



Approved: Karl Metzner
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Before: HON. FRANK MAAS
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	:	<u>SEALED COMPLAINT</u>
-v.-	:	Violation of
	:	18 U.S.C. § 2339B
MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT,	:	
a/k/a "Mahmud Al Mutazzim,"	:	COUNTY OF OFFENSE:
	:	BRONX
Defendant.	:	

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ss.:

ROBERT FULLER, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and charges as follows:


COUNT ONE

From at least in or about 2001, up to and including in or about May 2005, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT, a/k/a "Mahmud Al Mutazzim," the defendant, and others known and unknown, unlawfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other, within the United States, to provide material support and resources, as that term is defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339A, to a foreign terrorist organization, namely, Lashkar-e-Taiba.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B.)

The bases for my knowledge and the foregoing charge are, in part, as follows:

1. I have been a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") for the past approximately five years and am a member of the FBI/New York City Police Department Joint Terrorism Task Force ("JTTF"). I have been personally involved in the investigation of this case. I am currently assigned to a squad whose principal responsibility is to



investigate the activities of al Qaeda and its founder Usama Bin Laden. I have been investigating the criminal activities of members and associates of al Qaeda for approximately four years. This affidavit is based upon my personal participation in this investigation, conversations with witnesses, other agents, and other law enforcement officers, and review of relevant documents, reports, court documents, Web postings, audio recordings, and transcripts.


2. Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause, it does not include all the facts that I have learned during the course of my investigation. Where the contents of documents and the actions, statements and conversations of others are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part.

Lashkar-e-Taiba

3. Markaz Dawa Wa'al Irshad, which roughly translated means "Center or Invitation [to Islam] and Instructions," was founded in or about 1986 to organize Pakistani mujahideen participating in the jihad against Russians in Afghanistan. As it expanded, education and jihad sections were separated. Thereafter, the military wing of the Markaz Dawa Wa'al Irshad was established in the name of Lashkar-e-Taiba, also known as Lashker-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Toyeba, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Lashkar e-Tayyiba, and Lashkar-I-Taib (hereinafter abbreviated as "LET"). Later, Lashkar-e-Taiba expanded its focus to include jihad against the Government of India and conducted military operations in Kashmir. India and Pakistan have long disputed the territorial rights to the Kashmir region, and violence between the factions seeking control of the area is commonplace.

4. Lashkar-e-Taiba, which roughly translated means "Army of the Pure" or the "Army of the Righteous," claims to have trained thousands of mujahideen to fight in areas including Afghanistan, Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, and the Philippines. Lashkar-e-Taiba is known to have operated training camps in Pakistan for training mujahideen from around the world.

5. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, several electronic bulletin board-type messages were sent, with headlines linking directly back to the Lashkar-e-Taiba web site, in which a purported Lashkar-e-Taiba spokesperson, "Abu Osama," stated, in substance: "Lashkar-e-Taiba will not leave Afghan brethren in the lurch. They will sacrifice their lives along with other Muslims against America and other disbelievers



in case they attack Afghanistan. Lashkar-e-Taiba is intended to uphold the flag of Islam by jihad in the battlefield."

6. On or about December 13, 2001, terrorists attacked India's Parliament while it was in session, resulting in approximately 12 deaths. Media outlets reported that the Government of India blamed two groups for the attack, including Lashkar-e-Taiba.

7. On or about December 24, 2001, the United States designated Lashkar-e-Taiba a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. That designation was renewed effective December 23, 2003, and remains in effect.


Evidence of Material Support

8. During the course of this investigation, I have interviewed on a number of occasions a confidential source ("CS-1").¹ CS-1 advised me and other law enforcement officers, in part and in substance, of the following:

a. Between in or about October 2003 and in or about December 2003, CS-1 was in contact with an individual named Tarik Shah. During various conversations with CS-1 during this approximate time period, many of which were consensually recorded, Shah discussed with CS-1 the duty of "jihad" (i.e., holy war).

b. Shah indicated to CS-1, in substance, that he was a "professor" of the "martial arts" although he was currently not "training" any "brothers." In that regard, Shah noted, in substance, that after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, various mosques had, in fact, prevented Shah from continuing such training.

