than rivals its violent competitor.” See Marc Lynch, “Islam Divided between Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood,” in *Fault Lines in Global Jihad*, p. 162.

¹³⁷ Ayman al-Zawahiri, *Al-Hasad al-murr li-al-Ikhwan al-muslimin fi sittin aman* (no place: Matbu‘at Jama‘at al-Jihad, 1991). For an analysis of al-Zawahiri’s arguments therein, see Hatina, “Redeeming Sunni Islam,” pp. 103-11.

¹³⁸ See, e.g., Ayman al-Zawahiri, *Fursan tahta rayat al-nabi‘* [Knights under the Prophet’s Banner], serialized in *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* in December 2001, part 9. For other examples, see Lynch, “Islam Divided between Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood,” pp. 165-6.

¹³⁹ ‘Abd al-Majid ‘Abd al-Karim Hazin, “Mu’amirat Jama‘at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin ala al-islam wa ahlihi,” *al-Ikhlas*, 4 August 2007, at www.alekhlaas.net/forum/showthread.php?t=73101.

Akram Hijazi argued that MB anti-jihadist rhetoric “mirror[ed] the propaganda campaign of the Zionist-Crusaders” and asked the following exasperated question:

What remains of *hakimiyya* or *jihad* when the [Iraqi] Islamic Party [i.e., the Hizb al-Islamiyya al-‘Iraqiyya, a Brotherhood offshoot in Iraq] participates in the occupation of Muslim lands...[and when other Brotherhood branches] participate in governments not based on *shari‘a*...deny that *jihad* is an individual obligation...attack the *jihad* and the jihadist program...[and] deny the doctrine of *takfir*?¹⁴⁰

Spokesmen for the Islamic State have launched similar thematic – and no less severe – attacks on the MB. For example, the IS has criticized both deposed Egyptian MB Prime Minister Mursi and Hamas leader Isma‘il Haniyya as *tawaghit* (i.e., rebels against Allah, idolators, or tyrants) for employing “deviant methodologies,” thereby alluding to their participation (however tactical and cynical) in “infidel” institutions like elections, as well as their corrupt behavior in power and their general abandonment of armed *jihad*.¹⁴¹

For their part, more cautious and pragmatic elements within the Brotherhood have been highly critical of jihadist actions for some time. In the wake of the Egyptian government’s crackdown on the Brotherhood and execution of Sayyid Qutub, Hasan al-Hudaybi and other imprisoned MB leaders wrote a book, *Du ‘at la quda: Abhath fi al-‘aqida al-islamiyya wa manhaj al-da‘wa ila Allah* (*Preachers, Not Judges: Examining the Islamic Creed and Method of Da‘wa*), which argued for a shift away from the use of violence and the resumption of the gradualist strategy that al-Banna himself had mainly employed. This book was not only highly critical of what al-Hudaybi, who had advocated the disbanding of the Special Apparatus decades earlier, regarded as the disastrous advocacy of and resort to armed *jihad*, but also laid down non-violent guidelines that the bulk of the MB would subsequently follow for many decades – at least until the ouster of Mursi.¹⁴² Moreover, leading MB figures had openly criticized al-Qa‘ida for launching the 9/11 attacks, repeatedly condemned brutal acts of “terrorism” (especially actions targeting Muslims in Muslim

¹⁴⁰ Cited by Lynch, “Islam Divided between Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood,” pp. 165-6.

¹⁴¹ “From Hijrah to Khilafah,” *Dabiq* 1 (July 2014), pp. 38-9.

¹⁴² Hasan al-Hudaybi, *Du ‘at la quda: Abhath fi al-‘aqida al-islamiyya wa manhaj al-da‘wa ila Allah* (Cairo: Dar al-Tiba‘a wa al-Nashr al-Islamiyya, 1977). See esp. Zollner, *Muslim Brotherhood*, part 3, for a detailed analysis of this text. Note that this book was above all a criticism of radicals within the Brotherhood, in particular the Qutbist current. See Lav, *Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology*, pp. 61-73. In response, the Qutbists – and various other jihadist radicals – derisively characterized the Brotherhood as proponents of Murji‘ite doctrines. See, e.g., *ibid*, pp. 73-85, on the arguments of Qutub acolyte Tariq ‘Abd al-Halim. The key doctrine of the classical Murji‘ites (*Murji‘un*) in the medieval era, which was radically opposed to that of the sectarian, *takfiri* view of the Kharijites (*Khawarij*), was that only Allah, as opposed to other Muslims, could judge whether someone was a true Muslim, and that this determination would be postponed until later, on the Day of Judgment. They also argued that what made one a Muslim was saying the *shahada* and maintaining fealty to core Muslim beliefs, not one’s actual actions, even if they were “sinful.” See further *ibid*, chapter 1. The Sunni mainstream rejected the “extreme” positions of both the “overly” tolerant Murji‘ites and the highly intolerant Kharijites. For more on the debate between Islamist gradualists and jihadists in this context, see Joas Wagemakers, “‘Seceders’ or ‘Postponers’?: An Analysis of the ‘Khawarij’ and ‘Murji‘a’ Labels in Polemical Debates between Quietists and Jihadi Salafis,” in Deol and Kazmi, eds., *Contextualising Jihadi Thought*, pp. 143-65.

