

CHAPTER 5

ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION: EURO-AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF ISLAM BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

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In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.

In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of *convivencia* in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, academics, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.

Two major attitudes can be discerned in Western perceptions of Islam. The first and by far the most common view is that of clash and confrontation. Its roots go back to the Christian rejection of Islam as a religion in the eighth century when Islam first arose on the historical scene and was quickly perceived to be a theological and political threat to Christendom. The medieval European view of Islam as a heresy and its Prophet as an impostor provided the religious foundations of the confrontationalist position which has survived up to our own day and gained a new dimension after September 11. In the modern period, the confrontationalist view has been articulated in both religious and non-religious terms, the most famous one being the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis, which envisions the strategic and political conflicts between the Western and Muslim countries in terms of deep religious and cultural differences between the two, and which is analyzed critically by Waleed El-Ansary and Ejaz Akram in this collection. The second view is that of co-existence and accommodation which has become a major alternative only in recent decades although it has important historical precedents in the examples of Emanuel Swedenborg, Goethe, Henry Stubbe, Carlyle, and others. Proponents of the accommodationist view consider Islam to be a sister religion and in fact part of the Abrahamic tradition and prove, in the case of Swedenborg and Goethe, the possibility of envisioning co-existence with Islam and Muslims while remaining true to the word and spirit of Christianity. This position, which will be analyzed very briefly at the end of the essay, marks a new and important chapter in the history of Islam and the West with implications for long-term civilizational co-existence and understanding.

The first part of the essay will look at how Islam was perceived to be a religious heresy first by Christian theologians in the East and then in Europe. Such common views of Islam as the religion of the sword, the Prophet Muḥammad as a violent person, and the Qurʾān as a book of theological gibberish have their roots in this period. The second part will focus on late medieval and Renaissance views of Islam as a world culture pitted against the intellectual and religious dominance of Christianity. Although some of the late medieval and Renaissance thinkers saw Islam under the same light as they saw all religions and thus derided it as irrational and superstitious, they had a sense of appreciation for the philosophical and scientific achievements of Islamic civilization. This rather new attitude towards Islam had a major role in the making of eighteenth and nineteenth century representations of Islam in Europe and paved the way for the rise of Orientalism as the official study of things Oriental and Islamic for the next two centuries. The third part of the essay will analyze Orientalism within the context of the Western perceptions of Islam and how it has determined the modern depiction of Islam in the Western hemisphere. Having provided

this historical sketch, the last part of the essay will look in greater detail at how the modern language of violence, militancy, terrorism, and fundamentalism, used disproportionately to construct a belligerent image of Islam as the “other,” goes back to the early medieval perceptions of Islam as the religion of the sword. It will be argued that the concepts of *jihād* and *dār al-islām* (the abode of Islam) versus *dār al-ḥarb* (the abode of war) have been grossly misinterpreted and militarized through the meta-narrative of fundamentalist Islam to preempt the possibility of crafting a discourse of dialogue and co-existence between Islam and the West.

From Theological Rivalry to Cultural Differentiation: Perceptions of Islam during the Middle Ages

As a new dispensation from Heaven which claimed to have completed the cycle of Abrahamic revelations, Islam was seen as a major challenge to Christianity from the outset. References to Jewish and Christian Prophets, stories and other themes in the Qurʾān and the Prophetic traditions (*ḥadīth*), sometimes concurring with and sometimes diverging from the Biblical accounts, contributed to both a sense of consternation and insecurity and an urgency in responding to the Islamic claims of authenticity. The earliest polemics between Muslim scholars and Christian theologians attest to the zeal of the two communities to defend their faiths against one another. Baghdad and Syria from the eighth through tenth centuries were the two main centers of intellectual exchange and theological polemics between Muslims and Christians. Even though theological rivalry is a constant of this period, many ideas were exchanged on philosophy, logic, and theology which went beyond theological bickering. In fact, Eastern Christian theologians posed a serious challenge to their Muslim counterparts because they were a step ahead in cultivating a full-fledged theological vocabulary by using the lore of ancient Greek and Hellenistic culture. The reception of Islam as a religious challenge for Christianity was not because Islam was different and claimed to be a new religion. On the contrary, the message of Islam was too similar to both Judaism and Christianity in its essential outlook, in spite of the Qurʾānic criticisms of certain Judaic and Christian beliefs.

The other important factor was the rapid spread of Islam into areas that had been previously under Christian rule. Within a century after the conquest of Mecca, Islam had already spread outside the Arabian peninsula, bringing with it the conversion of large numbers of people in areas extending from Egypt and Jerusalem to Syria, the Caspian Sea and North Africa. While Jews and Christians were granted religious freedom as the People of the Book (*ahl al-kitāb*) under Islamic law and did not face conversion by force, the unexpected pace with which Islam spread sent alarms to those

living in Western Christendom. A few centuries later, this very fact would be used as a base for launching the Crusades against Muslims. Furthermore, the westward march of Muslim armies under the banner of the Umayyads, the Abbasids, and then the Ottomans added to the sense of urgency until the decline of the Ottoman Empire as a major political force in the Balkans and the Middle East. The spread of Islam, which was a riddle for many European Christians, was attributed to two main reasons: the spread of the religion by the sword and the Prophet's appealing to animal desires through polygamy and concubines. As we shall see below in the words of the seventeenth century traveler George Sandys, the simplicity of the Islamic faith was occasionally added to this list, referring, in a quasi-racist way, to the simple-mindedness of Muslim converts.¹

The combination of Islam as a religion with its own theological premises and the expansion of Muslim borders in such a short period of time played a key role in shaping the anti-Islamic sentiment of the Middle Ages. No single figure can illustrate this situation better than St. John of Damascus (c. 675-749) known in Arabic as Yuhanna al-Dimashqī and in Latin as Johannes Damascenus. A court official of the Umayyad caliphate in Syria like his father Ibn Maṣūṛ, St. John was a crucial figure not only for the formation of Orthodox theology and the fight against the iconoclast movement of the eighth century, but also for the history of Christian polemics against the "Saracens." In all likelihood, this pejorative name, used for Muslims in most of the anti-Islamic polemics, goes back to St. John himself.² St. John's polemics, together with those of Bede (d. 735) and Theodore Abu-Qurrah (d. 820 or 830),³ against Islam as an essentially Christian heresy or, to use St. John's own words, as the "heresy of the Ishmaelites," set the tone for medieval perceptions of Islam and continued to be a major factor until the end of the Renaissance.⁴ In fact, most of the theological depictions concerning Islam as a "deceptive superstition of the Ishmaelites" and a "forerunner of the Antichrist"⁵ go back to St. John. Moreover, St. John was also the first Christian polemicist to call the Prophet of Islam an imposter and a false prophet: "Muḥammad, the founder of Islam, is a false prophet who, by chance, came across the Old and New Testament and who, also, pretended that he encountered an Arian monk and thus he devised his own heresy."⁶

What is important about St. John's anti-Islamic polemics is that he had a direct knowledge of the language and ideas of Muslims which was radically absent among his followers in the West.⁷ R. W. Southern has rightly called this the "historical problem of Christianity" vis-à-vis Islam in the Middle Ages, i.e., the lack of first-hand knowledge of Islamic beliefs and practices as a precaution or deliberate choice to dissuade and prevent Christians from contaminating themselves with a heretical offshoot of Christianity.⁸ The absence of direct contact and reliable sources of knowledge led to a long

history of spurious scholarship against Islam and the Prophet Muḥammad in Western Christianity, resulting in the forging of Islam as an eerie foe in the European consciousness for a good part of the Middle Ages. The problem was further compounded by the Byzantine opposition to Islam and the decidedly inimical literature produced by Byzantine theologians between the eighth and tenth centuries on mostly theological grounds. Even though the anti-Islamic Byzantine literature displays considerable first-hand knowledge of Islamic faith and practices,⁹ including specific criticisms of some verses of the Qurʾān, the perception of Islam as a theological rival and heresy was its leitmotif and provided a solid historical and theological basis for later critiques of Islam.¹⁰

If deliberate ignorance was the cherished strategy of the period, the out-and-out rejection of Islam as a theological challenge was no less prevalent. The Qurʾānic assertion of Divine unity without the Trinity, the countenance of Jesus Christ as God's Prophet divested of divinity, and the presence of a religious community without clergy and a church-like authority were some of the challenges that did not go unnoticed in Western Christendom. Unlike Eastern Christianity, which had a presence in the midst of the Muslim world and better access to the Islamic faith, the image of Islam in the West was relegated to an unqualified heresy and regarded as no different than paganism or the Manicheanism from which St. Augustine had his historical conversion to Christianity. In contrast to Spain where the three Abrahamic faiths had a remarkable period of intellectual and cultural exchange, the vacuum created by the spatial and intellectual confinement of Western Christianity was filled in by folk tales about Islam and Muslims, paving the way for the new store of images, ideas, stories, myths, and tropes brought by the Crusaders. Paradoxically, the Crusades did not bring any new or more reliable knowledge about Islam, but instead reinforced its image as paganism and idolatry. There was, however, one very important consequence of the Crusades insofar as the medieval perceptions of Islam are concerned.

The Crusaders, it is to be noted, were the first Western Christians to go into Islamdom and witness Islamic culture with its cities, roads, bazaars, mosques, palaces and, most importantly, its inhabitants. With the Crusader came not only the legend of Saladin (Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī), the conqueror of Jerusalem, but also the stories of Muslim life, its promiscuity, its wealth and luxury, and such goods and commodities as silk, paper, and incense. Combined with popular imagery, these stories and imported goods, presenting a world immersed in the luxuries of worldly life, confirmed the "wicked nature" of the heresy of the Ishmaelites. Although the subdued sense of admiration tacit in these stories did very little to correct the image of Islam, it opened a new door of perception for it as a culture and civilization. In this way, Islam, vilified on purely religious and theological

grounds, came to possess a neutral value, if not possessing any importance in itself. The significance of this shift in perception cannot be overemphasized. After the fourteenth century, when Christianity began to lose its grip on the Western world, many lay people who did not bother themselves with Christian criticisms of Islam, or any other culture and religion for that matter, were more than happy to refer to Islamic culture as a world outside the theological and geographical confinements of Christianity. In a rather curious way, Islamic civilization, to the extent to which it was known in Western Europe, was pitted against Christianity to reject its exclusive claim to truth and universality. This explains, to a considerable extent, the double attitude of Renaissance Europe towards Islam: it hated Islam as a religion but admired its civilization.

During the passionate and bloody campaign of the Crusades, a most important and unexpected development took place for the written literature on Islam in the Middle Ages. This was the translation of the Qurʾān for the first time into Latin under the auspices of Peter the Venerable (d. c. 1156). The translation was done by the English scholar Robert of Ketton, who completed his rather free and incomplete rendition in July 1143.¹¹ As expected, the motive for the translation was not to gain a better understanding of Islam by reading its sacred scripture but to better know the enemy. In fact, Peter the Venerable explained his reasons for the undertaking of the translation of the Qurʾān as follows:

If this work seems superfluous, since the enemy is not vulnerable to such weapons as these, I answer that in the Republic of the great King some things are for defense, others for decoration, and some for both. Solomon the Peaceful made arms for defense, which were not necessary in his own time. David made ornaments for the Temple though there was no means of using them in his day. So it is with this work. If the Moslems cannot be converted by it, at least it is right for the learned to support the weaker brethren in the Church, who are so easily scandalized by small things.¹²

Regardless of the intention behind it, the translation of the Qurʾān was a momentous event, since it shaped the scope and direction of the study of Islam in the Middle Ages and provided the critics of Islamic religion with a text on which to build many of their anticipated criticisms.¹³ Parallel with this was an event that proved to be even more alarming: introduction of the Prophet of Islam into the Christian imagery of medieval Europe. Although St. John of Damascus was the first to call the Prophet of Islam a “false prophet,” before the eleventh century there were hardly any references to “Mahomet” as a major figure in the anti-Islamic literature. With the induction of the Prophet into the picture, however, a new and eschatological dimension was added to the preordained case of Islam as a villain faith

because the Prophet of Islam could now be identified as the anti-Christ heralding the end of time.

This portrayal of the Prophet of Islam suffered from the same historical problem of medieval Europe to which we have referred, namely the lack of knowledge of Islam based on original sources, texts, first-hand accounts and reliable histories. It is a notorious fact that there was not a single scholar among the Latin critics of Islam until the end of the thirteenth century who knew Arabic with any degree of proficiency. We may well remember Roger Bacon's complaint that Louis XI could not find a person to translate an Arabic letter of the Sultan of Egypt and write back to him in his language.¹⁴ In fact, the official teaching of Arabic in a European university would not take place until the second part of the sixteenth century when Arabic began to be taught regularly at the Collège de France in Paris in 1587. Nevertheless, the first work ever to appear on the Prophet in Latin was Embrico of Mainz's (d. 1077) *Vita Mahumeti*, culled mostly from Byzantine sources and embellished with profligate details about the Prophet's personal and social life.¹⁵ The picture that emerged out of such works largely corroborated the apocalyptic framework within which the Prophet of Islam and his disconcerting success in spreading the new faith was seen as a fulfillment of the Biblical promise of the anti-Christ. As expected, the theological concerns of this period shunned any appeal to reliable scholarship for the next two centuries, preempting the creation of a less belligerent image of the Prophet.