¹ In or about 1990, CS-1 was convicted of certain state crimes relating to robberies. While serving his state sentence, CS-1 agreed to cooperate with the Government regarding certain terrorism investigations and, in return, the Government wrote the state sentencing judge for sentencing consideration. After serving his sentence, CS-1 continued to cooperate with the Government and currently provides information as a paid informant. CS-1's information has proven to be reliable and has been corroborated by other sources of information, including surveillance and recordings.



c. Shah informed CS-1 that he had previously discussed with other "brothers" how "we could pass" knowledge on to "brothers who are ready" [to fight jihad].

9. In or about December 2003, Shah was arrested by New York state law enforcement authorities for petit larceny. During a search incident to that arrest, authorities recovered from Shah an address book that included the following entries:

a. "Mahmud Almutazzim (973) 393-7666, (240) 350-0051, (973) 792-0973, (202) 528-0567."


b. "Sayfullah (703) 461-3339."

Telephone records demonstrate that (240) 350-0051 was subscribed to in the name of "Taisha Abdel-Aziz," which is the name of MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT's wife, at 5306 Gwynn Oak Avenue, Gwynn Oak, Maryland, from September 21, 2000, through February 10, 2005. The telephone number (973) 792-0973 was listed as the contact number in a passport application submitted by "Mahmud Al Mutazzim," as detailed below. The telephone number (703) 461-3339 was subscribed to at an address in Alexandria, Virginia, known to have been a residence of Seifullah Chapman.²

10. Later, between in or about January 2004 and in or about February 2004, Shah and CS-1 had several discussions regarding "training," which were consensually recorded. During these discussions, CS-1 told Shah (at the FBI's direction) that CS-1 was in contact with a recruiter for jihad from the Middle East (in reality, an FBI Special Agent acting in an undercover capacity ("UC-1")) and advised Shah that the recruiter (UC-1) was interested in someone who could train a small number of individuals overseas in hand-to-hand combat and martial arts. Shah advised CS-1, in substance, that he was interested and that he had a close associate, Rafiq Sabir, a "doctor," who lived in Florida, and who would also be interested in joining the jihad.

² On or about March 4, 2004, Chapman and two of his co-conspirators were convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia of, among other charges, providing material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba. Chapman was a member of the Virginia Jihad Network in which members interested in jihad were trained in combat techniques, which involved, among other things, paintball exercises. At trial, Chapman testified on his own behalf and admitted that he had attended a Lashkar-e-Taiba training camp in or about 2001. Chapman was sentenced to ~~85 years~~ imprisonment, which he is currently serving.

*an extensive
term of*



Shah suggested that CS-1 present Shah and Sabir as, in essence, a "package" to the recruiter and indicated again that Shah could provide martial arts services and his "partner," a medical doctor, could provide medical services. Shah also indicated that he would be interested in meeting with the "recruiter" (UC-1). Later, during these discussions, CS-1 told Shah that UC-1 was willing to meet with Shah alone and that the meeting would probably take place in upstate New York, near the Canadian border.

11. On March 4 and 5, 2004, Shah met with UC-1 in a city in upstate New York. Those meetings were consensually recorded. During those meetings, and throughout his dealings with Shah, UC-1 posed as a recruiter for "brothers" overseas who were seeking other "brothers" to wage jihad. The following points were discussed, among others:


a. Shah talked with UC-1 about the "end point" and indicated that he "may not really be interested in coming back here ever." Shah mentioned that the "very serious" brothers might recognize Shah's "usefulness" and put him to use for jihad and the fight against the United States.

b. Shah discussed his specialty in the "martial arts" and informed UC-1 that he has been trained in jujitsu, which he described as the Japanese art and culture of hand-to-hand combat, and knife and stick fighting, and that he was "blessed" to have studied with a mujahideen who had previously fought a war in Malaysia in or about 1969.