countries) by jihadist groups, argued that prioritizing the waging of “offensive jihad” would lead to failure and repression, and strongly opposed the IS’ attempt to re-establish the Caliphate.¹⁴³ Yet this by no means signifies that the gradualist groups are inherently “peaceful,” genuinely “democratic,” or “moderate” with respect to their ultimate goals, which remain the Islamization of the entire world. Indeed, elements of the MB carried out attacks on the Copts when Mursi became President and began resorting to more extreme violence and terrorism after Mursi’s ouster.

What these polemical disagreements reveal is that there have long been significant disagreements amongst Sunni Islamists over the best *means and methods* to adopt in order to achieve their underlying Islamic supremacist agendas. The most important division is between Islamist organizations that have adopted the gradualist “Islamization from below” strategy, and the jihadist groups that are prosecuting the violent “Islamization from above” strategy. It should also be emphasized, however, that – as within other extremist milieus – there are some very serious schisms within the global jihadist milieu, and also internal factional divisions and disputes within particular jihadist organizations.

At this juncture, then, it may be useful to undertake a short digression to clarify this point further. It should already be apparent that the Islamist milieu is internally divided and subdivided in manifold ways.¹⁴⁴ One obvious major division is between Sunni Islamists and Shi‘i Islamists. The latter have tended to adopt a more inclusive, non-denominational perspective towards their Sunni “brothers,” and have often endeavored to collaborate with Sunni Islamists in order to forge a united Islamist front against their “infidel” enemies.¹⁴⁵ In contrast, Sunni Islamists tend to view all Shi‘a

¹⁴³ Cf., e.g., the examples cited by Lynch, “Islam Divided between Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood,” p. 165; and various anti-IS statements made by Yusuf al-Qaradawi: “Qaradawi Says ‘Jihadist Caliphate’ Violates Sharia,” *Al-‘Arabiyya*, 5 July 2014, at <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/07/05/Qaradawi-says-jihadist-caliphate-violates-sharia-.html>, although the article does not specify what al-Qaradawi’s theological or legal arguments actually are – elsewhere, however, he is reported to have said that it is “religiously invalid” and “does not serve the Islamic project”, cited in “Al-Qaradawi Considers ‘Baghdadi Succession’ in Iraq as Religiously Invalid,” *Shafaq News* [Iraq], 6 July 2014, at <http://english.shafaq.com/index.php/politics/10411-al-qaradawi-considers-baghdadi-succession-in-iraq-as-religiously-invalid>; and Jonathan Miller, “Al Qaeda Spiritual Leader: Islamic State are ‘Deviants,’” *Channel 4 News* [UK], 1 July 2014, at <http://www.channel4.com/news/sheikh-abu-muhammad-al-maqdis-salafist-islam-islamic-state>.

¹⁴⁴ The only volume devoted exclusively to the fault lines within the Islamist milieu is that of Moghadam and Fishman, eds., *Fault Lines in the Global Jihad*. Much more information can be gleaned about these internal divisions in primary source materials, especially the testimonies of insiders in memoirs and at trials, and detailed case studies of particular jihadist organizations.