Almost all of the Latin works that have survived on the Prophet's life had one clear goal: to show the impossibility of such a man as Muḥammad to be God's messenger. This is exceedingly clear in the picture with which we are presented. The Prophet's "this-worldly" qualities as opposed to the "other-worldly" nature of Jesus Christ was a constant theme. The Prophet, it was argued, was given to sex and political power, both of which he used, the Latins reasoned, to oppress his followers and destroy Christianity. He was merciless towards his enemies, especially towards Jews and Christians, and took pleasure in having his opponents tortured and killed. The only reasonable explanation for the enormous success of Muḥammad in religious and political fields was something as malicious as heresy, i.e., that he was a magician and used magical powers to convince and convert people. The focus on the psychological states of the Prophet was so persuasive for Europeans that as late as in the nineteenth century William Muir (1819-1905), a British official in India and later the principal of Edinburgh University, joined his medieval predecessors by calling the Prophet a "psychopath" in his extremely polemical *Life of Mohammed*. Many other details can be mentioned here including the Prophet's having a Christian background, that his dead body was eaten and desecrated by pigs, or that he was baptized secretly just before his death as a last attempt to save his soul.¹⁶

The foregoing image of the Prophet of Islam was an extension of the unwavering rejection of the Qurʾān as authentic revelation. In fact, once the Prophet had been portrayed as a possessed and hallucinatory spirit, it was more convincing in the eyes of the opponents for the Qurʾān to be attributed to such a man as Muḥammad. Having said that, there was also a deeper theological reason for focusing on the figure of the Prophet. Since Christianity is essentially a “Christic” religion and Jesus Christ the embodiment of the Word of God, the Latin critics accorded a similar role to Muḥammad in the religious universe of Islam: one could not understand and reject the message of Islam without its messenger. At any rate, the rejection of the Qurʾān as the word of God and the representation of the Prophet as a possessed spirit and magician immersed in the lusts of the inferior world stayed with the Western perception of Islam into the modern period. Perhaps the most disturbing outcome of this has been the exclusion of Islam from the family of monotheistic religions. Even in the modern period, where the interfaith dialogue between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam has come a long way thanks to the indefatigable work of such scholars as Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ismail Raji al-Faruqi, and Kenneth Cragg,¹⁷ we are still not prepared to speak with confidence of a Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition by which Islam can be seen within the same religious universe as the other two Abrahamic faiths. The absence of such a discourse reinforces the medieval perceptions of Islam as a heretic and pagan faith, and thwarts the likelihood of generating a more inclusive picture of Islam on primarily religious grounds.

From the Middle Ages Through the Modern Period:
The European Discovery of Islam as a World Culture

The Christian impression of Islam as a heretical religion was countered by the admiration of Islamic civilization in the works of some late medieval and Renaissance thinkers. The Islamic scientific and philosophical culture, *inter alia*, played a significant role in this process. Here we will mention only two examples, both of which show the extent to which Muslim philosophers were embraced with full enthusiasm. Our first example is Dante and his great work *The Divine Comedy*, an epitome of medieval Christian cosmology and eschatology in which everything is accorded a place proper to its rank in the Christian hierarchy of things. Writing in his purely Christian environment, Dante places the Prophet and ʿAlī, his son-in-law and the fourth caliph of Islam, in hell.¹⁸ By contrast, he places Saladin, Avicenna, and Averroes in limbo, thus granting them the possibility of salvation. This positive attitude is further revealed by the fact that Siger de Brabant, the champion of Latin Averroism, is placed in paradise as a salute to the memo-

ries of Avicenna and Averroes. With this scheme, Dante points to a first step in coming to terms with Islam: if it is to be rejected as a faith, its intellectual heroes are to be accorded their proper place. This conclusion can also be regarded as a result of Dante's interest in Islamic philosophy and science and is corroborated by the fact that besides Avicenna and Averroes, he refers to some Muslim astronomers and philosophers in other writings. The influence of the nocturnal ascent or the night journey (*mi'raj*) of the Prophet of Islam on the composition and structure of the *Divine Comedy* has been debated by a number of European scholars, pointing to Dante's overall interest in Semitic languages and Arabic-Islamic culture. The Spanish scholar Asin Palacios has claimed that the night journey served as a model for the *Divine Comedy*.¹⁹ In spite of Dante's rejection of the Prophet for strictly Christian reasons, his appreciation of Islamic thought and culture is a remarkable example of how the two civilizations can co-exist and interact with one another on intellectual and cultural grounds.

Another closely associated case in which one can easily discern a different perception of Islamic culture is the rise of Latin Averroism in the West and its dominance of the intellectual scene of the Scholastics until its official ban in 1277 by Bishop Tempier. Even though Averroism was denounced as a heretical school, it remained to be a witness to the deep impact of Islamic thought on the West. Roger Bacon (1214-1294), one of the luminaries of thirteenth century Scholasticism, called for the study of the language of the Saracens so that they could be defeated on intellectual, if not religious, grounds. Albertus Magnus (c. 1208-1280), considered to be the founder of Latin scholasticism, was not shy in admitting the superiority of Islamic thought on a number of issues in philosophy. Even Raymond Lull (c. 1235-1316), one of the most important figures for the study of Islam in the Middle Ages, was in favor of the scholarly study of Islamic culture in tandem with his conviction that the Christian faith could be demonstrated to non-believers through rational means.²⁰ Finally St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), who represents the pinnacle of Christian thought in the classical period, could not remain indifferent to the challenge of Islamic thought and especially that of Averroes since Averroism was no longer a distant threat but something right at home as represented by such Latin scholars as Siger de Brabant (c. 1240-1284), Boethius of Dacia, and other Averroists.²¹

It is pertinent to point out that this new intellectual attitude towards Islam came to fruition at a time when Western Europe, convinced of the nascent threat of Muslim power, was hoping for the conversion of the Mongols ("Tartars" as they were called by Latins) to Christianity for the final undoing of Islam. That the clergy saw conversion as a probable way of dealing with the problem of Islam was clear in the missionary activities of Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153), the founder of the Cistercian order

and an instrumental figure for the dispatching of the second Crusade in the twelfth century, and Raymond Lull, the “first missionary to Muslims,” despite the fact that neither of them conceived the goal of the Crusades to be one of proselytizing. In complaining about the absence of missionary work designed for the Gentiles, Bernard of Clairvaux implored his fellow Christians: “Are we waiting for faith to descend on them? Who [ever] came to believe through chance? How are they to believe without being preached to?”²² With Mongols embracing Islam under the leadership of Oljaytu, the great grandson of Genghis Khan, however, these hopes were dashed²³ and the deployment of philosophical rather than purely theological methods of persuasion presented itself as the only reasonable way of dealing with the people of the Islamic faith. Interestingly enough, the attention paid by European scholars to Islamic culture minus its religion in the eleventh and twelfth centuries contributed to what C. H. Haskins has called the “Renaissance of the twelfth century.”²⁴

The experience of *convivencia* of the three Abrahamic religions in Andalusia is an important chapter in the European perceptions of Islam during the Middle Ages. The translation movement centered in Toledo, the rise of Mozarabs and Mudejars, and the flourishing of Islamic culture in southern Spain, are some of the indications of a different mode of interaction between Islam and medieval Europe with a strong tendency to see Islamic culture as superior. Already in the ninth century, Alvaro, a Spanish Christian, was complaining about the influence of Islamic culture on the Christian youth:

My fellow Christians delight in the poems and romances of the Arabs; they study the works of Mohammedan theologians and philosophers, not in order to refute them, but to acquire a correct and elegant Arabic style. Where today can a layman be found who reads the Latin commentaries on Holy Scriptures? Who is there that studies the Gospels, the Prophets, the Apostles? Alas! The young Christians who are most conspicuous for their talents have no knowledge of any literature or language save the Arabic; they read and study with avidity Arabian books; they amass whole libraries of them at a vast cost, and they everywhere sing the praises of Arabian lore.²⁵

Although the perception of Islam as a religion did not undergo any major change, the appreciation of the Muslim culture of Andalusia provided a framework in which important ideas were exchanged in the fields of philosophy, science, and art. Despite the expected tensions of power between various groups, Spain as a “frontier culture” became home to many new ideas and cultural products from the Beati miniatures and Flamenco music to Elipandus’ revival of “adoptionism.” Toledo, Seville, and Cordoba were hailed not simply as “Muslim” cities in the religious sense of the term but as places of opulence, elegance, and remarkable cultural exchange and in-

teraction.²⁶ One can also mention here the deep impact of Islamic culture on Spanish literature and in particular the influence of Sufism on St. John of the Cross.

In spite of the esteemed memory of Andalusia, the belligerent attitude towards Islam as a heresy remained invariable even after the demise of the Christian Middle Ages when Western Europe set out to forge a new paradigm which would culminate in the rise of a new secular worldview. Pascal (1623-1662), perhaps the most passionate defender of the Christian faith in the seventeenth century, for instance, was as harsh and uncompromising as his predecessors in condemning the Prophet of Islam as an impostor and fraudulent prophet. The “fifteenth movement” of his *Les Pensées*, called “Contre Mahomet,” voices an important sentiment of Pascal and his co-religionists on Islam and the Prophet Muḥammad: Muḥammad is in no way comparable to Jesus; Muḥammad speaks with no Divine authority; he brought no miracles; his coming has not been foretold; and what he did could be done by anyone whereas what Jesus did is supra-human and supra-historical.²⁷

A similar attitude penetrates the work of George Sandys (1578-1644) entitled *Relation of a Journey begun An. Dom. 1610. Foure Books. Containing a description of the Turkish Empire, of Aegypt, of the Holy Land, of the Remote parts of Italy, and Ilands adioyning*, which is one of the earliest travel accounts of the Islamic world to reach Europe. Hailed as both a humanist and a Christian, Sandys saw Islam under the same light as did Pascal, and as a result had no intentions of placing his “humanist” outlook over his Christian prejudices against Islam. Sandys’ book contains important observations on the Islamic world, highly polemical remarks about the Qur’ān and the Prophet, and finally some very edifying praises of Muslim philosophers. The dual attitude of rejecting Islam as a religion while admiring its cultural achievements is clearly exemplified in Sandys’ work. Of “the Mahometan Religion,” Sandys has the following to say:

So that we may now conclude, that the *Mahometan* religion, being deriued from a person in life so wicked, so worldly in his projects, in his prosecutions of them so disloyall, treacherous & cruel; being grounded vpon fables and false reuelations, repugnant to sound reason, & that wisdome which the Diuine hand hath imprinted in his workes; alluring men with those enchantments of fleshly pleasures, permitted in this life and promised for the life ensuing; being also supported with tyranny and the sword (for it is death to speake there against it); and lastly, where it is planted rooting out all vertue, all wisdome and science, and in summe all liberty and ciuility; and laying the earth to waste, dispeopled and vninhabited, that neither it came from God (saue as a scourge by permission) neither can bring them to God that follow it.²⁸

Having rejected the religious foundations of Islam, Sandys follows suit in pitting Muslim philosophers against Islam as a common strategy of the late

Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The assumption behind this, voiced by a figure no less prominent than Roger Bacon, was the secret conversion of Avicenna and Averroes to Christianity and/or their profession of the Muslim faith for fear of persecution. For many Europeans, this was the most plausible way of explaining the genius of Muslim philosophers and scientists against the backdrop of a religion that the medieval West abhorred, ignored, and rejected. Thus Sandys speaks of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) in terms of praise and vindication while discarding Islam as irrational on the basis of the celebrated “double-truth theory” attributed by St. Thomas Aquinas to Averroes:

For although as a *Mahometan*, in his bookes *De Anima* and *De Almahad*, addressed particularly to a *Mahometan* Prince, he extolleth *Mahomet* highly, as being the *seale* of diuine *lawes* and the *last of the Prophets*. . . . But now this Auicen, laying downe for a while his outward person of a Mahometan, and putting on the habite of a Philosopher; in his *Metaphysicks* seemeth to make a flat opposition between the truth of their faith receiued from their Prophet, and the truth of vnderstanding by demonstrative argument. . . . And it is worthy obseruation, that in the judgment of Aucien one thing is true in their faith, & contrary in pure & demonstratiue reason. Whereas (to the honor of Christian Religion be it spoken) it is confessed by all, & enacted by a Councel, that it is an error to say, one thing is true in Theology, & in Philosophy the contrary. For the truths of religion are many times aboute reason, but neuer against it.²⁹

A similar line of thought is articulated in Peter Bayle’s monumental *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (Historical and Critical Dictionary, 1697). Bayle (1647-1706) was one of the pioneers of the Enlightenment and his skeptical scholarship had a deep impact on the French Encyclopedists, championed by Diderot, and the rationalist philosophers of the eighteenth century. His *Dictionnaire*, which has been aptly called the “arsenal of the Enlightenment,” devotes a generously lengthy twenty-three page entry to the Prophet of Islam under the name “Mahomet” as opposed to seven pages on Averroes and only half a page on al-Kindī (“Alchindus”). Bayle exercises caution in narrating the Christian bashings of Islam and the Prophet and rejects as simply foolish and baseless some of the legendary stories concerning the Prophet’s tomb being in the air, his dead body having been eaten by dogs as a sign of Divine curse and punishment, and his being the anti-Christ. There is enough material, Bayle argues, with which to charge the Prophet of Islam:

I will not deny, but, in some respects, the zeal of our own disputants is unjust; for if they make use of the extravagances of a Mahometan legendary, to make Mahomet himself odious or to ridicule him, they violate the equity, which is due to all the world, to wicked, as well as good men. We must not impute to any body what they never did, and consequently we must not argue against

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Mahomet from these idle fancies, which some of his followers have fabled of him, if he himself never published them. We have sufficient material against him, tho' we charge him only with his own faults, and do not make him answerable for the follies, which the indiscreet and romantic zeal of some of his disciples has prompted to write. (translation revised)³⁰