12. On or about April 1 and 2, 2004, Shah and UC-1 met again, this time in Florida. These meetings were consensually recorded. The following was discussed, among other things:

a. Shah informed UC-1 that he would like to learn at the camps about "chemical stuff" and later Shah specified that he wanted training about "explosives and firearms." UC-1 and Shah also discussed training on AK-47 assault rifles and hand grenades.

b. Shah explained to UC-1 that he had previously trained many "brothers" and that a "lot of my brothers" who were trained by him would "go over" and "got hooked up," although nobody ever came in and told Shah that they were "gonna walk in a place and blow up." The "brothers," Shah indicated, "don't even talk like that."



c. Shah mentioned the names of several students who studied martial arts with Shah and who had gone overseas to training camps in Afghanistan and Yemen, including "Mahmud Al Mutazzim," a name used by MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT, the defendant. In particular, Shah indicated, in substance, that Al Mutazzim was "over there" around the time frame of September 11, 2001, and had to keep on traveling to "different provinces and moving around in different places" before ultimately being able to return to the United States. Shah explained his belief that Al Mutazzim had been given the names of people to contact at the camps by a white American Muslim convert.³ Shah also stated that Al Mutazzim had told Shah how difficult it was to be back in the United States and not to be in training. Shah stated that he would call Al Mutazzim to enlist his help to prepare the demonstration video for martial arts training requested by UC-1 and assured UC-1 that Shah trusted Al Mutazzim. Shah also told UC-1 that Al Mutazzim could be trusted because he was a longtime student of Shah who, after leaving school, started "seeking the way to become Mujahideen."


13. Toll and pen register records show that on or about August 21, 2004, a 16 minute call was placed from telephone number (240) 350-0051 to telephone number (914) 489-9526. As detailed above, (240) 350-0051 was subscribed to in the name of MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT's wife at BRENT's home. Records indicate that (914) 489-9526 was subscribed to in the name of Shah's wife, and Shah's business cards listed that number as his telephone number.

14. On or about May 20, 2005, Shah met with CS-1 and UC-1 at CS-1's apartment in the Bronx, New York. Soon after the meeting had begun, Rafiq Sabir arrived and joined the meeting. This meeting was consensually recorded. During this meeting, the following, among other things, was discussed:

a. Shah and UC-1 discussed training camps overseas and spoke generally about jihad.

b. Shah asked UC-1 whether he was familiar with the "brothers" in Washington, D.C., and then indicated that Shah knew one of the brothers who was "fully prepared." Shah indicated that this "brother" was a paramedic and that Shah was

³ Based upon Shah's post-arrest statements and my discussions with agents involved in the Virginia Jihad Network investigation, I believe that the "white brother" to whom Shah refers is Seifullah Chapman. As mentioned above, Chapman's name and telephone number were found in Shah's possession.



happy because this brother followed his orders. Shah stated that, around the time of September 11, 2001, the paramedic took Shah to meet with a "white brother" in D.C. who had done training with the "Mujahideen" and had extensive knowledge about al Qaeda.⁴ Shah also indicated, in substance, that the "brother was taking brothers out" for paintball training exercises.

c. UC-1 told Shah and Sabir that al Qaeda needed trusted people in the organization and that he was authorized to deliver a message from his leader. UC-1 explained to Shah and Sabir that he was authorized to give bayat, i.e., the oath of loyalty to al Qaeda.

d. UC-1 explained bayat and subsequently both Shah and Sabir committed themselves to the path of Holy War, to the oath of secrecy, and to abide by the directives of al Qaeda. Both Shah and Sabir both indicated that they understood the oath and agreed that they would obey the guardians of the oath, namely Usama Bin Laden.