¹⁴⁵ To cite some illustrative examples, Iranian clerics met with al-Qa‘ida leaders in the Sudan in the mid-1990s to discuss the formation of a common Islamist front, some al-Qa‘ida operatives received training from Hizballah fighters during that period, both Iran and Hizballah have long collaborated with Hamas and other Sunni Palestinian rejectionist groups, and the Iranian regime provided a safe haven for key al-Qa‘ida figures after the American invasion of Afghanistan. Cf., e.g., U.S. Government, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), pp. 60-1, 240-1; Associated Press, “CIA Docs from Osama bin Laden Raid Suggest Iran-al Qaeda Link,” CBS News, 2 November 2017, at <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-osama-bin-laden-al-qaeda-before-september-11-terror-attacks-cia-documents/>; Adrien Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, “Al Qaeda has Rebuilt Itself – with Iran’s Help,” *The Atlantic*, 11 November 2017, at <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/al-qaeda-iran-cia/545576/>; and Mary Kay Linge, “Iran Official: We Protected al-Qaeda Terrorists before 9/11,” *New York Post*, 9 June 2018, at <https://nypost.com/2018/06/09/iran-admits-it-protected-al-qaeda-terrorists-before-9-11/>.

as “Islamically incorrect,” if not as “heretical.” Indeed, the most sectarian Sunni jihadists pejoratively label the Shi‘a as *rawafid* (“rejectors”), and some even go so far as to prioritize targeting them with violence because, by “falsely” claiming to be Muslims, they are viewed as more dangerous than non-Muslim “infidels.”¹⁴⁶ So it was that the al-Qa‘ida-affiliated jihadist leader in Iraq, Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, devoted much of his efforts – like no less sectarian South Asian Sunnis in groups like the Sipah-i Sahaba Pakistan (SSP: Soldiers of the Companions in Pakistan) and Lashkar-i Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi) – to carrying out mass casualty attacks against Shi‘i civilians rather than non-Muslim enemies. This was viewed as so counterproductive by Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri that the latter sent a highly critical letter to al-Zarqawi urging him to stop targeting other Muslims, however misguided they may be, advice that al-Zarqawi largely ignored.¹⁴⁷ Since that period, the extreme anti-Shi‘a violence carried out by Sunni jihadists in Iraq and Syria, including those linked to the Islamic State, soon led to the creation of new anti-Sunni Shi‘i paramilitary groups and “death squads,” which have responded in kind by deliberately targeting and perpetrating atrocities against Sunni civilians. This, together with the growing geopolitical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, has fortunately acted to inhibit operational cooperation between Sunni and Shi‘i Islamists.

However, as has been noted, there are also bitter divisions and rivalries between Sunni Islamists. In addition to the aforementioned conflicts over the best *means* to employ between “gradualist” and jihadist Islamists, there are also many other conflicts that have erupted, both between and within different Sunni jihadist organizations.¹⁴⁸ These internal conflicts are attributable to a number of intersecting factors, including

- bitter personality conflicts between narcissistic, egomaniacal jihadist leaders;
- ideological divisions between jihadist Salafists, Wahhabis, and Deobandis, which may seem trivial to outsiders but can sometimes be matters of life-or-death between extremists;
- disputes over sectarianism, e.g., how justified it is for jihadists to target other Muslims who are regarded as “heretical” or “Islamically-incorrect” (such as the Shi‘a, the Alawis, the Ahmadis, etc.),¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ See, e.g., Bernard Haykal, “Al-Qa‘ida and Shiism,” in Moghadam and Fishman, eds., *Fault Lines of Global Jihad*, chapter 8. The term *rawafid* was originally applied to those Muslims who supported ‘Ali as the political successor of Muhammad and thus did not accept the legitimacy of the first three “rightly guided” Caliphs, Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthman, but it was later used in a more general sense of rejectors of the “true” Islam.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, pp. 195-8.

¹⁴⁸ See esp. the fine recent study by Tore Refslund Hamming, *Polemical and Fratricidal Jihadists: A Historical Examination of Debates, Contestation and Infighting within the Sunni Jihadist Movement* (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College, 2019), available at <https://icsr.info/2019/08/13/polemical-and-fratricidal-jihadists-a-historical-examination-of-debates-contestation-and-infighting-within-the-sunni-jihadi-movement/>.