Having stated this precaution, Bayle joins his fellow Europeans in describing the Prophet of Islam as a man of sensuality and bellicosity, an impostor and a "false teacher." In the *Dictionary*, the Prophet appears under the same light of medieval Christian polemics, and Bayle states, on Humphrey Prideaux's authority:

Mahomet was an impostor, and that he made his imposture subservient to his lust.... what is related of his amours, is very strange. He was jealous to the highest degree, and yet he bore with patience the gallantries of that wife [A'ishah], which was the dearest to him" and that "... I choose to concur with the common opinion, That Mahomet was an impostor: for, besides what I shall say elsewhere his insinuating behavior, and dexterous address, in procuring friends, do plainly show, that he made use of religion only as an expedient to aggrandize himself." (translation revised)³¹

While Bayle's entry is hardly an improvement upon the gruesome picturing of the Prophet in the previous centuries, it does contain some important observations on Islamic culture, based mostly on the available travel accounts of the time. The modesty of Turkish women, for instance, is narrated in the context of stressing the "normalcy" of Muslim culture, which is contrasted to the common mores of Europe, indicating in a clear way the extent to which Europe's self-image was at work in various depictions of Islam and Muslims. Bayle also praises Muslim nations for their religious tolerance and admonishes the zeal of medieval Christians to persecute their own co-religionists. Like many of his predecessors and peers, Bayle pits Muslim history against the injunctions of the religion of Islam and explains the glory of Muslim history as a result of the deviation of Muslim nations from the principles of Islam rather an application of them. As he writes:

The Mahometans, according to the principles of their faith, are obliged to employ violence, to destroy other religions, and yet they tolerate them now, and have done so for many ages. The Christians have no order, but to preach, and instruct; and yet, time out of mind, they destroy, with fire and sword, those who are not of their religion. "When you meet with Infidels," says Mahomet, "kill them, cut off their heads, or take them prisoners, and put them in chains, till they have paid their ransom, or you find it convenient to set them at liberty. Be not afraid to persecute them, till they have laid down their arms, and submitted to you." Nevertheless, it is true, that the Saracens quickly left off the ways of violence; and that the Greek churches, as well the orthodox as the schismatical, have continued to this day under the yoke of Mahomet. They have their Patriarchs, their Metropolitans, their Synods, their Discipline, their Monks.... It

Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition

may be affirmed for a certain truth, that if the western princes had been lords of Asia, instead of the Saracens and Turks, there would be now no remnant of the Greek church, and they would not have tolerated Mahometanism, as these Infidels have tolerated Christianity. (translation revised)³²

Towards the end of his entry, Bayle refers his readers to the work of Humphrey Prideaux (d. 1724) of Westminster and Christ Church for further information about Islam, whose title leaves little need to explain its content: *The true nature of imposture fully display'd in the life of Mahomet: With a discourse annex'd for the vindication of Christianity from this charge. Offered to the considerations of the Deists of the present age*. Prideaux's book, published in 1697, was one of the most virulent and bitter attacks on Islam during the Enlightenment. That it became a best-seller in the eighteenth century and was reprinted many times into the nineteenth century tells much about the Enlightenment approach to Islam.³³ The robust rationalism and overt disdain for religion that characterized the Enlightenment was a major factor in the reinforcement of medieval perceptions of Islam as a religious worldview, and attacking Islam was an expedient way of deconstructing religion as such. This attitude is obvious in Voltaire (1694-1778), one of the most widely read celebrities of the Enlightenment, who took a less hostile position towards Islamic culture while maintaining the erstwhile Christian representations of the Prophet Muḥammad. In his famous tragedy *Fanaticisme ou Mahomet le prophète*, Voltaire projects Muḥammad as a prototype of fanaticism, cruelty, imposture, and sensuality, which was nothing new to his readers except for the legends and stories that he himself had invented. In a letter to Frederick of Prussia, he states:

[That] a merchant of camels should excite a revolt in his townlet ... that he should boast of being rapt to Heaven, and of having received there part of this unintelligible book which affronts common sense at every page; that he should put his own country to fire and the sword, to make this book respected; that he should cut the fathers' throats and ravish the daughters; that he should give the vanquished the choice between his religion and death; this certainly is what no man can excuse.³⁴

The ambivalent attitude of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, torn between the received images of Islam and the Prophet from Christian polemics and the glory of Islamic civilization witnessed by many travelers and scholars, resulted in a different genre of writing concerning Islam. One important work to be mentioned here is Stubbe's defense of Islam. A typical Renaissance man, historian, librarian, theologian, and a doctor, Henry Stubbe (1632-1676), published an unusual book with the following title: *An account of the rise and progress of Mahometanism with the life of Mahomet and a vindication of him and his religion from the calumnies of the Christians*.³⁵ In fact, it was this book which had led Prideaux to write his

attack on Islam mentioned above. Stubbe had no reservations about going against the grain and responding to the traditional charges of violence and sensuality associated with Muslims. More importantly, he openly defended Islamic faith as more proximate to man's reason and nature as a tacit way of criticizing Christian theology and the sacraments. A typical passage from his book reads:

This is the sum of Mahometan Religion, on the one hand not clogging Men's Faith with the necessity of believing a number of abstruse Notions which they cannot comprehend, and which are often contrary to the dictates of Reason and common Sense; nor on the other hand loading them with the performance of many troublesome, expensive, and superstitious Ceremonies, yet enjoying a due observance of Religious Worship, as the surest Method to keep Men in the bounds of their Duty both to God and Man.³⁶

In addition to the Islamic faith, the Prophet also receives a very fair treatment from Stubbe, who appears to be heralding the rise of a new class of European scholars of Islam in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Another very important exception of this period is the famous Swiss theologian and mystic Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772) and his historical theology of the rise of Islam. Swedenborg, who is one of the most important figures of eighteenth century Christian thought, considered the spread of Islam to be part of Divine Providence. For him, the true goal of Islam and its Prophet was to destroy the rampant paganism of pre-Islamic Arabs and their neighbors because the Church was too weak and dispersed to fight against paganism. It was as a response to this historic moment that the Lord sent a religion "accommodated to the genius of the orientals." As Swedenborg writes:

The Mahometan religion acknowledges the Lord as the Son of God, as the wisest of men, and as the greatest prophet ... that religion was raised up by the Lord's Divine Providence to destroy the idolatries of many nations ... that all these idolatries might be extirpated, it was brought to pass, by the Divine Providence of the Lord, that a new religion should arise, accommodated to the genius of the orientals, in which there should be something from both Testaments of the Word, and which should teach that the Lord came into the world, and that he was the greatest prophet, the wisest of all men, and the Son of God. This was accomplished through Mahomet.³⁷

Although Swedenborg attributes the belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ to Muslims, which is unwarranted in the Islamic sources, he hastens to add that the reason why Islam accepted Jesus only as a prophet and not a divine being was because "the orientals acknowledged God the Creator of the universe, and could not comprehend that He came into the world and assumed the Human. So neither do Christians comprehend it."³⁸ By

combining his theology of history with an anthropology of the “orientals,” Swedenborg confronts Islam as a religion whose essential message is the same as that of Christianity. That such an inclusivist approach should be taken by a mystic theologian of the stature of Emanuel Swedenborg is extremely important considering the rising tide of conservative Christian attacks on Islam in recent decades and especially after September 11. The example of Swedenborg together with Goethe and others evinces the reality of a peaceful co-existence between Christians and Muslims on both social and, more importantly, religious and theological grounds.

In contradistinction to the radical opposition of Pascal, Bayle, Prideaux, and Voltaire to Muḥammad as a figure of religion, some of their contemporaries, including Stubbe, saw something different in the Prophet of Islam as a man of the world. Divested of his claims to have received God’s word, the Prophet Muḥammad could be appreciated for what he had accomplished in history. This is an important shift from the strictly Christian assessments of Muḥammad as a false prophet, to putting increasingly more emphasis on his human qualities. This new attitude is also the beginning of the depiction of the Prophet and many other figures of the past as “heroes” and “geniuses,” the ostensibly non-religious terms that the Enlightenment intellectuals were fond of using against the Christian conceptions of history.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed the rise of many scholars and intellectuals who looked at the Prophet of Islam under this new light, which eventually led to more liberal and less inimical appraisals of Islam and Muslims. In England, Edward Pococke (1604-1691), the first chair holder of Islamic studies at Oxford, published his *Specimen Historiae Arabum*, a medley of analyses and translations on the history of Islam, its basic tenets and practices, and a selective rendering of one of the works of al-Ghazālī. Judged by the standards of his time, Pococke’s work was a major step in the scholarly study of Islam. Furthermore, Pococke was one of the first among the European scholars of Islam to spend time in the Islamic world collecting material for his studies. Of equal importance and prominence was George Sale (1697-1736), who produced the first English translation of the Qur’ān in 1734, making use of Lodovico Maracci’s Latin translation³⁹ published at Padua in 1698, rather than that of Robert Ketton published in the twelfth century.

Sale had no intentions of granting Islam any authenticity as a religion, and he made this point very clear in his “Preliminary Discourse” written as a preface to his translation. His overall approach to Islam, which earned him the somewhat belittling title of “half-Mussulman,” was to set the tone for the eighteenth and nineteenth century studies of Islam in Europe, and paved the way for the establishment of Orientalism as a discipline. Sale’s translation was a huge improvement on an earlier rendering of the Qur’ān

into English by Alexander Ross, which was based on Andre du Ryer's French translation published in 1647.⁴⁰ Like that of Sale, Ross' translation contained a short discourse on Islam and the Prophet in which Ross explained the *raison d'être* of the translation to his Christian readers and assured them that there was no danger in reading the Qur'ān because it was comprised of "contradictions, blasphemies, obscene speeches, and ridiculous fables...."⁴¹ It is important to note that the Ross translation was the first edition of the Qur'ān in America, which came out in Massachusetts in 1806 and enjoyed a wide circulation until the Sale translation became the standard text. In any case, Sale's translation was the definitive text of the Qur'ān in the English language until the end of the nineteenth century and it was on the basis of this translation that Gibbon and Carlyle read and discarded the Qur'ān as "a wearisome confused jumble, crude, incondite; endless iterations, long-windedness, entanglement; most crude, incondite;—insupportable stupidity, in short! Nothing but a sense of duty could carry any European through the Qur'ān."⁴²

While the Qur'ān and, by derivation, the religious foundations of Islam were invariably denied, the human qualities of the Prophet of Islam were invoked by the humanist intellectuals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries either to level subtle criticisms against Christianity or simply to cherish their secular humanist philosophy of history. The depiction of the Prophet as a genius and hero, with a piercing mind and perspicacity, remarkable powers of persuasion, sincerity, and dedication reached a climax with Carlyle and his heroic philosophy of history. In Carlyle's work, the Prophet is presented as a remarkable man of the world: a hero, a genius, a charismatic figure, a personality that the Christian spirit of the Middle Ages was incapable of seeing and appreciating. Although Carlyle had placed his analysis of the Prophet within a clearly secular framework and thus pre-empted any charges of heresy, he still felt obligated to apologize for his positive estimation of the Prophet: "as there is no danger of our becoming, any of us, Mahometans, I mean to say all the good of him I justly can. It is the way to get at his secret: let us try to understand what he meant with the world; what the world meant and means with him, will then be a more answerable question."⁴³

A much more assertive voice of the time was that of Goethe (1749-1832), who was neither secretive nor apologetic about his admiration for things Islamic. His *West-oeslicher Diwan* was a loud celebration of Persian-Islamic culture and his interest in the Islamic world went certainly beyond the mere curiosity of a German poet when he said, as quoted by Carlyle, that "if this be *Islam*, do we not all live in *Islam*?"⁴⁴ In the nineteenth century, Goethe's call was taken up by a whole generation of European and American poets and men of literature, which included such celebrities as Emerson and Thoreau.⁴⁵

Nineteenth Century Perceptions of Islam:
From Pilgrim to Orientalist

Outside the world of theology, philosophy, and literature, there were many Europeans whose thirst and curiosity for the Orient was not to be quenched by reading books. So they went to the Islamic world and produced a sizeable literature of travel accounts about Muslim countries, their customs, cities, etc. These were the European travelers of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries whose ranks included such people as Burton, Scott, Kinglake, Disraeli, Curzon, Warburton, Nerval, Chardin, Chateaubriand, Flaubert, Lamartine, Pierre Loti, and Tavernier.⁴⁶ The wealth of information they brought back to Europe contributed to the popular, if not academic, perceptions of Islam and Muslims whereby the impenetrable world of the Saracens and Orientals was now disclosed for many Europeans through the imaginative discourse of the travelers. In some curious ways, these travel accounts had an impact similar to that of the Crusades almost seven centuries before: a first-hand experience of the Orient was made available for public consumption in Europe and it was entrenched not in the religious concerns and hostilities of Christian theologians, but in the new mission of the Occident to “civilize” the Orient—the celebrated *mission civilisatrice* of the colonial period.⁴⁷ Perhaps the most elegant and radical expression of this view came from André Gide, the famous French poet and writer and recipient of the Nobel Prize in literature in 1947. In his famous *Journals*, Gide gives an account of his journey to Turkey in 1914, which turns out to be an utter disappointment for him:

Constantinople justifies all my prejudices and joins Venice in my personal hell. As soon as you admire some bit of architecture, the surface of a mosque, you learn (and you suspected already) that it is Albanian or Persian.... The Turkish costume is the ugliest you can imagine; and the race, to tell the truth, deserves it.... For too long I believed (out of love of exoticism, out of fear of chauvinistic self-satisfaction, and perhaps out of modesty), for too long I thought that there was more than one civilization, more than one culture that could rightfully claim our love and deserve our enthusiasm.... Now I know our Occidental (I was about to say French) civilization is not only the most beautiful; I believe, I know that it is the *only one*—yes, the very civilization of Greece, of which we are the only heirs.⁴⁸