15. On or about May 28, 2005, Shah and Sabir were arrested by the FBI on charges of conspiring to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, namely, al Qaeda. Following Shah's arrest, Shah was advised of his constitutional rights, agreed to speak with the agents, and made the following statements, among others:

a. Shah was a martial arts trainer who had previously trained many individuals committed to jihad, including "Mahmud Al Mutazzim" (a name used by MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT, the defendant), and Al Mutazzim remained committed to jihad and lived in the vicinity of Baltimore, Maryland.⁵

b. Beginning in or about Summer 2001, Shah had trained Al Mutazzim in martial arts when Shah lived in Beacon,

⁴ As explained below, MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT works as a paramedic, and the "white brother" to whom Shah referred was Seifullah Chapman.

⁵ Pursuant to a search warrant executed at Shah's residence in the Bronx, law enforcement authorities recovered, among other items, an envelope bearing the name "Mahmud Al-Mutazzim," with the address "2707 Upshur St., Apt. 6, Mt. Ranier, Maryland 27012," and telephone number "(301) 484-1415." Telephone records show that number (301) 484-1415 was subscribed to by "Mahmud Al-Mutazzim" at this address.



New York, and Al Mutazzim had lived with Shah during this time period. Shah also indicated that while Al Mutazzim lived with Shah in Beacon, New York, Al Mutazzim frequently viewed martial arts training videos and other videos about jihad in Bosnia.

c. Al Mutazzim, in the time period around the September 11 terrorist attacks, had introduced Shah to Seifullah Chapman in the Washington, D.C.-area, whom Shah understood to be a military trainer and Muslim convert who had traveled to training camps overseas. Chapman was the "white brother" and "white convert" to whom Shah had been referring in his previous conversations with UC-1.

d. Al Mutazzim's martial arts training with Shah ended after the September 11 attacks when the officials at the local mosque in Beacon, New York, where they sometimes practiced, essentially "kicked" them out. Sometime thereafter, Shah learned from a mutual associate that Al Mutazzim had "traveled." Shah interpreted this to mean that Al Mutazzim had been overseas to receive jihad training.

e. Later, when Al Mutazzim returned to the United States in or about 2002, Al Mutazzim mentioned to Shah that he had gone to a camp but did not specify to Shah what camp it had been.

16. On or about May 28, 2005, at the direction of the FBI, Shah made a consensually recorded call to a number Shah had previously used to contact Al Mutazzim. Shah spoke to MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT, a/k/a "Mahmud Al Mutazzim," the defendant, and BRENT agreed to meet with Shah in Maryland.⁶

17. Later on or about May 28, 2005, Shah agreed to travel with FBI agents to the vicinity of Columbia, Maryland, to meet with MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT, a/k/a "Mahmud Al Mutazzim," the defendant. Shah and BRENT met at a hotel in the vicinity of Columbia, Maryland. At the outset of the meeting, BRENT was accompanied by three other individuals who were not present for most of the ensuing meeting. This meeting was monitored and recorded using audio and video surveillance. During the meeting,

⁶ At the time of the calls, Shah was cooperating with the Government. At present, no cooperation agreement exists between Shah and the Government. However, Shah's information has been corroborated by other evidence, including audio recordings and surveillance, which are described herein.

the following, among other things, was discussed in substance between BRENT and Shah:

a. Shah indicated that he wanted to "travel." In response, BRENT replied that his "connections" were "kinda gone," in light of what had been happening in the community and that his only "connect" was "doing time now."⁷

b. BRENT explained that he never really "knew names" since that was the "way that they had it set up" over there and that, at the time he went to the camps, everything was "really organized."

c. BRENT described the difficulties he encountered in reaching the "camps" and the process by which he was able to find a connection to get into the camps, although he told Shah that he would not "mention" his connection's name to Shah.

d. BRENT encouraged Shah to travel overseas to the camps and told Shah that it was a question of "how much" Shah was willing to "sacrifice" and whether Shah was willing to "take a risk."


e. BRENT also explained that watching the videotapes of Muslim brothers "suffering" while he was "up" at Shah's residence (i.e., in Beacon, New York) had an impact on him and that this experience "kind of like pushed me over the, over the edge" about "going there."⁸

f. BRENT explained how difficult it was to make the trip since it was difficult to "trust" people in the current climate and noted that "we don't know who is who," and that "we were not in a position to make new friends."