¹⁴⁹ For the divisions between less sectarian jihadist groups, and the extreme *takfiri* jihadist groups that have no qualms about carrying out the mass murder of other Muslims, see V. G. Julie Rajan, *Al Qaeda’s Global Crisis: The Islamic State, takfir, and the Genocide of Muslims* (London and New York: Routledge, 2015). Other authors have also employed the term “genocide” when analyzing the behavior of jihadist groups, albeit more generally and in the context of the use of violence against non-Muslims rather than Muslim minorities, such as Richard L. Rubenstein,

- disputes over organization, e.g., whether to rely on centralized hierarchical structures, loose horizontal networks, entirely autonomous cells, or “lone wolves”;
- disputes over strategy, e.g., whether to keep focusing on targeting the “near enemy,” to prioritize targeting the “far enemy” (like the 9/11 attacks), or to do both simultaneously;¹⁵⁰
- disputes over tactics, e.g., whether to rely heavily on martyrdom operations, i.e., suicide attacks;
- disputes over weaponry, e.g., whether to continue relying on tried and true conventional weapons or invest time and resources in acquiring, developing, and deploying CBRN weapons;
- ethnic conflicts between jihadists, e.g., between Arabs and non-Arabs (especially black Africans), or Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns, within particular jihadist groups;¹⁵¹
- nationality conflicts between jihadists, e.g., between Saudis, Egyptians, and Algerians within particular jihadist groups;
- conflicts between rival jihadist groups for hegemony, e.g., between the al-Qa‘ida and Islamic State networks for leadership of the global *jihad* since their falling out in Syria;¹⁵² and
- “turf fights” over territorial control between local jihadist groups and global interlopers, e.g., between Hamas and rival jihadist groups in Gaza.¹⁵³

In short, it would be a terrible blunder to view the Islamist extremist milieu as in any way monolithic, just as it would be to characterize the communist, fascist, anarchist, and eco-radical extremist milieus in that way. On the contrary, recognizing where the manifold fault lines are within the Islamist milieu in general, and between and within jihadist groups in particular, would better enable counterterrorist operatives to parry, manipulate, confuse, and destabilize the diverse

Jihad and Genocide (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010). Although religious extermination is also included in, say, the United Nations’ definition of genocide, a better term for what the jihadists are doing is “religiocide,” since the word “genocide” stems from the Greek words γένος (race, stock, kin), coupled with *-cide* (act of killing). Technically, then, the term “genocide” should be restricted to deliberate attempts to eradicate entire ethno-cultural groups.

¹⁵⁰ See, e.g., Brynjar Lia, “Jihadis Divided between Strategists and Doctrinarians,” in Moghadam and Fishman, eds., *Fault Lines of Global Jihad*, chapter 3.

¹⁵¹ See, e.g., Anne Stenersen, “Arab and Non-Arab Jihadis,” in *ibid*, chapter 5.

¹⁵² See, e.g., Fawaz A. Gerges, *ISIS: A History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2016), chapter 8; and Aaron Y. Zelin, “The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *Research Notes* 20 (June 2014), available at

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf. For the long-germinating and increasingly bitter polemics and conflicts between al-Qa‘ida, the Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham (Support Front for the Syrian People), and the Islamic State, which eventually led to the break between the latter and those two other organizations, cf. Cole Bunzel, *From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution/Center for Middle East Policy, [March] 2015), pp. 20-2, 25-35; William McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State* (New York: St. Martin’s, 2015), pp. 33-45, 89-98, 126-31; and Charles R. Lister, *The Syrian Jihad: Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency* (New York: Oxford University, 2015), parts 3 and 4.

¹⁵³ See, e.g., Paz, “Jihadists and Nationalist Islamists,” in Moghadam and Fishman, eds. *Fault Lines in Global Jihad*, chapter 9.

organizational components within that milieu. In some cases, for example, it might be preferable to increase schismatic tendencies or precipitate purges within such organizations in order to further fragment and ultimately dissolve them, whereas in other contexts it might be better to maintain them in being but keep them internally fractious in order to disrupt their ongoing ability to function smoothly and harmoniously.¹⁵⁴

Returning to the main topic, here is a revealing quote from the Ayatollah Khumayni concerning the waging of *jihad* and its purposes that will complete this section on the Islamic supremacist goals of the Islamists:

Islam makes it incumbent on all adult males, provided they are not disabled or incapacitated, to prepare themselves for the conquest of [other] countries so that the writ of Islam is obeyed in every country in the world....But those who study Islamic *jihad* will understand why Islam wants to conquer the whole world....Those who know nothing of Islam pretend that Islam counsels against war. Those [who say this] are witless. Islam says: 'Kill all the unbelievers just as they would kill you all'! Does this mean that Muslims should sit back until they are devoured by [the unbelievers]? Islam says: 'Kill them [the non-Muslims], put them to the sword and scatter [their armies]' Does this mean sitting back until [non-Muslims] overcome us? Islam says: 'Kill in the service of Allah those who may want to kill you'! Does this mean that we should surrender [to the enemy]? Islam says: 'Whatever good there is exists thanks to the sword and in the shadow of the sword! People cannot be made obedient except with the sword! The sword is the key to Paradise, which can be opened only for the mujahidin! There are hundreds of other [Qur'anic] psalms and hadiths [reported sayings of the Prophet] urging Muslims to value war and to fight. Does all this mean that Islam is a religion that prevents men from waging war? I spit upon those foolish souls who make such a claim.¹⁵⁵