Like their intellectual peers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, most of these travelers were interested in the “worldly” qualities of Islamdom, perhaps with a good intention of dispelling some long-standing misgivings about a world in which Europe had now a vital interest. Their narrations, ranging from recondite and arid inventories of names and places to spirited depictions and imaginary ruminations, were based not so

much on a genuine interest in penetrating into the Islamic world as reflecting and constructing it through the eyes of an upper-class European writer. A somewhat crude indication of this is the fact that many of those travelers, notwithstanding such notable exceptions as Sir Richard Burton,⁴⁹ did not learn any of the Islamic languages or make any serious study of the beliefs and practices of Muslims other than what was available to them in Europe as common knowledge. In his celebrated travelogue, *Travels in Persia 1673-1677*, Sir John Chardin makes a number of observations on the Persians and displays a mixed feeling towards them. Speaking of the “temper, manners, and customs of the Persians,” he says:

They are courtly, civil, compliant, and well-bred; they have naturally an eager bent to Voluptuousness, Luxury, Extravagancy, and Profuseness; for which Reason, they are ignorant both of Frugality and Trade. In a Word, they are born with as good natural Parts as any other People, but few abuse them so much as they do

... [B]esides those Vices which the Persian are generally addicted to, they are Liers in the highest Degree; they speak, swear, and make false Depositions upon the least Consideration; they borrow and pay not; and if they can Cheat, they seldom lose the Opportunity; they are not to be trusted in Service, nor in all other Engagements; without Honesty in their Trading, wherein they overreach one so ingeniously, that one cannot help but being bubbld; greedy of Riches, and of vain Glory, of Respect and Reputation, which they endeavor to gain by all Means possible.⁵⁰

An important outcome of this literature is what Edward Said calls “Orientalizing the Orient,”⁵¹ i.e., the further romanticizing and vilification of Muslim peoples. In its more artistic and literary manifestations, Orientalism reinforces the mystique of the Orient by evoking such fixed identities and stereotypes as the exotic harem, the sensuous East, the Oriental man and his concubines, city streets immersed in mystery, all of which are to be seen vividly in the naturalistic European paintings of the Orient in the nineteenth century. These images of the Orient are still alive in the European mind and continue to be an inexhaustible resource for Hollywood constructions of Islam and Muslims in America.

It would not be a stretch to say that the nineteenth century bore witness to the most extensive interaction between Islam and the West. It was in this century that the academic study of Islam exploded—more than anyone in Europe could have imagined before. The new interest in Islam was closely tied to the political, economic and, most importantly, colonial circumstances of the nineteenth century, during which time a handful of European countries had proceeded to occupy a good part of the Islamic world. As we can see from the long list of Orientalist scholars, the nineteenth century witnessed a sudden and dramatic rise in the study of Islam, surpassing both

qualitatively and quantitatively the work of the last millennium over a period of seventy years: Silvestre de Sacy (1758-1838), the father of French Orientalism; E. W. Lane (1801-1876) whose *Arabic-English Lexicon* is still a classic;⁵² Karl Pfander, a German missionary working in India and famous for his controversy with Indian Muslim scholars; J. von Hammer-Purgstall (1774-1856), known for his meticulous studies on Ottoman history and Arabic, Persian, and Turkish poetry; William Muir, mentioned earlier; F. D. Maurice (1805-1872), a prominent theologian of the Church of England and the author of *The Religions of the World and Their Relations with Christianity*, a key text for the understanding of Christian perspectives on Islam in the nineteenth century; Ernest Renan (1823-1892) whose famous lecture at the Sorbonne on Islam and science incited a long controversy and elicited the responses of a number of Muslim intellectuals of the time, including Jamal al-Din Afghani and Namik Kemal.⁵³

These and many other figures writing on Islam and the Islamic world in the nineteenth century unearthed a new terrain for the study of Islam and crafted new modes of perception vis-à-vis the Islamic world. The contributions of these scholars to the shaping of the modern Western images of Islam were manifold. First, they were the direct conduits for satisfying the curiosity of the European populace about the Islamic world that was now, after centuries of menacing presence and bewildering success, under the political, military, and economic dominance of the West. In this limited sense, the concept of Islam articulated in the works of these scholars was intractably tied to the new colonial identity of Western Europe. Secondly, the torrent of information about the Muslim world, its history, beliefs, schools of thought, languages, geography, and ethnic texture served scholarship as much as power. It can hardly escape our attention that a good number of scholars, travelers, and translators of the nineteenth century, credited duly with relative expertise, were colonial officers sent to the Orient with clear and detailed job descriptions. The third and, for our purposes, the most important legacy of this period was the completion of the groundwork for the full-fledged establishment of what came to be known as Orientalism—a new set of categories, typologies, classifications, terminologies, and methods of coming to terms with things Oriental and Islamic.

Orientalism reached a climax in the second half of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century,⁵⁴ and a truly impressive and ambitious venture was set in motion by a dozen or so European academics who were to mould the modern study of Islam in Western universities. With all of their ambitions, fervor, differences, scholastic diligence, and distinctly Western identities, such names as Ignaz Goldziher (1850-1921), Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936), Duncan Black Macdonald (1863-1943), Carl Becker (1876-1933), David Samuel Margoliouth (1858-1940), Edward Granville

Browne (1862-1926), Reynold Alleyne Nicholson (1868-1945), Louis Masignou (1883-1962), and Sir Hamilton A. R. Gibb (1895-1971) became, *inter alia*, the towering figures of the Orientalist study of Islam.⁵⁵ By producing a massive body of books, journals, articles, translations, critical editions, reports, and academic posts for the study of Islam, the Orientalist scholars generated an enduring legacy that has shaped the parameters of the modern study of Islam and the Muslim world up to our own day.

The Orientalist journey in the path of representing Islam, however, contributed very little to the amelioration of the mystique of Islam and the Orient, which had been inherited from the pre-modern era. Some of the Western students of Islam were simply not interested in such an enterprise and focused their energies on their solitary work. In other cases, the dark image of Islam as a decadent and dying civilization, a backward, irrational, and sensual world was reinforced and made its way into popular culture through fiction, TV images, Hollywood productions, and media reporting. In this regard, Arberry's conciliatory remark that the seven British scholars of Islam, including Arberry himself, whom he analyzes in his *Oriental Essays*, "have striven, consciously or unconsciously, by the exercise of somewhat specialized skills to help build a bridge between the peoples and cultures of Asia and Europe"⁵⁶ appears to state no more than an unfinished project and unfulfilled will. Beyond the individual proclivities of Orientalist scholars, Orientalism was marred by a number of structural and methodological problems, some of which are still operative in the current representations of Islam. It is thus crucial to identify them in order to understand the ways in which Islam is constructed as the eerie "other" at best and as the enemy at worst. Without claiming to be exhaustive, we can briefly highlight some of these issues.

In its early stages, Orientalism functioned within the matrix of the nineteenth century European mindset. Currents of thought, from Romanticism and rationalism to historical criticism and hermeneutics, which had shaped Western humanities and the new colonial order, were at work in the remaking of the picture of Islam. Yet the Orientalists showed little interest in overcoming the limitations of studying another culture with categories that were patently Western. It was within this framework that the perennial search for "correspondences," homogenous structures, and orthodoxies in the Islamic tradition became a hallmark of the Orientalist tradition, whether one's field of study was popular Sufism, political history, science, or jurisprudence.⁵⁷ Inevitably, this has led to such grotesque generalizations as "Islamic orthodoxy," popular Islam versus high Islam, or Sufism versus religious law, often couched in the abstract language of academic parlance, that have been no less inhibiting and essentializing than the medieval conceptions of Islam—conceptions that continue to play out in popular images of Islam

in the West today. Secondly, the Orientalist tendency was to analyze the Islamic world: as a decaying civilization whose only import, at least for the Western student of Islam, was either its obscure textual tradition or the variegated responses of Muslim intellectuals to the challenges of the modern world. All of the leading figures of classical Orientalism, for instance, were unanimous in presenting Islamic philosophy and sciences as no more than a port for the transmission of Greek lore to Europe. In reading such classical works of Orientalism as Solomon Munk's *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe* (1859) or De Boer's *Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam* (1903), one gets the impression that Islamic philosophy, if this name was allowed at all, was essentially a long commentary in Arabic on Greek and Hellenistic thought taking the forms of either Aristotelianism or neo-Platonism.⁵⁸ The best compliment one could accord the Islamic intellectual tradition was, in the words of von Grunebaum, "creative borrowing,"⁵⁹ and within this framework the obsessive search for "originality" in Islamic thought was destined to fail.

Thus Islam, having lost its universal appeal and vitality, was seen not as a living tradition with a human face but as an object of study to be historicized and relativized. At this point, it is important to note that the fascination of the nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars of Islam resulted in a number of studies on "modern Islam" dealing exclusively with figures and movements that had come into contact with the modern West on intellectual and political grounds, while neglecting or simply ignoring a large part of the Islamic world, namely the traditional *ʿulamāʿ*, Sufis, and their followers who had not felt a need to respond to the West in ways that would have attracted the attention of Western scholars. It was only after the 1960s and 1970s, when classical Orientalism was called into question, that we began to see works dealing with the traditional world of Islam in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There remains, however, a long list of names yet to be studied including Shaykh ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʿirī, Shaykh Aḥmad al-ʿAlawī, Aḥmad ibn Idrīs, Ḥājjī Mullā Sabziwārī, Babanzade Aḥmed Hilmī, and Muṣṭafā Sabrī Efendi, the last Shaykh al-Islām of the Ottomans. In this sense, the Orientalist enterprise of mapping out the Islamic world has turned out to be an unfinished, if not failed, project.

The Legacy of Orientalism and the American Context:

Islam as the "Other"?

In the modern period, by which I mean the twentieth and the present century, the relation between the Islamic world and the West continues to be screened through inherited images and stereotypes. The depiction of Islamic societies as sensual, despotic, backward, underdeveloped, tribal,

promiscuous, aberrant, irrational, and mysterious collectivities have found its way into American popular culture. Such movies as *Navy SEALs* (1990), *Killing Streets* (1991), *The Human Shield* (1992), *The Son of the Pink Panther* (1993), *True Lies* (1994), and *Executive Decision* (1996), provide ample evidence for the persistence of monolithic and violent images of Arabs and Muslims. The uncontrolled use of stereotypes in the entertainment industry has a powerful impact on how ordinary movie-goers come to perceive hundreds of millions of people of Middle Eastern and Asian descent. Thinking through stereotypes and fixed identities creates the delusion of “seen one of ‘em, seen ‘em all,” and uninformed or misinformed readers hastily associate these wild images with what they read in the print media about the Islamic world, the Middle East, and Muslims in general. To use Sam Keen’s analogy, the vilification of Arabs, which in the eyes of many Americans represents quintessential Islam because a great majority of them cannot tell the difference between an Arab and non-Arab Muslim, becomes a free ride for portraying the other as villains and extremists: “You can hit an Arab free; they are free enemies, free villains—where you couldn’t do it to a Jew or you can’t do it to a black anymore.”⁶⁰

These violent images have too often become props for the construction of Islamophobic political discourses. The narrative of political, militant, and fundamentalist Islam, produced and sustained by an enormous network of writers, policy makers, journalists, and speakers, is no less damaging and insidious than their counterparts in the entertainment world. This narrative relegates the word “Islam” to political and military confrontation and has the debilitating effect of reducing the Muslim world to a subcategory of the Middle East conflict. Ironically, or perhaps we should say tragically, many people in Europe and America turn to Islam as a way of understanding the causes of the Middle East conflict. This approach, perpetuated in Western media on a daily basis, reinforces the image of Islam as a distant and foreign phenomenon, as a violent and militant faith, and as a monolithic world prone to extremism of all kinds.⁶¹ According to a survey conducted by the National Conferences in 1994, forty-two percent of the 3000 Americans interviewed believe that “Muslims belong to a religion that condones or supports terrorism.” Forty-seven percent accept the view that Muslims are “anti-Western and anti-American.”⁶² Until recently, this was the dominant view even among high school students in the US who have either never been exposed to Islam or have only been exposed to a distortion of it.⁶³ As became clear after September 11, political realities of the Islamic world are now seen through the lens of cultural stereotypes and amorphous collectivities, and this has become part of the public knowledge about Islam and Muslims. In presenting Bernard Lewis’ book *What Went Wrong*, for instance, an anonymous reporter broached the subject by saying that “sud-

denly the world wants to understand the culture that produced those who one fine day chose to incinerate themselves along with some 3,000 innocent Americans.” In fact, Lewis’ epigraphic statement from his book sums up this sentiment in condescending language: “If the peoples of the Middle East continue on their present path, the suicide bomber may become a metaphor for the whole region, and there will be no escape from a downward spiral of hate and spite, rage and self-pity, poverty and oppression.”⁶⁴