g. BRENT indicated that he had traveled to Pakistan. When Shah inquired whether BRENT had stayed in the

⁷ As noted above, Seifullah Chapman is serving ~~a sentence of 85 years~~ imprisonment. In addition, approximately ten of Chapman's co-conspirators, who were also members of the Virginia Jihad Network, are currently imprisoned. *an extensive term of 78*

⁸ A search of Shah's Bronx home resulted in the seizure of, among other things, a videotape, which I have reviewed, that details the jihad in Bosnia, glorifies the "martyrs," and seeks additional recruits for "martyrdom" operations.



city, BRENT responded that he had not been in the cities but had been up in the "mountains" training "and stuff" with "the mujahideen, the fighters." BRENT stated that because of "treaties with Bush," it became dangerous for "foreigners," like BRENT, to stay in the camps, and so they moved him around from place to place.

h. BRENT stated that he had agreed to provide whatever "assistance" he could over there and expressed his hope that Allah would bless him for his efforts.

i. BRENT stated that he would never "go back" on his decision to go to the camps and that it was "one of the better decisions in my life."


j. Near the conclusion of the meeting, the three individuals who had accompanied BRENT returned to the meeting location and at least one of the individuals asked Shah about "the doctor" in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Shah proceeded to discuss Sabir's job as a doctor at a military hospital in Saudi Arabia with BRENT and the other individuals present.

18. On or about June 2, 2005, another FBI agent and I interviewed two cooperating witnesses ("CW-1" and "CW-2," respectively) who pled guilty to their crimes based on their involvement with the Virginia Jihad Network and their travel to LET training camps in Pakistan.⁹ Based upon the interview of CW-1 and CW-2, and my review of reports and court documents, I learned the following, among other things:

a. Both CW-1 and CW-2, along with other members of the Virginia Jihad Network, including Seifullah Chapman, Ibrahim Ahmed Al-Hamdi, Randall Todd Royer, and others, participated in paintball training exercises and other tactics training in Virginia in preparation for jihad.

b. Between in or about 2000, up to and including in or about 2001, both CW-1 and CW-2 (and other members of the Virginia Jihad Network, including Seifullah Chapman and Ibrahim Ahmed Al-Hamdi) were given recommendations by Randall Todd Royer, another member of the Virginia Jihad Network who was the first member of the group to obtain entrance into the LET training camp

⁹ CW-1 and CW-2 have provided information and testimony that has been reliable and corroborated by other evidence. Both CW-1 and CW-2 are cooperating with the authorities in the hopes of receiving a reduction of their sentences.



in Pakistan. Subsequently, in or about 2001, both CW-1 and CW-2 traveled separately to the LET training camp in Pakistan. To reach the LET camp, both CW-1 and CW-2 traveled to the city of Lahore, Pakistan, to report to the LET office. After reporting to the office in Lahore, both CW-1 and CW-2 traveled by bus for several hours to the LET camps in the mountains.

c. The training at the LET camp was organized into several phases, including weapons and tactics training, and battlefield commands. CW-1 also indicated that the LET camp divided trainees into several groups, including one group made up of "foreigners." CW-1 indicated that the LET cadre members referred to themselves using "kuniyat" names (or aliases). CW-1 described, in detail, the weapons training that he received at the LET camp and stated that his intent was to use this training to enable CW-1 to travel to Afghanistan to wage jihad.

d. In or about April 2000, Randall Todd Royer entered Pakistan to serve with the Lashkar-e-Taiba at an LET camp in Pakistan.


e. In or about August 2000, Ibrahim Ahmed Al-Hamdi traveled to Pakistan to serve with the Lashkar-e-Taiba at an LET camp in Pakistan.

f. In or about July 2001, Seifullah Chapman traveled to Pakistan to serve with the Lashkar-e-Taiba at an LET camp in Pakistan.

g. Neither CW-1 nor CW-2 are aware of any other training camp that members of the Virginia Jihad Network had "connections" to other than the LET camp in Pakistan.

h. An individual not named as a co-conspirator herein ("Individual-1") who lived in the vicinity of Baltimore, Maryland, also participated in various paintball exercises with CW-1, CW-2 and other members of the Virginia Jihad Network, and participated in discussions among members about jihad and the possibility of traveling to train for jihad at LET training camps in Pakistan.