Since this and other similar statements expressed the beliefs of the instigator and most influential figure behind the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, they can hardly be dismissed as irrelevant or trivial in this context. Moreover, they clearly reflect

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Brian Fishman and Assaf Moghadam, "Conclusion: Jihadi Fault Lines and Counterterrorism Policy," in *ibid*, pp. 247-53.

¹⁵⁵ Cited by Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism* (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987), pp. 241-3. Khumayni's quoted passages therein are from the Qur'an. I have not found the original source for this statement, but there are several other Khumayni quotes that express the same goal of Islamic world domination. See, e.g., the triumphant 11 February 1979 statement by Khumayni cited by Dilip Hiro, *The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 32-3: "We will export our revolution to the four corners of the world because our revolution is Islamic; and the struggle will continue until the cry 'There's no God but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah' prevails throughout the world." See also the Khumayni quote in Asghar Schirazi, *The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1997), p. 69, citing the 25 March 1988 issue of the daily newspaper *Risalat [The Prophecy]*: "Establishing the Islamic state world-wide belongs to the great goals of the [Iranian] revolution."

the underlying Islamic supremacist goals of many other leading Shi‘i Islamist thinkers.¹⁵⁶ Such expansionist goals are clearly not confined, then, exclusively to Sunni Islamists.

In any case, the key point that all of the statements quoted above illustrate is that, far from accepting modern Western conceptions of international law, which presuppose “the existence of a family of nations composed of a community of states enjoying full sovereign rights and equality of status,” the leaders of today’s globally-oriented Islamist and jihadist groups instead adhere to what they rightly consider to be authentically Islamic conceptions.¹⁵⁷ These conceptions, which were first laid down by Islamic scholars in the era of Muhammad’s caliphal successors in order to manage the relations between the rapidly expanding Islamic community and non-Muslims, do not involve the recognition of other sovereign states, since “the ultimate goal of Islam was the subordination of the whole world to one [universal] system of law and religion.”¹⁵⁸ This “classical” medieval notion has been fully accepted rather than abandoned by today’s Islamists and jihadists, who regard modern nation-states as artificial creations that the “enemies of Islam” intentionally designed to prevent the restoration of a unified Muslim *umma*.

To sum up this section, Islamism is an extremist, right-wing, theocratic, totalitarian religio-political ideology whose ultimate goal is Islamic world domination. This is the case for both Sunni and Shi‘i Islamists, and for those who employ a gradualist Islamization strategy as well as for those who advocate and wage military *jihad*. Indeed, in order to accomplish their grandiose, utopian goals, those jihadists must subvert, defeat, subjugate, or even exterminate their enemies at home and abroad, above all “infidel” great powers like the American “Great Satan.” Given this uncompromisingly intolerant and bellicose worldview, coupled with such extravagant and imperialistic aims, there are unlikely to be significant ideological limits on the range of subversive methods and military weapons that Islamists might be willing to adopt.

Part IV: Concluding Remarks

¹⁵⁶ See, e.g., the comments of the Ayatollah Khamana’i’s representative in Fars Province during a sermon in Shiraz: “With our hopes high, we are fighting and awaiting the day when the banner of ‘There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger’ will fly all over planet Earth and the one global and just rule of the Mahdi will be established. Who says that the time for these things has passed?...Until we turn the White House into a Hussainiya [Shi‘i Islamic center], we will all continue to shout: ‘Death to America!’.” See “Ayatollah Lotfollah Dezhkham, Khamenei’s Representative in Fars Province: We Will Shout ‘Death to America’ until We Turn the White House into a Shiite Islamic Center,” MEMRI website, 25 January 2019, available at <https://www.memri.org/tv/iran-ayatollah-lotfollah-dezhkham-fars-province-sermon-death-america-until-white-house-islamic-center/transcript>.