The presumed confrontation between Islam and the West, already revitalized by Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” hypothesis, was thrown into full relief after the tragic and deplorable attacks on New York and Washington. Two main attitudes towards Islam have crystallized in the aftermath of September 11. The first is the resurfacing of the medieval descriptions of Islam as the religion of the sword, the Prophet as a violent person, Muslim societies as monolithic, violent, and power-driven collectivities, etc. The second attitude is to identify Islam as a code of belief and action that is obstinately irrational, anti-modern, aberrant, rigid, religious, and traditional. As expected, all of these stereotypes and attitudes have been employed to account for the root causes of the current confrontation between the Islamic and Western worlds. The identification of Islam with violence and militancy on the one hand, and with intolerance and tyranny on the other, is now a powerful image by which Islamic societies are understood and judged in the Western hemisphere. A typical example is Paul Johnson’s essay published in the *National Review* as a response to the September 11 attacks. Johnson, who cannot even claim to be a lay reader of Islam but sees himself entitled to speak as an authority on Islamic history, argues that “Islam is an imperialist religion.... Islam remains a religion of the Dark Ages.... mainstream Islam is essentially akin to the most extreme form of Biblical fundamentalism.... the history of Islam has been a history of conquest and reconquest....”⁶⁵ Johnson’s militant language is indicative of the extent to which the narrative of political Islam and terrorism contributes to the antagonistic representations of Islam as the “other” of the West. In a similar spirit, Francis Fukuyama claimed that “Islam, by contrast, is the only cultural system that seems regularly to produce people like Osama bin Laden or the Taliban who reject modernity lock, stock and barrel. This raises the question of how representative such people are of the larger Muslim community, and whether this rejection is somehow inherent in Islam.”⁶⁶

In the decades leading up to September 11, many academics, policy-makers, and the so-called terrorism experts have repeatedly portrayed Islam as a religion that condones and produces violence on a consistent basis. The images of suicide bombers, hijackings, assassinations, street riots and uprisings, which have a profound impact on the European and American perceptions of the Islamic world, inform the coded language of

“militant Islam,” and their *raison d’être* is attributed in an astonishingly simplistic way to the religion of Islam or Muslim culture rather than to the particular political circumstances that have given rise to them. In some cases, religious elements have been openly brought into the debate to explain the anti-Western and anti-American sentiments in the Islamic world. In an interview given to *Time* magazine after his 1980 election, President Reagan claimed that “Muslims were reverting to their belief that unless they killed a Christian or a Jew they would not go to heaven.”⁶⁷ Twenty-some years later, the situation has not changed very much as we read in Pat Robertson’s denouncement of Islam as “a violent religion bent on world domination” and Patrick J. Buchanan’s defense of “America against Islam.” In one of his messianic talks, Robertson took issue with President Bush’s assertion that Islam is a peaceful religion. Instead, Robertson argued that Islam is “not a peaceful religion that wants to coexist. They want to coexist until they can control, dominate, and then, if need be, destroy.”⁶⁸ Echoing Reagan’s remarks, he added that “the Koran makes it very clear that if you see an infidel, you are to kill him,” the “infidel” in the quotation being Jews and Christians. The same view was expressed in a more militant fashion by a certain Victor Tadros in an essay called “Islam Unveiled”—“unveiling” now becoming the buzzword for all those who have come to realize the “true nature of Islam.” Presenting himself as “Arabic/English translator” on the internet pages of the Texas Christian University where the piece is posted, Tadros reveals his wisdom of unveiling by saying that:

Most of the Western nations are unaware of the fact that the spirit of Islam is one of enmity, hostility, and Holy War (*jihād*) against both Jews and Christians. There is no other religion but Islam, that commands, in a crystal clear and emphatic way, its true-blue followers to kill both Jews and Christians and destroy their properties.⁶⁹

One can easily discard such views as grossly exaggerated and fanatical, having no value and relevance for the mainstream views concerning Islam. It is, however, a strong indication of the widespread misconceptions of Islam, especially among conservative Christians in the US,⁷⁰ and does not appear to be confined to a few aberrant voices. After September 11, for instance, evangelist Rev. Franklin Graham, the son of Billy Graham, called Islam “a very evil and wicked religion” and Rev. Jerry Vines, the past president of the Southern Baptist Convention, called the Prophet of Islam “a demon obsessed pedophile.”⁷¹ The presumed conflict between Islam and Christianity on predominantly religious grounds is conceived to be a struggle of the “Cross over the Crescent,” to use the title of Samuel Zwemer’s famous book.⁷² In a speech given on Dec 7, 2001, Patrick Buchanan, for instance, spoke on the “survival of Islam” as if speaking of an epidemic that

needs to be eradicated. Upgrading Huntington's "clash of civilizations" to a "war of civilizations," Buchanan asked if

... a war of civilizations [is] coming? Clearly, not a few in the Islamic world and the West so believe, and ardently desire.... For no matter how many deaths or defeats we inflict, we cannot kill Islam as we did Nazism, Japanese militarism and Soviet Bolshevism [note the comparison between Islam and the evils of the twentieth century].... If belief is decisive, Islam is militant, Christianity milquetoast. In population, Islam is exploding, the West dying. Islamic warriors are willing to suffer defeat and death, the West recoils at casualties. They are full of grievance; we, full of guilt. Where Islam prevails, it asserts a right to impose its dogma, while the West preaches equality. Islam is assertive, the West apologetic—about its crusaders, conquerors and empires. Don't count Islam out. It is the fastest growing faith in Europe and has surpassed Catholicism worldwide as Christianity expires in the West and the churches empty out, the mosques are going up.⁷³

While the title of another essay by Buchanan, "Why Does Islam Hate America," is a good summary of this kind of discourse,⁷⁴ the finest and most informed example of analyzing the contemporary Islamic world through essentialist categories and stereotypes on the one hand, and the narrative of confrontation on the other, has been given by Bernard Lewis in his famous article "The Roots of Muslim Rage," published almost ten years before September 11. Purporting to be an account of the contemporary Islamic world, Lewis' article sums up the main trait of Muslims with such words as rage, resentment, bitterness, revulsion, hatred, revenge, "holy war against the infidel enemy," struggles, attacks, hostility, and rejection. Lewis considers the "problem of the Islamic world:" i.e., extremism and fundamentalism, to be deeply rooted in its history and cultural preferences. Thus he locates the roots of what he labels as the "Muslim rage" in the cultural and civilizational realities of the Islamic world:

Clearly, something deeper is involved than these specific grievances, numerous and important as they may be—something deeper that turns every disagreement into a problem and makes every problem insoluble.

It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.⁷⁵

Seen in this light, the history of Islam and the West becomes, in Lewis' words, "a long series of attacks and counterattacks, *jihāds* and crusades, conquests and reconquests." It is remarkable that such a prominent historian as Lewis should reduce at one stroke the 1400 years history of Islamic and Western worlds to "attacks and conquests" and contribute to the mono-

lithic perception of Islam as a menacing power bent on destroying Western civilization. Lewis' attempt to summarize the present reality of the Islamic world in terms of rage and resentment against the West leads to gross generalizations and misrepresentations that one would normally expect only from an uninformed or deliberately misleading historian. Throughout this essay and his other works, Lewis looks at history through patterns and categories that culminate in his depiction of Islam and Muslims as immersed in rage, hatred, and a sense of revenge. This is not only to misunderstand the present conditions of the Muslim world but also to misinform and mislead the public at large into thinking that Muslims in the Muslim world, Europe, and America are part of a larger force directed against the foundations of Western civilization. Furthermore, Lewis, like many of his followers, uses the blanket term "Islamic fundamentalism" to discredit and categorize all of the socio-political organizations in the Islamic world as militarist and terrorist structures. This becomes poignantly clear and alarming when Lewis presents his modern version of *jihād* as the "holy war against the infidel West":

The army is God's army and the enemy is God's enemy. The duty of God's soldiers is to dispatch God's enemies as quickly as possible to the place where God will chastise them—that is to say, the afterlife. In the classical Islamic view, to which many Muslims are beginning to return, the world and all mankind are divided into two: the House of Islam, where the Muslim law and faith prevail, and the rest, known as the House of Unbelief or the House of War, which it is the duty of Muslims ultimately to bring to Islam [Lewis does not explain where he derives this clause from]. But the greater part of the world is still outside Islam, and even inside the Islamic lands, according to the view of the Muslim radicals, the faith of Islam has been undermined and the law of Islam has been abrogated. The obligation of holy war therefore begins at home and continues abroad, against the same infidel enemy.⁷⁶

In spite of his renowned scholarship, Lewis does not discuss the historical origination of the terms *dār al-islām* and *dār al-ḥarb*, nor does he mention the other geo-religious divisions, such as *dar al-ṣulḥ* or *dār al-ʿahd* ("the abode of peace and agreement" with which Muslim societies have an agreement of peace and where Muslim groups live as minorities under non-Muslim rule). By failing to observe these nuances, Lewis presents *dār al-ḥarb* as an Islamic missionary concept. But in reality these territorial divisions have entered Islamic law specifically to provide a blueprint for international relations and to regulate the legal and religious lives of Muslims living under non-Muslim rulers and sometimes as prisoners of war. In contrast to the Orientalist view that *dār al-ḥarb* means "abode of war," i.e., countries with which Muslims are in constant battle,⁷⁷ the classical sources of Islamic law use the term in the sense of what we call "foreign countries"

today. War against such foreign countries is allowed only when the Muslim state is attacked and the bond of peace (*ṣulḥ* and *‘ahd*) is broken unilaterally.⁷⁸ Just as defining a country as “foreign” does not mean discord or conflict, the term *dār al-ḥarb*, which is a legacy of the imperial era, does not mean war or battle. Neither Lewis nor those who distort and misrepresent the concepts of *jihād* and *dār al-ḥarb*, however, make an earnest effort to present a fuller picture of these Islamic concepts. Thus their radicalized and militant readings are found not in the classical sources of Islam written in Arabic, Persian, or Turkish, but mostly in Western works written in English, German, or Dutch. It is not difficult to see how this skewed interpretation militarizes and demonizes the concept of *jihād*—an irresistible fashion before and especially after the September 11th attacks. The word *jihād* has now been equated with militancy and terrorism and is invariably translated as “holy war” in spite of the fact that the holy war tradition originates from the history of Christianity. *Jihād*, which is always mentioned with such words as fundamentalism, terrorism, hatred, and revenge, is used to create a mass hysteria that invigorates the monolithic considerations of Islam. This view was voiced by such a prominent figure of the French intellectual scene as Jacques Ellul. Shortly before his death, in his preface to Bat Ye’or’s *The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam*, Ellul wrote:

... it is most important to grasp that the *jihād* is an institution in itself; that is to say, an organic piece of Muslim society.... The world, as Bat Ye’or brilliantly shows, is divided into two regions: the *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-harb*, the “domain of Islam” and “the domain of war.” The world is no longer divided into nations, peoples, and tribes. Rather, they are all located en bloc in the world of war, where *war is the only possible relationship with the outside world* [emphasis added]. The earth belongs to Allāh and all its inhabitants must acknowledge this reality; to achieve this goal there is but one method: war. The Koran allows that there are times when war is not advisable, and a momentary pause is called for. But that changes nothing: war remains an institution, which means that it must resume as soon as circumstances permit.⁷⁹

Examples can be multiplied almost *ad infinitum*. In a book written to “explain” the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, Yossef Bodansky, staff director of the Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare and the former technical editor of the *Israeli Air Force* magazine, defined *jihād* as the religious and social basis of an international terrorist infrastructure: “Islamic terrorism has embarked on a Holy War—*jihād*—against the West, especially the United States, which is being waged primarily through international terrorism.”⁸⁰ A similar hysteria was expressed by Amos Perlmutter of American University in a more alarming and tantalizing way when he informed his readers about a “general Islamic war being waged against the West, Christianity, modern capitalism,

Zionism, and Communism all at once.”⁸¹ Lumping these divergent aspects of Western civilization into an essential whole, Perlmutter, with a remarkable flight of fancy, declares Islam as the “other” of the West and repeats what Ernest Renan had said in his 1862 inaugural lecture at the Collège de France: “The Muslim is in the profoundest contempt of education, science, [and] *everything that constitutes the European spirit*” (emphasis added).⁸²

The campaign to discredit Islam and thus deliberately widen the gap between Muslims and the West is not limited to the Islamic world proper. It has now been carried to Muslim communities in the US with a clear intent to preempt the possibility of Islam having a human face in America. Steve Emerson’s documentary called “*Jihād in America: An Investigation of Islamic Extremists’ Activities in the United States*,” broadcast in 1994, was a major blow to the public image of *jihād*, which means both inner struggle and fight for the good of the society, but is now equated with terrorism.⁸³ Instead, Emerson’s film depicted a dark and renegade world of terrorists, extremists, fundamentalists, and all the other stereotypes of the narrative of political and fundamentalist Islam. Emerson’s militant onslaught on Islam and confrontationist discourse implicated all Muslims in the US as potential criminals and his allegations carry clearly cultural and ideological biases against Islam and Muslims. To substantiate his imaginary scenario, Emerson, who became notorious for his bogus accusation that the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995 was an “Arab-Muslim terrorist attack,” claimed that the so-called Islamic fundamentalists “use their mosques and their religious leaders to form the nucleus of their terrorist infrastructure.”⁸⁴ In a more combative tone, Emerson declared his vision of the “Muslim hatred of the West”: “The hatred of the West by militant Islamic fundamentalists is not tied to any particular act or event. Rather, fundamentalists equate the mere existence of the West—its economic, political, and cultural system—as an intrinsic attack on Islam.”⁸⁵