19. In or about June 2005, I reviewed travel records, including a passport application for "Mahmud Al Mutazzim" and a copy of the United States passport issued to "Mahmud Al Mutazzim." Based upon my review of the passport application, which was dated on or about March 6, 2000, it appears that BRENT requested an expedited passport to travel to a religious conference in Saudi Arabia. In support of his expedited passport



application, BRENT attached a letter of support from Seifullah Chapman, dated on or about March 3, 2000. Further, based upon my review of the passport, it appears that BRENT entered Lahore, Pakistan, on or about February 25, 2002, and departed from Lahore, Pakistan, on or about June 4, 2002.

20. The photograph on the "Mahmud Al Mutazzim" passport depicts the person I know to be MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT, a/k/a "Mahmud Al Mutazzim;" the defendant, from my review of other identification documents, including a Washington, D.C. driver's license and a second United States passport, each of which were issued in the name "Mahmud Faruq Brent," and from my own observations of BRENT. A database search using the Social Security number ("SSN") provided on employment records by "Mahmud Al Mutazzim" reveals that the same SSN has been used in association with both the name "Mahmud Al Mutazzim" and the name "Mahmud Faruq Brent."

21. Based upon my review of the "Mahmud Al Mutazzim" passport and other travel records, I also learned that on or about November 26, 2002, MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT traveled from the United Arab Emirates to the United States on the same flight as Individual-1.

22. Toll and pen register records show at least two telephone calls between telephones used by MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT, a/k/a "Mahmud Al Mutazzim," the defendant, and Seifullah Chapman, in May 2001, approximately two months prior to Chapman's travel to Pakistan to serve with the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Toll and pen register records also show that in or about March 2001, there was a telephone call between telephones used by Ibrahim Ahmed Al-Hamdi and BRENT. In addition, an address book seized from Chapman in July 2003 reflects a Maryland telephone number for "Mahmud Brent." Records for a telephone calling card believed to be used by BRENT reflect this same Maryland telephone number as the originating number for hundreds of telephone calls.

23. On or about June 2, 2005, other law enforcement agents interviewed an official at a medical services company based in Silver Springs, Maryland (the "Medical Services Company"). During this interview, the Medical Services Company official confirmed that between in or about December 2003 up to and including in or about November 2004, MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT, a/k/a "Mahmud Al Mutazzim," the defendant, had been working as a paramedic at the Medical Services Company.

24. On or about June 6, 2005, other FBI agents and I interviewed an individual with ties to the mosque in Beacon, New

York ("Witness-1"). Witness-1 indicated that Shah had conducted martial arts training at the Beacon mosque in or about 2001. Witness-1 also indicated that Shah had invited a male from the Baltimore area to train at the mosque although Witness-1 did not recall the name of this individual. Witness-1 further indicated that, in essence, Shah was asked by officials at the mosque to cease the martial arts training soon after September 11, 2001, because it was inappropriate. Witness-1 was shown surveillance photos of BRENT. He did not recognize BRENT from those photos.

25. On or about June 14, 2005, other FBI agents and I interviewed a second individual with ties to the mosque in Beacon ("Witness-2"). Witness-2 stated that, in or around July 2002, he learned that Shah had sought permission for a person from Baltimore to live at the mosque for a period of time. Witness-2 saw this person with Shah. I showed Witness-2 surveillance photos of MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT, and he identified BRENT as the individual he had seen with Shah at the mosque.

WHEREFORE, deponent prays that an arrest warrant issue for MAHMUD FARUQ BRENT, a/k/a "Mahmud Al Mutazzim," the defendant, and that he be arrested and imprisoned or bailed, as the case may be.



ROBERT FULLER
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Sworn to before me this
3rd day of August, 2005



UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FRANK MAAS
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York