¹⁵⁷ For the general Muslim rejection of Western and other non-Islamic international laws, norms, and institutions, see Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1955), pp. 44–6. Furthermore, in theory, Muslims also reject standard Western conceptions of international relations, including notions such as the balance of power and *Realpolitik*. That this is also the Islamist and jihadist view is apparent. See Mary Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* (New Haven: Yale University, 2006), pp. 74–5. This is confirmed by the bitter comments of Bin Laden himself, who stated that “no sane Muslim should take his grievances to the United Nations” or any other international bodies, which are “infidel, man-made organizations.” See his December 1998 interview for al-Jazira, cited in Lawrence, ed., *Messages to the World*, pp. 67–8.

¹⁵⁸ Khadduri, *War and Peace*, p. 45.

As has been noted above, there are many problems with both the overly broad and schematic definitions of “Islamophobia” (such as that of the Runnymede Trust) and, even more so, with those whose blatant political and religious biases are built into the definition (such of those of Bazian and other Islamists). In practice, the latter essentially argue that no one, whether an “infidel” or a Muslim liberal, could possibly have – much less be allowed to publicly express – any legitimate concerns about aspects of Islam or even Islamism without falling into the “Islamophobic” category. In response to such a nonsensical position, one can make several counterarguments. First, being concerned about and critical of a totalitarian right-wing ideology like Islamism no more signifies that one is “Islamophobic” than being concerned about Nazism makes one a “Germanophobe.” Second, apart from certain circles of Christian and Jewish extremists who consider Islam *per se* to be a “demonic,” “satanic,” or “heretical” religion – usually the very same fanatics who also demonize “secular humanism” using similar terms – virtually no one in the West can be said to have a “phobia” about Islam as a religion, i.e., be irrationally fearful of Islam for narrowly theological reasons. Third, certain regressive and intolerant aspects of Islam itself, not just Islamism, present real and ongoing problems for the West, and are therefore both legitimate matters of concern and deserving of criticism. Hence, although it is true that many Westerners have developed negative attitudes towards Islam, especially since the onset of jihadist terrorism symbolized most dramatically by 9/11, the question is whether those negative attitudes are warranted, i.e., whether they are not only understandable but justifiable responses to real problems and actual threats posed by elements within the Muslim community, or whether they are instead based on irrational prejudices against Muslims and are therefore unwarranted. Certain people definitely do fall into the latter “Islam-hating” or “Muslim-hating” category, such as foolish Qur'an-burning Florida pastor Terry Jones, American right-wing radio talk show hosts Michael Savage (né Michael Weiner) and Bryan Fischer, the Coptic maker of a crude anti-Muhammad film (Nakoula Basseley Nakoula), assorted “know nothings” in various countries, and members of certain fringe European fascist groups (although other fascists are actually pro-Islam or even pro-Islamist), but most Westerners who have concerns about Islam clearly fall into the former category.

Is it “Islamophobic,” for example, to associate Muslims with terrorism and other security threats during an era when jihadist groups are carrying out vastly disproportionate amounts of terrorism in various regions throughout the world?¹⁵⁹ Is it “Islamophobic” to be concerned when Islamist activists demand the introduction of *shari'a*-based laws that are directly contrary to Western laws and Western secular Enlightenment values?¹⁶⁰ Is it “Islamophobic” to be concerned about high immigrant and Muslim crime (as well as welfare dependency and birth-) rates when it is a statistical fact that both immigrants from the Third World, including Muslim countries, and Muslims born in Europe are responsible for committing disproportionate amounts of crime, especially violent sexual assaults? Is it “Islamophobic” for Westerners to want to preserve and defend their own cultural mores and civilizational values in the face of certain Muslim religio-cultural practices that are arguably antithetical to those mores and values, e.g., polygamy, blatant male domination of women, forcible female genital mutilation, “honor killings,” arranged marriages with pre-pubescent girls,

¹⁵⁹ For a recent analysis of the relative dangers of jihadist terrorism and other forms of terrorism, see Bale and Bar-On, *Fighting the Last War*, pp. 115-30, where many sources are cited.