In a similar vein, Samuel Huntington presents the resistance of the Islamic world to secular globalization as being equal to the rejection of democracy, human rights, equality, and the rule of law—the very notions that the so-called Islamists have been struggling to bring to their own home countries: “Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic [and other] . . . cultures.”⁸⁶ Huntington thus mistakes the lack of electoral democracy in present-day Muslim and primarily Middle Eastern countries for the absence of a democratic culture, grossly ignoring the political realities and power structures in those countries. As shown by the work of Norris and Inglehart, based on a huge survey conducted in 75 countries, nine of which are Muslim, between 1995 and 2001,⁸⁷ Huntington’s assumption that the

idea of democracy does not exist in the Islamic world is unsubstantiated by the perceptions and attestations of common people in Muslim countries. As Esposito points out, these remarks point not so much to a clash of cultures and societies that can be justified on social or civilizational grounds as to “a market for clash.”⁸⁸

The labeling of Islam as a religion that condones and begets violence and terrorism against Muslims or non-Muslims is a creation of the narrative of militant Islam which has been thoroughly deconstructed by David Dakake and Reza Shah-Kazemi in their contributions to this volume. Proponents of such distortion refuse to admit the ubiquitous reality of violence committed in the name of religion. A cursory look at recent history reveals that violent and terrorist acts have been carried out in the name of all the major world religions including Judaism, Christianity, and Hinduism. Reverend Michael Bray and the bombing of abortion clinics, Timothy McVeigh and the bombing of federal buildings in Oklahoma, David Koresh and the events that took place in Waco, Texas, the religio-political conflict between the Catholics and the Protestants in Northern Ireland, or the implication of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the genocidal killing and raping of more than 250,000 Muslims in Bosnia are but a few examples one can mention in relation to Christianity. Similarly, the killing of 38 Palestinians by Baruch Goldstein, a Brooklyn psychologist, upon entering the al-Khalil mosque in Hebron in 1994, the assassination of Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by Yigal Amir, who belonged to an extremist Jewish organization, and Meir Kahane's justification of violence and terrorism in the name of Judaism are just a few examples that one can mention in relation to Judaism.⁸⁹

Such examples underline an important facet of our modern predicament that goes beyond national and religious boundaries, namely the violent character of modern culture. It is obvious that none of these cases represent the majority view of Judaism or Christianity and expectedly no attempt is made to trace the origins of such violent acts to the religion itself or its history. The alarming fact is that the same procedure has not been followed in the case of Islam. Moreover, as Joseph E. B. Lumbard shows in his study of the decline of the Islamic intellectual tradition, the rise of militant views among certain groups in the Islamic world is closely tied to the degeneration of traditional Islamic values on the one hand, and the destructive forces of modernization on the other. Therefore, the commonly held view that Muslim societies need to be modernized more in order to overcome the problem of intolerance and extremism is to put the cart before the horse. It is not the traditional beliefs and practices of Islam but their distortions and misrepresentation that are the root of the problem and which require urgent attention.

The fact that Islam is singled out among other religions or religious groups against which charges of violence and extremism can easily be brought, demonstrates the extent to which we become captive to our own history. In spite of the colonial period, the golden age of Orientalism, and the massive body of information about Islam and the Muslim world in Western institutions of learning, Islam is still perceived as an alien phenomenon outside the religious and intellectual horizon of the Western world. The lack of knowledge and familiarity that had obstructed the study of Islam for centuries during the Middle Ages continues to be a stumbling block for the appreciation of the rich tapestry of Islamic culture and history. Furthermore, since the average Westerner is much more familiar with the Judeo-Christian tradition, he or she is in a better position to appreciate the diversity of that tradition and distinguish between the rule and the exception that proves it. In the case of Islam, we scarcely refer to a Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition whereby the historical unknowing of Islam may be undone and a more realistic picture of Islam may be constructed.

In addition to the charges of militancy and terrorism, the current perceptions of Islam in Europe and the US are also paralyzed by the lack of democracy and secularism in Muslim countries. As we have seen in the above quotes from Lewis and Huntington, it is argued that the absence of a civic culture to promote democracy, freedom, and women's rights is attributed to traditional Islamic culture, which is portrayed as oppressive, backward, irrational, patriarchal, etc. Although Lewis envisions no essential clash between the principles of Islam and the ideals and procedures of democracy, he nevertheless blames "Islamic fundamentalists" for "exploit[ing] the opportunities that a self-proclaimed democratic system by its own logic is bound to offer them."⁹⁰ Gilles Kepel takes a more radical approach and argues for the essential incompatibility of Islam and democratic principles when he says that "the rejection of even a chimerical notion of democracy is actually inherent in Islamic religious doctrine."⁹¹ It is remarkable that Western observers such as Kepel should present a narrow and minimalist reading of the debate over democracy in the Islamic world that has been going on for the last three or four decades, and relegate it to the views of few extremist religious figures. As Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart have demonstrated, most Muslims oppose the secular character of Western democracy, not the ideals of democracy itself. Although such criticisms do exist, they are mostly reactions to the way in which democracy is exploited in many Muslim countries to legitimate corrupt and oppressive regimes. Furthermore, the so-called anti-Western or anti-American sentiments arise from the open support given to these regimes by European countries and the US. As Michael Salla points out, "the West is likely to provide military and economic support to the governments in question in order to crush

Islamic militancy, while providing diplomatic cover for widespread political repression and human rights abuses."⁹² A tragic example of Western double-standards on democracy in the Islamic world is Algeria where the US preferred, in the words of Robin Wright, a "police state" to an Islamic democracy.⁹³

At this point, the question of democracy in the Islamic world assumes two important dimensions: intellectual and political. The intellectual nature of the democracy debate is self-evident as many Muslim intellectuals and leaders, including the so-called fundamentalists or Islamists, have been engaged in a critical and constructive dialogue with such issues as political participation, power-sharing, representation, governance, human rights, religious and cultural pluralism, minorities, etc. Looking at the debate in the last several decades, one can assuredly say that forging a non-secular definition of democracy and political rule that will not disenfranchise traditional Islamic values is more than a mere possibility and is taking place in various Muslim countries.⁹⁴

As for the political aspect, it is obvious that both the presence and lack of democracy in the Islamic world has grave policy implications, and the European and American policies often make the issue even more complex and difficult. In some cases, the promotion of democracy, i.e., withholding support from "good allies-bad regimes," presents itself as a dichotomy because "pushing hard for political change might not only disrupt the effort to promote peace but could also work against vital US interests: stability in the oil-rich Persian Gulf and in strategically critical Egypt."⁹⁵ Seen from this angle, supporting oppressive regimes becomes a rule of thumb in foreign policy decisions whose ideological foundations are supplied by the narrative of fundamentalist Islam and terrorism as discussed above. All we are left with then is either the messianic threat of Islamic fundamentalism or the "political inability and immaturity" of the Arabs who are, in the words of the movie *Lawrence of Arabia* (1962), "a political naïf in need of tutelage from a wiser Westerner."⁹⁶ By the same token, the question of Palestine is attributed to the undemocratic nature of Arabs. It is claimed that the issue between Israel and the Palestinians "is not occupation, it is not settlements, and it certainly is not Israeli brutality and aggression. It is the Arabs' inability to live peacefully with others."⁹⁷ Such statements are nothing short of racism but do not bother us because the Arabs are the "free criminals" of the new world. They permeate the American public debate over democracy in the Islamic world and cloud, to say the least, the lingering political problems of Muslim countries that cannot be understood properly in isolation from the global network of governments, international organizations, and corporate business interests.

Debate over the absence of secularism in Muslim countries presents a case similar to the question of democracy. Islamic claims to political rule and the unexpected successes of the so-called Islamists in such countries as Turkey, Malaysia, Iran, and Algeria are usually explained as an anomaly that arises out of the lack of a secular tradition in the Islamic world. The Western-style separation between church and state does not have any historical precedence in Islam, and the attempts to reconcile religion and politics are considered to be cases of religious extremism and fanaticism. By the same token, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim world is attributed to the absence of secularism on the one hand, and the failure of secularist governments on the other. Turkey is mentioned as an exception to the rule due to its program of secularism and Westernization launched in 1923 under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic. In recent years, this has led to a lively debate over the so-called “Turkish model” with its secularist, modern, and pro-Western predilections that can be exported to other Muslim countries. This view not only grossly simplifies the problem of secularism in the Islamic world but also presents a distorted picture in which any or all attempts to overcome the misdeeds of secularism are interpreted as turning the clocks back and obliterating the principles of democracy and human rights. As a result, the secularist regimes in the Islamic world are supported at all costs lest the threat of religious fundamentalism and fanaticism become a reality. This assumption, however, obscures the fact that the secular authority of the state in countries like Turkey is used as a shield against religion rather than guaranteeing the rights of various religious groups against each other and against the overwhelming power of the state. As Graham Fuller points out, Turkey is an example that merits consideration not because “Turkey is ‘secular’; in fact, Turkish ‘secularism’ is actually based on total state control and even repression of religion. Turkey is becoming a model precisely because Turkish democracy is beating back rigid state ideology and slowly and reluctantly permitting the emergence of Islamist movements and parties that reflect tradition, a large segment of public opinion, and the country’s developing democratic spirit.”⁹⁸

The power-driven and often crude application of secularism in such countries as Tunisia, Algeria, and Turkey has been instrumental in disenfranchising and radicalizing large segments of society in the Islamic world. Using secularism as a way of repressing Islamic norms and local traditions in the name of modernization, state-centered power elites have created chasms between the ruler and the ruled and further widened the gap between the forces of modernity and traditional beliefs and practices; for the project of modernization has been enforced by oppressive and often corrupt regimes whose legitimacy is derived not so much from their constitu-

ency as their strategic alliances with Western governments. It is obvious that secularism, as developed during the European Enlightenment, with its non-religious and profane view of the world and society, is not compatible with Islam or any religious tradition for that matter. Secularism as a philosophical project constructs the world in terms of a self-enclosed and immanent reality with a clear rejection of the transcendent. The humanist utopia that humanity will outgrow religion underlies much of the secularist discourse and criticism leveled against Islam and its revival in the twentieth century as we read in Lewis' presentation of "our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present" as a point of contention between Islam and the West. The triumph of secularism, however, has been called into question and now, as we see in the work of Peter Berger and others, there is a growing movement to de-secularize the world.⁹⁹

True, the secular character of modern Western civilization is seen as a threat and an area of confrontation in the Muslim world, which remains by and large more religious and traditional than many other parts of the world. Exportation of modern consumerist culture, its popular icons, and the modes of behavior that come with them are perceived to have an eroding effect on the texture of traditional Muslim societies, and propel many to denounce the West as a materialist civilization. It should be pointed out, however, that this view of the West is not very different from that of a pious Christian living in Europe or in America who sees sex, drugs, violence, individualism, destruction of the family, school shootings, or the moral depravity of wanton consumerism under the same or similar light as a devout Muslim, Jew, or Hindu. The difference is the deep culture shock that accompanies a non-Westerner's perception of modern culture. It also needs to be emphasized that the primary target of anti-modernist and anti-Western discourse is not so much the West in and of itself but the West *in* the Islamic world, i.e., what some have referred to as the "McDonaldization" of the world, which poses a threat not only to people of the Islamic faith, but to local and indigenous traditions the world over. Tropes and commodities of modern Western culture become a source of contention when they are exported to traditional societies in the name of modernization, development, and globalization by regimes that lay claim to democracy and secularism. Paradoxically, when these criticisms are translated from the Islamic world back to the West, they are typically presented as bases for militant fundamentalism and anti-modernism while similar criticisms in the West are divested of any such militant or political connotations.

Finally, one should also evaluate such criticisms of modernism and Westernization against the backdrop of European colonialism and its enduring legacy in the Islamic world. A good part of the anti-Western discourse to be found in the Islamic world today has its roots in the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries when encounter with Europe and the modern world meant carrying the brunt of imperialism and colonialism. The fact that more than seventy percent of the Islamic world was under European colonial rule in the second half of the nineteenth century has had a profound impact on how the contemporary Islamic world came to perceive the West as a colonial and enslaving power.¹⁰⁰ We see this clearly in al-Jabarti's celebrated encounter with and testimony to the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798: for al-Jabarti and his fellow Egyptians, modern Europe was embodied not in new scientific discoveries or ideas of liberty and fraternity but in the violent reality of the invasion of Egypt—the cultural heartland of the Islamic world—by France, the seat of the French Revolution of 1789.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, the defense of Muslim lands during the historic transition from the empire to the nation-states was undertaken by Muslim leaders and intellectuals who formulated their anti-colonialist struggle as *jihād* against the occupying countries of Europe and Russia.¹⁰² Such concepts as *ummah*, *jihād*, and *dār al-ḥarb* assumed a new geo-political meaning and became part of the modern Islamic discourse during the colonial period. This fact should be kept in mind when analyzing their repercussions in the Islamic world today. For many of the so-called Islamist intellectuals and leaders, overcoming the socio-economic, political, and intellectual heritage of the colonial and post-colonial periods is an ongoing struggle for Muslim societies to reassert their identities in a day and age in which the secularizing effects of modernization and globalization are felt throughout the world.¹⁰³