¹⁶⁰ For this problem, see Jean-Paul Charnay, *La Charia et l'Occident* (Paris: L'Herne, 2001).

etc.? (Why, after all, is it OK for non-Westerners to want to preserve their cultures, but not OK for Westerners to want to preserve theirs?) Is it “Islamophobic” to be concerned about the ongoing efforts of Islamists to criminalize all criticism and satirical treatments of Islam, i.e., to restrict freedom of expression in Western societies, not only by labeling such criticisms as “Islamophobic” but by engaging in outright intimidation and acts of violence? Is every Westerner who expresses such legitimate concerns in fact a “nativist,” “racist,” “xenophobe,” “right-winger,” or “Islamophobe”? The answer to these questions is clearly no. Indeed, as the late Walter Laqueur has wryly observed, if elements within the Eskimo community began committing disproportionate amounts of terrorism and behaving so aggressively in other contexts, there would be an understandable increase in the amount of suspicion and hostility directed at Eskimos, which would then inevitably lead to bogus accusations of “Eskimophobia.”¹⁶¹

Nevertheless, according to the ever-growing and increasingly histrionic “anti-Islamophobia” network, anyone who has such justifiable and indeed commonsensical concerns is a priori viewed as nothing more than a bigoted Islam-hater or a racist, “cultural” or otherwise.¹⁶² Needless to say, the application of the term “racism” is particularly ridiculous in this context, since Muslims are members of a multi-ethnic community of religious believers (the *umma*) – one that includes many whites – rather than a specific racial group. Finally, perhaps those morally sensitive souls who profess to be so concerned with stigmatizing and discriminatory “phobias” should really be paying far more attention to the pronounced Islamist hatred of moderate Muslims and “infidels” (or “infidelphobia,” though as noted I personally reject the use of the term “phobia” in these political contexts) – not to mention the brutal, systematic official and unofficial persecution of religious minorities in so many contemporary Muslim countries – which are built-in characteristics of Islamism and are also vastly more widespread and harmful than so-called “Islamophobia” could ever become in the West.¹⁶³ Indeed, here is a suggestion for those who know virtually nothing about the history of Islam or any of its core beliefs: start with the “loyalty [towards Muslims] and enmity [towards ‘infidels’]” (*al-wala’ wa al-bara’*) doctrine, deriving from Qur’anic passages (e.g., 3:28, 4:89, 5:51), that is so vociferously espoused by Wahhabis and other Islamists.¹⁶⁴ Then ask yourself

¹⁶¹ See his review of Michael Gove’s *Celsius 7/7* book in *The Times Literary Supplement*, 11 August 2006.

¹⁶² See, e.g., Zine report, p. 9, where “anti-Muslim racism” and “Islamophobia” are said to be inextricably linked: “The specificity of Islamophobia as a form of oppression must be considered in the ways that both religion and race are invoked and in how religion is racialized.”

¹⁶³ Oddly enough, many Islamic and Islamist organizations that complain constantly about supposed “Islamophobia” in the West are strangely silent about the brutal persecution and “re-education” of Muslim Uighurs by the Chinese government in Xinjiang province, perhaps because they know that, unlike guilt-ridden Western governments, the CCP regime would be completely unresponsive to their complaints.

¹⁶⁴ See, (e.g., Shaykh Muhammad Sa‘id al-Qahtani, *Al-Wala’ wa ’l-Bara’ According to the Aqeedah of the Salaf, Part 1* [Mecca: Kashf al-Shubhat Publications, 1993], at <http://www.kalamullah.com/Books/alWalaawalBaraa1.pdf>, which was originally an M.A. thesis written under the direction of Muhammad Qutub, Sayyid Qutub’s brother, and other professors at ‘Umm al-Qura University in Mecca, Saudi Arabia) and embraced in part by all too many Muslims. Cf. the enthusiastic support within al-Qa‘ida for this same intolerant, “infidel” hating *al-wala’ wa al-bara’* notion, as reflected in “Al-Qaeda Releases ‘Standards of Friendship and Enmity in Islam...’,” *MEMRI*, 26 September 2013, at <http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/7428.htm>. Of course, as two Canadian critics of the term

“Islamophobia” have rightly pointed out, “one doubts that a formulation like ‘infidelphobia’ will gain traction anytime soon.” See Jackson Doughtart and Faisal Saeed al-Mutar, “Opinion: Stop Calling Criticism of Islam ‘Islamophobia,’” *National Post*, 26 September 2012, at <http://life.nationalpost.com/2012/09/26/opinion-stop-calling->

if Westerners, whether secularists or Christians, have legitimate reasons to be concerned about the spread of Islamism in Western countries.

Given the prominence of the MB and its satellite organizations in the global Sunni Islamist movement, it is hardly prejudicial, discriminatory, or defamatory for Quiggin and the other defendants to request that the activities of MB-linked charities like IRC and IRW be more carefully monitored to ensure that some of their funds do not end up, whether inadvertently or intentionally, in the coffers of groups like Hamas. Or, if this turns out to be the case, that the GOC should not continue to provide financial assistance to those charities, at least not until their funding of designated terrorist groups ceases. In my opinion, these suggestions, far from being evidence of supposed “Islamophobia,” evince nothing more than a display of prudence and old-fashioned common sense, especially given the documented links between the IRW (and IRC) and the MB and the many past examples of financial scandals involving Islamic charities and jihadist groups (several of which Levitt has enumerated in his report).¹⁶⁵ As a general rule, when dealing with important national security affairs, it is better to err on the side of caution than to engage in naïve wishful thinking. In this context, as in all others, one should follow the evidence wherever it may lead instead of permitting all discussions of the entire topic to be suppressed or censored. As the slogan goes, “facts don’t care about your feelings.” Nor should they.

The bottom line is that freedom of speech is the most important and basic freedom in any society that claims to be a free or democratic society. Given its central importance, no government that claims to be democratic can permit its most hypersensitive and psychologically fragile citizens, its most self-righteous moral puritans, its loudest and most partisan activist groups, its most dishonest anti-democratic political and religious extremists, or its most powerful and unscrupulous elites to decide what all of their fellow citizens is allowed to say or not say. Effectively, this invariably leads – as it now increasingly is in Western countries – to situations in which free speech is coming under attack and indeed being circumscribed to suit the censorious demands of those who wish to stifle dissent and limit criticism, no matter how legitimate that criticism might be. It should be remembered that *the true test of support for free speech is whether one believes that even people*

[criticism-of-islam-islamophobia/](#) . Ironically, the only real “phobia” that is often on display in this context is the phobia about “Islamophobia” itself, for which British journalist Andrew Anthony has coined the clever phrase “Islamophobiaphobia.” See his book *The Fallout: How a Guilty Liberal Lost His Innocence* (London: Vintage, 2008), chapter 10.

¹⁶⁵ An excellent short summary of the documented links between the IRW and the MB can be found in “Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW),” *NGO Monitor*, 21 January 2021, at https://www.ngo-monitor.org/ngos/islamic_relief_worldwide_irw/ . And for historical examples of cases where charitable funding was allegedly being diverted from certain Muslim charities to jihadist groups, see – in addition to the examples cited by Levitt – the books by J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World* (New York: Cambridge University, 2006); and Abdel-Rahman Ghandour, *Jihad humanitaire: Enquête sur les ONG islamiques* (Paris: Flammarion, 2002), wherein Ghandour analyzes the broader problems associated with the growing network of ostensibly “humanitarian” Islamic NGOs, both state-sponsored and non-state, problems that are far more acute in the case of Islamist and MB NGOs. Indeed, new information is constantly surfacing about the financial machinations or scandals involving MB figures and other Islamists in the West. Note, e.g., the recent revelations about the MB’s vast real estate holdings in Europe, in Ian Hamel, “Mohamed Louizi: Les Frères musulmans dissimulent un immense empire immobilier en France et en Europe,” *Global Watch Analysis*, undated, at <https://global-watch-analysis.com/mohamed-louizi-les-freres-musulmans-dissimulent-un-immense-empire-immobilier-en-france-et-en-europe/> .

who express views that one considers the most repugnant have the right to openly express their opinions. After all, everyone believes that people who agree with them have a right to express their views.

In this case, it is my opinion that an Islamic charity that has long been associated with the MB network in Canada is waging “lawfare,” by claiming “defamation,” in order to suppress legitimate concerns about potential irregularities and violations of law with respect to its funding activities. The filing of the plaintiffs and the supporting reports by Zine and Perry proclaim that such criticism of the IRC is legally sanctionable because it might cause some Canadian Muslims to stop providing the charity with alms (*zakat*) and voluntary contributions (*sadaqa*) or even because some unhinged person might be inspired to carry out an “Islamophobic” attack on the organization. The reality, however, is that any kind of negative reportage about particular individuals and entities, no matter how justifiable or accurate it may be, could potentially result in harming the interests of those individuals and entities. If the kind of “logic” used by the plaintiff in this case was carried to its extreme, one could argue that *no one has a right to publicly criticize anyone, even for good reasons, since it could conceivably harm the criticized parties*, e.g., that no one should be allowed to highlight the corrupt behavior of certain politicians, no matter how accurately, because it might somehow damage their reputations and political careers. In short, if the plaintiffs win their case, it is likely to have a chilling effect on free expression in Canada, especially in contexts where the problematic activities of Islamist groups are being reported on.