In spite of the widespread perceptions of Islam as the menacing “other” of the West, whether conceived as Judeo-Christian, secular, or both, there is an alternative view that considers Islam and the Islamic world as a sister civilization to the West and as part of the Abrahamic tradition which includes Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Voiced by many European and American scholars and intellectuals, this view, whose full analysis we must leave for another study, takes the approach of accommodation, co-existence, and dialogue as its starting point and vehemently denies the demonization of Islam through the narrative of Islamic fundamentalism, radicalism, and terrorism. The proponents of this view, such as Edward Said, John Esposito, John Voll, Bruce Lawrence, James Piscatori, Graham Fuller, and Richard Bulliet, consider the Islamic world not as a monolithic unit but as a diverse, dynamic, and multi-faceted reality. Rather than looking through the mirror of fixed identities and stereotypes, they identify the problems of Muslim countries vis-à-vis themselves and the West within the context of their social and political circumstances. While admitting the existence of some radical voices in the Islamic world as a small minority, they see the Islamic vision of life as essentially tolerant, democratic, and not necessarily anti-Western and anti-American. Although they acknowledge

that there are cultural differences between the Islamic world and the West, they do not conceive an essential(ist) clash between the two and see Islam as an intellectual and spiritual challenge rather than a military threat to the West.¹⁰⁴ They also stress the fact that most of the anti-American sentiment in the Islamic world emanates from American foreign policy, which adopts a double standard on the question of democracy in Muslim countries and especially in the Middle East, and provides unconditional and one-sided support to Israel.¹⁰⁵ They also recognize the experience of Muslim minorities in Europe and the US as a valuable chapter in the history of the two worlds with tremendous potentials for dialogue and co-existence between Islam and the West. It would not be a stretch to say that the sharp contrast between the confrontationalist and accommodationist perspectives represents a new chapter in the history of Islam and the West, both at the level of civilizational co-existence and policy decisions in the post-September 11 era.¹⁰⁶

Conclusion

Western perceptions of Islam are more a reflection of the West's understanding of itself than of Islam. The same holds true for the Muslim perceptions of the West. Both worlds see one another through the eyes of their own self-understanding, as they strive to come to terms with their own identity and their views of the other. The Muslim perceptions of the West are inevitably encoded in Muslim modes of self-understanding that have undergone a number of changes throughout Islamic history, generating new modes of perception and understanding towards the West. A Muslim's view of Christianity or Greek philosophy in the ninth century is not the same as his approach to modern science and technology in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. When we speak of continuities and discontinuities in the history of Islam and the West, we can do so only within the context of the perseverance or waning of such modes of self-perception and self-understanding. In this sense, the encounter of the Muslim world with the modern West, its science and technology, its military and economic might, and its worldview is also an encounter with itself, in that the Muslim world's self-perception informs the ways in which the "West" as a term of contrast and comparison is constructed in the Islamic world. Such burning issues as tradition and modernity, religiosity and secularism, revival of Islamic civilization, economic and political development in Muslim countries, and modern science and technology and their socio-philosophical challenges cannot be properly discussed in today's Islamic world without taking into account the role played by the West in this process.

Roots of Misconception

By the same token, the West's encounter with Islam is a coming to terms with its own self-image. Ethnocentrism, universalism versus particularism and locality, representations of the other, the legacy of colonialism, globalization, human rights, pluralism, and the limits of modernism are only a few among the many issues that define the West in its relation to the non-Western world. In a day and age in which national and cultural boundaries are crossed over in a myriad of media, none of these issues can be discussed without attending to their meanings and implications for cultures and identities beyond the precincts of the Western world. At this juncture, studying Islam and its Western constructions is an exercise in looking at ourselves and our modes of perception as they are reflected in the images and categories by which we understand the other. Whether Islam is conceived to be a religious heresy, a theological challenge, a sister civilization, or simply an alien culture, we can no longer fail to see its relevance and urgency for the West's self-understanding in the new millennium.

Notes

¹ These usual explanations for the spread of Islam were prevalent even among such American writers of the nineteenth century as Edward Forster, John Hayward, and George Bush, the first American biographer of the Prophet. See Fuad Shaʿban, *Islam and Arabs in Early American Thought: The Roots of Orientalism in America* (North Carolina: The Acorn Press, 1991), pp. 40-43.

² According to Oleg Grabar, the term “Saracen” comes from the word “Sarakenoi”: “John of Damascus and others after him always insisted on the fact that the new masters of the Near East are Ishmaelites, that is, outcasts; and it is with this implication that the old term *Sarakenoi* is explained as meaning “empty (because of or away from?) of Sarah (*ek tes Sarras kenous*) and that the Arabs are often called *Agarenois*, obviously in a pejorative sense” (Oleg Grabar, “The Umayyad Dome of The Rock In Jerusalem,” *Ars Orientalis* 3 (1959): 44).

³ For Theodore Abu-Qurrah and extracts from his writings against Islam, see Adel-Theodore Khoury, *Les Théologiens Byzantins et L’Islam: Textes et Auteurs* (Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1969), pp. 83-105.

⁴ Bede was the first theologian to label the Saracens as enemies of God in his biblical commentaries. This was important for finding a place for the Saracens in the Christian version of biblical history.

⁵ Daniel J. Sahas, *John of Damascus on Islam: The “Heresy of the Ishmaelites”* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), p. 68.

⁶ *De Hearesibus*, 764B, quoted in Sahas, *ibid.*, p. 73.

⁷ For St. John’s career in Syria under the Umayyad caliphate, see Sahas, pp. 32-48.

⁸ R. W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 3.

⁹ As Kedar points out, this was a result of the daily interaction of Eastern Christians with Muslims. See his *Crusade and Mission: European Attitudes toward the Muslims* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 35f.

¹⁰ Some of the anti-Islamic texts produced by Byzantine theologians have been collected in Adel-Theodore Khoury, *Les Théologiens Byzantins et L’Islam*, where one can follow the representative texts of such theologians as St. John of Damascus, Theodore Abu-Kurra, Theophane the Confessor, Nicetas of Byzantium, and George Hamartolos.

¹¹ On Ketton’s translation see Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, “Deux Traductions Latines du Coran au Moyen Age” *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 16 (Paris: Librairie J. Vrin, 1948) published in her *La connaissance de l’Islam dans l’Occident médiéval* (Great Britain: Variorum, 1994), I, pp. 69-131 where d’Alverny also analyzes Mark of Toledo’s Latin translation completed shortly after that of Ketton. See also James Kritzeck, “Robert of Ketton’s Translation of the Qur’an,” *Islamic Quarterly* 2, no. 4 (1955): 309-312.

¹² Quoted in Southern, *ibid.*, pp. 38-9. In spite of his deliberate anti-Islamic campaign, Peter the Venerable ushered in a new era in the European studies of Islam in the Middle Ages. See James Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable and Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 24-36.

¹³ Cf. Kenneth M. Setton, *Western Hostility to Islam and Prophecies of Turkish Doom* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1991), pp. 47-53.

¹⁴ Cf. James Windrow Sweetman, *Islam and Christian Theology*, part 2, vol. 1 (London: Lutterworth, 1955), pp. 98-99. Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny draws attention to the same problem in her important essay "La connaissance de l'Islam en Occident du IXe au milieu de XIIe siècle," *Settimane di studio del Centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo 12, L'Occidente e l'Islam nell'alto medioevo, Spoleto 2-8 aprile 1964, col. II Spoleto, 1965*, published in *La connaissance de l'Islam dans l'Occident medieval*, V, pp. 577-8.

¹⁵ Southern mentions two other works of equal importance. The first is Walter of Compiegne's *Otia de Machomete* written between 1137 and 1155, and the second Guibert of Nogent's *Gesta Dei per Francos*, composed at the beginning of the twelfth century, which is an account of the Crusades with a chapter devoted to the Prophet of Islam. Cf. Southern, *ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁶ For more on the image of the Prophet of Islam in the West from the Middle Ages and the Renaissance up to the present, see Clinton Bennett, *In Search of Muḥammad* (Cassell: London & New York, 1998), pp. 69-92 and 93-135; and Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (Oxford: Oneworld, 1993; first published in 1960), pp. 100-130. For a critical evaluation of three Orientalist scholars on the Prophet of Islam, see Jabal Muḥammad Buaben, *Image of the Prophet Muḥammad in the West: A Study of Muir, Margoliouth and Watt* (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1996).

¹⁷ Cf. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred* (Albany, NY: State University New York Press, 1989), pp. 280-308; "Comments on a Few Theological Issues in Islamic-Christian Dialogue" in *Christian-Muslim Encounters*, Yvonne and Wadi Haddad (eds.), (Florida: Florida University Press, 1995), pp. 457-467; and "Islamic-Christian Dialogues: Problems and Obstacles to be Pondered and Overcome," *Muslim World* no. 3-4 (July-October 1998): 218-237; Kenneth Cragg, *The Call of the Minaret* (New York: Orbis Books, 1989, 2nd printing; first published in 1956) and *Muḥammad and the Qur'ān: A Question of Response* (New York: Orbis Books, 1984); Ismail Raji al-Faruqi (ed.), *Triologue of the Abrahamic Faiths* (Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1982). See also Frithjof Schuon, *Christianity/Islam: Essays on Esoteric Ecumenism* (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom Books, 1985).

¹⁸ *Inferno*, Canto 28 where Dante describes the heretics in the eighth circle of hell. Dante puts the Prophet Muḥammad in the ninth bowge as a heretic responsible for schism and discord. We can see in this depiction the repercussions of the labeling of Islam as an Ishmaelite heresy by St. John of Damascus and Bede in the eighth century. For the spiritual significance of 'Alī see Reza Shah-Kazemi's contribution to this volume: "Recollecting the Spirit of *Jihād*."

¹⁹ Cf. Miguel Asin Palacios, *Islam and the Divine Comedy*, tr. with abridgment by Harold Sunderland (London: 1926), pp. 256-263.

²⁰ Lull's most important work *Ars Magna* provides ample material for his approach to Islam as a religious and cultural/philosophical challenge.

²¹ Averroists were known for their distinctly heretical views and all of these views—attributed to Averroes and his Latin followers—were listed in the 1277 condemnation of Averroism. Among those, four are the most important: the eternity of the world; the claim that God does not know the particulars; monopsychism, i.e., the view that there is only one intellect for all human beings and this absolves individuals of their moral responsibility; and finally the all-too-famous double-truth theory, i.e., the view that

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religion and philosophy hold different truths and that they should be kept separate. The third view on monopsychism was taken to be such a major challenge for Christian theology that St. Thomas Aquinas had to write a treatise called *On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists*. For the 219 propositions condemned by Bishop Tempier on the order of Pope John XXI, see *Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions*, ed. Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 584-591.

²² *De consideratione*, III, I, 3-4, quoted in Benjamin Z. Kedar, *Crusade and Mission*, p. 61.

²³ Oljaytu's embracing of the Shi'ite branch of Islam instead of Buddhism or Christianity, the two religions he had studied before accepting Islam, is a momentous event in the history of Islam with repercussions both for Shi'ism and Muslim-Christian relations. For some of the Christian reactions to the historic Mongol conversion, see David Bundy, "The Syriac and Armenian Christian Responses to the Islamification of the Mongols" in John Victor Tolan (ed.), *Medieval Christian Perceptions of Islam* (New York/London: Garland Publishing, 1996), pp. 33-53.

²⁴ Haskins attributes a considerable role to the interaction of Muslims and Christians in al-Andalus and especially in Toledo where many of the translations from Arabic into Latin were made for the flourishing of a new intellectual climate in the twelfth century. See his *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976; first published in 1927), especially pp. 278-367.

²⁵ Alvaro, *Indiculus luminosus*, chap. 35, quoted in Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam* (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 57.

²⁶ For a brief treatment of Andalusia in the history of Islam and the West, see Anwar Chejne, "The Role of al-Andalus in the Movements of Ideas Between Islam and the West" in Khalil I. Semaan (ed.), *Islam and the Medieval West: Aspects of Intercultural Relations* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1980), pp. 110-133. See also, Jane Smith, "Islam and Christendom," in *The Oxford History of Islam*, ed. by J. L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 317-321.

²⁷ *Les Pensées de Blaise Pascal* (Le club français du livre, 1957), pp. 200-1.

²⁸ *Relation of a Journey begun An. Dom. 1610*, p. 60, quoted in Jonathan Haynes, *The Humanist as Traveler: George Sandys's Relation of a Journey begun An. Dom. 1610* (London/Toronto: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1986), p. 71.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60, quoted in Haynes, p. 70.

³⁰ *The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Peter Bayle* (New York/London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1984), vol. IV, p. 29. All translations of Bayle have been slightly modified from medieval spellings to more modern spellings.

³¹ Bayle, *The Dictionary*, pp. 47 and 30.

³² Bayle, *The Dictionary*, p. 39.

³³ On Prideaux's approach to Islamic history, see P. M. Holt, "The Treatment of Arab History by Prideaux, Oackley and Sale" in B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 290-302.

³⁴ From the *Lettre au roi de Prusse* quoted in N. Daniel, *Islam and the West*, p. 311.

³⁵ Stubbe's book remained in manuscript form until 1911 when it was edited and published for the first time by Hafiz Mahmud Khan Shairani (London: Luzac, 1911). A

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second edition was printed in Lahore in 1954. For references to Stubbe's work, see P. M. Holt, *A Seventeenth-Century Defender of Islam: Henry Stubbe (1632-76) and His Book* (London: Dr. Williams' s Trust, 1972).

³⁶ Quoted in Holt, *A Seventeenth-Century Defender of Islam*, pp. 22-23.

³⁷ E. Swedenborg, "Divine Providence" in *A Compendium of Swedenborg's Theological Writings*, edited by Samuel M. Warren (New York: Swedenborg Foundation, Inc., 1974; first edition 1975), pp. 520-1.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 521.

³⁹ In addition to his meticulous translation of the Qur'ān into Latin as late as the end of the seventeenth century, Maracci also wrote a number of polemics against Islam including his *Prodromus* and *Refutatio*, both of which have been added to his translation. Cf. N. Daniel, *Islam and the West*, p. 321.

⁴⁰ There were other translations of the Qur'ān into the European languages in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The works of Claude Etienne Savary (1750-1788), Garcin de Tassy (1794-1878), and Albert de Biberstein Kasimirski (1808-1887) contained partial translations of the Qur'ān into French. Several anonymous translations of the Qur'ān in English were in circulation in the nineteenth century but Sale's rendering remained to be the definitive text. In Germany, Martin Luther's (1483-1546) interest in the Qur'ān was already known and some have even attributed a selective translation to Luther. In 1659, Johann Andreas Endter and Wolfgang Endter published a German translation of the Qur'ān titled *al-Koranum Mahumedanum*. As a fashion of the late Middle Ages, the Qur'ān was called the "sacred book of the Turks" and sometimes the "Turkish Bible." This was followed by Johan Lange's version published in Hamburg in 1688. Theodor Arnold's *Der Koran*, based on the Arabic original and Sale's English translation, was published 1746 to be followed by David Friedrich Megerlin's *Die Turkische Bibel oder des Koran* in 1772. A comprehensive list of Qur'ān translations can be found in Ismet Binark and Halit Eren, *World Bibliography of Translations of the Meanings of the Holy Quran: Printed Translations, 1515-1980*, edited with introduction by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu (Istanbul: Research Center for Islamic History, Art, and Culture [IRCICA], 1986). See also Muḥammad Hamidullah (trans.), *Le Saint Coran* (Paris: Club Francais du Livre, 1985), pp. LX-XC.

⁴¹ Quoted in Fuad Sha'ban, *Islam and Arabs in Early American Thought*, p. 31.

⁴² Thomas Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History* (1840) ed. Carl Niemeyer (Lincoln/London: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 64-65. Carlyle mentions Sale's translation as a "very fair one."

⁴³ Carlyle, *ibid.*, p. 43.

⁴⁴ Carlyle, *ibid.*, p. 56.

⁴⁵ Cf. John D. Yohannan, *Persian Poetry in England and America: A 200-Year History* (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1977).

⁴⁶ Cf. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), pp. 166-197.

⁴⁷ This is not to suggest that the inherited religious biases against Islam were absent in the narrations of the "humanist" travelers of Europe. George Sandys' *Relation of a Journey*, mentioned above, is a case in point. Sandys' accounts of Turkey, Egypt, the Holy Land, and Italy clearly reveal the extent to which the seventeenth century humanists of Europe were under the influence of Christian polemics against Islam. Cf. Jonathan Haynes, *The Humanist as Traveler: George Sandys's Relation of a Journey*, pp. 65-81.

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⁴⁸ André Gide, *Journals 1889-1949*, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Vintage Books, 1956), vol. I, pp. 177, 181.

⁴⁹ Burton was so much engaged in assuming a local identity that he presented himself as a Muslim doctor of Indian descent. His *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah (1855-1856)* bears testimony to his knowledge of Arabic language and Islamic culture.

⁵⁰ Sir John Chardin, *Travels in Persia 1673-1677* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1988), pp. 184 and 187.

⁵¹ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, p. 49ff.

⁵² Lane's *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, published first in 1836, is even more important than his *Lexicon* in revealing his approach to the Arab-Islamic world.

⁵³ Albert Hourani provides a very fine analysis of these and other minor figures in his *Islam in European Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 18-34.

⁵⁴ According to one estimate quoted by Said, close to 60,000 books about the New Orient were written between 1800 and 1950. Cf. E. Said, *Orientalism*, p. 204.

⁵⁵ For I. Goldziher, C. S. Hurgronje, C. H. Becker, D. B. Macdonald, L. Massignon, see Jean Jacques Waardenburg, *L'Islam dans le miroir de l'Occident. Comment quelques orientalistes occidentaux se sont penchés sur l'Islam et se sont formé une image de cette religion* (Paris: Mouton, 1963). See also A. J. Arberry, *Oriental Essays: Portraits of Seven Scholars* (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997; first published in 1960) and Maxime Rodinson, *Europe and the Mystique of Islam* (Seattle/London: University of Washington Press, 1987), pp. 83-129.

⁵⁶ A. J. Arberry, *Oriental Essays* (Great Britain: Curzon Press, 1997; first published in 1960), p. 7.

⁵⁷ A classical example of the Orientalist construction of an Islamic orthodoxy is I. Goldziher's "Stellung der alten islamischen Orthodoxie zu den antiken Wissenschaften," *Abhandlungen der Koniglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Jahrgang, 1915 (Berlin: Verlag der Akademie, 1916) where Goldziher establishes the *kalam* (theology) and *fiqh* (jurisprudence) critiques of philosophy especially by the Ḥanbalite scholars as the official position of "Islamic orthodoxy" against the pre-Islamic traditions. This article has been translated into English by M. L. Swartz in his *Studies on Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 185-215.

⁵⁸ T. J. De Boer's work has been translated into English by E. R. Jones as *The History of Philosophy in Islam* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1967).

⁵⁹ Gustave E. von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam*, p. 294. This theme is further articulated in a collection of essays edited by von Grunebaum as *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955).

⁶⁰ Sam Keen, *Faces of the Enemy* (Cambridge: Harper and Row, 1986), pp. 29, 30, quoted in J. Shaheen, *Arab and Muslim Stereotyping in American Popular Culture* (Washington D. C.: Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University, 1997), p. 12.

⁶¹ Cf. Jack Shaheen, *The TV Arab* (Ohio: The Popular Press, 1984) and *Arab and Muslim Stereotyping*. See also Michael Hudson and Ronald G. Wolfe (eds.), *The American Media*

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and the Arabs (Washington D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1980).

⁶² J. Shaheen, *Arab and Muslim Stereotyping*, p. 3.

⁶³ Michael Suleiman, *American Images of Middle East Peoples: Impact of the High Schools* (New York: Middle East Studies Association, 1977), quoted in Fred R. von. Der Mehden, "American Perceptions of Islam," in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, ed. by John L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 21.

⁶⁴ *Jerusalem Post*, April 7, 2002.

⁶⁵ P. Johnson, "'Relentlessly and Thoroughly': The Only Way to Respond," *National Review*, October 15, 2001, p. 20.

⁶⁶ F. Fukuyama, "The West Has Won," *The Guardian*, October 11, 2002.

⁶⁷ Quoted in Fawaz A. Gerges, *America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 69-70.

⁶⁸ *The Washington Post*, February 22, 2002, A02. This is as if taken verbatim from Renan: "Islam was liberal [tolerant] when it was weak and was violent when it became strong" (*L'Islamisme et la science* [Paris: 1883], p. 18).

⁶⁹ http://www.magazine.tcu.edu/forum/display_message.asp?mid=599

⁷⁰ Another powerful myth often invoked to exclude Islam from the Judeo-Christian tradition is the stupendous idea that Muslims believe in a God other than what Jews and Christians believe. One may recall here the so-called "moon-god Allāh" story according to which Muslims worship the "Moon God," a pagan deity. This myth has been popularized by Dr. Robert Morey in his lectures and publications including *The Moon-god Allāh, Islam: the Religion of the Moon God, Behind the Veil: Unmasking Islam*, and *The Islamic Invasion: Confronting the World's Fastest Growing Religion*.

⁷¹ Nicholas D. Kristof, "Bigotry in Islam—And Here," *New York Times*, July 9, 2002.

⁷² For Zwemer, who founded and edited the *Muslim World* for nearly four decades, and other missionary views of Islam in the modern period, see Jane I. Smith, "Christian Missionary Views of Islam in the 19th-20th Centuries," in Zafar Ishaq Ansari and John L. Esposito (eds.), *Muslims and the West: Encounter and Dialogue* (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 2001), pp. 146-177.

⁷³ December 7, 2002 "Coming Clash of Civilizations?" at <http://www.theamericancause.org/patcomingclashprint.htm>.

⁷⁴ March 5, 2002, at <http://www.theamericancause.org/patwhydoesislam.htm>.

⁷⁵ Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic Monthly* (September 1990): 47-60.

⁷⁶ Lewis, *ibid.* See also Lewis' "Islam and Liberal Democracy," *The Atlantic Monthly* (February 1993): 93.

⁷⁷ L. Massignon, *La Crise de l'autorité religieuse et le Califat en Islam* (Paris, 1925), pp. 80-81; E. Tyan, *Institutions du droit public musulman* (Paris, 1954) Vol. II, p. 302; Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 53 and 170; *ibid.*, "International Law," in *Law in the Middle East*, M. Khadduri and H. J. Liebesny (eds.), (Washington D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1955), pp. 349-370. Cf. also the Encyclopedia of Islam entry "dar al-harb" reprinted in *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*, ed. by H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, n.d.), pp. 68-69.

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⁷⁸ For some of the classical sources on the subject, see Ahmad al-Sarakhsi, *al-Mabsut* (Istanbul: Dar al-da‘wah, 1912), vol. 30, p. 33; Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *Ahkam ahli al-dhimmah* (Damascus, 1381 [A.H.]), vol. I, p. 5; and Ibn Abidin, *Radd al-mukhtar* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1415/1994), vol. III, pp. 247, 253. For an excellent survey of the classical sources, see Ahmet Ozel, *Islam Hukukunda Ulke Kavrami: Daru’l-islam, Daru’l-harb, Daru’l-sulh* (Istanbul: Iz Yayincilik, 1998).

⁷⁹ Bat Ye’or’s *The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam* (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985), from the Preface.

⁸⁰ Quoted in Paul Findley, *Silent No More: Confronting America’s False Images of Islam* (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 2001), p. 65.

⁸¹ *The Wall Street Journal*, October 4, 1984.

⁸² Ernest Renan, *L’Islamisme et la science*, p. 3.

⁸³ For a full analysis of the traditional Islamic interpretation of *jihād* see David Dakake’s “The Myth of a Militant Islam” and Reza Shah-Kazemi’s “Recollecting the Spirit of *Jihād*” in this volume.

⁸⁴ The *Wall Street Journal*, June 25, 1993. After September 11, Emerson added a new item to his attacks and defamations with his book *American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us* (New York: Free Press, 2002). For a similar approach, see Daniel Pipes, “Fighting Militant Islam, Without Bias,” *City Journal* (Autumn 2001).

⁸⁵ *San Diego Union Tribune*, June 8, 1993, quoted in P. Findley, p. 71.

⁸⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 258 quoted in John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 127.

⁸⁷ Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, “Islam and the West: Testing the Clash of Civilizations Thesis,” John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Working Paper Number RWP02-015, April 22, 2002.

⁸⁸ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, p. 126.

⁸⁹ Mark Juergensmeyer’s work *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley/London: University of California Press, 2000) contains much valuable material on modern justifications of the use of violence in the name of religion and shows the extent to which violence can take on various names and identities.

⁹⁰ Lewis, “Islam and Liberal Democracy,” p. 93.

⁹¹ Gilles Kepel, *The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), p. 194.

⁹² Michael E. Salla, “Political Islam and the West: A New Cold War or Convergence?,” *Third World Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (December 1997): 729-743.

⁹³ Robin Wright, “Islam, Democracy and the West,” *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1992): 137-8 quoted in Gerges, *America and Political Islam*, pp. 29-30.

⁹⁴ There is an ever-growing literature on Islam and democracy, pointing to the vibrancy of the debate in the Islamic world. For a brief discussion of the cases of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Iran, see John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 133-145. See also J. L. Esposito and John Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); A.

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Soroush, *Reason, Freedom, & Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of 'Abdolkarim Soroush*, translated and edited with a critical introduction by Mahmoud Sadri, Ahmad Sadri (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Azzam S. Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Fatima Mernissi, *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1992).

⁹⁵ Martin Indyk, "Back to the Bazaar," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 1 (February 2002): 75-89.

⁹⁶ Quoted in Ralph Braibanti, *The Nature and Structure of the Islamic World* (Chicago: International Strategy and Policy Institute, 1995), p. 6.

⁹⁷ The columnist Mona Charen quoted in Robert Fisk, "Fear and Learning in America," *Independent*, April 17, 2002.

⁹⁸ Graham Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 2 (March/April 2002): 59.

⁹⁹ Cf. Peter L. Berger (ed.), *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999). See also the essays by John Keane, P. Berger, Abdelwahab Elmessiri, and Ahmet Davutoglu in *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, ed. by J. L. Esposito and A. Tamimi (New York: New York University Press, 2000), and William E. Connolly, *Why I am Not a Secularist* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

¹⁰⁰ For a treatment of the eighteenth and nineteenth century Islamic movements within the context of European colonialism, see John Voll, "Foundations for Renewal and Reform" in *The Oxford History of Islam*, ed. by J. L. Esposito, pp. 509-547. See also John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, pp. 168-212.

¹⁰¹ Cf. al-Jabarti's narration of the French invasion of Egypt and his cultural response to Napoleon in *Al-Jabarti's Chronicle of the French Occupation 1798: Napoleon in Egypt*, trans. Shmuel Moreh (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997, 3rd printing).

¹⁰² Cf. S. V. R. Nasr, "European Colonialism and the Emergence of Modern Muslim States," in *The Oxford History of Islam*, pp. 549-599.

¹⁰³ Cf. Bruce B. Lawrence, *Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 40-50 and Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, "Islamism: A Designer Ideology for Resistance, Change and Empowerment," in *Muslims and the West: Encounter and Dialogue*, pp. 274-295.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. my "Deconstructing Monolithic Perceptions: A Conversation with Professor John Esposito," *The Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* (April 2001): 155-163.

¹⁰⁵ For an analysis of these scholars from the point of view of US foreign policy decisions, see Mohommed A. Muqtedar Khan, "US Foreign Policy and Political Islam: Interests, Ideas, and Ideology," *Security Dialogue* 29, no. 4 (1998): 449-462.

¹⁰⁶ For the policy recommendations of the accommodationist wing, see Gerges, *America and Political Islam*, pp. 28-36.

